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ABSTRACT
Australia is a federation with a mixed private-public system. Public hospitals and community health
care are the responsibility of states and territories.

Private fee-for-service clinicians and

pharmaceuticals is subsidised by the Commonwealth government via the Medicare Benefit Schedule
(MBS) and Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS). As with other countries, issues of efficiency and
equity are key considerations, with equity issues in Australia confounded by large geographical area
and population distribution.
This study presents a quantitative tool to improve resource distribution for state public health
systems that provide public hospital and community services. The goal is to enable improvements in
health outcomes, promote allocative efficiency and improve equity between geographical regions. A
Health Outcomes Resource Standard (HORSt) is a new population needs-based funding tool that can
inform resource distribution from Australian states to Local Health Networks (LHNs). The aims of the
HORSt are to:
1. Have a parsimonious, measurable and consistent benchmark of desirable health outcomes
approximated by health status for states’ LHNs’ populations relative to funding inputs across the
continuum of care.
2. Identify and incorporate measures of local geographical population health needs into resource
allocation decisions.
3. Identify the share and quantum of taxpayer resources provided by the state to geographical
populations to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care.
The HORSt identifies what the relative share of state health funding should be from the state health
budget for each local population on the basis of need, after Medicare and Pharmaceutical benefits
(Commonwealth public subsidies) are considered.

The HORSt is a tool of outcomes-based

commissioning. The HORSt is intended to be the first step in a broader state health funding model
to inform resource distribution to LHNs, utilising activity-based funding (ABF) as it is presently used
for purchasing facility outputs and a driver of technical efficiency as the second step. This study uses
NSW as a case study.
The HORSt utilises age-standardised Potential Preventable Hospitalisations (PPHs) within
populations as a marker of population health status and proxy of the wellbeing and health outcomes
of the local populations. The HORSt utilises Two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to first
assess the allocative efficiency of the main publicly provided resources across the continuum of care
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amongst 88 small population areas across NSW, to produce benchmarked low (desirable) levels of
age-standardised PPHs. Regression analysis is utilised in the second stage in order to explain the
allocative efficiency for each small population via considering populations’ social determinants of
health.
Predicted allocative efficiency scores for each small area population and the LHNs that they reside
within are then calculated from the regression equation. Health need indices are developed from
these predicted scores relative to their distance from the benchmarked level of allocative efficiency.
The need indices applied to the pool of publicly subsidised funding across the continuum of care
then inform the share of state health funding that ought to be provided to each LHN, to act as a
financial enabler to address populations’ needs arising from social determinants that influence
populations’ health status.
HORSt DEA produces meaningful results for each region’s measured allocative efficiency of health
outcomes taking into account the use of MBS, PBS and state health resources. Populations with the
best and worst health outcomes are amongst those with the highest and lowest rates of allocative
efficiency respectively. The findings from the regression stage successfully predict the measured
allocative efficiency of the DEA, indicating that the most advantageous and disadvantageous social
determinants give rise to the best and worst levels of allocative efficiency of health outcomes.
Significant predictors of each population’s allocative efficiency of health outcomes are:
socioeconomic status; the proportion of the population who are indigenous; and the proportion of
the population who pay out-of-pocket costs (proxy for private service utilisation).
HORSt represents a departure from the standard approach of population needs-based funding
models that have sought to use predictors of utilisation for informing resource distribution, adopting
a risk capitation approach to health needs.

Whilst these models do have their place, the HORSt

demonstrates a viable alternative where enabling equity and improving health outcomes is the key
goal for resource distribution. Population health needs in this context can be better assessed via
considering the measurement of allocative efficiency of a suitable proxy of health outcomes and by
considering the productivity of resource inputs across the continuum of care. Traditional models
make no attempt to consider the productivity of the resource inputs across the continuum of care
and therefore make no attempt to measure allocative efficiency of health outcomes. If the goal of
all health systems is to ultimately improve health outcomes, funding acting as an enabler to do so is
better served by a HORSt to guide resource distribution that makes allocative efficiency and the
determinants for achieving it or restricting it obvious.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.0

INTRODUCTION

This study presents the development of a Health Outcomes Resource Standard (HORSt), a resource
allocation instrument and equity monitor designed to address health inequities evident in
geographical populations’ health status and guide more equitable resource distribution of Australian
states’1 public health funding to their Local Health Networks (LHNs)2, so as to improve health
outcomes of populations. This is a quantitative econometric study that uses the state of New South
Wales (NSW) in 2015/16 as a case study to demonstrate the model.

The current payment3 model employed by states to fund public health services at the local level is
Activity Based Funding (ABF) (Independent Hospital Pricing Authority 2015a). ABF by definition as a
casemix / episode funding model that pays for hospital outputs, informs the comparative technical
efficiency of facilities outputs across LHNs (Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001). However, whilst all
states have embraced ABF as a new payment currency for purchasing hospital activity since
Commonwealth4 health reforms required it from 1 July 2012 (Council of Australian Governments
2011, p. 64; Palmer & Short 2014, p. 108), ABF by its design, is an output-based funding instrument
useful for driving technical efficiency. By design, it does not aim to promote allocative efficiency or
address health inequities that are evident in Australia, such as avoidable illnesses and premature
deaths (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016b).

1

Throughout this thesis, the term ‘state’ means any Australian state or mainland territory of Australia.

2

Regionalised Health Services in states have various different names. In New South Wales, they are known as ‘Local Health

Districts LHDs’; in Queensland ‘Hospital and Health Services’; in South Australia ‘Local Health Networks’; in Victoria Local
Hospital Networks and in Tasmania ‘Tasmanian Health Organisations’ (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a, p.
26). For brevity, this thesis uses the term ‘LHN’ to refer to states’ regional population area health service structures.
3

In NSW the Ministry of Health (MoH) since the commencement of ABF describes the funding model as a “purchasing

model”. However, for all intents and purposes the NSW MoH model is a funding model. The MoH sets activity targets for
every LHD that are ultimately then provided with funds to utilise on the agreed activity volume (Foley 2011, 2012).
4

The term “Commonwealth” refers to the Commonwealth Government of Australia. The Commonwealth is also known as

the Australian Federal Government, or the Australian Government.
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This position has recently been articulated by the Independent Hospitals Pricing Authority (IHPA)
that governs ABF pricing determinations. i.e.:
“Whilst Activity Based Funding models have been effective in driving technical efficiency in the
delivery of public hospital services, the current pricing models designed by IHPA do not necessarily
provide incentives to maximise allocative and dynamic efficiency” (IHPA 2019, p. 30).

Consequently, resource distribution by states to LHNs is not determined by technical efficiency
considerations alone. This is evident by all states, whilst considering population growth, still relying
somewhat largely on using historical determinants, typically previous years casemix activity, as the
starting point in establishing funding distribution to LHNs so as to determine negotiated agreements
with LHNs in relation to how much activity is to be funded (Department of Health and Human
Services Victoria 2014; NSW ABF Taskforce 2013b; Queensland Health 2014; SA Department of
Health and Ageing 2014; System Purchasing and Performance 2013; Western Australia Department
of Health 2014). In the case of NSW, minor equity adjustments, (where population health needs are
expressed as predictors of utilisation) are also made to this starting point (NSW Ministry of Health
2017, p. 50; 2018, p. 23). Once activity targets are established for each LHN, ABF is then used as the
purchasing / funding model within this largely historically determined envelope.

The current funding model from state to regional / local area therefore is made up of two primary
stages:
1. Cost / historical activity adjusted for population growth factors determines the funding
envelope (activity targets) distributed from the State to LHN; and
2. ABF used to purchase facility-based services with the region/ local area.
Both stages ultimately focus on funding and purchasing outputs within the state health system. In
doing so they do not consider the productivity contributions and allocative efficiency of publicly
subsidised funding inputs across the continuum of care within Australia’s mixed private / public
health system for achieving desirable health outcomes.

This thesis develops the HORSt not to be a comprehensive public health funding model for
Australian states. The goal is the development of a tool that can be used by states as the first step in
a two-step funding model as a population needs-based resource distribution enabler to promote
equity and allocative efficiency.
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Specifically, the HORSt as the first step will identify the total share of public funding that should be
provided to each LHN from the state budget with respect to:


the pool of public resources consumed by each LHNs populations across the continuum
of care including state health public hospital funding and Commonwealth public
subsidisation for private services and pharmaceuticals under the Medicare Benefits
Schedule (MBS) and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS);



the productivity of the pool of these public resources to achieve allocatively efficient
benchmarked health outcomes, approximated by variables of population health status;
and



population health needs expressed by populations’ capacity to benefit from resourcing
to achieve the benchmarked efficient outcomes.

In this regard the HORSt as the first step replaces the reliance on historical funding and activity to
allocate funds from the state to LHNs. It also positions public funding between the state and LHNs
as a residual needs adjusted public funding component of the continuum of care which promotes
equity and allocative efficiency.

The scope of this research only addresses step one. It does not address issues relating to the ABF
model that informs the second step. Nonetheless the compatibility between the HORSt and ABF is
examined and verified in the literature review in Chapter Two. ABF is left unchanged in its role as
the second step. The funding shares from the first step can be expressed in either dollars or ABF
volume. Furthermore, the HORSt acting as the starting point in a broader funding model does not
seek to incorporate supply side cost issues or adjust for patient flows between LHNs. Both aspects
are however important and a discussion of these issues in union with ABF is provided in the
concluding chapter. The HORSt also has the potential as a distribution tool for Commonwealth to
the States with IHPA translating the HORSt quantum into NWAUs. This is also discussed in the
conclusion.

Cognisant of the interactions of the continuum of care and social determinants that give rise to
health outcomes, the HORSt uses measures of population health status that reflect burden of
disease to proxy health outcomes at the population level. As such, the HORSt is not specifically
designed to inform equity adjustments for specific health program areas, or for specific health
interventions, treatments, or procedures.
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1.1

SUMMARY OF INNOVATIONS AND UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS

The HORSt is specifically designed to address health inequities by considering each LHN’s
populations’ capacity to benefit from taxpayer funded health resources. Uniquely it does so by
examining the social determinants of health that give rise to health inequities evident in health
outcomes (approximated by a measure of population health status) and by considering the
interaction of these social determinants with the allocative efficiency of the bulk of taxpayer
resources provided to local populations across the continuum of care.

This methodological

approach is unique and thus the study makes an important contribution to knowledge.

The resources included across the continuum of care are Australian Government funding of the
Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS) and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and NSW public
state health resources (funded by the Australian Government and State Governments). At the time
of the study, according to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), these resources
constituted $105.8 billion in 2016, representing 62% of total health expenditure in Australia and 92%
of total governments tax payer funded health expenditure (Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare 2017a, pp. 22-30).

The HORSt represents a departure from mainstream health reform and state health funding models
in Australia that have largely focused on improving the technical efficiency of hospital outputs
(Bennett 2012; Paterson 2002, p. 313). The HORSt places emphasis on the allocatively efficient and
equitable achievement of improving health outcomes and does so by not violating any regulatory or
constitutionally prescribed arrangements that exist under Australia’s federation.

In terms of innovation, the development of the HORSt in this thesis makes a number of unique
contributions. In summary, the HORSt as a state public health funding tool is the first of its kind to:
1. consider and enumerate the productivity of the bulk of taxpayer resources across the
continuum of care;
2. recognize in a mixed private / public system, state health funding as component of an
integrated health care system and not a standalone silo of publicly provided services;
3. measure and use the relative allocative efficiency of the main taxpayer provided and
subsidised resources across the continuum of care to produce desirable health
outcomes to represent a benchmark;
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4. represent population health needs in the context of populations’ capacity to benefit to
achieve benchmarked health outcomes; and
5. enumerate what the state health system should distribute to local populations to
achieve funding equity aligned to population needs and with respect to public
subsidisation across the continuum of care.
The methodology employed in developing the HORSt also represents a unique contribution to the
literature of population needs-based funding models in health care. The HORSt utilises Two-stage
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a linear programming econometric tool which assesses efficiency
and then uses robust regression to assess variables that can best explain the efficiency (Fatimah &
Mahmudah 2017, pp. 1,974).

Contextualised to the HORSt, the DEA will measure for 88 small populations across NSW the
allocative efficiency of taxpayer resources across the continuum of care to achieve desirable levels of
health outcomes. Populations that are found to be allocatively efficient determine the benchmark.

Having established the benchmark, the second stage uses predictive regression techniques to
develop need indices for populations across NSW. The regression identifies social determinants of
health that predict each population’s ability / inability to achieve the benchmark. Need indices are
informed by each population’s predicted allocative efficiency to that of the benchmark population.
Need indices are an expression of vertical equity and are then used to inform shares of funding
resources between the State and the LHNs with respect to the pool of resources (MBS, PBS and state
health). The State resource distribution to LHNs are a residual given that MBS and PBS resources are
not distributable.

1.2

STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS

This thesis is organised into seven chapters.

Chapter 1 - Introduction
Prior to outlining the specific aims and research questions for this study, the first chapter provides
an overview of the rationale and background supporting the development of the HORSt. This
chapter also provides a broad overview of the Australian health care system in terms of health
outcomes, health inequalities and health inequities. An outline of the governance and funding
distributions of public health funded and taxpayer subsidised health funding in Australia is provided.
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The chapter concludes by outlining the study’s scope and contextual information about the NSW
health system, used as a case study, relevant to the time of the study.

Chapter 2 - Literature review
The second chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to the development of the HORSt.
Specifically, the concepts of equity and efficiency contextualised to theories of social justice and
public health funding models and the Australian health care system are examined. The effectiveness
of public health funding models used in Australian states and their ability to promote equity and
efficiency are reviewed and contextualised to the literature.

International approaches to

regionalised resource allocation models are critiqued along with methodological approaches
employed to represent population health needs and health outcomes.

Alternative resource

distribution methodologies and measures of need from the education sector are also considered.
The gaps and limitations of previous research are highlighted and examined in the context of
opportunities for this study and summarised. The chapter concludes by outlining the conceptual
framework derived from the literature that supports the methodological design of the HORSt and
the study’s research questions.

Chapter 3 – Governance and funding arrangements review
Chapter Three is a review of the governance and funding arrangements of the Australian Health Care
system that were briefly introduced in Chapter One. This chapter is important for the HORSt as it
examines the extent to which equity and efficiency are promoted within each layer of publicly
provided and subsidised health care in the Australian health care system. Relevant legislative issues
that bound the Australian federal system of government are outlined.

Drawing upon the conceptual framework established via the literature review, each layer of funding
is assessed for theoretical and practical inclusion in the development of the HORSt methodology so
as to recognize the productivity contributions of resourcing across the continuum of care to the
achievement of health outcomes. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates that state health resource
distribution not only has a role to provide public health services but can act as residual funding
enabler to correct for inequities and allocative inefficiency that is exacerbated by Commonwealth
provided public subsidisation and constitutionally protected private practice.
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Chapter 4 - Methodology
Chapter Four outlines the methods applied in the development of the HORSt.

This chapter

commences with detailing the ethics approval undertaken for the thesis. Guided by the conceptual
framework developed from gaps and limitations revealed in the literature review and issues
surrounding the governance and funding arrangements, the methodology is justified and outlined in
alignment with the thesis aims and research questions.

The nature of the research construct and quantitative approach is then justified along with the
specific econometric methodology used in this thesis being Two-Stage DEA. This involves:
1. DEA for establishing benchmarked allocative efficient health outcomes; and
2. Robust regression as a predictive methodology for identifying social determinants /
health needs that give rise to the allocative efficiency of health outcomes.
The Two Stage DEA methodology employed represents the first two stages in the development of
the HORSt. A third stage is outlined for the HORSt being the process of developing from the DEA and
regression results, health need indices for each of the 88 populations defined by the Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data structures of the 15 NSW LHNs. The process for calculating LHN
shares of resources and informing resource distribution to meet local health needs is then
prescribed.

Chapter 5 – Data sources
Chapter Five outlines and justifies the data sources to be used with the methodology. This chapter
first describes and justifies the ABS 88 small area populations within the 15 NSW LHNs to be used in
the analysis subject to data availability. Variables to be included in the DEA are then presented and
validated. Finally, variables for assessment in the regression are examined and outlined. This
chapter also includes quality assurance processes undertaken for data extractions and provides
descriptive data analysis of key variables to be included.

Chapter 6 - Results
The sixth chapter presents the results for each of the 88 NSW populations from the analysis. First
the results of the DEA are validated as meaningful representations of the benchmarked allocative
efficient health outcomes. The regression analysis results are then presented and are shown to
demonstrate realistic predictors of the DEA results. The derived health needs indices are then
confirmed as understandable and logical indicators commensurate with relative health needs of the
NSW population’s and LHN’s. The results for each NSW LHNs health needs share of funding is then
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calculated. These show the funding adjustments required from the state with respect to the pool of
resources included in this study across the continuum of care to enable equity improvements. A
comparison to current share of funding provided to LHNs for admitted and non-admitted activity in
NSW is presented and examined.

Chapter 7 - Conclusions
The final chapter revisits the research questions of the thesis. Each of the aims and research
questions are answered. The unique and significant contributions achieved in the research is
outlined. Strengths and limitations of the research are highlighted. A discussion of the practical
application for the HORSt is provided.

1.3

RATIONALE / BACKGROUND

The justification for developing a HORSt for Australian States is four-fold with evidence
demonstrating that:
1

Health inequities, much of which are socially determined, exist in Australia and can be
addressed;

2

The distribution of publicly funded and publicly subsidised health care in Australia is
inequitable and can be improved;

3

State health funding models, irrespective of ABF, still use elements of historical funding that
does not advance equity or efficiency; and

4

Previous resource distribution models seeking to address need emphasised horizontal equity
(equality in funding access expressed by health system use) rather than vertical equity and
health needs expressed in terms of capacity to benefit.

These issues are now introduced. A fuller examination of these issues in the development of the
conceptual framework that underpins this research methodology is provided in the literature
review in Chapter Two and in the review of governance and funding arrangements in Chapter
Three.

1.3.1 Health inequities in Australia
In Australia significant health inequities exist for: people of lower socioeconomic status; the
Indigenous population; people living with disabilities; rural and remote communities; and migrants
with low levels of English. Inequities take the form of preventable illnesses and premature deaths
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(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016b, pp. 29-32; Turrell et al. 2006). The World Health
Organisation (WHO) defines health inequities as:
“avoidable inequalities in health between groups of people within countries and
between countries.

These inequities arise from inequalities within and between

societies. Social and economic conditions and their effects on people’s lives determine
their risk of illness and the actions taken to prevent them becoming ill or treat illness
when it occurs” (Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008a, emphasis not
added).

The socially produced factors underpinning health status that give rise to health inequities are
significant. A large body of international literature considers that the social and economic conditions
in which people are born, live and work are the single most important determinants of health status
(Aberg Yngwe et al. 2003; Case et al. 2008; Case et al. 2007; Chan 2008; Choi et al. 2015; Commission
on Social Determinants of Health 2008b; Khanam et al. 2009; Satcher 2010; Theodossiou &
Zangelidis 2009).

Sir Michael Marmot (2016) maintains that often in Australia there is a tendency to see health
inequities as confined to the appallingly poor health of Indigenous Australians, whilst the reality is
that people in the middle of the social hierarchy will have fewer years of healthy life than those at
the top and those at the bottom have worse health than those in the middle. Moreover, for many
people who are socioeconomically disadvantaged, multiple combinations of the attributes that are
associated with health inequities often apply (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a;
Health Policy Analysis 2014b). Problematically and somewhat compounding this issue in Australia is
that a recent study of intergenerational mobility found that Australians have a restricted ability to
improve upon the socioeconomic status of their family and that in an international context, Australia
has a relatively low rate of socioeconomic mobility (Mendolia & Siminski 2015). Given this, there is a
risk that health inequities can become entrenched within lower socioeconomic segments of the
Australian community.

The study will explicitly target the improvement of health inequities, by considering the
influence of measurable social determinants of health upon proxies of population health status.
Variables representing population health status are examined and justified for inclusion in the
HORSt in the literature review.
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1.3.2 Inequitable distribution of and access to publicly funded and publicly subsidised
health care in Australia.
Outside of public hospitals, the availability, distribution and financial accessibility of medical services
are dominated by private doctors free to set their own fees (Johar et al. 2016). These fees are part
taxpayer funded by Medicare rebates, with patients liable for any co-payments of fees that exceed
the rebates (Department of Health and Ageing 2009, p. 7). Private doctors’ rights of private practice
are guaranteed by the Australian Constitution (Australian Senate 1946; Faunce 2009; Scully 2009).

In Australia, the financial and geographical access to health services can create health inequities
(Duckett & Griffiths 2016a, p. 4; Turrell et al. 2006) and there is well established evidence that
access to these services is more abundant in more affluent areas where doctors choose to live and
work (Bickerdyke et al. 2002, p. 85; Eckermann & Sheridan 2016; McRae & Butler 2014, p. 281).
There is also evidence of people forgoing treatment due to unaffordability of out-of-pocket costs
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018c, 2018e; Duckett et al. 2014; Scott 2016; Sweet
2012).

A fairer distribution of taxpayer funded resources that seeks to consider the social

determinants of health that give rise to inequities, is warranted, along with improving the financial
access. Reducing health inequities improves well-being and opportunity, promotes social cohesion
and inclusion, increases workforce participation and productivity, helps to overcome other forms of
disadvantage and reduces health system costs (Brown et al. 2012; Duckett & Griffiths 2016a, p. 4).

In developing the HORSt, the study will consider the total taxpayer funded resources spent on
per capita basis on people in each LHN across the continuum of care. Adjustments to the state
health budget allocation to each LHN will be guided by meeting the resourcing requirements to
address health care needs in order to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of
care.

1.3.3 State health funding models reliance upon elements of historical funding
Due to the large size of the physical geography of Australia, most states, commencing with NSW in
1973, regionalised their public health care services to best provide care close to different regional
populations (Eagar et al. 2001, p. 29; Palmer & Short 2014, p. 96). Regionalisation is an important
principle of empowering local populations for decision-making regarding their own health care. The
National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA) of 2011 made it mandatory for all Australian states to
have LHNs by 1 July 2011 (Council of Australian Governments 2011, p. 5; Palmer & Short 2014, p.
97). Regionalisation of state health services requires states to utilise funding models to provide
resources to LHNs. This distribution, between state government and LHNs, is the focus of this thesis.
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The basis of service level agreements between the state and LHNs is largely historically determined
by previous years’ activity. Once this funding envelope is determined, ABF is used to purchase
services from facilities within LHNs (Department of Health and Human Services Victoria 2014; NSW
ABF Taskforce 2013b; Queensland Health 2014; SA Department of Health and Ageing 2014; System
Purchasing and Performance 2013; Western Australia Department of Health 2014).

Historical

funding is regressive, stymies innovation and does not advance improvements in health outcomes
(Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001; Hindle 2002).

Output-basedfinding models, such as ABF, promote technical efficiency, but create incentives to
overproduce in that they fund utilisation and not need (Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001, p. 78).
As such they cannot be used to establish appropriate resource distribution. The use of historical
determinants to do so makes this evident.

The HORSt seeks to inform per capita resourcing on a health needs basis of geographical
populations.

Aggregated at the LHN level, this can inform resource distribution to meet

population needs, ending the reliance on historical funding.

1.3.4 Previous resource distribution models - equality in funding access
Barr et al. (2014), Carr-Hill (1994), Carr-Hill and Sheldon (1992), Mooney (2009), Mooney et al.
(1991) and Sheldon et al. (1993) find that the definition of health needs used in population needsbased resource allocation models has been all too often described in terms of health care utilisation
and equity is achieved via providing equal access for equal need. These authors all concluded that
these models have not sufficiently considered different populations’ capacity to benefit from
different resources and underrepresents unmet need by those who do not / cannot access the
health system. Contrastingly, population health needs within the HORSt will be informed by vertical
equity financial loadings, which reflect different geographical populations’ capacity to benefit from
resources subject to how the social determinants of health for these populations affect comparative
rates of health outcomes.

1.4

AIMS OF THE STUDY

Specifically, there are three broad aims of the study that contribute to the development of the
HORSt:
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1.

Develop the HORSt as a parsimonious, measurable and consistent benchmark of desirable
health outcomes for states’ LHNs’ populations, relative to funding inputs across the
continuum of care, so as to promote allocative efficiency and equity across populations.

2. Identify and incorporate measures of local geographical population health needs that can be
used in resource allocation decisions.
3. Identify the share and quantum of taxpayer resources provided by the state to geographical
populations to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care, in order to
act as an enabler to improve equity of health outcomes.

1.5

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions for this study are best organised under its aims.

AIM 1: Develop the HORSt as a parsimonious, measurable and consistent benchmark of desirable
health outcomes for states’ LHNs’ populations, relative to funding inputs across the continuum of
care, so as to promote allocative efficiency and equity across populations.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
1. What measures / data of health status can best represent an acceptable level of desirable
health outcomes for populations that can inform a benchmark?
2. What health service funding inputs should be included to represent the continuum of care?
3. What methodology should be applied to derive the benchmark?

AIM 2: Identify and incorporate measures of local geographical population health needs that can be
used in resource allocation decisions.
RESEARCH QUESTION:
4. What are appropriate measures of population need that could be applied to support the
HORSt?
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AIM 3: Identify the share and quantum of taxpayer resources provided by the state to geographical
populations to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care so as to act as an
enabler to improve equity of health outcomes.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
5. What share of funding is required for each geographical population to adjust for population
health needs so as to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care?
6. What quantum of funding is required to be adjusted by the state from the existing pool of
resources used by each geographical population?
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1.6

OVERVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

This section provides background to the Australian Health Care System, outlining an overview of the
funding and governance arrangements of the governments, providers and consumers. Health
outcomes and health inequality in the Australian health care system are also discussed and
contextualised to the rationale presented supporting the development of the HORSt.

A

comprehensive critique of the specific funding and governance arrangements pertinent to the
advancement of equity and efficiency and legislative issues that can affect the development of the
HORSt is provided in Chapter Three.

1.6.1 Overview of Funding and Governance arrangements
The provision of health services in Australia is a mix of public and private arrangements (Eagar et al.
2001, p. 26; Lairson et al. 1995, p. 475). Medical practitioners, excluding salaried staff in state-run
public hospitals and community public health services, are entrepreneurial private operators and are
free to set their own charges (Gadiel 2015, p. 1) and their rights of private practice and location of
practice are constitutionally protected (Australian Senate 1946; Faunce 2009). Private services
outside of state-run public hospitals and community-based services can attract out-of-pocket
expenses to be paid by the user (Department of Human Services 2015).

The complexity of health funding and provider arrangements in Australia is summarised in Figure 1
(page 16). The origins of the complexity of funding and the mixed public private health care system
arise from the federated system of government established by the Australian Constitution in 1901
and successive political reforms spanning from 1938 to the present day (Boxall & Gillespie 2013, pp.
ix - x).

The contemporary roles of the Commonwealth and states as a funder or provider of health care can
be summarised as follows:


Commonwealth funding partially supports each state’s public system; subsidises drugs via
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and subsidises the private sector via; Medicare
Benefits Schedule (MBS) payments to medical practitioners; and via the Private Health
Insurance (PHI) rebate.



States provide funding and administration to public hospitals and community health
services.
(Palmer & Short 2014, pp. 81-2)
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Moreover, the Commonwealth and states share funding arrangements for the National Disability
Insurance Scheme (NDIS) (National Disability Insurance Agency 2017). Contributions are expected to
be almost equal shares (Norman 2017).

Universal public access via Medicare ensures that access to public hospitals is provided at no cost to
public patients for Australian citizens and eligible residents. Medicare provides universal insurance
for full or partial reimbursement of medical practitioners’ fees, subject to:


the Medicare reimbursement schedule;



the type of practitioner; and



the modality of the service; and safety nets.

The subsidisation of pharmaceutical costs through the PBS is provided for Medicare eligible patients
(Department of Human Services 2015).
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Figure 1 Structure of the Australian Health Care system and its flow of funds

From Health Expenditure Australia 2015-16 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a, p. 3)

Page 16

Private Health Insurance (PHI) is available for purchase to assist with the reimbursement of out-ofpocket expenses in private hospitals and for other medical services not covered by Medicare.
Premiums are subsidised by the Commonwealth government via a rebate according to individual
incomes (Palmer & Short 2014, pp. 11-2).

Commonwealth and state governments contribute taxpayer funds to public state health care
services, predominantly public hospitals, with minor payments made by private health insurers and
other revenue sources (Palmer & Short 2014, pp. 12-3). The largest component of Australia’s health
expenditure is state-run public hospitals, which represents approximately one third of the total
Australian health expenditure(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016c, p. 41). Of this
expenditure, state governments contribute the majority of funding (54% in 2013-14), with the
Commonwealth the next largest source of funding (37% in 2013-14) (Australian Institute of Health
and Welfare 2016a, p. 38).

The nature of the health care system being either publicly funded by the taxpayer or taxpayer
subsidised gives rise to questions of how funding is distributed for health care and whether or not
this distribution is equitable amongst the population, so as to promote improvements in health
outcomes. The distribution of taxpayer funded, or taxpayer subsidised services happen at multiple
layers in the health system. For example: from Commonwealth to the states; from Commonwealth
to private doctors; from Commonwealth to private health insurance holders; from Commonwealth
to private individuals; and from states to regionalised areas (LHNs). Determining an equitable
distribution between state government and LHNs, with respect to the allocative efficiency of the
main sources of government funding across the whole continuum of care to produce health
outcomes is the focus of this thesis.

1.6.2 Health outcomes, health inequality and health inequities in Australia
The Australian health care system is one of the most effective health care systems in the world. Life
expectancy in Australia is higher than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) average. Figure 2 on page 18 shows that the life expectancy at birth for children born in
Australia in 2016 was the equal sixth highest amongst OECD nations, 82.5 years, equal to that of
Israel and Norway, behind Luxembourg 82.8 years, Italy 83.3 years, Spain 83.4 years, Switzerland
83.7 years and Japan 84.1 years (OECD 2019).
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Figure 2 Life expectancy at birth 2016

Figure 2 was constructed using data generated from the OECD online database OECD Health Statistics: Health status – life expectancy at birth indicator
(OECD 2019).
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Figure 3 Life expectancy in years and health spending per capita 2016
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Figure 3 was constructed utilising the data from OECD Health Statistics: Health status – life
expectancy at birth indicator (OECD 2019) and published OECD statistics pertaining to health
expenditure in the publication Health at a Glance 2017 (OECD 2017a, p. 30).

In addition to superior life expectancy of Australians, the Australian health care system is also one of
the most efficient systems in the world. Figure 3 on page 20 shows that in 2016 using USD
purchasing power parity (PPP) the cost per capita of health spending in Australia, correlated to life
expectancy, is substantially lower than many other OECD nations that have higher costs and / or
lower life expectancy (OECD 2017a, 2019).

Whilst OECD statistics show that the average Australian enjoys comparative health outcomes that
are the envy of many other nations, gains in health outcomes are not shared equally amongst the
population. In Australia significant health inequities exist for people of lower socioeconomic status;
the Indigenous population; people living with disabilities; rural and remote communities; and
migrants with low levels of English (Allan et al. 2007; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
2016a; NSW Department of Health 2004; Palmer & Short 2014; Turrell et al. 2006).

Australia’s biennial report card “Australia’s Health 2016” (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
2016a, p. 518) highlights the following contemporary examples of health inequalities in Australia. As
per Marmot’s argument discussed (p9), these are not confined to the Indigenous population and
most of these are in fact health inequities, meeting all definitional criteria of being socially produced,
systematic in their unequal distribution across the population, avoidable and unfair. Examples from
the report card include:


“20% of Australians living in the lowest socioeconomic areas in 2014–15 were 1.6 times as
likely as the highest 20% to have at least two chronic health conditions;



Australians living in the lowest socioeconomic areas lived about 3 years less than those living
in the highest areas in 2009–2011;



If all Australians had the same death rates as people living in the highest socioeconomic
areas in 2009–2011, overall mortality rates would have reduced by 13%—and there would
have been 54,000 fewer deaths;



People in low economic resource households spend proportionally less on medical and
health care than other households (3.0% and 5.1% of weekly equalised expenditure,
respectively, in 2009–10); and
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People living in the lowest socioeconomic areas in 2014–15 were more than twice as likely
to delay seeing—or not see—a dental professional due to cost compared with those living in
the highest socioeconomic areas (28% compared with 12%)”

(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a, p. 130).
Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs) also known as conditions that are Potential
Preventable Hospitalisations (PPHs) are further markers of health inequality. PPHs5 are conditions
that are deemed to be treatable in an ambulatory care setting. When evident in hospital inpatient
data, the literature has long considered them as a proxy of potentially preventable illness and
avoidable hospitalisations (Ansari et al. 2006; Falster et al. 2016; Longman et al. 2011; Longman et
al. 2015; Victorian Health Information Surveillance System 2016). However, more contemporary
Australian evidence has concluded that PPHs represent sicker patients (Falster et al. 2015; Falster et
al. 2016).

Whilst the social causes of poor health evident in Australia are beyond the remit of the health
system alone, the challenge of addressing health inequities can be nonetheless influenced by the
distribution of taxpayer provided and taxpayer subsidised health funding to enable improvements in
health outcomes. This study seeks to improve resource distribution to alleviate inequities and
enable better health outcomes.

1.6.3 Time Frame for the case study
Population needs-based resource distribution tools typically use secondary data sources, such as
census data, to develop need indices that inform resource distribution. These are designed to be
stable enough to use for multiple years resource distribution and updates to need indices typically
occur when new census / population data becomes available

(Inter-Government & Funding

Strategies 2005b; Rice & Smith 2001). The HORSt need indices that this research will develop using
similar secondary data sources are also designed to be stable enough to inform multiple individual
years resource distribution. For the purposes of the developing this research, in addition to using
the latest census data, the HORSt uses three years of hospital and expenditure data to 2015/16 and
measures of central tendency justified in Chapter Five to demonstrate a proof of concept model for
2015/16. Some geographical data structures used are from earlier years using official Government
sources. However, these are still relevant and do not affect the outcomes of the model. Chapter

5

For the remained of this thesis the term PPH will be used.
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Five outlines and justifies all the data used in the model. As a proof of concept, the HORSt can be
applied to later years’ data. A discussion of operationalising the HORSt to do so is included in the
discussion in the final chapter.

1.6.4 Regionalised health structures in Australian states at the time of the study
The organisation of regionalised services within states is a significant factor for this study. Aspects of
physical and human geography in the context of resource distribution and the advancement of
equity and efficiency require consideration.

A contemporary summary of the structure of

regionalised services within states in 2016 is summarised in Table 1.

Table 1 exemplifies the diversity amongst states in regionalising health services.

To put this

regionalisation into context, the human and physical geography size of each state is summarised in
Table 2.
Table 1

Regional organisation of health services in Australia in 2016

State

Networks / Districts / Services

NSW

15 LHNs + 3 Speciality Networks + I Contracted Service Division

Victoria

88 LHNs (Local Hospital Networks)

Queensland

19 Hospitals and Health Services

Tasmania

1 THS (Tasmanian Health Service) -2016 previously had Tasmanian Health
Organisations (THOs)

South Australia

5 LHNs (Local Health Networks

Western Australia

5 Health Services + 1 Notional Local Health Network + 1 Speciality service

Northern Territory

2 Health Services (Top End Health Service + Central Australia Health
Service)

Australian Capital Territory

1 Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Local Hospital Network Directorate

Table 1 sources: (Administrator National Health Funding Pool 2016b; Department of Health and
Human Services Tasmania 2015)
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Table 2

Human and physical geography of states

State

Area square

%

Population

‘000’

% of Australian

kms

Australian

estimate

2016

population

land mass

June

NSW

800,642

10.41%

7,725.9

32.0%

Victoria (VIC)

227,416

2.96%

6068.0

25.2%

Queensland (QLD)

1,730,648

22.50%

4,844.5

20.1%

Tasmania (TAS)

68,401

0.89%

519.1

2.2%

South Australia (SA)

983,482

12.79%

1,708.2

7.1%

Western Australia (WA)

2,529,875

32.89%

2,617.2

10.8%

Northern Territory (NT)

1,349,129

17.54%

244.9

1.0%

Australian Capital Territory

2,431

0.03%

396.1

1.6%

Table 2 sources: (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016a; Geoscience Australia 2017).

Comparing the data from both tables shows that ACT with the smallest physical geography and
population has just one service, the NT the third largest in physical size with the second smallest
population, spread the most sparsely, has two. NSW has a third of the Australian population and
10% of the land mass and 15 LHNs, whilst Western Australia has 11% of the population and a third of
the land and 5 Health Services. Seemingly an anomaly compared to other states regionalised health
structures, Victoria with just 3% of the land mass is the most regionalised and decentralised with 88
local hospital networks. Hospital networks are an apt description for Victorian regionalisation where
each ‘network’ is effectively just a hospital and community health services are separately managed
(Administrator National Health Funding Pool 2016b).

Given the literature demonstrating the differing effects of social determinants on health outcomes,
it is logical to consider that differences in urbanisation, rurality, population size and socioeconomic
composition and regionalised health structures between states, will likely result in a tool like the
HORSt having different levels of relevance for regional resource distribution to improve health
inequalities and inequities. The HORSt is logically going to be more applicable in states and
territories that face more dispersed and socioeconomically different populations, where inequalities
and inequities are more apparent and where the supply of services are scarcer.
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NSW has a large remote geographical area, one third of the Australian population and also has one
third of the Australian Indigenous population (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014a). By
contrast, Victoria has a mix of well-populated metropolitan and regional areas, little land classified
as remote, no land classified as very remote and whilst having 25% of the Australian population, it
has only 3% of the Australian Indigenous population (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
2014a).

Figure 4 illustrates remoteness in Australia. NSW, Queensland, the Northern Territory, Western
Australia and South Australia have areas of remoteness that are not evident in Victoria or Tasmania.
Figure 4 Remoteness map of Australia

Figure 4 is adapted from the 2011 Australian Statistical Geography Standard: Remoteness Structure
Map (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011, p. 2).

1.6.5

The NSW public health system at the time of the study

According to the 2015-16 NSW Health annual report, the NSW Health is the largest health care
system in Australia and one of the largest in the world with 111,000 staff servicing 7.7 million people
and administering a $20.7bn budget. The overarching key directions for the NSW public health
system at the time of the study were:
• keeping people healthy and out of hospital;
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• providing world-class clinical care; and
• delivering truly integrated care
(NSW Ministry of Health 2016, p. 2).

As discussed, the regionalised structure of NSW Health involves 15 LHNS which are depicted in the
map in Figure 5.
Figure 5 NSW LHNs at the time of the case study 2016

Source: (Epidemiology and Evidence 2015).

The NSW funding model for each region is expressed through individual service level agreements
between the NSW Ministry of Health and each LHN. The majority of each LHN’s operating revenue,
(budget), is expressed in National Weighted Activity Units (NWAUs) which are multiplied by a state
price per NWAU to determine the activity budget for Acute, Emergency Department, Sub Acute and
Non-Acute Services, Acute Mental Health and Non admitted services. The determination of each
LHNs activity is by default the primary instrument of resource distribution between the NSW State
Government and regional areas (NSW ABF Taskforce 2013b; NSW Ministry of Health 2017).

The annual volume of services for each LHN (called an activity target) is largely determined on
historical factors of the previous year’s activity and population growth subject to adjustors. The
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official NSW Ministry of Health statements to the Administrator of the National Health Funding Pool
of how targets are to be formed confirm this, i.e. in the context of setting targets NSW reports:
“Provisional estimates and historical activity measures provide the basis for discussions with
individual LHNs and subsequent negotiations for approval or adjustment” (Administrator National
Health Funding Pool 2016a).

However, further statements provide a perspective that population health needs are more widely
considered than history i.e.:
“Ensuring access to health services for local populations is a key objective of NSW health policy. The
Health Services Act 1997 stipulates that in determining LHN budgets, the Minister have regard to the
size and health needs of the local population and provision of services to residents outside the local
area. Accordingly, targets are adjusted considering factors appropriate to each LHN and service
type, rather than simple extrapolation from historical activity data. The factors considered are
reviewed on an annual basis” (Administrator National Health Funding Pool 2016a).

The emphasis of the latter statement regarding the importance of population health needs in setting
LHN activity targets in NSW requires examination. When the factors used for establishing NSW LHN
activity target setting and their contributions to setting the target were assessed by the MoH, equity
plays a minor role and is offset against performance negative adjustors. In 2015/16 adjustors and
their contributions to LHN activity targets were as follows:


Weighted population change -population growth component (44%);



Activity trend -historical activity (28%);



Readmission within 28 days -performance adjustment (5%);



Potentially Preventable Hospitalisations -performance adjustment (5%);



Expected Health Utilisation Index (EHUI / HNI) Health needs / equity adjustment only
applied as a positive adjustor should the current relative utilisation (RU) rate is less than
the HNI which itself is a utilisation index (16%);



LHN Specific adjustments (2%).

(Foley 2012; NSW Ministry of Health 2017; Slater 2014).

Higher rates of readmissions within 28 days of discharge; higher rates of Potentially Preventable
Hospitalisations (PPHs); and higher rates of current relative utilisation that exceed the health needs
index, are all negative adjustors in determining the target (NSW Ministry of Health 2017). However,
given the abundant literature on these adjustors being strongly influenced by social determinants
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(Kangovi & Grande 2011; Kansagara et al. 2011; Kirby, S et al. 2010; Kirby, SE et al. 2010; Mele et al.
2018) and therefore beyond the control of health care facilities and LHNs, the use of these elements
as a punitive measure is questionable. In fact, it is logical considering the weight of this evidence
and the linking of social determinants with health outcomes that doing so exacerbates inequity.

Table 3 on page 28 demonstrates at the time of the case study, NSW Health reported that the
volume and cost of activity for LHN populations across inpatient and non-admitted programs to be
valued at $12.5 billion. The table shows the majority of this activity (91%) was funded under ABF,
however some small-scale facilities within some LHNs, primarily rural ones, were funded by block
grants and other sources. This table will be a component of the pool of resources to be redistributed
to LHNs under the HORSt:


after the productivity of these resources in conjunction with resources from the MBS
and PBS are assessed for their contributions to allocative efficiency of achieving
benchmarked health outcomes; and



with respect to social determinants within the populations that influence the
achievement of the benchmark.
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Table 3

2015-16 total costs of NSW LHN populations’ public admitted and non-admitted activity by LHN of residence

Acute
LHN Of Usual
Residence

Funded by
ABF
Block
Central Coast
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Far West
Other
Total
ABF
Hunter New
Block
England
Other
Total
ABF
Illawarra/
Block
ShoalHaven
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Mid North Coast
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Murrumbidgee
Other
Total
ABF
Nepean Blue
Block
Mountains
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Northern NSW
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Northern Sydney
Other
Total
ABF
South Eastern Block
Sydney
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Southern NSW
Other
Total
ABF
South Western Block
Sydney
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Sydney
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Western NSW
Other
Total
ABF
Block
Western Sydney
Other
Total
ABF
Block
NSW
Other
Total

Acute MH
(Mental
Health)

410
0
0
411
32
2
0
33
869
57
0
925
444
8
0
452
286
13
0
299
199
53
0
252
327
0
0
328
301
4
0
305
562
10
0
572
694
2
3
698
159
11
0
170
902
0
0
902
508
2
0
509
331
43
0
374
774
0
1
776
6,796
205
4
7,006

26
0
0
26
3
0
0
3
63
1
0
64
31
0
0
32
23
0
0
24
11
1
0
12
26
1
0
27
23
0
0
23
52
5
0
57
49
1
3
53
14
1
0
15
56
1
0
58
45
0
0
45
9
19
0
28
40
21
2
63
472
52
5
529

ED

80
0
0
81
10
1
0
11
185
32
0
216
97
8
0
105
64
4
0
68
43
36
0
79
68
0
0
68
93
3
0
96
124
0
0
124
153
0
0
153
46
7
0
53
168
0
0
169
100
0
0
101
78
20
0
97
152
0
0
153
1,462
112
0
1,574

Clinical Stream costs in $Millions
Non Grouped
to SNAP (Sub
NAP (NonOther
and Non
admitted)
Acute
Patient)
0
2
161
0
0
0
4
0
0
4
2
161
0
0
18
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
1
23
5
0
232
0
9
32
3
0
157
9
10
421
0
0
94
0
18
29
0
0
44
0
19
166
0
0
59
0
6
6
0
0
41
0
6
106
0
0
8
0
12
7
6
0
13
6
12
28
0
1
130
0
0
16
0
0
0
0
1
146
0
1
47
0
0
5
1
0
66
1
1
119
1
1
216
0
0
3
0
0
37
1
1
256
0
0
227
0
0
6
0
0
11
1
0
244
0
1
25
0
4
2
1
0
32
1
5
59
0
2
261
0
0
8
0
0
57
0
2
326
0
0
110
0
0
18
0
0
55
0
0
184
1
3
29
0
5
1
3
0
1
4
8
31
0
1
295
0
0
12
3
0
1
3
1
309
10
13
1,912
0
56
152
21
0
516
31
69
2,580

SNAP

47
0
0
47
5
0
0
5
58
0
0
58
55
0
0
55
14
0
0
14
20
0
0
20
29
0
0
29
24
0
0
24
62
0
0
62
97
0
0
97
21
0
0
21
82
0
0
82
54
0
0
54
17
0
0
17
65
0
0
65
651
0
0
651

Sub Acute
MH
6
1
0
6
2
0
0
2
7
3
0
9
6
0
0
6
2
0
0
3
6
0
0
6
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
2
0
3
0
3
6
0
0
6
2
6
0
8
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
3
1
0
4
6
1
0
7
49
16
0
65

Total

731
2
4
737
70
9
0
79
1,419
134
160
1,713
728
64
44
836
449
29
42
519
288
109
19
415
581
18
1
600
489
14
67
570
1,018
21
37
1,076
1,226
9
17
1,252
269
30
32
331
1,473
10
57
1,540
818
20
55
894
471
89
4
564
1,334
35
7
1,376
11,363
595
546
12,503

Source: (NSW ABF Taskforce 2019).
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1.7

PROJECT SCOPE

The development of the HORSt as an instrument of population needs to inform resource distribution
between state and the LHN is designed to be a component of a broader funding model rather than
all-encompassing funding model. Whilst the scope of this study is well defined within the stated
aims and research questions (sections 1.4 and 1.5 pages 11 - 12), questions arise to the inclusivity of
other factors or components that might logically be expected to be included in a population needsbased funding model to support its functioning. This section clarifies the scope of this thesis in
anticipation of logical issues that may arise which are nonetheless beyond the remit of the HORSt
research. Table 4 is a summary of these issues which are out of scope for this thesis. A discussion
supporting the rationale for doing so follows.

Table 4

Summary of out scope issues for this thesis

Out of scope for thesis

Rationale

Informing shares of specific

Further research is required beyond the proof of concept stage and very

health programs

broad approach taken by the HORSt in terms of the measurement of health
outcomes and how this could translate the HORSt methodology to inform
specific program areas. Moreover, given the HORSt approach to including
the productive capabilities of the continuum of care and given that health
programs are components of that continuum, health program shares will not
be informed by this research.

Cost and supply issues

Can be informed by ABF and other aspects of the payment model.

ABF / Purchasing services

The HORSt complements and does not replace ABF. The HORSt does not

(outputs) between LHN and

seek to alter the operation of ABF as a payment currency used for purchasing

facilities

decisions between LHN and facilities. ABF remains as key second step in the
broader funding model after the HORSt has guided the resource distribution
between the state and the LHNs.

Patient flows adjustment

The HORSt is concerned with resource distribution between state and LHNs.

between

Further research is required to develop policy for flows adjustment from

LHNs

and

to

Speciality network services

LHNs to Specialty network services and between LHNs.

Capital planning

Further research is required for the applicability of the HORSt to assist with
capital decision making.

Resourcing
beyond

distribution

The applicability of the HORSt methodology to other taxpayer funded /

recurrent

subsidised resource distribution issues that arise between governments and

distribution of state health

local areas are discussed in the concluding chapter.

funding to LHNs.
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As per the aims of this study the development of the HORSt as a tool, seeks ultimately to inform
resource distribution of shares of state health funding to LHNs that are required to enable
maximisation of equity in funding to achieve improvements in health outcomes commensurate with
a benchmarked level of desirable health outcomes. Whilst the use of age-standardised PPHs, as a
measure of population health status and proxy measure of health outcomes is critiqued and justified
along with consideration of alternatives, the applicability of using this measure to individual program
budget areas used by state health systems such as (Acute / Emergency / Non-admitted / Sub Acute /
Mental Health / Teaching and Research etc), as per used in NSW (Inter-Government & Funding
Strategies 2005b; NSW ABF Taskforce 2019) is not specifically assessed in this thesis. This is because
the focus of this research is to demonstrate the HORSt methodology as a proof of concept model of
a broad top-level tool of resource distribution between geographic communities. It does not seek to
prescribe individual resource distribution for specific state health programs within those regions.
Furthermore, there are conceptual differences of purpose between the HORSt, taking a health
outcomes approach to health needs with respect to resourcing across the continuum of care and
eliciting health needs of specific health programs which in themselves are components of the
continuum of care.

As an equity enabler and resource distribution component within a funding model, the HORSt is not
designed to address the costs of health system facilities or supply issues. These matters are
important logical considerations within health funding models, nevertheless such factors are out of
scope for this thesis. Decision making around how to pay for facilities and services can be informed
by ABF and other aspects of the current payment model after the HORSt is applied to guide budget
shares to LHNs. Moreover, the HORSt does not act as replacement to ABF as a payment model
between LHNs and facilities. The HORSt can be demonstrated to complement ABF. Matters
pertaining to the use of ABF as a payment currency for outputs are therefore out of scope for this
study.

The HORSt considers population needs in terms of the LHN of residence of the patient. However,
patient flows are an important determination for the funding model where patients living in one
LHN can seek services from another or from a speciality network service and this situation is
appropriate considering that it is not economically viable to have major tertiary and teaching
hospitals for example in every LHN. The state pool of funds shown on page 28 to be included as the
state funding component in the HORSt pool alongside other taxpayer subsidised resources from the
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Commonwealth government, represent state expenditure by LHN of residence including flows to
other LHNs and speciality network services. The HORSt as a broad tool of population needs-based
funding considers each population’s health needs regardless of the location of supply of services.
However, in operationalising a funding model, where the HORSt is a component tool being the first
step outlining the distribution of state resources to LHNs at a macro level, flows adjustment will be
necessary as part of the next stage in the funding model. The methodology for flows adjustment is
out of scope for the research agenda of this thesis.

The HORSt methodology developed in this thesis is primarily concerned with guiding resource
distribution of the recurrent state government funding between states and local populations.
Capital works developed for the state health system, via either public or private partnership capital
funding enterprises are therefore out of scope for this study.

Notwithstanding these out of scope issues, the HORSt methodology can be considered for other
resourcing decisions beyond that of recurrent health funding distribution between state and LHN.
The applicability of the HORSt methodology with respect to other resource distribution decision
making (including non-health applications) is discussed in the study’s concluding chapter.

1.8

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has outlined the rationale for the study and provided an overview of the governance
arrangements of the mixed private and public health system in Australia; the challenges faced in
terms of health inequalities and inequities that are associated with poor socioeconomic
determinants of health; and equity issues that arise from health system funding. Specifically aligned
to the study aims, the distribution of taxpayer subsidised health care amongst the mixed private /
public system in Australia is not equitable and the state public health systems face a continuing issue
of how to distribute resources to regionalised populations. Background information pertaining to
NSW, to be used as a case study has been provided, along with the study scope

The unique and significant contributions made by the HORSt and the study aims have been justified
and outlined. The development of the HORSt shifts the focus at the state level from paying for
outputs, to providing a funding enabler for outcomes and a new process for population needs-based
assessment of resource distribution that considers the interactions of integrated care via the
achievement of equity in funding for taxpayer subsidised resources across the continuum of care.
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0

INTRODUCTION

As outlined in the previous chapter, the development of the HORSt seeks to recognise health
inequities evident in geographical populations’ health outcomes so as to guide more equitable
resource distributions to regional populations within states’ LHNs. This chapter provides a high-level
overview of the literature in this area and critique of the concepts of equity, efficiency and health
needs, contextualised to public health funding models used in Australia and with respect to the main
theories of social justice. As NSW is to be used a case study for the HORSt and as NSW operated the
longest running population needs-based funding model in Australia to address equity issues, the
examination of this former funding model’s ability to promote equity and efficiency is reviewed.

The methodology employed in this literature review purposely considered English language
academic and policy literature surrounding Australian and international approaches to regionalised
resource allocation models. The most common theories of social justice are also evaluated and
contextualised to the concepts of equity and efficiency for the development of the HORSt.
Alternative measures of approximating population health status, needs and health outcomes within
resource distribution instruments were also reviewed.

School education in Australia faces similar challenges of public funding and similar governance
arrangements under the Australian federated system of multiple public and private payers to that of
state public health. As such, the methodological approach recommended by the Gonski review for
school education funding to improve equity of enabling better educational outcomes is also
considered for its translatability to state health funding for inclusion with the HORSt.

Each section of this literature review examines and critiques the gaps and limitations of previous
research in the context of opportunities for this study. A summary box of these salient findings is
presented at the conclusion of each section. The chapter concludes by synthesising each section’s
findings to outlining the conceptual framework that supports the study’s research questions and the
methodological design of the HORSt outlined in Chapter Four.
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2.1

EQUITY IN HEALTH CARE

In health economics, equity issues frequently arise in the literature in the context of fairness
regarding resource allocation decision making for health care (Macinko & Starfield 2002; Whitehead
1992). Fairness issues arise as health systems are concerned not only with improving the health
outcomes of society, but with the fair distribution of resources (Mcguire et al. 1994, p. 55; Steinbach
et al. 2016). Problematically, what constitutes fairness is a subjective moral decision and is guided
by theories of social justice (Isuchiya & Dolan 2008; Singer & Mapa 1998). Elements of differing
theories and perspectives of social justice are evident in most nations’ healthcare systems and
Australia in this regard contains a mix of different attributes of social justice (Marmot 2010). Four of
the most common theories of social justice pertaining to the problem of health care resource
allocation decision making, Libertarianism, Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and Rawlsianism (Steinbach
et al. 2016) are examined in this section and contextualised to the Australian health care system for
their ability to promote equity issues pertaining to fair resource allocation in the context of this
study. These theories of social justice are then contextualised further to the study in a critique of
the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity in the next section.

2.1.1 Social justice in health care
Libertarianism is based on the doctrine that individual’s rights to freedom are paramount over that
of the state and that the state should not infringe upon those rights (Rajczi 2016; Roberts & Reich
2002). Libertarians believe in minimal state involvement for the protection against negative rights
by allowing state interference to ensure that the actions of one individual minimise the impacts for
harm of the rights of another. Doing so positions the role of the state to safeguard individual
freedoms and extend equity via equality for every member of society by guaranteeing legal
protections (Andreescu 2015, p. 104).

In the context of resource allocation for health care, libertarian views extend to considering the
distribution of health care resources by the state to guard against negative rights to freedom.
Whether or not a person has a right to health and healthcare provided by the state to address that
right however is an area of conjecture in the libertarian literature (Goodman 2005; Lenchus 2017). A
less contentious example of where libertarian views would be in support of government provided
care is vaccination programs, where negative rights of contagious preventable diseases may be
guarded against (Roberts & Reich 2002, pp. 1056-7). The literature also describes libertarianism
extending to paternalism by government regulations or programs to limit the negative harm from
poor choices made by individuals that can affect their own health (Rajczi 2016, p. 97). However,
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libertarianism tends to seek to restrict the degrees of government involvement in paternalist
actions, supporting individual freedoms; libertarianism has a strong view that individuals take
responsibility for their own actions (Cappelen & Norheim 2005).

The importance of considering libertarian views of personal responsibility in health care is made
clear by considering the concept of moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs whereby if medical insurance
pays for health care, the financial consequence of illness are not bound upon the individual and
there is therefore less incentive to the individual to maintain good health (Arrow 1963, p. 961;
Christophe 2001; Ehrlich & G. 1972; Pauly 1968). Within universal publicly provided health systems
and universal publicly provided health insurance schemes, there is policy and system design
elements to encourage personal responsibility to address moral hazard. Examples are:


in the United Kingdom (UK) clinical commissioning groups within the National Health Service
(NHS) have recently adopted a policy of lifestyle rationing whereby it gives people who
smoke or are obese a lower priority for publicly provided elective surgery, making them wait
longer than those who do not smoke and are not obese (Pillutla et al. 2018; Shaw 2016);



in the Australian health care system, it has been argued that the co-payments Australians
face in accessing private medical practitioners, on top of Medicare’s universal insurance
reimbursement, acts as an instrument of encouraging personal responsibility (Barnes 2013;
Rollins 2014). However, research indicates that there is little evidence to support this
incentive argument. Co-payments are shown to reduce access to people whom are in need
who then often end up in public emergency departments as ambulatory patients at great
cost to the taxpayer (Eckermann 2014a, 2014b; Eckermann & Sheridan 2016).

Notwithstanding these examples of libertarian elements within public health systems and the need
for health systems to minimise wasted resources associated with moral hazard, as Breyer and Kliemt
(2015, p. 137) argue: “libertarian views on rights tend to rule out coercive redistribution for purposes
of public health care guarantees”. Contextualised to this study, libertarian views are therefore not
specifically related to ethically supporting state health public resource distribution. Health funding
at the population level cannot create incentives that impact on choices that individuals make,
particularly in a mixed public private funding system like Australia. Moreover, libertarian views are
also problematic to the study as state health systems in Australia are required by the Medicare
principles, discussed in Chapter Three (page 94), to provide public hospital and community services
free of charge on the basis of clinical need which does not consider individual actions that may give
rise to that need (Council of Australian Governments 2011).
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Utilitarianism is based on the principles of maximising benefits for the greatest number, where
maximising benefits are measured by maximising society’s utility / welfare (Mill 2001; Mulgan 2007).
With regards to relative scarcity of health care resources, utilitarianism principles prescribe that
resources should be allocated to those that have the greatest ability to benefit via considering the
concept of opportunity cost (Stein 2015). Singer (1993, p. 25) uses an example to demonstrate this
whereby an earthquake injures two individuals: one person has lost a leg and is in danger of losing a
toe from her remaining leg; the other has a leg injury that can be saved but only if health care
resources are not spent on saving the toe of the more injured person. Utilitarianism says in this
situation you save the leg of the person with the saveable leg injury and forgo treating the person in
danger of losing toe, as saving the leg yields more benefits. Doing so maximises benefits of scarce
resources for society. Principles of utilitarianism are therefore often seen in the context of rationing
for health care, particularly in the area of assessing societal benefits in health care evaluations (Nord
et al. 1995a; Singer & Mapa 1998).

In terms of equity however, a key problem with utilitarianism is that in maximising societal benefits,
individuals can be often viewed as means to others’ ends (Roberts & Reich 2002, pp. 1,056). This is
apparent in the case of Singer’s earthquake example where the person forgoing treatment
potentially losing a toe affords a means to the person whose leg might be saved by freeing up
resources.

Egalitarianism is a form of social justice that treats all people equally and in terms of resources
considers that people should get the same (Arneson 2013). Egalitarianism is often viewed as a
competitive theory of social justice to utilitarianism. Stein (2015, p. 47) contends for example:
“If the slogan of utilitarianism is ‘help those who can benefit the most’, the slogan of egalitarianism is
‘help those who are worse off’”.
Considering this statement, egalitarianism can be demonstrated to be in direct contrast to
utilitarianism by reconsidering Singer’s earthquake victim’s example above. Egalitarian principles
would allocate resources to the more severely injured person with little or no benefit to that person
and in doing so would create an opportunity cost of reducing the benefits available to the person
who had a better chance with the resources to gain a benefit. This example highlights what Stein
(2015) claims is a key weakness with egalitarianism that it is “insensitive to relative benefits” (p. 48).
It can be concluded that egalitarian principles are therefore not concerned with the effectiveness of
resource allocation.
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Surveys of Australian’s attitudes to resource allocation to those in need, consistently demonstrate
that egalitarian values tend to trump utilitarian values, whereby people still will want resources
directed towards those in perilous situations even where the expenditure of resources is likely to
achieve little to any benefit (Nord et al. 1995a, 1995b). McKie and Richardson (2003) find:
“several empirical studies have also revealed that people are often prepared to sacriﬁce health gains
in order to ensure that the more severely ill are given priority over the less severely ill” (pp. 2,409).

Jonsen (1986, p. 174) describes the rationale for these egalitarian attitudes within societies,
although specifically contextualised to rescuing identiﬁable individuals facing avoidable death, as a
“rule of rescue”. This is where society’s rescuing actions that have little consideration to benefits are
a moral imperative of a compulsion to act without considering rationality of the likely outcome and
as McKie and Richardson (2003, pp. 2,407) state “without too much thought to the opportunity cost
of doing so”.

In the context of equity and resource allocation, by its definition egalitarianism implies that equity is
achieved via equality of opportunity to access. A worthy moral goal may well be that of equal health
outcomes; however, egalitarianism is problematic for this study, as taking an equality approach does
not consider that individuals are not equal in terms of their capacity to benefit from resources to
achieve improvements in health outcomes.

In the context of the Australian health care system aspects of utilitarianism and egalitarianism can
both be observed through resource allocation policy for the assessment of new technologies. Drugs
and medical treatments are assessed for public subsidisation by considering how cost effective
treatments are, often utilising measures such as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) and typically
core criteria considers a utilitarian view whereby assessment is made against QALY maximisation
from a societal point of view (Department of Health 2016, p. 65). However, specifically in the case of
access to publicly subsidised pharmaceuticals, egalitarian conditions labelled within policy as ‘rule of
rescue’ apply for individuals facing premature / avoidable death. In such cases resources are made
available to individuals and these rules can circumvent QALY maximisation of societal benefits
(Department of Health 2016, p. 123).

Rawlsianism is based on the work of John Rawls that seeks to ethically solve problems of distributive
justice by representing “justice as fairness” (Matson 2013, p. 1). Rawls (1971, p. 266) states that
society should be organised to allow the maximum amount of equal liberties upon its members and
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importantly for matters or resource distribution, that social and economic inequalities are only to be
allowed if the worst off will be better off than they might be under an equal distribution. According
to Ekmekci and Arda (2015) and Bommier and Stecklov (2002) the underlying moral theory
purported by John Rawls is consistent with equity issues contextualised to health care resource
distribution decisions of public monies.

According to Matson (2013) Rawls “revives the social contract tradition of philosophers John Locke,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, in opposition to utilitarianism” (p. 1). Specifically,
Ekmekci and Arda (2015) and Bommier and Stecklov (2002) argue, that whilst Rawls theory did not
specifically discuss a right to health care as Rawls believed that a person’s health is primarily an
endowment of luck that one is born with, that Rawls theory can be nonetheless applied to the
distribution of health care resources from the state in that Rawls identified that fairness in terms of
distributive justice is “achieved when each and every individual has access to the services she needs”
(Ekmekci & Arda 2015, p. 228). Furthermore, Ekmekci and Arda (2015, p. 229) reason that a just /
fair society has a role in the fair distribution of primary goods, which Rawls defines as elements that
support welfare that can amend inequalities arising from individual endowments. Similar to this
view, the work of Daniels (1985) extended Rawls position to explicitly include distribution of health
care, advocating that “the health care system should be designed so as to bring everyone as close as
possible to a decent minimum level of health, which he refers to as normal species functioning"
(Richard & Paul 2000, p. 328).

In Australia the Medicare principles of the universality of public insurance regarding access to public
hospital services and subsidised private care (discussed in further detail in Chapter Three, page 94)
are aligned with distributive justice principles outlined by Rawls and Daniel and that also of
egalitarianism in the context that all people should have equal opportunity of access (Harris & Harris
1998; Harris et al. 2003; Spies-Butcher 2014). The effectiveness of treatment and maximising
societal benefits are not prescribed in the Medicare principles (Council of Australian Governments
2011, p. 5). As such, as discussed on page 36, utilitarianism principles in Australian health care are
largely confined to the cost effectiveness and efficiency assessments of medical technologies and
interventions.

The HORSt is aligned with the distributive justice goals of Rawls theory in terms of seeking to afford
an opportunity to improve upon health outcomes of populations on the basis of health care needs,
via considering need in terms of capacity to benefit. Moreover, the HORSt is more specifically
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aligned to Daniel’s position whereby the HORSt seeks to identify the resources required for
populations to achieve an acceptable level of health outcomes. The following section explores this
in further detail in the context of horizontal and vertical equity.

2.1.2 Horizontal and Vertical equity and health care needs
Addressing equity in terms of resource allocation decision-making, the health economics literature
divides equity into two categories: (vertical equity) unequal resources for unequal health needs; and
(horizontal equity) equal resources for equal needs (Mcguire et al. 1994; Mooney & Jan 1997; Morris
et al. 2005). The following image, Figure 6 by Maguire (2016) used with permission via referencing
and annotation to the source, is based on a meme that has been used extensively to communicate
differences between equality and equity (Froehle 2016). Nonetheless this image can also illustrate
the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity in the context of resource allocation for this study.

Figure 6 Horizontal and Vertical Equity demonstrated by the Meme of Maguire (2016)

In Figure 6, the three boys in the left side panel of the picture all have the same amount of
resources, (one box each), to utilise to watch their sporting fixture. We can see the two taller boys
are able to use these resources well. The tallest boy has a fantastic elevated view. The boy of
middle height finds his resource adequate for viewing the game, yet the smaller boy is afforded a
view through a crack in the fence.

As a starting point the height of the boys is what Rawls would describe as a natural endowment,
factors that they were born with via a “natural lottery” (Resnik 1997, p. 427). These factors affect
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the boys’ capacity to benefit from the resources they have. According to (Matson 2013, p. 1),
“although the natural lottery is neither just nor unjust, societies that base distribution of goods on it
are unjust: There must be redress for the undeserved inequalities of birth and natural endowment”.

In the right-hand side of Figure 6, the resources have been redistributed. The largest boy’s elevated
view has been redistributed so that he still achieves the outcome of clearly being able to view the
game, but the redistribution of the resources affords the smallest boy now with the same outcome
as the other boys. That is: there is no more squinting for the smallest boy through the hole in the
fence; nothing changes for the boy of middle height; and all three now achieve an unobstructed
view of the game. The public provision of the distribution of healthcare in Australia can be
considered metaphorically in similar terms.

For example, the need for healthcare could

metaphorically be a need to access a view of the game without obstruction and the health outcome
being successfully seeing the game.

The literature reviews of Mooney and Jan (1997) and Macinko and Starfield (2002), find that health
care needs have become a mainstay concept of defining equity with the majority of health
economics literature focusing on needs within the context of horizontal equity. That is, equity is
almost always defined in terms of equal access for equal needs (Mooney 2009; Rice & Smith 2001, p.
88), with the majority of health economics literature that has sought to define need has done so
using health care utilisation as a measure of access to services as proxies of need (Macinko &
Starfield 2002; Mooney et al. 1991). The rationale for doing so is that operationalising health care
needs so as to define equity in the context of a workable resource allocation instrument is
problematic, given that like equity, need is a value laden concept (Culyer 1995). Need therefore
requires some sort of defining concept or measure itself. Guinness and Wiseman (2011, p. 253)
state that there are three common conceptual definitions of health care need underpinning the
definition of horizontal equity, being:


equal access to health care for equal need;



equal use of health care for equal need; and



equal expenditure of health care for equal need

In the context of horizontal equity, if all three boys in Figure 6 on page 38 have the same need – to
see the game, then the provision of the same resources, one box each, seems fair and equitable.
After all, it could be argued that even the smallest boy can see the game via the crack in the fence,
but just not as well as the other two. In this context horizontal equity is about putting fairness on
par with equality with needs addressed via all the boys being afforded the same resources to access
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the game (the left-hand side of the picture). This is congruent with the Australian Medicare
principles (page 94) regarding equality of access.

In the context of access within the definitions of health care need, the literature defines access via
either the physical opportunity to use the health system, or to enter the health system, or in terms
of financial barriers that affect the opportunity or entry of the system (Culyer & Wagstaff 1992). As
discussed, that access can give rise to inequities. Strategies to address inequities purely around
achieving equivalence of access would be aligned with the equality illustration of the left hand side
of Figure 6 and would not consider need in terms of capacity to benefit and as per Matson’s view,
this is unjust based on funding for equal access does not correct Rawls’ natural lottery of
endowment through birth.

Mooney’s explanation for the reliance of health utilisation as a proxy of need within funding models
is because economics has an “obsession with quantification” (2009, p. 210) and utilisation
represents ease of measurement. However, it is not unreasonable for instruments that apply the
distribution of taxpayer funded resources to be quantified and indeed the transparent allocations of
public monies logically require it. Moreover, it could be argued that utilisation which represents a
key cost to the health system and is easily measurable through output-based funding mechanisms
such as ABF, is a logical parameter for inclusion. Notwithstanding Mooney’s criticisms, he concludes
that the typical approaches to defining equity, equal access for equal needs where needs are proxied
by utilisation, require new considerations. Significantly he asserts that need is a concept that can
never be practically equalised and should be expressed in terms of capacity to benefit (Mooney
2009, p. 210).

Policy approaches in Australia that have focused on output-based funding models such as ABF and
Medicare’s fee for service and historical funding of inputs (Bennett 2012; Sansoni 2016) validates
Mooney’s summary. Furthermore, in Australia at the state level, both the former NSW Resource
Distribution Formula (RDF) and the Queensland Resource Allocation Formula (RAF) were models that
considered the health care needs of regional populations within their states. The models were used
to redistribute funding according to needs that were approximated by access, where access was
measured by variables that best predicted health service utilisation (Inter-Government & Funding
Strategies 2005b; Queensland Health 1994). Importantly, however, the intent of both models was to
tackle geographical inequities in funding, not health inequities (Ho 2001; Kirigia 2009). These
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models will be appraised in more detail in section 2.3 (page 46) which examines the effectiveness of
different funding models to promote equity and efficiency.

Returning to the sporting field metaphor image of Figure 6 (page 38) if we consider more closely
what Mooney (2009) championed as the best way to describe need; as capacity to benefit, the three
boy’s needs are quite different. In the left hand panel of the image, the one box afforded to the
middle boy to access the system is adequate, yet it is very questionable that the taller boy needs this
resource, which represents an opportunity cost to the smaller boy who, given the same one box
resource has an unmet need. In other words, all three boys’ capacity to benefit from one box is not
the same. That is their need, which is to see an obstructed view of the game is very different. In this
context, the equity shown in the right-hand panel of the picture is that of vertical equity, where the
resource distribution shows unequal access for unequal need, (different amounts of boxes supplied
to people who have different capacities to benefit from these resources). Importantly access is still
available to all in the right-hand panel, yet the access is more allocatively efficient and equitable.
The HORSt seeks to achieve this result for the distribution of public resources from states to LHNs
and therefore in so doing so does not compromise the Medicare principles (page 94) regarding
access. Doing so would be considered just using the Rawlsian principles discussed and the explicit
extension of Rawlsian theory to health care advocated by Daniels.

Congruent to Mooney’s position, advocating need to be considered in terms of capacity to benefit,
multiple reviewers of the health economics literature suggest that health inequities should have
both an opportunity and a potential to be addressed (Culyer 1995; Starfield 2001; Whitehead 1992).
Considering peoples’ capacity to benefit is therefore useful in considering the potential of improving
health outcomes and tackling inequities and is demonstrated by the literature as better definition of
health need than the reliance upon health utilisation. As such, the HORSt frames population health
need in the context of vertical equity and via considering populations’ capacities to benefit from
resources. The approach for doing so is discussed further in section 2.3.3 Population needs-based
models’ (page 52).
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Summary of key findings section 2.1 – Equity in Health Care
-HORSt as a resource distribution tool aimed at enabling improvements in health inequity and health
outcomes is justified by theories of social justice of Rawls and Daniels and Egalitarian perspectives
demonstrated by Australians.
-

Horizontal equity approximating health need as use, predominately used in resource

allocation funding instruments, places equity in the context of equality.
-

Lack of use of vertical equity approaches to the problem represents a gap in the literature.

-

Defining need in terms of vertical equity and capacity to benefit is a just goal for the health

system congruent with the work of Daniels that advocates a health system should bring “everyone as
close as possible to a decent minimum level of health, which he refers to as normal species
functioning" (Richard & Paul 2000, p. 328).

2.2

EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE

Against a backdrop of the global financial crisis (GFC), the OECD (2013) observed that for many
economies there has been a significant shift from funding growth to productivity growth in the
health sector with countries most affected by the GFC making the largest cuts to health expenditure.
Australia, whilst faring typically better than most OECD nations during the GFC, was not immune to
this trend with the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014b) reporting that growth in real
health expenditure in 2012/13 was at its lowest level since the mid 1980’s. The implications of these
health expenditure cuts have placed even more emphasis on efficiency.

In health economics, efficiency can be defined by three areas: technical efficiency; dynamic
efficiency; and allocative efficiency (Duckett 2008a, pp. 325-6; Mcguire et al. 1994, pp. 76-7). All
three efficiency types are interconnected. These concepts are introduced in this section and
critiqued with respect to the effectiveness of funding models discussed within this chapter and
contextualised to the development of the HORSt and the advancement of equity.

Technical efficiency, is concerned with the optimal production of health service outputs (Duckett
2008a; Segal & Richardson 1994). Dynamic efficiency is concerned with how well the health system
as a whole can adapt to change and innovation (Duckett 2008a).
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Allocative efficiency is concerned with ensuring that goods and services are allocated so as to
maximize the welfare of the community via the optimal mix of goods and services from the best
allocation of resources (Drummond 1989, p. 60; Duckett 2008a; Eagar et al. 2001, p. 18; Mcguire et
al. 1994, p. 76). In public health care systems, the optimal mix of goods and services is also strongly
interlinked with social justice pursuits of health care distribution as to whom and what type of
services are supplied (Segal & Richardson 1994).

Accordingly, allocative efficiency is often

represented in the literature as being promoted by concepts of equity (Carr-Hill 1994; Carr-Hill &
Sheldon 1992; Mooney 1983). Consequently, allocative efficiency involves taking into consideration
three elements:
1. the technical efficiency of the health resources used in the production of health outcomes;
2. effectiveness of the outputs of health care to produce health outcomes; and
3. efficiency of the distribution of the health outcomes
(Duckett 2004b, pp. 226-8).
It is important to consider that by their definitions, technical, dynamic and allocative efficiency can
be pursued at many levels. For example, the optimal mix of goods and services could apply narrowly
to the outputs of a hospital or more broadly to the outputs of a regional health service within a state
or further still to the state or national level. The same can be said of a hospital’s, state’s or nations’
ability to innovate through technical change or to achieve optimal production of outputs at the least
costs.

The structural, funding and governance arrangements of the Australian health care system provide
key challenges for efficiency strategies. For example, if the goal of the health system is to improve
health outcomes, the optimal mix of services (allocative efficiency) within a state health system
dominated by public hospitals is unlikely to be a panacea. This is because health outcomes are
affected by the access to and interaction with all types of health services, not just to those found
within the remit of the state public hospital system.

Evashwick (1989, p. 30) describes and

demonstrates an array of different integrated health services, “a continuum of care”, as supporting
the goal of optimising health care for populations. Eagar et al (2011), emphasises that allocative
efficiency gains cannot be achieved without effective investment across the continuum of care. To
this end the HORSt seeks to consider the tax payer funded and subsidised resources required for
improving health outcomes across the whole continuum of care with the HORSt informing state
resource distribution as a component within broader government funding, rather than trying to align
health care needs to the confines of state budget resources alone. In doing so the HORSt seeks to
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promote allocative efficiency with respect to the definition of its three elements outlined by Duckett
on the previous page.

2.2.1 The compatibility between efficiency and equity
The role of efficiency within a health system also needs to be considered as to where it fits in overall
funding policy particularly with regards to equity. Efficiency has been considered by segments of the
literature for many years as a trade-off with equity (Bevan et al. 2010; Earl-Slater 1999; Okun 1975;
Williams & Cookson 2006). In particular, Williams and Cookson (2006), argue that health technology
assessments all too often focus solely on efficiency gains at the opportunity cost of considering
equity. Outlining the potential for conflict Guinness and Wiseman (2011) state:
“equity and efficiency are often conflicting objectives. For instance, it may be efficient to fund
services concentrated in a small number of large centres but more equitable in terms of access to
services to fund a larger number of dispersed smaller services” (p. 17).

Within the literature however, there is also a view that considers that the trade-off between equity
and efficiency is “semantically bad” (Reidpath et al. 2012, p. 1). This is based on the established
definitions of efficiency contextualised somewhat narrowly to optimality amongst functional
relationships of resource inputs to outputs (production) and not in the context of resource
distribution. In this regard the sort of efficiency that the conflict seeks to portray is of the technical /
productive variety whereas, contrastingly, equity in the context of public health care funding as
demonstrated in the literature is about fair resource distributions and or access associated with
those distributions, typically to promote allocative efficiency. It follows that equity and efficiency in
health care funding models are actually complementary whereby equity decisions determining
resource allocation (funding) to optimise improvements in health outcomes promote allocative
efficiency and maximising technical efficiency becomes the strategy in the provision (production) of
health care to deliver the outputs.

Culyer (2006, pp. 1,155) describes the equity efficiency trade-off as “bogus” as the trade-off
argument fails to acknowledge that the concepts of equity and efficiency are categorically different.
Culyer affirms that:
“As separate categories of ethical consideration each ought to be given its due and proper
attention. The suggested decision making context for combining equity and efficiency is a
‘deliberative process’ rather than an algorithm: a procedure that focuses minds on the real
conflict – that between rival notions of what is to be regarded as equitable, which one may
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conjecture is best resolved through consultation and deliberation. A language that speaks of
‘conflict’ between equity and efficiency is unhelpful since, appropriately – and entirely
conventionally – conceptualized, there is no conflict between them. Both are necessary
ingredients in finding a satisfactory solution” (2006, pp. 1,158).

Guinness and Wiseman’s previously quoted example of conflict between equity and efficiency is
analogous to the public financing of small rural and regional health services in Australia. However,
rather than conflict, it can be shown that this is an example of deliberate decision-making regarding
equity promoting allocative efficiency and technical efficiency of the production and / or delivery of
health care services. Due to scale, rural and or remote location and associated operating costs, small
regional and rural services in Australia are known to be less efficient than larger and more urban
services that can take advantage of economies of scale (Scuteri et al. 2011). These facilities are
known as community service obligations (CSOs). CSOs comprise hospitals and/ or community health
services and state and federal governments consider that states are obliged to provide them as in
many cases no other health service such as private GPs for example, exist (Council of Australian
Governments 2011).

The public financing of CSOs is consistent with Culyer’s argument of a

deliberative process which to use words from Culyer’s previous quote, is required to find a
‘satisfactory solution’ of providing access that would not exist in a private market. Doing so
promotes allocative efficiency and equity and so despite their known technical inefficiencies of
services, CSOs are protected by national agreements between state and Commonwealth
governments (Council of Australian Governments 2011).

In the context of state health funding models, the literature support for the complementary and
deliberate relationship between equity and efficiency are important considerations for the
development of the HORSt as an equity tool of resource distribution and a first stage in the two-step
funding model. The second stage using ABF is an effective tool of technical efficiency. The next
section critiquing the effectiveness of state-based funding models in Australia illustrates the HORSt
in this role and also provides further examples that verify the compatibility between equity and
efficiency components within funding models.
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Summary of key findings section 2.2 – Efficiency in Health Care
-

Allocative efficiency is often associated with concept of equity.

-

Allocative efficiency requires considering technical efficiency of the health resources used in

the production of health outcomes; effectiveness of the outputs of health care to produce health
outcomes; and efficiency of the distribution of the health outcomes.
-

Siloed nature of the health system and its governance arrangements are a key challenge for

allocative efficiency of health outcomes.
-

If the HORSt is to successfully be an instrument of equity, it will require being positioned as

instrument of allocative efficiency and this itself will require considering the production of health
system outputs across the continuum of care to produce health outcomes.
-

Equity and efficiency goals are not always in trade off. Context and deliberate decision-

making matters. The HORSt can work as a complementary tool of ABF.
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2.3.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDING MODELS

There are three main types of funding models that Australian state governments have used for
funding regions that operate public hospitals. These are cost based, population needs-based and
output-based(Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001; Hindle 2002). These models are examined in
terms of effectiveness for addressing equity and efficiency in subsequent sections considering
Australian and International literature.

Table 5, summarises Australian states’ approaches to funding and also makes apparent that at times
these three models have been used in conjunction with each other. Given this it may be more
accurate to describe them as funding components rather than funding models per se.
Table 5

Australian state health funding models

State/
Territory
NSW

Status quo

Equity models

Efficiency models

Cost based ‘Historical’

Population

Output-based/ casemix

funding

based funding

funding

1990-2012 -Needs-

Casemix model between area health

based

services

pre 1990 1 /
post 1990 elements

remain12

needs-

model

allocating

for

funding

and

hospitals

20014 non

mandated, made mandatory in 20085.

from state to area

Queensland

health services 1,2,3

ABF 20126.

pre 19917 /

1991-1995 -Needs-

Casemix model between regions and

post 1991 elements remain13

based

hospitals 1991-958

model

allocating
from

for

funding

state

to

Casemix from 19958, ABF 20126

regions7,8
Victoria

pre 19939 /

Casemix from 19939, ABF 20126

post 1993 elements remain11
South Australia

pre 19949 /

Casemix from 19949, ABF 20126

post 1994 elements remain14
Western

Pre 19969 /

Australia

post 1996 elements remain15

Tasmania

Pre 19969 /

Casemix from 19969, ABF 20126

Casemix from 19969, ABF 20126

post 1996 elements remain16
Northern

Pre 199710 /

Territory

post 1997 elements remain10

Australian

Pre 19979 /

Capital

post 1997 elements remain8

Casemix from 199710, ABF 20126

Casemix from 19979, ABF 20126

Territory
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Table 5 References 1-(Services Development Branch 1990), 2-(Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b), 3-(NSW Health 2005), 4(Hindle 2002), 5-(Government Relations Branch NSW Health 2008), 6-(Council of Australian Governments 2011), 7-(Queensland Health
1994), 8-(Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services 1997), 9-(Duckett 1998), 10-(Beaver et al. 1998), 11-(Department of
Health and Human Services Victoria 2014), 12-(NSW ABF Taskforce 2013a), 13-(Queensland Health 2016, p. 6), 14-(SA Department of
Health and Ageing 2016, p. 40), 15-(Western Australia Department of Health 2014, p. 53), 16-(Department of Health and Human Services
Tasmania 2016).

Table 5 shows that with the exceptions of NSW and Queensland, all other states, commencing with
Victoria in 1993, used casemix (episode or output-based) funding. This was similar to ABF but with
different payment rules within each state to pay for public hospitals (Duckett 1998). Prior to
casemix funding for these states, the funding model employed by all states was historical (Eagar et
al. 2001).

2.3.1 Costs / input-based models
Cost based models are sometimes called historical funding because under this approach the funding
arrangement is primarily based on the previous year’s costs of production / inputs. Typically, the
funder can make adjustments for population growth and other factors that may be considered
relevant, but the underlying driver is the past year’s costs (Broadhead 1991).

In preserving the status quo, historically determined models compromises dynamic efficiency, where
innovation in health care can be stymied by the business as usual funding of inputs. This in itself can
create poor alignment between population health needs and services, compromising equity and
allocative efficiency.

Furthermore, where historical payment is not linked to outputs, global

historical budgets can encourage spending for the sake of maintaining budgets for inputs,
compromising technical efficiency as well (Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001, pp. 72-3).

Table 5 illustrates that cost-based models were very much the modus operandi for many years in
Australia prior to the commencement of output-based and needs-based funding. Importantly
however, historical determinants still remain as necessary components within funding models that
utilise output-based models. The rationale for this is explained further in the following section 2.3.2.

2.3.2 Output-based models (ABF / episode funding)
Output-based models pay for outputs. As described by Eagar, Garrett and Lin, (2001, p. 77):
“the idea of output-based funding is fundamentally simple. It is based on the view that
outputs of the health system can be quantified and costed and that all providers should
be paid the same amount for producing the same product”.
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Output-based models left unchecked with no resource allocation guidance constraint, where
payment is based on output, have an incentive to overproduce. Doing so does not advance equity or
allocative efficiency. The models can be regressive in that they fund utilisation and not need
(Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001, p. 78).

The National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA) required states to adopt ABF in 2012 as their
funding model (Palmer & Short 2014). ABF also known as casemix or episode funding is an outputbasedmodel and key efficiency reform (Independent Hospital Pricing Authority 2015a).

The Independent Hospital and Pricing Authority (IHPA) defines ABF on their website as
“a way of funding hospitals whereby they get paid for the number and mix of patients they
treat. If a hospital treats more patients, it receives more funding. Because some patients are
more complicated to treat than others, ABF also takes this in to account” [sic] (2015a).
There have been indications in ABF documents that part of the rationale for ABF is that it will allow
historical based funding to end (Health Policy Solutions et al. 2011, p. 12). As discussed in the first
chapter, these views do not however consider the operationalised evidence that ABF is used only
after a budget constraint for regions is established. As per illustrated in Table 5, the starting point
for how much activity is to be funded is typically based on history, being the previous year’s activity
(Department of Health and Human Services Tasmania 2016, p. 27; Department of Health and Human
Services Victoria 2014; Department of Health Western Australia 2016, p. 53; NSW ABF Taskforce
2013a; Queensland Health 2016, p. 6; SA Department of Health and Ageing 2016, p. 40).

As defined by the IHPA, ABF is fundamentally a currency for paying for hospital activity. Considering
the extent of IHPA’s definition, it is logical to conclude that ABF does not solve decisions of how
resources should be equitably allocated within state public hospital systems in order to meet the
health needs of the population. Consequently, it is not surprising to find state governments still
relying on historical patterns of public hospitals’ activity to inform the quantity and distribution of
public hospital outputs to be purchased using ABF. As such, ABF should therefore be considered as a
component of a broader funding model and not a state health funding model per se.

Output-based funding models do encourage technical efficiency (Auditor-General of Victoria 1998;
Duckett 2008b; Eagar et al. 2001) yet it is apparent from the experience of ABF in Australia that they
require a resource allocation constraint to determine how many outputs should be purchased. For
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these reasons, as shown in Table 5, NSW and QLD attempted to combine equity objectives and
efficiency measures as a deliberative process during the life of their population needs-based models.
Resource allocation funding decisions to regions were guided by population needs-based formulas
and purchasing decisions within regions directed by episode / casemix funding (Government
Relations Branch NSW Health 2008; Queensland Health 1994).

The current ABF model applies loadings in the payment calculations for each hospital service based
on patient characteristics such as: people living in remote areas; people who identify as an
Indigenous Australians; length of stay; and the type of service facility (type of hospital) (Independent
Hospital Pricing Authority 2015b). Whilst considering patient characteristics could be seen as an
additional payment to tackle health inequalities, problematically the ABF loadings are paid to the
treating hospital on a per case basis. Given the highly mobile nature of flows of patients between
regions, especially between rural locations to major city teaching hospitals, these additional
payments can end up in regions where these inequalities are insignificant (Health Consult Pty Ltd
2011).

The effectiveness of output-based models, especially the casemix system in Australia that pre-dates
ABF, has been well studied. The Auditor-General Victoria (1998) report into casemix funding, found
that the funding model (casemix) achieved its major efficiency objectives for Victorian hospitals.
Interestingly, the report highlighted questionable findings for equity.
“The majority of hospitals indicated that casemix funding had not improved access for
socio-economically disadvantaged groups. Most hospitals advised that this outcome
cannot be achieved by changes to the funding formula” (p. 172).

The international literature of the limitations of casemix models corresponds with Australian
examples, finding that equity and allocative efficiency can be easily compromised and
overproduction can be incentivised. For example, Danish studies have provided evidence of casemix
models that have led to overproduction with a focus on outputs rather than integrated care to the
betterment of outcomes. Moreover, there was evidence of facilities preferring to treat less complex
patients that are potentially easier and cheaper to treat. There was also incentives for facilities to
perpetuate the status quo to preserve profit making and revenue streams at the opportunity costs
for investment in innovations, (dynamic inefficiency) (Burau et al. 2018; Søgaard et al. 2015).
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In Norway there is evidence of casemix facilitating gaming on the part of health service providers to
seek greater reimbursement, in spite of governance arrangements to mitigate this from occurring
(Lægreid & Neby 2016). In one of the largest international studies; a systematic meta review of 65
studies since 1980 across 10 countries (Australia, Austria, England, Germany, Israel, Italy, Scotland,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States of America) found that ABF was associated with higher
rates of post-acute care hospitalisations and possible increases in readmissions (Palmer et al. 2014).

Reviews of the ABF experience in England, Germany, France, Finland and Ireland finds that like the
Australian experience, ABF requires a budget restraint and strong governance arrangements above it
to restrict its tendency to overproduce or game reimbursement (Baxter et al. 2015; O'Reilly et al.
2012). Aligned to this view the Canadian Health Services Research Foundation (2013) contended
that ABF ought to be part of a blended funding model.

Summary of key findings section 2.3 - Effectiveness of Public Health Funding Models
-2.3.1 Cost based and 2.3.2 Output-based Models
Cost / historical based:
-

Funding based on previous years activity do not encourage technical, allocative, or dynamic

efficiency;
-

Perpetuates status quo;

-

Still used as starting point for funding regions by Australian States;

-

Does not promote equity

Output-based/ casemix / ABF
-

Purchasing tool that promotes technical efficiency of outputs

-

Encourages tendency to overproduce outputs

-

Does not promote allocative efficiency

-

Cannot inform resource distribution or regional budgets of how much activity is to be

purchased
-

Requires a budget constraint / funding envelope – which has led to use in conjunction with

Cost / historical models
-

Does not promote equity
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2.3.3 Population needs-based models
Population needs-based models seek to consider the health needs of populations.

They are

primarily used to guide resource distribution amongst populations on the basis of population needs
and therefore are intrinsically aligned to the promotion of equity and allocative efficiency in funding
allocations amongst populations (Eagar et al. 2001, pp. 74-6; Segal & Richardson 1994). Rice and
Smith (1999, pp. 9-10) consider these models to be a form of risk-adjusted capitation scheme, to
ensure equal funding for equal needs for all citizens within populations subject to risk characteristics
of persons within populations that affect the demand and associated costs for health services.

Population needs-based models inform resource distribution to individual populations by using
mechanisms that weight each populations need’s characteristics relative to the whole population.
Shares of funding from a central health authority to regions responsible for providing health care to
regional populations are made on the basis of the weighted needs of each regional population (Eyles
et al. 1991; McIntosh et al. 2010; Penno et al. 2013).

The proposed HORSt is a population needs-based tool. This section provides an overview of the
literature for these models and in particular the former models used in Australia.

First the

effectiveness of these models to promote equity and health outcomes is examined. Second, the
componentry within the models used to weight need is outlined. Three important issues arising
from the literature that are contextually important to the development of the HORSt are then
critiqued. These issues are that population needs-based models:


are not designed to ensure technical efficiency of health outputs;



rely upon utilisation as a default proxy of health need which is problematic for
advancing equity and promoting allocating efficiency; and



claim to promote allocative efficiency although make little attempt to empirically
measure if this is the case.

2.3.3.1 Overview – the role and effectiveness of population needs-based funding models in
improving health inequality
There is evidence that health outcomes can improve through the improvement of equity in funding
that these models prescribe. For example in the UK, longitudinal ecological studies found that
increases in funding to areas that had poorer social determinants of health resulted in closing gaps
of mortality experienced by these populations compared to affluent areas (Barr et al. 2014).
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However, that is not to say that greater funding under these models amongst populations facing
adverse social determinants of health will always yield improvements in health outcomes. In
Australia using a targeted population program for example, where additional specific funding has
been directed to closing the mortality gap and improving the health outcomes of the indigenous
population that are known to face significant socially determined barriers of health, little progress in
terms of health outcomes improvement has been made (Browne et al. 2012; Commission on Social
Determinants of Health 2008b; Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2018).

The literature indicates that due to the exogenous nature of health care expenditure, analysis of the
role and effects of health care expenditures for specific programs on health outcomes remains
problematic. Often aspects of health program quality and effectiveness and accessibility are key
issues that affect success (Barr et al. 2014; Bousmah et al. 2016; Crémieux et al. 1999; Martin et al.
2008).

Given the qualifiers in the literature pertaining to the effectiveness of funding related to outcomes
for populations facing difficult social determinants of health, it is important to state that the role of
population needs-based funding models is not seeking to cure the social determinants that give rise
to poorer health outcomes or guarantee improvements in health outcomes. Rather, improving
funding equity to address social determinants can act as an enabler for improving health outcomes
and allocative efficiency by aligning resources to population needs (NSW Department of Health
2004; Sheridan et al. 2011). Furthermore, aligned with the literature introduced in Chapter One
regarding health inequities and how social determinants of health affect outcomes and the Rawlsian
theories of social justice extended upon by Daniels critiqued in this chapter (page 37), population
needs-based funding models are a just mechanism of resource allocation. They can also provide
transparency for taxpayers in ensuring that population needs are considered in the distribution of
publicly funded resources (NSW Department of Health 2004, p. 32; Penno et al. 2013, p. 1).

The success of funding per se as an enabler to contribute to improved health outcomes is however
well established.

The OECD regularly monitors the contributing inputs for improved health

outcomes and has found amongst OECD nations that health care expenditure growth over two
decades between 1990 and 2010 contributed to the majority of the growth in life expectancy over
that time (OECD 2017a, p. 38).
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The role of population needs-based funding models as an enabler to improve health inequities and
health inequalities in the international literature however, is more often an implicit goal, with
explicit statements of purpose contextualised as per the discussion in the previous equity section
(page 39), as facilitating horizontal equity via equal funding access for equal need. For example Ho
(2001) and Kirigia (2009), find that the equity goal of the these models sought to equalise the same
opportunity for financial access to state public health funding to regions based on factors that gave
rise to health care utilisation.

Wenzl et al. (2015) suggest that from the perspective of models used in England, it is not clear as to
whether these models promote equity. This is because the overarching goal is to more accurately
predict the financial needs of providers (such as Clinical Commissioning Groups) to align budgets
accordingly so that the capitation model is adequately financed for predictable demand for the
population. Implicitly doing so and risk adjusting for the population needs to inform resource
distribution, however, is an implicit lever for improved equity of funding access amongst
populations.

Examples of purpose of the formulas from the international literature are as follows. In:


New Zealand, the main goal of the original formula is to “assist in achieving equality of
access to core personal health services according to need” (New Zealand Ministry of
Health 1996, p. 6)



Finland, the main equity aim of the formula used is to ensure “that each municipality
has an equal opportunity to allocate more resources to servicing population areas with
greater needs and less to areas with fewer needs” (Häkkinen 2005, p. S108);



England, the foundational purpose of the formula was to “redress disparities in funding
between poorer and more affluent areas” and to promote “equal access for equal
needs” (Wenzl et al. 2015, p. 7);



France, the intention is to facilitate equal access to health care via minimising
socioeconomic and demographic barriers to access (Jourdain 2000); and in



Australia in NSW, “the goal of the RDF is better equity in health funding. The RDF target
share allocates funding required to meet the health needs of an Area Health Service’s
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(AHS’s)6 population” (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales
1998, p. 58)
The enabling aspect of reducing health inequities and improving health outcomes can be reasonably
deduced from these examples of models’ objectives to provide fairness in funding. In support of
this, Rice and Smith (2001, p. 88) from their own review of the international literature find that
population needs-based funding models have largely had two inherent goals of “securing equity of
health and to secure equity of access to health care” and that from an operationalised perspective
models have sought to contribute to a reduction in health inequalities via creating the “potential for
equal levels of care”, a horizontal equity approach.

Given the explicit goals of these funding models tied to improving the financial distribution of equal
access for equal needs amongst regions and the literature’s consensus on the difficulties of analysis
to show effectiveness of these models in terms of reducing inequalities evident in improved health
outcomes, it is not surprising to find that the literature regarding the effectiveness of these models
has focused on demonstrating improvements in funding equity amongst regionalised areas. In
England for example, the NHS RAWP has been deemed to be a success for bringing down budgetary
excesses of relative advantaged areas down to a needs-based target budget and similarly by
boosting the budgetary shortfall of relatively disadvantaged areas to their needs-based target
(Gorsky & Millward 2018, p. 75). The Australian NSW RDF example now discussed also assessed
effectiveness in this way.

During the period of operation of the RDF, the model in its various forms never actually set the
budgets for each NSW regional area, with the redistributive shares of funding computed under the
RDF applied to growth funding (Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b; NSW Health 2005;
Services Development Branch 1990). Setting budgets to precise RDF shares was considered to be
too disruptive for the health services in the short term and so the RDF was applied to growth funding
on top of historically determined budgets. Over time with the consistent application of growth
funding guided by the RDF, the shares of funding of the AHSs were more closely aligned to
population need than history and the RDF was considered to be effective in improving funding
equity (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales 1998, p. 58).

6

AHSs in NSW were the regional forerunners of LHDs. In many cases the borders of the former NSW AHSs are identical to

LHDs. Minor border changes do apply.
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Identical to the approach used to assess the NHS RAWP success in England, the RDF’s effectiveness
considered how far away each NSW AHS’s budget was from its targeted fair share of resources
assigned under the formula. Prior to any guiding action of the RDF on NSW AHS budgets, the
average population weighted distance from the RDF target for all AHSs was nearly 14% in 1990 with
some AHSs receiving more than their fair share and some less. During its operational life up until
2010, successive NSW State Governments of all political views actively supported the NSW RDF for
equitably guiding growth funding to local regions (NSW Health 2005; Services Development Branch
1990). An RDF target was established in the late 1990’s so that the average population weighted
distance from target for that all AHSs would be no greater than 2% of their equity share (NSW
Department of Health 2003, p. 29). With the RDF in operation much of this funding inequity had
been addressed and by 2005 the average weighted distance had been reduced to 1.8% (InterGovernment & Funding Strategies 2005b; Kirigia 2009; NSW Health 2005). This is illustrated in
Figure 7 on page 57.

The change in the NSW AHSs budgets, illustrated in Figure 7 by the reduction in funding inequities to
the distance from RDF target, does show that the RDF’s application to growth funding was able to
influence cost based / historical funding. Outside of the NSW government publications claiming the
effectiveness of the RDF, only one external study, Kirigia (2009), sought to test its effectiveness.
Kirigia’s thesis considered alternative measures of health need using socioeconomic, demographic
and premature mortality data.

She found that funding inequities across regions nonetheless

remained. A further issue noted was that the RDF did not consider funding inequity within the AHSs.
However, the RDF was never intended to do so.

The overarching effect however, of the discontinuation of the RDF as an equity funding tool is also
apparent in Figure 7. The immediate years following its non-use show a ballooning of the distance
from target to be more than three orders of magnitude away from the stated policy objectives of
2%. Independent external auditors found the primary reason for reversing much of the gains made
in funding equity over the 20 years to 2010 was directly attributable to state government funding
allocations made to LHNs in 2011 that had not considered RDF calculated needs-based shares
(Health Policy Analysis 2012, p. iii).
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Figure 7 NSW Area Health Service Weighted Average distance from RDF Target

Figure 7 adapted from NSW Resource Distribution Formula Technical Paper (Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b, p. 9), which showed publicised
Distance from target figures between 1989/90 and 2004/05. 2008/09 figures were publicised through the course of NSW State Parliamentary business
(Garling 2008, pp. 7-8; Smith 2010). 2010/11 and 2011/12 figures were verified by an external audit of the RDF (Health Policy Analysis 2012).
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The application of the HORSt to growth funding congruent with the operation of the former RDF is
discussed in the concluding chapter. As a funding enabler of reducing inequity and improving health
outcomes, assessment of the HORSt’s effectiveness would face an identical set of challenges as
described in the literature. As such assessment of effectiveness logically should follow the RDF and
RAWP methodology. However, such assessment would involve a long-term commitment to utilising
the HORSt.

2.3.3.2 Overview of componentry and extent of population needs-based models
The international literature pertaining to the construction and operation of population needs-based
funding models demonstrate a high degree of variability in the componentry and
comprehensiveness that makes up the models. For example, the NSW former RDF by the time of its
abandonment in 2012 was a very comprehensive model that developed health need indicators
(HNIs) from socioeconomic determinants (all of which sought to explain utilisation) for a variety of
health programs. The health programs are not disease specific. They satisfy core budget areas of
state public health expenditure, predominately public hospital services. i.e. These are:


Acute;



Emergency Department (ED);



Rehabilitation;



Outpatients;



Community;



Mental Health Admitted and Ambulatory;



Renal, Palliative Care;



Teaching and Research; and



Population health programs.

(Health Policy Analysis 2012; Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b)
The HNIs differed for most of the programs. The final needs-based shares of state health funding for
each NSW AHS / LHN was computed considering each program’s HNI in conjunction with
adjustments for cost related issues for facilities, speciality state-wide services, dental hospital and
small hospital operating costs, HIV / aids costs, net patient flows between other states and NSW and
net patients flows between NSW AHSs (Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b; Slater &
Marshall 2012).
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In contrast to the NSW final model, the original model used in England commencing in 19767 which
is widely accepted in the literature as the founding population needs-based model for allocating
health resources amongst populations, utilised a simple standardised mortality ratio (SMR), (a health
outcomes approach) to allocate funding to different areas on the basis of need (Gorsky & Millward
2018; National Health System 1976). All jurisdictions’ models have gone through evolutions. For
example, by 1997 the English model had become more sophisticated, utilising socioeconomic status
variables in conjunction with SMRs and an additional health outcomes parameter consider long term
illness, as the basis of a needs-based formula that explained differences in demand and costs for
general and acute services. Similar to the health program approach used in NSW, the later English
model also used a separate multivariable model of SMRs and a different set of socioeconomic
indicators as predictors of differing program service demand and costs (Diderichsen et al. 1997).

Rice and Smith (2001, pp. 103-5) define the componentry of these formulas in the context of factors
that give rise to necessary risk adjustment for population needs which give rise to health system
utilisation and costs. They summarise these risk components as:
 demography (age, sex);
 ethnicity (for example, indigenous status);
 employment / disability;
 geographic location;
 mortality;
 morbidity;
 social economic factors (such as unemployment, marital status, housing quality, income,
family structure).

Rice and Smith’s categorisation is not however a quintessential list, where it could be argued that
there is overlap between categories, for example aspects of disability could be considered
socioeconomic and a more extensive or shorter list of categories could be contrived. Penno et al.
(2013, p. 4) state in the context of their own review of the international literature, that the
construction of population needs-based formulae typically starts with the concept of:
“aligning allocations with factors that explain differences in demand (utilisation); by implication that
these factors reflect differential health need. The factors are represented by variables that represent

7

This model is often referred to as the RAWP in reference to the Resource Allocation Working Party that recommended it.
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components of health need that can be defined by two broad categories: demographic indicators
which act as proxies for need and more manifest measures of need such as disease status.”

As an example of the extent of variables that have been used as needs-based components that
explain health system use, a summary overview of 10 international models variables is presented in
Table 6 on page 62. Most of the data applied as predictors of utilisation come from country’s official
census statistics or official data collections. Census statistics, whilst typically not collected annually
are constructed for most countries to be relatively stable metrics overtime and can therefore be of
use in models to inform prospective budgets (National Health System 1976; Rice & Smith 1999;
Technical Advisory Group for Resource Allocation 2016).

Sweden and England have considered methodologies that seek clinical person-level data to predict
needs via utilisation (Andersson et al. 2011; Dixon et al. 2011). The Nutfield Trust for example has
developed a methodology for the English NHS and describes this approach as “Person-based
Resource Allocation” (Bardsley & Dixon 2011) . This data is usually of a diagnostic nature and
examples are found in Table 6 in the column labelled ‘Clinical’. There are some key limitations of
this approach including;


that data may not be available on all members of the population or enough members of
the population to be representative of health needs;



there are often significant delays in the availability of the data and



that they may not fully account for socioeconomic effects on need for health services

(Andersson et al. 2000; Health Policy Analysis 2014b, p. 6)
Table 6 provides a general overview of the type of variables that have been used in jurisdictions at
various times. It is not intended to show all of the nuanced details of variables which can vary within
specific health program sub structures of population needs-based models and which are subject to
constant revision by their jurisdictions.

Operationalising variables like those shown in Table 6 to represent need within population-based
formulas often involve statistical methods such as regression analysis which is used to consider
correlations between variables and a proxy of health need (utilisation) (Asthana et al. 2004; Carr-Hill
& Sheldon 1992; Health Policy Analysis 2013). The correlation coefficients of variables from the
regression that are found to explain variations in utilisation can be used to inform population needsbased weightings with the funding formula to equalise the funding of health needs for each
geographical area. Applied to a budget the health need indices can provide a weighted population
Page 60

needs-based share of funding for regions (Carr-Hill & Sheldon 1992; Inter-Government & Funding
Strategies 2005b).
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Table 6

Examples of needs-based components used to explain health system utilisation in population needs-based funding models

Country / Jurisdiction

Component factors used that correlate with health system demand / costs (utilisation)*
Demography

Socioeconomic

Geographic

England
Weighted capitation model - used
for
allocating
to
Clinical
Commissioning Groups (CCGs)
(replaced Primary care trusts).
Separate applications for different
clinical programs. NB for brevity
only the Acute program measures
are shown in this table
(NHS Analysis and Insight for
Finance 2019; NHS England
Strategic Finance 2014)

5 yr age
bands 0 to
85+ yrs

Persons without qualifications;
Education
retainment;
Pension
claimants;
Income deprivation affecting
children;
and
Disability
living
allowance
claimants.

Supply
index;
Mean
Waiting
Times;
Distance
to
outpatient services,
admitted services;
Numbers of GPs; and
Accessibility scores
for
acute
and
outpatient provider
capacity;
Ages
/
sex
standardised
CCG
population growth
rates

England
(person-based model)
Not implemented – proposed
(Dixon et al. 2011)

Age

Scotland
Weighted capitation model geographical / population-based
with some person-based elements

5 yr age
bands 0 to
90+ yrs

Separate applications for different
clinical programs
(Technical Advisory Group
Resource Allocation 2016)

for

CCG
population
size

Persons without qualifications
aged
16-74;
People living in social housing;
Urban
professionals
Disability
living
allowance
claimants.
Mental Health program: % of
people living alone; and
% living in social housing.
Maternity program: mean house
prices

Maternity program:
urban-rural index

Ethnicity

Epidemiological / Health Outcomes
Mortality
Age-standardised
death rates /
standardised
mortality rates
(SMRs)

*NB. SMR used
only for the
Acute and GP
prescribing
programs does so
without
any
direct linkage or
correlation
to
utilisation.

Clinical

Morbidity / other
Low Birth Weights;
Standardised limiting
chronic illness

Asthma prevalence

157 ICD 10 codes

Acute
and
GP
prescribing program:
Standardised limiting
chronic illness rate

Acute and GP
prescribing
program
Morbidity
and
life
Circumstances
index – defined
by ICD 10 clinical
codes
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Country / Jurisdiction

Component factors used that correlate with health system demand / costs (utilisation)*
Demography

Socioeconomic

Geographic

5 yr age
bands 0 to
85+ yrs

Proportion of 65+ not claiming
Attendance Allowance;
Northern
Ireland
Multiple
Deprivation Measure Score;
Standardised Birth Rate;
Proportion of all households not
owned outright;
Proportion of households with 2
or less children;
Proportion of all females aged
45-64;

A separate rurality
formula is applied
across programs for
rural areas

Ethnicity

Epidemiological / Health Outcomes
Mortality

Northern Ireland
Regional capitation formula
Separate applications for 9
different clinical programs and sub
programs. NB For brevity only the
Acute program measures are
shown in this table:
(DoH Statistics and Research 2014)

Italy
Somewhat population-needs-based
and only partially weighed.
Intended for determining fair
shares of funding equity across 21
regions of Italy. As of 2014, not fully
implemented due to political
disputes amongst regions.
(Caruso & Dirindin 2012; Ferré et al.
2014; Poscia et al. 2018)

Australia NSW RDF
Population weighted model for
allocating state heath funding to
regional areas – made defunct in
2012.
(Inter-Government
&
Funding
Strategies 2005b; Slater & Marshall
2012)

Use of health
services by
age.
Funds
for
prevention
are allocated
to regions on
the basis of
the
(unweighted)
resident
population.
Age / sex;
5 yr Age
groupings to
85+ yrs

Population Health, Primary &
Community, Outpatients and
Emergency
Departments:
SEIFA Index of Occupation &
Education;
and
%
Homeless
people.
Oral Health program: Health
care card holders

Morbidity / other
Standardised
selfreported not good
health for all persons
Standardised Limiting
Long-Term Illness
Standardised Cancer
Incidence Rate
Standardised
Rate

Rural areas

Acute program: SEIFA Index of
Occupation
&
Education.

Clinical

Acute,
Population
Health, Primary &
Community,
Outpatients
and
Emergency
Departments:
Accessibility
and
Remoteness Index of
Australia (ARIA+)

Birth

*NB
Social
deprivation and
the health status
of the population
as assessed by
the mortality rate
and
are
not
empirically
correlated
or
linked to demand
/
costs
/
utilisation
Acute,
Population
Health, Primary
& Community,
Outpatients and
Emergency
Departments: %
Aboriginal
&
Torres
Strait
Islanders

Acute,
Population
Health, Primary
&
Community,
Outpatients and
Emergency
Departments:
Standardised
Mortality ratios
of
premature
deaths <70 yrs

Oral Health program:
caries in children 0-14
years and adults.
Maternity program
only: Fertility rate
mothers <35 years
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Country / Jurisdiction

Component factors used that correlate with health system demand / costs (utilisation)*
Demography

Socioeconomic

Geographic

Ethnicity

Epidemiological / Health Outcomes

New Zealand
Population weighted model for
allocating state heath funding to
regional areas
(Penno et al. 2012; Penno et al.
2013)

Age / sex;
5 yr Age
groupings to
85+ yrs

Deprivation
quintiles
Deprivation index

Sweden Stockholm County
Population weighted model for
allocation to 9 Health Care
Authorities.
(Andersson et al. 2011; Andersson
et al. 2000).

Age / sex
0, 1-15, then
20 yr age
groups
to
age 65, 6675,
76-80,81-85, 8590 and 90+
Age
Sex

Marital status (single, living with
children or married);
Type of housing (small, other);
Occupation; and
Education (lowest education /
upper secondary).

Considered but
not
yet
implemented a
range of Costly
Diagnostic
Groups (CDGs)

Socioeconomic status - income

Last three years
clinical use /
informs severity
index

20
Age
categories 5
yr span and
90yrs +

Income source;
Average Income;
Marital Status

Mortality

Canada Ontario
Health Based Allocation Model –
part of mixed funding model with
casemix – applied to Local Health
Integration Networks (LHINs)
Person based activity informs
Resource Intensity Weighting for
LHINs population-based shares
(Ontario Ministry of Health 2018;
Rachlis & Gardner 2008)
Netherlands
Dutch Risk Equalisation Model Risk-adjusted payment to insurers
from employers and Government
for population need characteristics
(Douven 2004; Eijkenaar et al.
2019; Ministry of Health 2008)

from

Maori,
Other

Urbanisation;
Proximity of access
per 1,000 pop within
25km
radius
of
facilities

Clinical

Morbidity / other

Pacific,

Non-western
migrant
population

Standardised
death probability

Primary
Care
Cost groups;
Diagnostic groups
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2.3.3.3 Populations needs-based funding models cannot ensure technically efficient health outputs
A key limitation of population-based needs models is that whilst they can promote equitable funding
distribution for population need, the models have no mechanism to ensure that the funding will be
spent in a technically efficient manner to address population needs (Eagar et al. 2001, pp. 76-7;
Hindle 2002; Kirigia 2009). This criticism of the limits of population needs-based funding models
could be viewed in support of the trade-off discussed in the preceding section between equity and
efficiency. However, as per Culyer’s arguments presented on page 44 to the contrary, alleviating this
criticism involves deliberate positioning of a population needs-based funding tool as a first stage
component of resource distribution within a broader funding model that also involves a secondary
mechanism that promotes technical efficiency.

As illustrated in Table 5 on page 47, both the RDF and QRAF were not always used in isolation as
state funding models. Cognisant of the limitations of population needs-based models with regards
to not being effective instruments of ensuring technical efficiency of outputs, NSW and QLD
employed them as the first step in a combined funding model. Redistribution of resources under the
first step afforded areas with higher population needs with higher shares of funding and vice versa.
Casemix funding, called episode funding by NSW and QLD at the time, was used as the second step
that informed each area’s hospitals technical efficiency (Government Relations Branch NSW Health
2008; Hindle 2002; Ho 2001; Schneider 2005). This demonstrates that the HORSt as an instrument
of population needs-based funding can be operationalised as a first step in the funding model with
ABF acting as the second.

It is important to note that there is a body of Australian literature that is somewhat unaware of the
two-step arrangement that combined RDF and episode funding in NSW. Palmer and Short (2014, p.
346), state for example in the context of casemix funding (the forerunner of ABF), that there was:
“continuing opposition to the use of casemix funding in NSW Health Department. Part of the
reservations about the application of this new method of hospital funding stemmed from the fact
that the department had devoted considerable resources to securing greater equity between
geographical areas in the allocation of health service funding.”

Not only does this view not acknowledge the use of episode funding alongside the NSW RDF since
2001 (NSW Health 2005, p. 4), but it is reasonably possible to deduce from this view the falsehood
that a state health funding model can only consist of needs-based or episode based funding, not
both. Such a view is in conflict with the international literature presented in the casemix funding
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section on page 51. Outside of Australia, Ontario Canada is a good example of where population
needs-based funding and casemix funding are combined within a funding model. The model utilises
three components being:


Global Budgets – elements of cost / historical funding; and



Health Based Allocation Method (HBAM) – a population needs-based funding tool; and



Quality Based Procedures – quality adjusted form of casemix

(Palmer et al. 2018).

Whilst the RDF had successfully coexisted as the first step in a two-step funding model with episode
funding since 2001, the NSW Ministry for Health in 2011 commenced ABF and promptly abandoned
RDF. There has never been any documented statement by the NSW Government as to the official
decommissioning of the RDF (Slater & Marshall 2015). In the absence of this it would be reasonable
to deduce in NSW, that RDF was replaced by ABF, especially with the marketing of the new NSW
Health funding model to the NSW health system being exclusively presented in terms of ABF (NSW
ABF Taskforce 2013a, 2013b).

At the cessation of using the NSW RDF and the commencement of ABF, health needs components
known as the health need indices (HNIs) were reviewed and were retained in the NSW Health
funding model for making minor adjustments to the historical volume of outputs to be purchased
using ABF (NSW ABF Taskforce 2013a).

A former NSW Ministry of Health senior bureaucrat

described these components as an “equity lens” (Bolevich 2013). In reality these components have a
negligible role and effect on resource distribution in the new model (Slater 2014) and as such they
do not improve health inequities, nor do they act to steer funding away from historically determined
resource distribution. These components, a revised version of the former health need indices from
within the RDF, are still based on variables that predict utilisation to represent need. In fact, NSW
Health aptly now calls these variables ‘Expected Health Utilisation Indices’ (EHUIs) (Health Policy
Analysis 2014a, p. 1).

The use nonetheless of the EHUIs further demonstrates the compatibility of use of an equity tool
alongside ABF. For successful operationalising of the HORSt, it will be necessary to emphasise the
dual, separate, although complementary functioning of the HORSt alongside ABF.
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2.3.3.4 Utilisation is a problematic default proxy of population health need
The concept of need is a value laden concept (Culyer 1995, p. 727). As such, a key challenge for
population needs-based funding models is developing a robust measure of relative population needs
that can be operationalised into a funding formula. As outlined in the preceding equity section
(page 39), a summary of international literature find that there has been a prolonged use of health
care utilisation within needs-based population funding models as a proxy of health need and
utilisation expressed as equal access can give rise to inequities (Barr et al. 2014; Carr-Hill 1994; CarrHill & Sheldon 1992; Mooney 2009; Mooney et al. 1991; Sheldon et al. 1993). Problematically,
defining health needs in terms of access to services and utilisation requires some sort of proxy
measurement itself for it to be meaningful in terms of policy setting and resource allocation.
Specifically, as shown in the examples provided in Table 6 (page 62), population needs have been
largely approximated by access, where access, was measured in formative constructs by variables
which include socioeconomic determinants of health that best predicted health service utilisation.

Carr-Hill and Sheldon find that measures of social deprivation found to correlate to health needs
through regression are “illusionary” (1992, p. 117). Underlying this assertion is that as a proxy of
health need; utilisation as the dependent variable in regression modelling is problematic, reflecting
both patterns of available supply and satisfied demand and therefore not health need. Unsatisfied
demand, not visible within utilisation, can be representative of unmet needs and health inequalities.

Carr-Hill (1994) and Rice and Smith (2001) also highlight in direct contrast to unmet need that
supplier induced demand can be represented in utilisation statistics. In such cases the utilisation is
inefficient, unnecessary and contains over-servicing. This too creates difficulty for population needsbased formulas relying upon use as the measure of needs.

The NSW former RDF made efforts to factor out influences of endogenous supply on utilisation so as
to try and uncover underlying need factors that affect levels of demand for services (Health Policy
Analysis 2013, p. 14). To do so, the NSW RDF considered that private sector hospital activity to a
varying degree, depending on the type of activity, is substitutable to public hospital services. In
developing the dependent variable in the regression for the HNIs which was based on standardised
cost weights for inpatient activities, the NSW RDF applied a discount for private hospital activities
(Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b, p. 45). The discount applied to the standardised
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cost weights in the former RDF had the effect of reducing the relative health needs in populations
where private services usage was higher.

Notwithstanding the efforts made in the NSW RDF model to improve upon utilisation as a proxy of
health need, it is clear from Mooney’s summation of the literature reviewed in the equity section of
this chapter, that the over reliance of utilisation as this proxy represents a gap in the literature,
whereby needs are contextualised in terms of horizontal equity and resource distribution amongst
populations is about equivalence of access for equivalence of need.

The gap in the literature described asserts that health needs are better represented by capacity to
benefit, rather than utilisation. Whilst this gap will inform the approach outlined for the HORSt, it is
nonetheless important to contextualise utilisation’s use in these models to the models’ individual
purposes. To not do so would be to assume (incorrectly) that the utilisation approach to population
health needs-based models is always lacking. This is not necessarily the case. These models’
primary use is to guide resource distributions from governments to regionalised areas. The context
of deliberate policy making to do so is crucially important. For example, if the contextualised goal is
to pursue vertical equity in funding shares to populations so at to enable improvement in health
inequalities and health outcomes via considering populations capacity to benefit to achieve
outcomes, a non-utilisation approach to health need in light of the gap in the literature can be
justified. However, if the goal is to best predict health system costs under a risk (needs) adjusted
weighted capitation model so as to enable equal opportunity of access (horizontal equity) then an
utilisation approach to health needs (representing access), congruent with the plethora of models
that have set out to do so is satisfactory.

In addition to context, practicality is important for operationalising these instruments.

The

utilisation measure of health need approach is popular due to its simplicity and its relationship with
funding driven by expressed demand. Logically, given this simplicity and intuitive connection to
health system costs, utilisation applied in such mechanisms affords governments with a degree of
transparency that can support public accountability. In contrast, a health outcomes approach for
population needs-based modelling is not without difficulty. Section 2.4 (page 72) outlines the
alternative variables that could be used in establishing measures of population outcomes that are
robust enough to support these instruments. The HORSt will utilise a measure of population health
status as a proxy of health outcomes and health needs.
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The HORSt population-based shares of funding will be compared with the most recently used equity
tool in NSW, the NSW EHUIs (Expected Health Utilisation Index). Whilst the HORSt is a different
approach, both models acknowledge via the literature the importance of considering social
determinants as predictors of the proxied need variables. The comparative resource distribution
shares of both models applying social determinants that predict needs (however differently defined)
therefore may produce similar results.

2.3.3.5 Do population needs-based models actually improve allocative efficiency?
As stated in the efficiency section (page 43), the literature indicates that population needs-based
models promote allocative efficiency via improvements in equity aligned to a more appropriate mix
of resources that can be applied to health needs. However, in order to explicitly promote allocative
efficiency, it is logical to consider a measure or estimate of allocative efficiency so as to guide the
redistribution of population needs-based funding shares to do so.

None of the extensive

international and Australian literature searched and examined for this literature review indicates any
population needs-based funding models attempting to estimate or measure the underlying
allocative efficiency of the production of health outcomes.

Revisiting the axioms required for allocative efficiency outlined by Duckett (page 43), allocative
efficiency involves consideration of three elements. These are:
1. technical efficiency of the health resources used in the production of health outcomes;
2. effectiveness of the outputs of health care to produce health outcomes; and
3. efficiency of the distribution of the health outcomes.
Considering these definitional elements and the international literature’s critique of population
needs-based funding models, the a priori view in the literature for the promotion of allocative
efficiency is difficult to explicitly sustain. As outlined, population needs-based funding models:


cannot control the technical efficiency of the health resources used in the production of
health outcomes and require a secondary mechanism to work in union to promote
technical efficiency such as ABF;



cannot influence the effectiveness of the outputs of health care to produce health
outcomes; and



as an enabling instrument for improving funding equity, cannot guarantee efficiency of
the distribution of health outcomes especially when these models tend to rely upon
utilisation as a proxy of health care need.
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Whilst there may be an implicit improvement, promotion, or enabling of allocative efficiency
through these models’ redistributive action of resources to a more appropriate mix of resources to
support needs (no matter how defined), the lack of formal measurement of allocative efficiency
contextualised to health outcomes therefore represents a gap in the literature. In response to this
gap, establishing a population needs-based tool where the allocative efficiency of desirable level of
health outcomes can be calculated is a more transparent approach to the problem. Populations that
are allocatively efficient in the production of desirable health outcomes could represent a
benchmark. Redistributing funding to populations that have poor allocative efficiency compared to
the benchmark, due to poor social determinants of health that affect allocative efficiency, could act
as a funding enabler to promote allocative efficiency of better health outcomes. The HORSt seeks to
achieve this, although to do so requires the development of a proxy representing health outcomes
of populations that can be used as a proxy of population health needs. The next sections in this
literature review outline alternative proxies to utilisation for health needs and also consider a
benchmark to support establishing the measurement of allocative efficiency and resource
distribution.
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Summary of key findings section 2.3 - Effectiveness of Public Health Funding Models
2.3.3 Population needs-based funding models:
- implicitly act as funding enabler to promote equity and allocative efficiency;
- in acting as a funding enabler, are not seeking to guarantee improvement in equity or outcomes;
-are a just method of resource allocation aligned to social justice theories of Rawls and Daniels;
-afford transparency of resource distribution for taxpayers;
-cannot promote technical efficiency of health outputs;
-can act in partnership with casemix funding (which can promote technical efficiency);
-resource distribution best applied to growth funding to gradually align regional shares to population
needs;
-effectiveness is largely assessed by improvements in regional shares of funding distance from
needs-based shares of funding
-typically, have sought to measure need as health system use and have used variables that predict
utilisation as population weights to inform regions shares of funding; and
-have not sought to explicitly measure the allocative efficiency that they claim to promote.

Specific gaps in literature:
- utilisation approach to health needs in population needs-based funding models aligns to horizontal
equity;
- if the literature’s recommendation that need should be expressed by capacity to benefit (vertical
equity) is pursued, alternative measures of need are required;
- do not explicitly measure allocative efficiency –if allocative efficiency is to be promoted it ought to
be measured / estimated and this will require contextualisation of allocative efficiency to the
production of health outcomes.
-require partnership with ABF, where ABF continues to promote Technical efficiency of outputs
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2.4

PROXY MEASURES OF HEALTH OUTCOMES THAT CAN BE USED AS MEASURES OF

POPULATION HEALTH NEED FOR USE IN THE HORSt
In order to advance the literature’s recommendations to position need in the context of vertical
equity and define it via capacity to benefit, the HORSt will consider different health need proxy
alternatives to utilisation. This section now considers measures of health outcomes that may be
useful for approximating need for health outcomes in the HORSt.

In considering measures of population health needs, it is also useful to examine Bradshaw’s view of
societal needs. Bradshaw (1972) outlines four axioms of social need. The more axioms that apply to
measures of need, the stronger the need. These axioms are:


Normative need – need defined by experts and evidence;



Felt need – need representing the perceptions and experiences by the individual;



Expressed need – demanded need (observed access of services); and



Comparative need – needs identified by comparison of services or comparison of access
to services.

In the context of the need for health care, expressed and comparative need are represented in
utilisation statistics; however, felt need and normative need are not. A health outcomes approach
to need could ideally encompass more of these axioms.

The importance of measuring health outcomes in the context of funding has become more
important to health systems that have previously focused on improving the technical efficiency of
the delivery of health interventions (outputs) and now wanting to ensure that interventions yield
value in improving health outcomes (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care
2019; Colldén & Hellström 2018; Porter 2009).

In Australia health outcomes are defined as:
“a change in the health of an individual, or a group of people or population, which is wholly or
partially attributable to an intervention or series of interventions” (Sansoni 2016, p. 7).

Sansoni (2016, p. 8) identifies that health outcome measures can take the form of:
“clinical/biomedical indicators, health outcome-related performance indicators, standardised clinical
assessments and patient reported outcome measures (PROMs)”.
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For developing a measure for the HORSt, it is important to recognize that these health outcome
measures collected for individuals need to reflect the population. In this situation Sansoni outlines
with respect to the health outcomes definition, the change in health status of individuals can be
aggregated at the population level and a health outcomes performance indicator such as
“the rate of avoidable adverse events, hospital acquired infection rates, time to treatment rates,
return to theatre rates and unplanned readmission rates” can be used.

In moving towards the HORSt approach, measures that give an overall representation of the health
status of the populations’ that can be then considered in the context of populations’ capacity to
benefit from resources (health needs) so as to afford the opportunity to improve the health
outcomes of the population are sought. In other words, a health outcomes performance measure as
measure of population health status will be used as proxy for population health outcomes and for
representing health needs. Such an approach is somewhat congruent with the epidemiological /
health outcome measures used as needs based components of the population needs based formulas
presented in table 6 on page 62. However, as discussed, a distinguishing feature to that of the
HORSt, is that those formulae used those components to explain utilisation as need.

Health status is defined as;
“a generic term referring to the health (good or poor) of a person, group or population in a particular
area” (Segen's Online Medical Dictionary 2011).
This is a holistic concept representing the wellbeing of a person and is often measured by life
expectancy or self-assessed health status, degrees of functioning, illness and mental wellbeing
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2015c). As a fundamental goal of providing health care is
the improvement of the health status of the population (Palmer & Short 2014, p. 15), this is a
suitable concept for the research. Measurable differences in health status amongst geographical
populations can inform equitable policy regarding resource distribution.

Furthermore, Eagar,

Garrett and Lin (2001) consider that the health status of geographical populations is an important
consideration of health care needs assessment.

Four indicators of health status are considered. They have been selected for consideration for use
within the HORSt based on being well accepted and documented performance measures of health
outcomes and or health status. Measures were also considered because of practicality of collection
for the case study, NSW. These are as follows:
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1.

Self-reported health surveys; including Patient reported outcomes (PROMS) and Patient
Reported Experience Measures (PREMS;

2.

Potentially Preventable Hospitalisations (PPHs);

3.

Charlson Co-Morbidities; and

4.

Standardised Mortality Ratios (SMRs).

Each of these is critiqued in detail in the following sub sections.

2.4.1 Self-reported health surveys
There is broad consensus in the international literature that self-reported health (SRH) surveys are a
valid and reliable measure of health-related quality of life (HRQoL). International literature indicates
that these instruments consistently demonstrate in cross sectional and longitudinal studies across
populations of diverse socio economic backgrounds that self-appraisal of an individual’s health is a
powerful predictor of future morbidity and mortality (Appels et al. 1996; Borawski 1996; Chu 2017;
Idler 1997; Idler 1991; Moreira 2018).

The attributes of SRH in the literature is particularly attractive to the HORSt as a performance
measure of health outcomes. Whilst SRH represents one axiom of Bradshaw’s social need (felt
needs) it could be argued that as a generic performance measure of health outcomes per se that
SRH is a product of interventions across the continuum of care.

The NSW Ministry of Health has conducted the NSW Adult Population Health Survey annually each
year (since 1997) and the Child Population Health Survey (since 2001). This is an ongoing survey of
the health of people in NSW using computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). The main aims
of the surveys are to provide detailed information on the health of adults and children in NSW and
to support planning, implementation and evaluation of health services and programs in NSW
(Population Health 2016).

For analysis, the survey sample was weighted to adjust for differences in the probabilities of
selection among respondents. Post-stratification weights were used to reduce the effect of differing
non-response rates among males and females and different age groups on the survey estimates.
These weights were adjusted for differences between the age and sex structure of the survey
sample. Population data based on Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates and population
projections based on data from the NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure have been used
to calibrate weights to the population within each health LHN and the Australian Bureau of Statistics
Page 74

latest mid-year population estimates (excluding residents of institutions) for LHN (Population Health
2016).

Whilst the weights could inform the HORSt as a proxy of population health need, advice from the
NSW Ministry of Health is that it is statistically problematic to determine accurate survey results for
populations below the LHN level (Harrold 2017). Given wide ranging variation in social determinants
across LHNs, lower level geographies of population areas within LHNs (discussed in Chapter Five)
would be required for the HORSt. Unfortunately, this means this approach is not achievable for the
study.

2.4.1.2
Patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) and Patient Reported
Experience (PREMs)
Patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) and Patient Reported Experience Measures (PREMs)
are measures of SRH. Where SRH surveys, such as the one used in NSW, report on the general
health of the population, PROMs are instruments that that report on Patient Reported Outcomes.
PROMs are closely aligned to the definition of health outcomes as they seek to enumerate the
change in health outcome directly attributable to a health intervention, requiring a survey measure
to be taken before and after a treatment. PREMs are instruments that report on the experience of
the intervention and collected at a single point in time are used to report on aspects of quality and
safety (Dawson et al. 2010; Kingsley & Patel 2017; Weldring & Smith 2013).

The HORSt requires a health outcomes performance measure that typifies what the overall health
status is of the community which reflects the continuum of care. Sansoni (2016, pp. 26-7) indicates
that recent developments in the collection of PROMs in Australia have sought to apply generic
instruments that are compatible with assessment of models of care. These measures are compatible
with considering the outcomes of interventions across the continuum of care. However, in Australia
the establishment of clinical registries and protocols to collect the data and other PROMs initiatives
is still in its infancy. Thompson et al. (2016, p. 3) describes the efforts to date as being “fragmented
and often isolated”. The implication for the HORSt is that for this study there is simply not enough
data at this stage to make a realistic assessment for including PROMs as the measure of population
health status.

PREMS by virtue of measuring experience, rather than outcomes, precludes their inclusion in the
HORSt.
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2.4.2 PPHs as a proxy for population health status.
As introduced in Chapter One (page 21), the literature has identified PPHs, evident within
hospitalisation statistics as markers of health inequality (Falster et al. 2015; Falster et al. 2016).
Duckett and Griffiths (2016a, p. 1), claim that where PPHs are persistent within geographical
populations, to which they describe as “hot spots”, they represent entrenched health inequalities
that without intervention are most likely to endure.

A long standing theory surrounding PPHs was that their occurrence represented a lack of access to
ambulatory care services, particularly primary care and preventative services (Ansari et al. 2006;
Falster et al. 2016; Longman et al. 2011; Longman et al. 2015; Page et al. 2007; Victorian Health
Information Surveillance System 2016). Duckett and Griffiths (2016a) contemporary work on hot
spots is congruent with this theory, highlighting populations that are most in need of primary care
investment interventions and recommend Primary Care Networks (PHNs) develop interventional
strategies (pp. 37-42).

The hypothesis surrounding PPHs and lack of access is that if appropriate

access to primary services exists, these potentially avoidable hospitalisations would be minimised.
“In theory at least, if the condition is treated and/or managed appropriately in the
community (through public health interventions, in general practice or with other
community support) the patient is less likely to end up in hospital. Hospitalisations for
ACSCs (PPHs8) are therefore considered to be potentially preventable” (Duckett &
Griffiths 2016a, p. 6).
However, contemporary Australian evidence refutes this hypothesis, finding that persons presenting
to hospital with PPHs were found to not have limited access to primary care leading up to their PPH
admission. In fact, these patients were found to be prolific uses of multiple elements of the health
system prior to their admission. PPHs therefore are conditions associated with sicker patients
(Falster et al. 2015; Falster et al. 2016). A logical extension of this finding is that PPHs may not be as
avoidable as first thought through primary care interventions, although this cannot be confirmed
without consideration as to the effectiveness of the health care received prior to admission and the
health of the patient which is not evident in the contemporary literature.

8

Duckett and Griffith use the term ACSCs.
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Advocates in the literature for moving away from utilisation approaches to health needs have
supported the development of morbidity measures to reflect need (Asthana & Gibson 2011; Asthana
et al. 2004). PPHs certainly do reflect on the basis of the evidence presented a generic morbidity
metric of health status.

Similar to the other data of health inequalities presented in Chapter One, PPHs are shown in the
international and Australian literature to be strongly correlated with socioeconomic status with
evidence showing a strong link between high rates of PPHs and socioeconomic disadvantage (Agabiti
et al. 2009; Butler et al. 2013; Roos et al. 2005; Trachtenberg et al. 2014; Weeks et al. 2016).
Consistent with this, high rates of PPHs are observed to be prolonged amongst socioeconomically
disadvantaged communities (Duckett & Griffiths 2016a; Falster et al. 2015).

Tackling health inequities is an ongoing priority for Commonwealth and state governments
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a; Holland 2014; NSW Department of Health 2004)
and reducing PPHs are part of that challenge.

In Australia there are 22 categories of PPHs

recognised within the National Health Care Agreement for action by Commonwealth and state
governments, divided into three broad categories of Acute, Chronic and Vaccine Preventable
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017b). These are listed in appendix 1.

In the context of NSW, figures 8 and 9 (pages 78 and 79) illustrate the health inequalities within
populations via standardised rates of PPHs. Specifically, the example in Figure 9 shows the rate of
PPHs for Acute, Chronic, Vaccine Preventable and All PPHs by NSW LHN in 2015/16 in number and
by directly age gender standardised rate per 100,000 population. The age gender standardised rate
for all categories of PPHs is also shown by quintiles of socioeconomic disadvantage in Figure 9
(Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).
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Figure 8 2015-16 NSW PPHs, Acute, Chronic, Vaccine Preventable and Total by NSW LHN (LHD)

Figure 8 Source: (Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).
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Figure 9 2015-16 NSW PPHs, Acute, Chronic, Vaccine Preventable and Total by ABS Socioeconomic disadvantage quintiles

Figure 9 Source: (Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).
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Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate the wide-ranging differences in the rate of PPHs across the NSW Health
Districts and concur with the literature’s findings that the most socioeconomically disadvantage
quintiles within populations have much higher rates of age gender standardised PPHs than more
socioeconomically advantaged quintiles.

In summary the literatures findings regarding PPHs is that they:


are markers of health inequality (aligning with definitional criteria of health inequities
presented in Chapter One);



are representative of sicker patients;



occur after the abundant consumption of resources across the continuum of care; and



correlate with socioeconomic status, a social determinant of health outcomes.

Furthermore, PPHs represent three of the four categories of Bradshaw’s framework of social needs
i.e.


PPHs reflected normative need; experts and evidence consider them health conditions that
should be avoided. As such they are required to be reported and used as performance and
quality indicators for state health systems (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
2017b).



PPHs reflect comparative need; to reiterate they are considered in comparison across small
population areas as markers of inequality (Duckett & Griffiths 2016a).



PPHs reflect expressed need. “A community or person who uses a lot of services is assumed
to have high need” (Marosszeky et al. 2006, p. 4).

From this summary, it is reasonable to consider rates of age-standardised PPHs in small area
populations as a proxy measure for poor population health status that can be used with the
HORSt. Chapters Four and Five explores in more detail how PPHs can be utilised within the
HORSt so as to represent a desirable level of population health outcomes.

2.4.3 Charlson comorbidity as a proxy measure for geographical population health
status
Valderas et al. (2009, p. 357) describes comorbidity as being:
“associated with worse health outcomes, more complex clinical management and increased health
care costs”.
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Comorbidities are evident within Australian public hospital administrative data sets (Quan et al.
2011). A measure of comorbidities may serve as a measurable proxy of geographical population
health status. Whilst there are many approaches for assessing comorbidities within administrative
data sets, the Charlson index is the most widely applied and validated (de Groot et al. 2003; Hall
2006; Nadathur 2011).

Charlson’s index was initially used to predict mortality based on 19 predefined comorbidities, that
were weighted 1,2,3 or 6, with weighting based on ratio of hazard / severity, with the higher score
indicating a higher burden of disease (Charlson et al. 1987). These are summarised in appendix 2.
However, the use of the index has been varied over time, where it has been used to predict burden
of disease, length of stay and health system costs (Charlson et al. 2014; Nadathur 2011). Latter
studies have utilised a set of ICD-10 codes (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and
Related Health Problems 10th Revision), which all Australian hospitals use, to identify hospital
separations exhibiting comorbidities (Nadathur 2011).

Similar to PPHs, the literature indicates that comorbidity is inversely related to socioeconomic status
(Chang et al. 2016). This makes their use as a proxy of geographical population health status
attractive to the HORSt, whereby it would be expected that higher rates of observed comorbidity
would exist where the social determinants of health care are poor.

However, the use of a

comorbidity index, poses a number of challenges for the proposed HORSt, including isolating
hospital acquired comorbidities (a measure of poor quality) and age gender adjusting the
comorbidities as there is a known correlation in the literature between age and comorbidity
(Naessens et al. 2007; Yurkovich et al. 2015). Nonetheless, Charlson Co-morbidity rates from with
state health hospital data collections can be utilised as a proxy measure of small area populations’
health status. Methodology and data feasibility for including them within the HORSt in this context
is explored in more detail in Chapters Four and Five.

2.4.4 Standardised Mortality Ratios (SMRs)
As outlined in the section on population needs-based funding models (page 52), the use of SMRs in
these instruments is well established. Typically, premature mortality is used for SMRs below an age
limit. The first version of the RAWP in England used this as sole indicator of health need and the
many other models, including the former NSW RDF have at some stage used this measure (see Table
6 page 62).
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An important issue that becomes apparent from the literature is that there is conjecture as to
whether or not mortality actually represents need and if mortality is a need indicator itself, or as in
the examples provided in Table 6, an indicator that explains utilisation where utilisation is the proxy
of need. The original English RAWP, Italian and Scottish models use mortality as needs adjuster with
no reference to utilisation, whereas the former RDF formally made a link whereby utilisation
representing morbidity would be associated with higher rates of mortality (Bedard et al. 2000; Rice
& Smith 1999). The RAWP model evolution from the SMR as the sole indicator of need to a model
that reflected utilisation was because it was viewed that the SMR did not reflect the demand for
health care associated with chronic disease and social deprivation (Asthana et al. 2004; Barr et al.
2014; Carr-Hill & Sheldon 1992).

Notwithstanding the literatures views on the use of mortality as a need indicator, mortality ratios
are a population health outcome measure. Sansoni (2016, p. 20) highlights that there are some
important considerations for their use being:
“they are not particularly responsive to the change in delivery of health care, as for many conditions
it may take some years for the reduction in mortality, or increase in years of survival, to become
apparent”.

Contextualised to operationalising the HORSt as resource distribution tool and funding enabler to
improve health outcomes and health inequities, the use of a premature SMR to do so is problematic.
First there are strong arguments in the literature that the measure does reflect needs and social
determinants of health outcomes. Second, premature SMRs may not be the best measure for
recurrent funding distribution or as an enabler for improving health outcomes that involve
improving morbidity outcomes. In light of these arguments and those in this literature review that
champion an alternative method to utilisation of approximating need, the HORSt will not consider
the SMR as the health outcomes proxy measure of need. Although given the widespread use of the
SMR as a predictor of utilisation, the SMR will be assessed for its predictive strength of the health
need variable that is ultimately selected.
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Summary of key findings section 2.4 - Proxy measures of health outcomes that can be used as
measures of population health need for use in the HORSt:
-Population health status performance measures can be utilised as a proxy for population health
outcomes.
-Morbidity measures such as rates of PPHs and Charlson Comorbidities could be used in place of
utilisation as measures of population health needs. Higher rates would indicate higher rates of
illness.
-Higher rates of PPHs and Charlson-Comorbidities correlate with poorer social determinants of
health and vice versa.
-Rates of PPHs are well established health outcomes performance measures, utilised by the
Australian Governments and states.
-Rates of PPHs satisfy three of four measures social need defined by Bradshaw.
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2.5

USING BENCHMARKED OUTCOMES FOR ENABLING EQUITY IN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC

SCHOOL EDUCATION – THE GONSKI SCHOOL RESOURCING STANDARD
Many of these issues identified in the Australian health care system are equally relevant to the
funding provisions of other Australian state government responsibilities. There are strong parallels
between publicly provided health care and publicly provided school education in Australia. Both are
constitutionally prescribed under Australia’s federalism as a state government responsibility and
both are a mix of public and private providers, whereby private providers are publicly subsidised by
the taxpayer (Parliament of Australia 2015). Furthermore, many of the social determinants of health
that give rise to health inequities and poorer health outcomes are also observed to cause barriers to
educational outcomes (Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008b, p. 57; Marmot 2005, p.
1100). Given this, in developing the HORSt, it is appropriate to consider funding models that have
been developed for the equitable distribution of public funding for schools in Australia. The
following section discuss funding models developed for public funding distributions for schools’
education in the Australian context and critique these models for applicability to developing the
HORSt.

2.5.1 Gonski’s School Resourcing Standard
Given the similar governance and funding arrangements and equity and efficiency issues in school
education in Australia to that of the public health system, unsurprisingly similar challenges of public
funding resource distribution occur. In response to this in 2010 the Rudd Labor Government
established a review of school funding chaired by David Gonksi (Gonski et al. 2011, p. xi).
Analogously to health where Medicare benefits (taxpayer funds) are observed to be
disproportionately used across locations to fund private doctors (Bickerdyke et al. 2002, p. 212;
Eckermann & Sheridan 2016, p. 512), Gonksi observed that school funding in Australia is also
disproportionate with some private schools getting more funding from taxpayers than needed
(Gonski et al. 2011, p. xvi). In terms of inequities of educational outcomes Gonski’s review of
funding for schools found that:
“The key dimensions of disadvantage that are having a significant impact on
educational performance in Australia are socioeconomic status, indigeneity, English
language proficiency, disability and school remoteness” (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 122).

Whilst Gonksi et.al made forty-one recommendations, a key aspect of these is the development of a
School Resourcing Standard (SRS). This outlines a mechanism to redistribute resources to address
social determinants that act as barriers to academic achievement (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 225;
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Parliament of Australia 2015). The Gonksi SRS has at its starting point, educational outcomes using
the National Assessment Program—Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) assessment results (Gonski et
al. 2011, p. 68).

The Gonski et al (2011) SRS approach is only concerned with recurrent funding, not capital (p. 162).
The SRS in Figure 10 shows the basic operation of the SRS. This involves establishing references
schools where NAPLAN results are considered to be at an acceptable level and where the social
determinants to educational outcomes for these schools and their students are favourable and not
considered barriers to academic achievement. This is analogous to a benchmark. Regression
techniques are then used with all sources of school funding (public and private) to benchmark a
reference cost per student for these outcomes (pp. 255-6).

Further regression analysis then

prescribes loadings to be paid to schools where NAPLAN outcomes are below the reference level and
the social determinants of educational outcomes are unfavourable (low socio-economic status,
indigeneity, low level of English, disability and rural remote location). These loadings are paid on top
of the reference level (pp. 257-9). These loadings constitute vertical equity adjustments; reflecting
that greater resources should be applied to those who have a greater capacity to benefit, a greater
need.

Figure 10

The Gonksi SRS

Figure 10 above is Figure 50 in the Gonski Review of School Funding (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 154). The
box on the left-hand side of Figure 10 reflects a benchmark level of resource per student from public
and private resources to achieve a benchmarked level of educational outcomes that are desirable.
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Where social determinants are observed in geographical areas to be a barrier to achieving the
benchmarked outcomes, schools in these geographical areas financial receiving loadings (right-hand
Figure 10) on top of the benchmarked resources identified.

Making outcomes the focus is an attractive alternative approach to state health funding models that
have heavily focused on efficiency of funding services rather than outcomes. i.e.
“The Gonski report provides a completely different lens through which to view, measure and fund
service systems. It is a view that is almost completely counter to the way governments and policy
makers currently approach health systems. The most fundamental difference is that Gonski
begins with a focus on student achievement of real education outcomes. In health, we are still
stuck trying to look at throughputs and costs – an almost entirely provider focused approach
where actual health outcomes are not even measured. We are trying to run the system more
efficiently, but take no real account of health outcomes” (Bennett 2012).

The principles of Gonksi for school education has been very popular with the public in Australia
(Aston 2016).

However, criticisms do exist.

These are: the additional funding for schools

recommended has been argued to be unaffordable; and the ability of schools receiving extra
resources to spend the money efficiently has been questioned (Jensen 2013; Slater 2016). However,
using a Gonski approach to a state health resourcing tool like the HORSt, it is not envisaged that
these criticisms would be sustained, given that the intent of the HORSt is to act as the first step in
the funding model, utilising ABF as the second to promote technical efficiency.

Given the similar challenges of resource distribution and similar social determinants that give rise to
inequities in school education and health outcomes, the use of the Gonski SRS, with its benchmarked
productivity approach of assessing a wide range of funding inputs and social determinants affects
upon desirable and measurable outputs, is an attractive conceptual and methodological approach to
developing the HORSt as a funding model that can promote allocative efficiency and equity of state
health distributions to LHNs. Setting a level of benchmarked outcomes for the whole population is
congruent with the social justice views of Rawls and Daniel discussed in section 2.1 (page 37)
whereby it is just that society affords each member the opportunity to have a decent minimum level
of health.
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Summary of key findings section 2.5
Using benchmarked outcomes for enabling equity in Australian public-school education – The
Gonski school resourcing standard
-State public school funding faces similar governance and funding challenges and resourcing
decisions as that of the state public health sector.
-Gonski school education “school resourcing standard” uses an outcomes-based approach to assess
students’ needs.
- School resourcing standard (SRS) - applies a benchmark to outcomes
- SRS utilises a broad approach to considering funding inputs to be included in the determination of
the productivity of outcomes and the resourcing share of funding required by the state government
- Recommends school resourcing shares of funding be based on social determinants that affect
achievement of the benchmarked outcomes.

Populations that are allocative efficient in the production of desirable health outcomes can serve as
benchmark. Resource distribution can be informed by redistributing funding to population’s that
have poor allocative efficiency compared to the benchmark, due to poor social determinants of
health that affect allocative efficiency. Doing so represents a funding enabler on the basis of
capacity to benefit and is congruent to social justice theories by Rawls and Daniels.

2.6

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The Conceptual Framework for this study is presented in Figure 11 (page 88). This shows the
connections between the literature’s findings, the study aims and research questions and the
methodological development and process that will be required to satisfy these.
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Figure 11

Conceptual Framework for the study

Literature – Findings / Gaps / Opportunities

Aims

Research Questions

Methodology

development

processes

address

to

/

research

questions
Resource distribution to enable improvement in equity and
outcomes justified by theories of social justice
Need in health care best expressed in terms of capacity to benefit
(vertical equity) rather than utilisation (horizontal equity).
Efficiency (all types) can be improved by moving away from siloed
approaches to funding and considering continuum of care
Cost and ABF funding models do not advance equity or improved
outcomes or allocative efficiency
Population needs-based models implicitly enable equity and
allocative efficiency yet can be improved to more transparently do
so via measuring allocative efficiency of health outcomes. Doing so
involves establishing benchmark and considering resource inputs
involved in the production of health outcomes across the
continuum of care – not just from within the state health silo.
Doing so ends a reliance of need being approximated by utilisation
and is congruent with need expressed as capacity to benefit.
Population measures of health status, using measures of morbidity
(PPHs and Charlson rates) can be used as a health outcomes proxy.
Gonski SRS – demonstrates in school education that a benchmark
approach – placing outcomes at centre of the model and then
considering social determinants that affect the benchmark to
inform needs-based funding is viable.

AIM 1- Develop the
HORSt as a parsimonious,
measurable
and
consistent benchmark of
desirable
health
outcomes for states’
LHNs’
populations,
relative to funding inputs
across the continuum of
care,
to
promote
allocative efficiency and
equity
across
populations.
AIM 2: Identify and
incorporate measures of
local
geographical
population health needs
that can be used in
resource
allocation
decisions.
AIM 3: Identify the share
and quantum of taxpayer
resources provided by the
state to geographical
populations to maximise
equity of health funding
across the continuum of
care to act as an enabler
to improve equity of
health outcomes.

What measures / data of health
status can best represent an
acceptable level of desirable health
outcomes for populations that can
inform a benchmark?
What health service funding inputs
should be included to represent the
continuum of care?
What methodology should be applied
to derive the benchmark?
What are appropriate measures of
population need that could be
applied to support the HORSt?

Identify data sources to best represent
benchmarked outcomes (PPHs or Charlson
rates) as per literature review.
Identify / justify
methodology.

a

benchmarking

The benchmark should be a measure of the
allocative efficiency of the outcomes
variable and in doing so incorporate
variables that represent the resourcing
inputs across the continuum of care.
Identify / justify variables that best predict
/ affect the populations’ ability to achieve
allocative efficiency of desired health
outcomes
Identify / justify a predictive methodology

What share of funding is required for
each geographical population to
adjust for population health needs to
maximise equity of health funding
across the continuum of care?
What quantum of funding is required
to be adjusted by the state from the
existing pool of resources used by
each?

Developing health need indices from the
need variables that can act as population
weights to inform resource distribution.
Identifying and justifying the pool of funds
across the continuum of care that the need
indices should be applied too.
Calculating the state share of needs-based
/ needs weighted funding for each LHN.
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2.7

CHAPTER SUMMARY - GAPS, ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED IN

PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The literature critiqued in this chapter has illustrated several key issues and consistent findings that
are pertinent to the development of the HORSt and the advancement of improving the equitable
distribution of state health funding amongst LHNs, whilst supporting the efficiency goals of ABF.
Gaps, issues, opportunities and weaknesses identified in the literature are presented in summary
and examined in the subsections below. As is apparent findings and implications from each of the
literature reviews sections are interrelated and somewhat overlap.

For brevity this summary

synthesises these issues.

Vertical equity and need
From a social justice perspective, the literature demonstrates that Daniel’s extension of Rawlsian
views of just resource distribution for affording opportunities to improve equity in health outcomes
are aligned to needs defined by capacity to benefit, which is how the literature describes the most
appropriate way to consider need. However, the practical approach to doing so in Australia under
Medicare principles is more aligned to the promotion of equality via equal access.

Funding models and tools employed at the state level in Australia are equally lacking in addressing
population needs in terms of capacity to benefit which is consistent with the international
literature’s findings that the majority of funding models that have sought to advance population
need have done so via expressing need as health system use. This represents a gap in the literature
where vertical equity approaches within funding instruments to tackling just population needs-based
resource distribution have been underutilised. Hence there is scope to represent need in terms of
capacity to benefit in the context of vertical equity within the HORSt.

Efficiency and the continuum of care
Segments of the international literature that purport a trade-off between equity and efficiency are
unhelpful for policy makers, whereby the trade-off argument may convey views that population
needs-based tools promoting equity may be doing so at the opportunity cost of compromising
efficiency. The literature review demonstrated that the trade-off argument needs qualification
whereby the policy pursuit of equity and efficiency is a deliberative complementary process and that
both pursuits can be complementary.
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The structural funding and governance arrangements also can affect the pursuit of equity, where
policy is set within demarcated areas to produce outputs. The lack of attention for resource
distribution funding instruments aligned to payment for the improvement of health outcomes
represents a significant gap in the literature.

Developing funding models that consider the

productive contributions of health service outputs to health outcomes across the continuum of care
is essential for improving allocative efficiency.

Gonski recognised that school outputs were a function of social determinants of education and the
productivity of funding inputs from all sources of school funding (public and private). Similarly, it is
logical to represent the continuum of care in the HORSt in terms of social determinants of health
and the productivity of funding inputs from as many measurable and reliable sources across the
continuum of care of the multi-layer mixed public / private health system. Gonski recognised the
importance of this functional relationship in the school resourcing standard, via approaching the
needs-based problem in the context of productivity via a benchmark. The HORSt seeks to do the
same.

Funding models – Equity and Efficiency
ABF can promote technical efficiency. However, current cost based and ABF models cannot advance
equity. Cost models promote the status quo and ABF can, if left unchecked, overproduce.

Population needs-based funding act as enablers to implicitly improve allocative efficiency of
resource distribution and improve health outcomes. However, need is almost exclusively expressed
by utilisation, expressed demand and resource allocation is guided by weighting population shares
according to variables that predict utilisation. These models do not explicitly improve allocative
efficiency and none of the literature seeks to measure allocative efficiency.

Opportunities exist for the HORSt to consider measuring allocative efficiency. This will require
considering the productive inputs across the continuum of care to produce a desirable level of
health outcomes. Developing a benchmark for the HORSt as per the Gonski SRS is a sensible and just
approach. Doing so will involve considering a proxy measure for the health status of the population
as proxy of health outcomes. Resource distribution population shares can be weighted for variables
found to affect the allocative efficiency of achieving the benchmark.
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Variables to approximate health system need via population health status
The use of PPHs or Charlson Co-Morbidities from within state health inpatient statistics affords the
use of a health outcomes approach. Both metrics are shown in the literature to represent sicker
patients and within populations are makers of poor health status.

Benchmarking outcomes – Gonksi experience
The similar issues that have arisen in publicly subsidised education in Australia, regarding fairness of
resource distribution and the contemporary approach by Gonski, demonstrates an opportunity for
the development of a HORSt as a resource distribution tool for health care with a focus on health
outcomes. Doing so would substantially differentiate the HORSt to previous population needs-based
models in health that have approximated need by health system access (use). Doing so would also
promote vertical equity and define need by capacity to benefit.

Given the public support for the Gonski SRS which has shifted the focus on educational outcomes,
the HORSt designed upon similar conceptual and methodological underpinnings would make publicly
subsidised health funding transparent across populations and shift the focus from outputs to health
outcomes.
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CHAPTER THREE – REVIEW OF GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS OF
TAXPAYER PROVIDED AND SUBSIDISED HEALTH CARE IN AUSTRALIA
3.0

INTRODUCTION

Chapter One provided an overview to funding and governance arrangements of the mixed public /
private Australian Health Care system. This section provides a critique of the specific funding and
governance arrangements that embody the Australian health care system, examining the origins and
operation of the mixed public private system in the context of public funding and public
subsidisation from the Australian and state governments. Contextualised to the literature review
and conceptual framework for developing the HORSt in Chapter Two, the advancement of equity
and efficiency within each layer of publicly provided and subsidised health care is examined, along
with relevant legislative issues that bound the Australian federal system of government.
Characteristics of the funding and governance arrangements that are relevant to the development of
the HORSt at the state level across the continuum of care are identified and appraised for their
inclusion in the model’s methodology and for feasibility as data sources. Discussion is organised
under the following sections that consider taxpayer funding distributions between:


Commonwealth and states;



Commonwealth and private providers via the MBS;



Commonwealth and private insurers;



Commonwealth / states and clients of the NDIS; and



Commonwealth and private individuals for the PBS.

Out-of-pocket costs paid by individuals are also examined.

3.1

GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING DISTRIBUTIONS FROM COMMONWEALTH TO STATES

The Australian Constitution came into effect in 1901 and established Commonwealth and state
powers (Parliament Education Office 2015a, p. 4).

Prior to World War Two (WWII), both

Commonwealth and states collected income taxes.

However, in 1942 due to the financial

requirements of the war effort, the Commonwealth sought to become the sole collector of income
tax, compensating states for their loss of tax revenue in the form of conditional funding grants. The
Commonwealth legislation sought was challenged in the High Court by four states but found to be
constitutionally sound in what was called the “Uniform Tax case 1942” (Parliament Education Office
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2015b; The Constitutional Centre of Western Australia 2015). Whilst employed as a wartime
measure for the duration of the war plus one year, this arrangement was sought by the Chifley
government in 1946 to continue indefinitely and despite several high court challenges since this
arrangement remains (Boxall & Gillespie 2013, p. 25; Burton et al. 2002, p. 15).

The Commonwealth’s initial health responsibilities were limited to quarantine issues (Eagar et al.
2001, p. 26). However, an amendment to section 51 of the Australian Constitution in 1946 which
allowed the Commonwealth to make financial provisions for social services, including health
benefits, was achieved through referendum. Specifically, the amendment sought:
“The provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment,
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental
services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits to students
and family allowances" (Australian Senate 1946).
The provision of public hospital services however, still resided thereafter with state governments
with no explicit Commonwealth power to administer public hospitals or to make laws for public
hospitals (Scully 2009).

The ceding of income taxes in 1942 solely to the Commonwealth is considered to be a watershed
moment for vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) in Australia (Burton et al. 2002). VFI occurs whereby the
Commonwealth government’s ability to raise revenues exceeds its spending responsibilities and the
state governments have insufficient revenues from their own sources to finance spending
responsibilities (Department of Finance 2014). Mathews and Jay (1972, p. 191) described the
impacts of the imbalance on the states in both fiscal and policy terms;
“not only had the Commonwealth government, with its vast wartime powers, become
used to taking unilateral action with respect to decisions affecting the prosecution and
financing of the war, the control of the war-time economy and the arrangements for
post-war reconstruction; its assumption of uniform income tax powers had given it the
fiscal supremacy to pursue the centripetal policies.”
This new power and fiscal might wielded by the Commonwealth government had the direct result of
states becoming more dependent upon Commonwealth funding for all areas of state responsibilities,
including the provision of public hospital services. The Commonwealth’s desire to influence state
policy, despite having no constitutional power to administer public hospitals, has increased with the
imbalance (Crowe & Stephenson 2014; Duckett 2000, p. 95).
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The key instrument of Commonwealth influence in state health funding policy is the funding
agreements with the states. Known previously as the Medicare agreement, the Australian Health
Care Agreement (AHCA) and more recently as the National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA), these
agreements establish principles, standards and expectations of access, service and volume that
states have to follow (Parliament of Australia 2014; Paterson 2002, p. 313). The agreements ensure
that states uphold Medicare principles, being:


“Medicare eligible persons are to be given the choice to receive, free of charge as public
patients, health and emergency services of a kind or kinds that are currently, or were
historically provided by hospitals;



access to such services by public patients free of charge is to be on the basis of clinical need
and within a clinically appropriate period; and



arrangements are to be in place to ensure equitable access to such services for all eligible
persons, regardless of their geographic location”

(Council of Australian Governments 2011, p. 5).
The Medicare principles are statements of equity to be adhered to by the states. As introduced in
the equity section of the literature review, these principles broadly align with the concept of
horizontal equity, given the strong focus on equality of access. However, the universality of
Medicare in the context of clinical need is also aligned to vertical equity, as patients who have more
severe illnesses are not denied access to greater resources, they require than those with lesser
clinical need. Consistent with Medicare’s strong focus on equity, Duckett (2000, p. 224) has
described the Australian health care system’s “quest for equity” as being a pivotal issue since the
1960’s. He contends that equity of access has been the principal driver of reforms that has
ultimately culminated in the contemporary Medicare system, which is;
“designed to ensure that all Australians have equal access to care in public systems” (p.
xxi).

Up until 2012, the mechanism of distributing what constitutes an equitable share of Commonwealth
funding to the states to address the VFI occurs via funding transfer agreements called Specific
Purpose Payments (SPPs).

These cover: health; schools; housing; indigenous affairs; disability

services; skills; and training development (Commonwealth Grants Commission 2015). Funding
transfers for SPPs are subject to negotiation between the Commonwealth and states, (including the
health care agreements as discussed). The quantity of the funds supplied, which are distributed
amongst the states, are subject to recommendations by the Commonwealth Grants Commission
(CGC). The CGC considers the population needs of each state relative to the average need of the
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population across all states.

Population need is largely assessed on per capita criteria

(Commonwealth Grants Commission 2015).

Negotiations between Commonwealth and states for the health funding agreements are often
prolonged, political and at times acrimonious. Common sources of conflict surround the size of the
Commonwealth’s financial contribution to the states and attempts by both parties to actively “cost
shift” patients and their costs between privately provided taxpayer subsidised Medicare services and
that of public hospitals and vice versa (Duckett 2004a, p. 2; Maiden 2010; Milne 2010). Cost-shifting
has been described as a central cause of buck passing between jurisdictions, with the buck passing
described as “the blame game” (Standing Committee on Health and Ageing 2006, p. 40). Severe
penalties in terms of withholding hundreds of millions of dollars of Commonwealth funding can and
have been applied to state breaches of the Medicare principles underpinning these agreements
(Auditor-General 2007, p. 49; Parliament of Australia 1998).

Improved health outcomes are not the result of a siloed differentiated production line of health care
from either Commonwealth or state responsibilities, however as identified in the literature review
are affected by patient’s access and interaction with the continuum of care. Therefore, it would be
naïve to consider that all forms of cost shifting are undesirable. Cost shifting, whilst being expedient
to the bottom line of either state or Commonwealth budgets, can actually benefit improved patient
outcomes and the overall efficiency of taxpayer funding considered in totality rather than in terms of
demarcated Commonwealth and state budgets. The continuum of care is logically independent of
issues of who pays for what, but nonetheless impacted upon by the governance of payment
arrangements.

In the Australian context, within the continuum of care, primary care services delivered privately by
general practitioners (GPs) and subsidised by the Commonwealth government are more cost
effective than allowing for illness to progress to where it requires hospital interventions. They are
also more cost effective than the use of a hospital emergency department in lieu of access to a GP
(Eckermann 2014a).

In response to this, state health systems have an incentive to work

collaboratively with other levels of the health system outside of their control. State health systems
seek to engage the other parts of the continuum by strategies of “integrated care” (Kodner &
Spreeuwenberg 2002, p. 1).

Integrated care refers to:
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“the provision of seamless, effective and efficient care that reflects the whole of a
person’s health needs, from prevention through to end of life, across physical and
mental health, in partnership with the individual, their carers and family and across
public/private and Commonwealth/ State boundaries” (Office of the Secretary 2015, p.
15).
NSW Health for example, has made concentrated efforts in recent years to invest in hospital
avoidance and integrated care strategies, culminating with its 2015 State Health Plan goal of
“keeping people healthy and out of hospital” (Office of the Secretary 2015, p. 8). However, doing so
could also be branded as cost shifting by the Commonwealth, if the benefits of investing in the
continuum of care are ignored.

From 2012, the Rudd Labor Government replaced the CGC health funding distribution to states by
using ABF.

All states and territories were required to be part of a NHRA whereby the

Commonwealth’s contribution to states was linked to state public hospital activity based on an
efficient price for hospital services determined by the Independent Hospital Pricing Authority (IHPA)
(Council of Australian Governments 2011). ABF’s key expected improvements were the coordination
of a nationally transparent methodology for paying for public hospital outputs and the promoting
and incentivising of technical efficiency through paying for outputs at a benchmarked price (Health
Policy Solutions et al. 2011). This provided the Commonwealth with an incentive to encourage
states to shift patients into more cost efficient primary care and was sought therefore as a solution
to ending the blame game (Duckett 2013, 2014).

Eagar et al (2011) suggested that the ending of the blame game through National Health reform
strategies encourages an environment of dynamic efficiency whereby there are opportunities for the
innovation and integration of successful programs that cross the continuum of care. From 2017
onwards however, the Abbott / Turnbull Liberal Government dropped the link to activity for state
hospital funding and essentially replaced it with similar principles of the previous CGC model.
Funding from Commonwealth to states provides revenues that support the state’s budgets which
include a provision for the state health budget (Parliament of Australia 2014).

Implementing the HORSt as a tool to guide state distributions to LHNs does require being compatible
with the Medicare principles governing Commonwealth funding to states. Population needs-based
funding models previously used in NSW and QLD (discussed in section 2.3 page 52) spanned some 22
years and 4 years respectively (Ho 2001; Slater 2014). During this time, they coexisted amicably with
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the Medicare principles of the respective AHCAs without incurring any breach of the agreements
and it follows that the HORSt acting as a similar mechanism does not require any regulatory reform
between Commonwealth and states.

3.2

TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES FROM COMMONWEALTH TO PRIVATE DOCTORS

Private health care in Australia is dominated by General Practitioners (GPs) and Specialists. Whilst
publicly subsidised by the taxpayer through Medicare, the distribution of these private services, with
the exception of incentivising doctors to work in locations of need such as the Rural Health
Workforce Strategy (Department of Health 2013), has not been subject to a distributive equity
mechanism. The defining rationale for why this is so, relates back to the 1946 social services
referendum.

Apart from providing the Commonwealth with new powers to provide health benefits, the 1946
amendment to section 51 of the constitution was also a significant step towards enshrining the
mixed public / private Australian health care system, as it guaranteed (save for future changes to the
constitution) the freedom of private practice of Australian doctors. Sought by lobbying from the
British Medical Association (BMA)9, the anti-conscription clause that was included in the amendment
allowed for the Commonwealth to provide:
“medical and dental services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription)”
(Australian Senate 1946);
was designed to;
“avoid doctors being conscripted into government service” (Browning 2000).

The high court has confirmed the purpose of the anti-conscription clause and the limits it places on
the ability of the Commonwealth government to reform the public / private mixed system in the
future. i.e. In Wong v Commonwealth the high court found that in reference to section 51 xxiii of
the constitution that:
“A civil conscription guarantee should be construed widely and that it would invalidate federal laws
requiring providers of medical and dental services (either expressly or by practical compulsion) to
work for the federal government or any specified State, agency or private industrial employer. This

9

The Australian Medical Association (AMA) was formed from merged branches of the BMA in 1962 (Australian

Medical Association 2016).
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decision is likely to restrict the capacity of any future federal government to restructure the
Australian health care system, e.g. by implementing recommendations from the National Health
and Hospitals Reform Commission for either federal government or private corporate control of
presently State-run public hospitals” (Faunce 2009, p. 196, emphasis added).

As a result of this seminal legislative protection from forced employment, private practitioners
choosing their location and establishing their own fee structure can create financial and
geographical barriers to people accessing primary and secondary care (McRae & van Gool 2017).
The power of the medical establishment in avoiding controlling government influences in Australia is
significant and a key challenge to reform and the advancement of a more equitably distributed
health system (Boxall & Gillespie 2013; Palmer & Short 2014).

Despite the significant power of the medical establishment in Australia, according to Boxall and
Gillespie (2013, pp. 10-1), the medical workforce is not always aligned to the self-interested political
directions taken by the medical establishment. Furthermore, there is a long history in Australia of
beneficent doctors actively price discriminating advantageously for patients of limited financial
means (Johar 2012).

The payment system to private practitioners via taxpayer subsidisation (Medicare) is also an
important consideration of the advancement of equity and efficiency. Medicare, as a fee-for-service
model to pay for services of private practitioners (Department of Human Services 2015), is an
output-basedmodel like ABF.

Therefore, as discussed, there are incentives to over produce.

However, unlike an ABF model at the state level with the state budget acting as the ultimate
resource constraint above it and the states allowed to ration services under the second Medicare
principle on the basis of clinical need, the Medicare payment system for private practitioners is
somewhat open-ended with physicians acting as gatekeepers to the volume of services delivered
(Webber 2012).

The information asymmetry between clinicians and patients, where clinicians are imperfect agents
to their patients can also support the over production and commonly this situation in the literature
is referred to as Supplier Induced Demand (Bickerdyke et al. 2002, p. 12; Eckermann & Sheridan
2016, p. 512; Mcguire et al. 1994, p. 36). As such, the fee-for-service model does not encourage
allocative efficiency and combined with the freedom of practice in locations that suit the doctor, the
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model does not advance equity. Furthermore, as an episodic funding model, it is not designed to
support improvements in integrated care (Boxall & Gillespie 2013, p. 175).

Medicare pays private practitioners contributions towards each service via the MBS. For nonhospital services, Medicare covers services for doctors, specialists, optometrists and in specific
circumstances, dentists and other allied health practitioners on a fee-for-service basis up to a
schedule fee set out by the MBS. Beyond the schedule fee the patient is liable for out-of-pocket
charges set by the practitioner (Department of Human Services 2015).

If the patient elects to be a private patient in a public or private hospital, Medicare covers 75% of the
MBS fee for services and procedures. Medical practitioner charges beyond this are the responsibility
of the patient, as are hospital accommodation and items such as theatre fees and medicines. PHI
can reimburse the remaining 25% of the schedule fee and the accommodation and medical costs
(Department of Human Services 2015).

The MBS payments for each consultation, as the universal insurance component within private
doctors’ fees acts to some degree as a transparent price floor (Johar et al. 2016, p. 528). Further, it
can encourage price competition amongst practitioners who charge fees and amongst those that
bulk bill (charge no out-of-pocket costs).

Beneficent and entrepreneurial practitioners, price

discriminate amongst patients, bulk billing (not charging out-of-pocket costs) to those with limited
means, charging out-of-pocket costs to patients who are more socioeconomically advantaged (Johar
2012, p. 597; Johar et al. 2016, pp. 530-2).

Whilst medical beneficence by private practitioners to needy people could be seen to advance
equity, the reliance upon private doctors in the marketplace to always do so is not guaranteed.
Furthermore, recent studies indicate that the out-of-pocket costs that Australians face are rising
(Scott 2016). Where ambulatory patients cannot afford fees and are not able to access bulk billing,
the alternative is using the public hospital system typically via emergency departments (Eckermann
2014a). Using hospital for the treatment of illness that could otherwise be treated in primary care is
allocatively inefficient, ultimately costing the taxpayer more. In terms of equity, Eckermann et al.
(2016, p. 7) find that supplier induced demand is likely to occur as a result of a reduction in bulk
billing .i.e.
“The under-servicing of ‘at need’ populations with reduction of bulk billing rates also
leads to perverse incentives for GP discretionary over-servicing to fill patient lists and
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maintain their income by inducing demand in populations who remain able to afford
services. Such over-servicing of populations typically manifests as over testing for rare or
untreatable conditions and associated unnecessary treatment resulting from false
positives, as well as over-treatment directly (e.g. over-medication)”.

The funding and governance arrangements of Commonwealth taxpayer subsidisation of private
medical services through Medicare discussed, demonstrate a number of issues for the development
of the HORSt. First, the Australian constitution has enshrined the freedom of private practice for
private medical practitioners. Combined with the episodic payment system for these practitioners,
the MBS representing 28% in 2015-16 of Australian Government health expenditure (Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a), these arrangements are unlikely to encourage on its own the
efficient or equitable advancement of improved health outcomes that involve patients who require
state hospital system care. In establishing a benchmark level of health outcomes for populations at
the state level, the HORSt needs to therefore consider the inclusion of Medicare funding as a crucial
productive component of the resourcing of the continuum of care. MBS data is available from the
Commonwealth at small area population levels (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a;
Department of Human Services 2016). A discussion surrounding the extent and application of this
data to the HORSt is contained within Chapters Four and Five.

3.3

TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES FROM COMMONWEALTH TO PRIVATE HEALTH INSURERS

Australians are encouraged to take out PHI in Australia via financial incentives being;


the PHI rebate, a taxpayer subsidised rebate, indexed to income level, to help cover the cost
of the PHI premiums (Private Health Insurance Ombudsman 2017a);



the Lifetime Health Cover loading, a progressing loading applied to future PHI premiums for
not taking out coverage prior to a person’s 30th birthday (Private Health Insurance
Ombudsman 2017b); and



the Medicare Levy surcharge, an additional rate of taxation charged over and above the
Medicare levy for incomes above a threshold (Private Health Insurance Ombudsman 2017c).

The PHI rebate is paid directly to private health insurers. Income tested, this reduces the cost
individuals and families face in premiums payable to the insurer (Private Health Insurance
Ombudsman 2017a).
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The goal of these incentives is to boost the coverage of PHI in Australia. In doing so it has long been
purported by the Commonwealth Government that more Australians will use private hospitals for
elective surgery, taking pressure off public hospitals (Boxall 2015). Contemporary PHI industry
statements that have vested interests champion this view (Eddy 2016).

There is growing body of evidence, spanning many years, to suggest that these incentives however,
have not relieved public hospital pressure (Boxall 2014, 2015; Duckett 2005; Duckett & Jackson
2000; Eckermann 2014a; Eckermann et al. 2016; Menadue & McAuley 2012; Savage & Lu 2006).
Moreover, the effectiveness of these incentives in terms of equity and efficiency and particularly the
size of the taxpayer subsidy of the PHI rebate and the opportunity cost that it represents have been
questioned. i.e.
“Cumulative evidence since the introduction of the rebate in 2000 shows that despite
spending growing to $6.0 billion in 2013-14 and projected to grow to $7.2 billion by
2017-18, the rebate has not taken pressure off the public health system. Rich, young,
healthy populations joined for tax breaks and to avoid later higher premiums when
older”
(Eckermann et al. 2016, p. 8).

Russell (2015) argues that whilst PHI is incentivised and subsidised, it represents waste as there is no
requirement for PHI to be used. This represents allocative inefficiency, whereby taxpayer funding is
used to purchase a contingency rather than to fund services. Where it is not used, the subsidy
supports PHI companies’ bottom line.

In terms of the lack of use of PHI, Russell (2015) observes that around 25% of PHI holders choose to
use the public hospital system. This finding runs contrary to the government expectations that PHI
coverage would remove pressure from the public system. However, this finding can be somewhat
expected, whereby patients face disincentives to use their PHI as electing to do so often involves
significant out-of-pocket costs which in Australia can exceed US levels (Sivey 2016; Sweet 2012).

Eckermann et al. (2016) and Mihm (2016) find a significant portion of PHI is purchased to avoid
taxation. Furthermore, Mihm (2016) finds that some low cost PHI policies are marketed by insurers
as tax avoidance instruments rather than providing health benefits. Mihm finds that these policies
are effectively “junk policies” with little if any benefits that can be used in private hospitals with
approximately 1% of private hospital services covered by them. The implication of this is that by
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their lack of private benefits, these policies direct patients who need hospital care towards public
hospitals.

This is further evidence of allocative inefficiency and is diametrically opposed to

contemporary industry views and that of Government that holding PHI takes pressure of the public
system.

Congruent with the previous quote by Eckermann, Sheridan and Ivers, Harris (2013) maintains that
even after means testing, the PHI rebate significantly rewards the wealthy. Menadue and McAuley
(2012, p. 12) argue that this can create an inequitable demarcated health system of a private
hospital system for the rich versus a public Medicare system for the poor.

Contemporary

statements by former Liberal Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull referring to Medicare as ‘a safety
net’, reinforce this view that Medicare is for the less well-off (Duckett 2016). Duckett (2000, p. xxi)
has long considered that labelling Medicare for the poor, damages social cohesion and weakens the
equitable system of universality of Medicare whereby the rich do not see the value in contributing to
a system that they view or are told is not for them.

Menadue and McAuley (2012, p. 16) summarise PHI in Australia as being allocatively and technically
inefficient and failing to promote equity. i.e.
“To satisfy criteria of efficiency and equity, the best policy for the Government would be
to withdraw all support for private health insurance. It is administratively expensive
(technically inefficient in economists' terms), distorts incentives and choices (allocatively
inefficient) and does not satisfy any reasonable criteria of equity”.
Additionally, Harris (2013) and Menadue (2017), argue that given that PHI is relatively
expensive, that private hospitals could be better subsidised directly by taxpayers at an overall
lower cost rather than via the taxpayer subsidies for the PHI rebate.

The abundant evidence in this section has shown that the distribution of the PHI rebate is skewed
towards more well-off members of the community and that this distribution is significantly
inefficient and inequitable. It follows that there is no evidence that the PHI rebate alleviates health
inequities. It could be argued based upon this evidence that the PHI rebate actually contributes
towards perpetuating health inequities, via the enormous opportunity cost of tax payer funding that
could be otherwise provided to support an expansion of the public health system at lower cost,
rather than support a risk contingency for the wealthy.
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The PHI rebate, as inefficient as the literature has shown it to be, was nonetheless considered for
inclusion as an input in the development of the HORSt benchmark. However, PHI data is not
available at sufficiently low-level population structure to support its inclusion as a funding input
within the HORSt and for this reason will not be included.

3.4

TAXPAYER FUNDING TO SUPPORT THE NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME

(NDIS)
The NDIS is a social insurance scheme that supports people with permanent and significant
disabilities under the age of 65. It commenced in 2016 and will be progressively implemented across
Australia. It was developed to directly provide people with individualised support to enhance their
quality of life and done so in recognition that the disability system in Australia was inefficient and
inequitable (Fawcett & Plath 2014; Foster et al. 2016). The NDIS is an example of a person-based
needs funding model, the type of which was discussed in the literature review.

The goal of the NDIS is to provide a multifaceted approach to support, for improving the lives of
people with permanent and significant disabilities and their carers, across health, education and
community services (National Disability Insurance Agency 2017). Whilst not a dedicated health
program, taxpayers pay for the NDIS through a specific Medicare levy increase and consolidated
revenue and both Commonwealth and states share funding contributions for the NDIS (Foster et al.
2016, p. 30). The National Disability Insurance Agency administers funding to individuals following
assessment of needs (National Disability Insurance Agency 2017).

The NDIS commenced at piloted locations in 2013.

The gradual roll-out across the country

commenced in 2016 (National Disability Insurance Agency 2017). Given this and the somewhat
enormous task of assessing individual clients for the level of support required and eligibility, it is too
early to assess the NDIS in terms of effectiveness of advancing equity or efficiency. Nevertheless,
disability has been identified as a significant determinant of health inequities, with people living with
disabilities facing significantly poorer avoidable health outcomes (Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare 2016a; Turrell et al. 2006). The intent of the program could therefore assist in the longer
term towards addressing these health inequities. Moreover, of interest to this study, it is important
to consider how the NDIS approaches equity and considers need. For example,
“Under the Scheme, (the NDIS) support is to be targeted to those with significant needs
who require specialist rather than mainstream support and who are likely to benefit
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most by way of improved independence and social and economic participation” (Foster
et al. 2016, p. 30)
This approach is aligned to the concept of vertical equity, where clients’ needs in terms of their
capacity to benefit for specific financial support will be individually assessed. This represents a
departure from the Medicare principles approach of equality of access, horizontal equity and is more
aligned, as discussed previously to what Mooney (2009) and (Culyer 1995) state as a more workable
approach to need; that is need assessed in terms of capacity to benefit.

As a multifaceted insurance model, beyond improving health alone, taxpayer funding of the NDIS is
not suitable to be included within the development of the HORSt. Disability however, as a significant
predictor of health inequalities, is relevant to factors that can give rise to poorer health outcomes
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2010, 2016a). As such, variables that represent disability
at the population level will be examined for their use to inform vertical equity loadings in Chapter
Five.

3.5

TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES FROM COMMONWEALTH TO SUPPORT THE PBS

The PBS provides Australians with taxpayer subsidised medicines to make them more affordable.
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) assesses the cost-effectiveness of drugs to
be listed for subsidisation on the PBS and recommends to the Commonwealth government drugs to
be listed (Department of Health 2017).

The PBS seeks to operate equitably based on the financial means of patients, whereby it currently
operates with co-payments payable by the patient, with pensioners and concessional card holders
paying $6.30 in 2017 for a prescription and non-concession patients paying a maximum of $38.80.
Maximum expenditure annual safety nets also apply being $378 and $1494.90 respectively for
concessional and non-concessional patients, with the cost of further prescriptions being respectively
free or reduced to the concessional rate (Department of Health 2017). However, Palmer and Short
(2014, p. 139) find that people with chronic illness typically on lower incomes face significant out-ofpocket co-payments irrespective of the safety net arrangements.

The PBS, like the MBS, can be also characterised as an output-based model, where each script
produced is an output. Moreover, doctors also act as gatekeepers to the PBS, so the distribution of
taxpayer subsidies is logically linked to this access.
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Aligned to the arguments made for including the MBS in establishing resourcing for a benchmarked
level of population health outcomes at the state level, the HORSt will also include PBS funding which
representing 15% of the Australian Government expenditure on health care in 2015-16 (Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a) and is therefore a crucial component of the resourcing of the
continuum of care.

PBS data is available from the Commonwealth at small area population

levels(Department of Human Services 2016). A discussion surrounding the extent and application of
this data to the HORSt is contained within in Chapters Four and Five.

3.6

OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS

In Australia out-of-pocket costs or co-payments occur whereby there is a gap between the
reimbursement by Medicare (under the MBS) and the medical practitioner’s fee. These costs are
common and typify the nature of private medical practice in Australia dominated by general
practitioners and specialists. For private hospital patients the gap is between the private insurance
benefit, Medicare reimbursement and the fee (Paris et al. 2010) .

For a country that provides its citizens with universal access to publicly subsidised health insurance
(Medicare), publicly subsidises prescription drugs (PBS), has one of the largest networks of public
hospitals in the world that provide treatment free of charge and has punitive tax arrangements to
encourage PHI coverage and publicly subsidies PHI premiums, it is puzzling that Australians face
increasingly higher out-of-pocket costs as a proportion of household consumption, eclipsing that of
the most expensive private system, the United States of America (USA) (Duckett et al. 2014, p. 4;
OECD 2017a, p. 26).

Unsurprisingly however, these rising out-of-pocket expenses present a

significant problem for health funding inequity and where timely access to private primary care is
compromised due to unaffordability it can lead to inequity of health outcomes whereby delay in
seeking care can exacerbate illness. Out-of-pocket expenses have a significant impact on the most
vulnerable members of society and the there is significant health inequalities evident in the data
arising from people’s ability to pay these costs and access services (Duckett et al. 2014; Kraft et al.
2009; Mollborn et al. 2005; Prentice & Pizer 2007).

The OECD reported in 2017 that 16.2 medical consultations per 100 people in Australia were avoided
due to cost (OECD 2017a, p. 26; 2017b). In addition, at the time of this preparing this study, the
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AIHW released data and a report on out-of-pocket costs in Australia. This is the first time such data
has been available to the public. Summarising the data Russell (2018) found that:
“seven percent of Australians (an estimated 1.3 million people) said the cost of services were the
reason that they delayed or did not seek specialist, GP, imaging or pathology services when they
needed them”.
Furthermore, the AIHW data highlights significant inequities regarding costs barriers to treatment
across locations, with a defining trend of a lower number of people delaying or avoiding treatment
due to cost in metropolitan areas of NSW 6.7% compared to NSW regional and rural areas 8.3%
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018e).

The practice of excessive fees and price discrimination by Australia’s private clinicians can be
described as rent-seeking behaviour, whereby the financial extraction of such disproportionate fees
is a non-compensated value relative to factor costs that contribute to production or the benefits
received by the patients (Gross & Laugesen 2018, p. 771; Krueger 1974). The rent-seeking behaviour
is systematic of the market failure associated with the information asymmetry between clinicians
and patients and is associated with monopolistic power which ultimately compromises technical and
allocative efficiency (Dunn & Shapiro 2014, p. 160; Ghosh 2008, p. 269).

Freed and Allen (2017) found that in Australia there is widespread differences in fees for service for:
the same speciality / type of service; location; amongst states. At an extreme level there was more
than a 400% difference in fees charged for the same speciality. This extreme range was found for
multiple specialities. The implication of this is that out-of-pocket expenses would be difficult to
justify as a variable that productively contributes to the resourcing of benchmarked health outcomes
and as such the HORSt will not consider it in establishing the resource pool for the benchmark.
However, in so far as that out-of-pocket costs represents inequity through people’s inability to pay
and consequently acts as a barrier to access, out-of-pocket costs will be considered in the HORSt as a
variable that may contribute to explaining how social determinants influence health outcomes.

3.7

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has examined the funding and governance arrangements of taxpayer subsidies within
the mixed private-public health system in Australia. Out-of-pocket expenses paid by individuals to
health care providers were also examined. The ability of these funding transfers to promote equity
and efficiency were critiqued in terms of their applicability for inclusion in the development of the
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HORSt. Legislative issues that surround the Australian health care system were also examined for
relevance to the HORSt development. The key findings are as follows.

The Medicare principles that all state governments must adhere to pertaining to timely and equal
access for services will not be breached by the Development of the HORSt.

Given the nature of private medicine in Australia, which is dominated by constitutionally protected
private medicine, taxpayer subsidisation of the MBS and the PBS is not subject to any resource
distribution mechanism. As such, this taxpayer subsidisation cannot advance equity or allocative
efficiency and the state health system is uniquely positioned to do so through resource distribution
guided by health needs.

Taxpayer subsidies made to private doctors under the MBS fee-for-service and to the PBS which is
gate-kept by private doctors are important components of the production of health outcomes. In a
benchmarked model considering the allocative efficiency of health outcomes, the MBS and PBS will
be important and necessary resource inputs for the HORSt to consider.

Taxpayer subsidies to the PHI rebate are inefficient. The literature also demonstrates that they are
inequitable, tending to favour the more socially advantaged members of the community. Due to
their significant inefficiencies and the fact they represent a risk contingency rather than a resource
that is actively used, it is difficult to apply this variable as a resource input for the production of
improved health outcomes. Data are also not available at the small population level required for the
study (as per outlined in Chapter Five). The study will therefore not seek to include this variable in
the development of the HORSt.

The NDIS is a multifaceted insurance model with expected benefits to improve people with
disabilities lives beyond that of the health sector.

Given this, the NDIS contribution to the

production of health outcomes is unknown and will not be included in the HORSt benchmark.
However, variables that represent disability within the population could be relevant predictors of
the allocative efficiency of desired health outcomes and will be tested as predictors of health need
within the model.

The enormous variation in out-of-pocket costs faced by Australians represents inefficiency and
inequity. It is difficult to know whether this funding transfer from individuals to private doctors
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represents a resource contribution to health outcomes, or a rent-seeking contribution to abnormal
profits. Data on out-of-pocket costs will not be included therefore as a resource input to the HORSt
benchmark. However, this data for small populations will be tested for inclusion as a predictor of
the allocative efficiency of the desirable outcomes to see whether or not the affordability of these
costs affects outcomes.
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.0

INTRODUCTION

The previous two chapters reviewed the literature of the underlying key concepts surrounding
health needs, equity and efficiency, public funding models, governance and funding arrangements
and the limitations and conditions that Australian federalism imposes upon Australian state health
systems.

Developed from key findings and gaps in the literature, this chapter provides the

methodology of the study, which applies the conceptual framework (page 88) underpinning the
study.

The section below demonstrates that all necessary ethical approvals for this study were achieved.
Following this, this chapter outlines the methodology for the development of the HORSt in the
context of NSW as an econometric case study via four areas of discussion, which are:
1. An overview of the methodological approach underpinning the development of the
HORSt and justification for the research methodology as a quantitative design.
2. The methodology supporting the development of the HORSt benchmark to inform the
allocative efficiency of taxpayer resources expended across the continuum of care to
produce health outcomes (approximated by measures of population health status).
3. The methodology for predictive modelling that identifies social determinants that give
rise to the allocative efficiency of population health status and affect populations’
ability to achieve benchmarked outcomes.
4. The methodology for operationalising the HORSt to inform vertical equity adjustments
and resource distribution between the state and the LHNs so that equity of health
funding across the continuum of care can be maximised.
Justification of data sources required to support the HORSt benchmark, predictive modelling and the
population structures used for analysis are outlined in Chapter Five.

The chapter concludes with a summary of the research methodology.
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4.1

ETHICAL APPROVAL

Consistent with paragraph 5.1.22 of the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC)
National Statement, “research can be exempt from Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) review
if that research:
(a) is negligible risk research; and
(b) involves the use of existing collections of data or records that contain only non-identifiable
data about human beings.
In doing so, it needs to be recognised that a decision to exempt a research study from ethical review
by the HREC is, in effect, a determination that the research meets the requirements of the National
Statement and is ethically acceptable” (National Health and Medical Research Council 2015b).

According to the National Statement section the definition of where research is negligible risk is:
“where there is no foreseeable risk of harm or discomfort; and any foreseeable risk is no more than
inconvenience. Where the risk, even if unlikely, is more than inconvenience, the research is not
negligible risk” (National Health and Medical Research Council 2015a).

In February 2017 a protocol was developed to support an application for the exemption of the study
from ethical review by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) as the study is a negligible risk
on the basis of that there were no study participants and data to be used is de-identified and
aggregated by age groups and sex at population levels. Specifically, the protocol identified the use
of the following de-identified data:

•

NSW aggregated hospitalisation data by age group and sex of the 22 Ambulatory Care

Sensitive Conditions defined by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, for each NSW SA3
geographic area for the ten years 2006/07 to 2015/16.

•

NSW aggregated hospitalisation data by age group and sex for Charlson-Comorbidities for

each NSW SA3 geographic area for the ten years 2006/07 to 2015/16.

•

NSW aggregated hospitalisation data by age group, sex, NWAUs, costs and program area for

the ten years 2006/07 to 2015/16 for each SA3 geographic area and for each LHN.
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•

Volume and cost of Medicare Benefits schedule categories (1 through 10) based on date of

processing by age group and sex for each SA3 geographic area for the financial years 2013/14,
2014/15, 2015/16.

•

Total scripts and benefits paid for the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (Normal

Arrangements PBS and Special Arrangements PBS) for all patient categories based on date of
processing by age group and sex for each SA3 geographic area for the financial years 2013/14,
2014/15, 2015/16.

•

State health expenditure public hospital expenditure for LHNs and SA3 geographic areas

measured by NWAUs for the years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16.

•

NSW Self-reported health survey data at SA3 level, aggregate by sex, age group and self-

reported health scores (1 through 5) for the last ten years 2006/07 to 2015/16.

On 16 March 2017, Australian Health Services Research Institute (AHSRI) Deputy Director
A/Professor Rob Gordon, reviewed the research protocol for the study and granted an exemption
from ethical review by the HREC. As SWSLHN Epidemiology unit extracted NSW Health data, as a
courtesy to the SWSLHN, a copy of the research protocol was also supplied to the SWSLHN HREC
whom agreed that the research satisfies conditions of being exempt from ethical review by the
HREC. Appendix 3 provides a copy of the ethics approval.

4.2

OVERVIEW AND THEORETICAL APPROACH

The literature reviews gaps, limitations and opportunities culminated in the study’s conceptual
framework (page 88) to support the study’s aims and research questions. In response to this, the
theoretical approach underpinning the HORSt involves three broad stages. These are:
1. The development of a measurable benchmark reflecting the allocative efficiency of the
production of health outcomes for populations relative to the resource inputs across the
continuum of care for those populations;
2. Identifying social determinants, that can represent populations’ health needs in terms of
populations’ capacity to benefit, that predict populations’ ability / inability to achieve the
benchmark; and
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3. Using the social determinant predictors of allocative efficiency as vertical equity funding
adjustors that can be applied to populations that cannot achieve the benchmark.
It might seem counterintuitive to be rewarding populations that do not meet the benchmark with
vertical equity loadings (a greater share of funding), however such a view does not consider the logic
that health care funding at the population level cannot create incentives that impact on choices that
individuals make, particularly in the mixed funding system of Australia.

Furthermore, as

demonstrated in the review of Governance and Funding arrangements in Chapter Three,
Commonwealth government subsidised funding of private services under the MBS and the PBS are
not subject to any distributive equity mechanism for populations and can exacerbate inequity. The
overall goal of the HORSt that culminates in the third stage is to guide the allocation of state health
funding from the state to geographical regions (LHNs). Funding shares are based on each LHN
population’s socially determined health needs and the affects these needs have on the LHNs
populations’ ability to achieve the benchmark, relative to the bulk of taxpayer funded resources
consumed by the populations across the continuum of care.

The vertical equity loadings are therefore not rewarding inefficiency or poor performance per se;
they are however compensating populations that have greater capacity to benefit, a greater need,
which acts as barrier for achieving the benchmarked outcomes and with respect to the total pool of
available tax payer funded resources which for this study will include MBS, PBS and State Public
Hospital resources. Congruent with the literature reviews findings on the purpose of population
needs-based funding instruments, the purpose of the loadings is to act as an enabler. The loadings
represent an equity adjustment and promote allocative efficiency, by creating a more optimal mix of
resources aligned to the production of more desirable outcomes. The loadings inform each LHNs
HORSt need index and when applied to the total pool of available taxpayer funded resources show
what residual amount is required to be adjusted by the State government so that equity of health
funding can be maximised.

To reiterate, the HORSt methodology will work as only a first step in the state health funding model.
ABF, identified in the literature review as being a compatible second step, is used to drive technical
efficiency between the LHNs and the state health service providers / facilities. Furthermore, the
HORSt methodology in supporting the first step in the funding model of guiding allocations from the
state to LHNs will not consider patient flows; patients from one LHN being treated in another.
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The conceptual approach underpinning the HORSt is somewhat analogous to the Gonski school
resourcing standard (SRS) which, as depicted in the literature review, identified reference schools as
a benchmark whereby they have an acceptable level of educational outcomes, measured by NAPLAN
results and are located within populations that have social determinants aligned to achieving those
outcomes. Gonski’s model applies vertical equity loadings applied to schools that do not meet the
benchmark and have social determinants know to give rise to poorer outcomes (Gonski et al. 2011).

The theoretical application of the HORSt is not unrealistically seeking to eradicate all the differences
in health so that health is equalised across the population. The realistic goal to enable maximising
equity, supported by the literature, should be to reduce or eliminate differences that result from
factors that are considered avoidable and unfair (NSW Department of Health 2004, p. 1; Whitehead
1991, p. 220). Doing so responds to the literature that argues for need to be defined in the context
of capacity to benefit and takes a vertical equity approach. This realistic approach is also aligned
with the Gonski SRS that did not seek to have all students achieve identical outcomes, but rather
seeks to reduce the avoidable barriers to educational outcomes so students have the same
opportunities to achieve (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 153). As such the equity goal in the HORSt
methodology is aligned with the promotion allocative efficiency with respect to factors that give rise
to health needs of the population and the benchmark is a function of allocative efficiency,
representing the health outcomes achieved by populations’ relative to their funding inputs.

The publicly reported limitations of the Gonski model do not apply to the HORSt. First, a key
criticism with Gonski is that it has no secondary mechanism (no ABF as in the case of the HORSt) to
ensure that resource distributions recommended under the formula can be expended efficiently
(Gannicott 2016, p. 16). Secondly, whilst Gonski was initially a tool of reallocation of current
funding, it ultimately recommended more funding (Gannicott 2016, p. 10). The HORSt by contrast
will not recommend additional health funding for the system. The HORSt is designed to act as
instrument of resource distribution, involving some reallocation, but nonetheless presiding over a
fiscal neutrality. Decisions of greater levels of funding are beyond the scope of the HORSt research
and matters of policy determinations for the state government.

The theoretical foundation of the first stage of the development of the HORSt benchmark is to utilise
PPHs as a proxy for health outcomes via a measure of health status at the population level. Doing so
is an extension of the work of Duckett and Griffiths (2016b) which identifies “hot spots” (p. 3) of
prolonged poorer health represented by PPHs which as discussed in the literature review are
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potentially preventable illnesses and representative of sicker patients and are found to be
persistently high in areas of having lower socioeconomic status, remoteness and indigeneity. The
HORSt application of this work is to take an inverse position of Duckett and Griffith’s hot spots and
consider establishing the benchmark where prolonged ‘cold spots’ exist, (geographical locations
where population health status is observed to be good) and where the social determinants of health
for those populations are favourable to achieve better health outcomes.

An alternative proxy of geographical population health status to using PPHs was also considered via
an application of the Charlson comorbidity index. As discussed in Chapter Two, whilst primarily used
as a tool of risk of mortality, the Charlson comorbidity index is a tested measure of health status,
which has been used to evaluate health outcomes in many clinical settings. Again revisiting the
literature review, similar to PPHs, the literature indicates that comorbidity is inversely related to
socioeconomic status (Chang et al. 2016).

Also congruent with Gonski’s approach that considers all sources of funding inputs to schools from
private and public sources, the HORSt will consider the majority of funding applied to across the
continuum of health care Australia. The publicly subsidised MBS and PBS funding and health funding
of public hospitals are the most feasible and applicable sources of funding to be included. The
inclusion of these variables is discussed further in next chapter encompassing data sources. These
funding inputs within the HORSt across the continuum of care represent 73% in 2015-16 of
Australian Government’s and NSW expenditure in NSW on, Medicare reimbursement of private
doctors, subsidised prescriptions and public hospitals (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
2018b).

4.2.1 A quantitative design
Creswell (2008, pp. 51-5) and Leedy and Ormrod (2010, p. 107) summarise and outline criteria for
the suitability of either quantitative and qualitative approaches to research design. Using their
summary of the literature, the HORSt is justified as a quantitative study as it requires:


using quantifiable measures to develop a benchmark for health outcomes relative to health
funding inputs;



a confirmatory / predictive approach; seeking to predict the effect of explanatory variables
upon a benchmarked level of health outcomes so as to make vertical equity financial
adjustments;



understanding of the quantum of funding required to achieve the benchmark;
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measurable levels of adjustments to be made to data of the social determinants of health;
and;



requires an understanding of the relationship between variables and their underlying trends.

Furthermore, the HORSt benchmark reflects the allocative efficiency of health outcomes using proxy
variables of population health status relative to funding inputs. In the second stage the predictive
model considers variables that can represent population needs that give rise to allocative efficiency
of the observed health status. Predictive methods are a subset of descriptive methodologies, which
can be categorised within quantitative correlation methods (Creswell 2008, p. 359). These methods
involve examining the predictive nature of the relationships between variables (McMillan 2010).
The relevance of predictive methods to the research is demonstrated though abundant literature for
investigating health needs in the context of funding models to alleviate inequities (Carr-Hill &
Sheldon 1992; Ho 2001; McDermott et al. 1997; Mooney 2009; Mooney et al. 1991) and from this
there is an expectation in the literature that operationalised funding determinations are transparent
and verifiable by accessible quantitative data sets.

The three methodological stages of the HORSt are now appraised and contextualised to the research
with supporting literature in sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. The population structures within
NSW LHNs used for the HORSt and the available data are justified and outlined in Chapter Five.
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4.3

METHDOLOGY FOR THE HORST BENCHMARK – (HORST METHOD STAGE 1)

To measure the relative allocative efficiency of the health outcomes produced from resources
applied across the combination of services of the continuum of care to different geographical areas,
an analysis of the relationship between the combination of health inputs and health outcomes is
necessary. Populations that are observed to have the best health outcomes relative to their funding
inputs can serve as benchmark populations to those populations that are not as relatively efficient.

Within the literature, efficiency at its simplest level can be described as the productivity ratio
between output and input, where more output per unit of input reflects greater relative efficiency
(Wilson 1999, p. 918). In the context of the HORSt design, the outputs in these ratios are not health
service outputs but proxies of population health status serving as a proxy for population health
outcomes.

As a ratio representing a fractional relationship, efficiency is logically constrained

between 0 and 1. The following equations 1 through 3 expand this fractional relationship in more
detail mathematically.

Equation 1
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =

𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡

Equation 1 outlines the mathematical relationship of efficiency in its simplest form between a single
output and input. However, where there are multiple outputs and inputs, efficiency is expressed as
a weighted ratio as per equation 2 and 3 below. Weights are required as different outputs and
inputs will have different contributions to the relative efficiency of each unit assessed (Farrell 1957,
p. 254; Kao 2016, p. 19).

Equation 2
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =

𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠

Alternatively, for a specific unit (t), this ratio in equation 2 can be expanded to demonstrate
weightings (coefficients) to each input and output. This is illustrated in equation 3.
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Equation 3
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡 =

𝑢1 𝑦1𝑡 + 𝑢2 𝑦2𝑡 + … + 𝑢𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑣1 𝑥1𝑡 + 𝑣2 𝑥2𝑡 + … + 𝑣𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑡

where:
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑖
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑖 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑖
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑖 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡

Problematically in a multiple output / input model, as depicted in equation 2 and 3, there will be a
necessity to appropriately assign weights to each side of the simple efficiency ratio so as to
understand the relative efficiency (Charnes et al. 1978; Sherman & Zhu 2006b, p. 64).

This issue is relevant to the HORSt, where the benchmark sought will be the population/s that has
the highest relative efficiency of producing desirable health outcomes (proxied by low rates of age
sex standardised PPHs or Charlson Co-morbidities), given the multiple financial inputs identified in
the literature across the continuum of care. The inputs being that of the expenditure of MBS, PBS
and state health system funding. The weighting of what role each funding source plays in producing
the outcomes is problematic and not solved through a simple ratio analysis.

An additional complicating dimension will be how environmental factors (the social determinants of
health) that affect the relative efficiency are to be assessed. In order to then redirect funding to
areas of need, the HORSt will then require a mechanism that predicts / explains the relative
efficiency so as to make vertical equity financial adjustments on the basis of predictors that reflect
these social determinants known to affect health outcomes.

An alternative to pursuing a model that considers the allocative efficiency of the bulk of the funding
inputs across the continuum of care to produce desirable outcomes would be to arbitrarily set a
benchmark around each population that can be shown to be exhibit prolonged cold spots (low /
good rates of PPHs or Charlson Co-morbidities) and then consider the financial inputs that typify
these areas as a benchmarked level of resourcing. A regression for environmental factors that give
rise to the rate of PPHs could be conducted to see what adjustments need to be made to each
population that have social determinants that give rise to poorer health outcomes. Gonski’s school
resourcing standard (SRS) used such an approach, identifying reference schools that met a desirable
level of educational standards (outcomes) and then considered reference school costs to help inform
Page 117

the funding benchmark (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 225). However, such an approach is far more
problematic with the HORSt regarding health services. Both funding for state public schools and
state public hospitals in Australia have multiple sources of public and private funding, however there
are some important key differences. In particular, the mixed funding which ultimately contributes to
schools’ educational outcomes are applied to one layer of educational delivery; schools.
Contrastingly, the state health system health outcomes are more diversely interconnected to
financial inputs of the continuum of care spread over multiple health care providers and services,
many of which are outside the remit of the state health sector and all having different contributions
to health outcomes. It is therefore necessary to adopt a model that can consider and weight the
different inputs contributions across the continuum of care to the efficiency of producing health
outcomes.

4.3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
Fortunately, econometrics has a solution that can be aligned to the development of the HORSt. The
use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is now a common tool for measuring the relative efficiency
of multiple entities, called in the DEA literature ‘decision making units (DMUs)’, within a group and
with the flexibility of multiple outputs and inputs (Hoff 2007). DMUs can be any entity where the
focus is upon efficiency and the DEA literature is replete with DMUs across many industries, for
example: manufacturers (lo Storto 2018); energy providers (Pérez 2017); hospitals and health
services (Ferrier & Trivitt 2013; Laspa & Priporas 2008); social welfare programs (Habibov & Fan
2010); banks (Sherman & Zhu 2006a); internationally compared health sectors (Berenguer et al.
2016); and regional health systems (Carrillo 2017). In the case of the HORSt, the populations within
NSW can be considered DMUs.

DEA is a linear programming technique and was specifically developed by Charnes et al. (1978) to
evaluate non-profit and public sector efficiencies to support benchmarking. DEA was specifically
developed to consider multiple outputs and inputs and provided a unique solution to determining
weights for factors. Using linear programming for each DMU, DEA determines a unique set of factor
weights (coefficients) for each DMU which are favourable for the DMU to maximise its efficiency and
which are feasible for all other DMUs (p. 431). In doing so, if a DMU is found to be inefficient there
can be no conjecture regarding the weighting of its factors unduly contributing to the inefficiency.
This is highly advantageous to the HORSt in avoiding having to arbitrarily set and justify weights for
factor inputs of difference services across the continuum of care.
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The efficiency scores produced are relative efficiency scores, as the linear programing applied to
each DMU compares their efficiency to all other DMUs.

DEA does this by identifying the best

practice or relatively efficient units to all other units. It identifies the scale of inefficiency of the
inefficient units compared to the best practice units. DMUs that are relatively efficient have an
efficiency score of 1 (100%) whereas inefficient DMUs efficiency scores are greater than zero but less
than 1. The benchmarked populations found to be the most efficient (100% efficient) are known in
the DEA literature to be categorised as “peers” and the results of the peers and inefficient DMUs can
be graphically plotted along a production frontier (Steering Committee for the Review of
Commonwealth/State Service Provision 1997). Figure 12 (page 121) illustrates an example plot of
the frontier.

DEA takes the form of an objective function where the objective is to maximise the efficiency score
of each DMU, subject to the constraint that, when the same set of weights (coefficients) is applied to
all other DMUS being compared, no DMU will be more than 100% efficient(≤ 1). This objective
function is outlined in the following linear programing example provided by (Sherman & Zhu 2006b,
p. 64).

DEA linear programing for calculating the relative efficiency score for each DMU

𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑀𝑈0 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃𝑜 =

𝑢1 𝑦10 + 𝑢2 𝑦20 +. . . +𝑢𝑟 𝑦𝑟0
𝑣1 𝑥10 + 𝑣2 𝑥20 +. . . +𝑣𝑚 𝑥𝑚0

subject to
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑀𝑈1 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃1 =

𝑢1 𝑦11 + 𝑢2 𝑦21 +. . . +𝑢𝑟 𝑦𝑟1
≤ 1;
𝑣1 𝑥11 + 𝑣2 𝑥21 +. . . +𝑣𝑚 𝑥𝑚1

𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑀𝑈2 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃2 =

𝑢1 𝑦12 + 𝑢2 𝑦22 +. . . +𝑢𝑟 𝑦𝑟2
≤ 1,
𝑣1 𝑥12 + 𝑣2 𝑥22 +. . . +𝑣𝑚 𝑥𝑚2

…..
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑗 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃𝑗 =

𝑢1 𝑦1𝑗 + 𝑢2 𝑦2𝑗 +. . . +𝑢𝑟 𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑣1 𝑥1𝑗 + 𝑣2 𝑥2𝑗 +. . . +𝑣𝑚 𝑥𝑚𝑗

≤1

whereby: 𝑢1 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑟 = 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑟 > 0;
𝜃𝑜 𝑡𝑜 𝜃𝑗 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑠 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑗;
𝑦1 𝑡𝑜 𝑦𝑟 = 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑟;
𝑣1 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑚 = 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑟 ≥ 0; and
𝑥1 𝑡𝑜 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑟
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The linear programming described above is an extensive set of computations and constraints and as
such DEA is typically calculated using modern DEA software packages. The software also helps
orientate the programming so that DEA can be optimised for maximising efficiency subject to
minimising the resource inputs or maximising the outputs and for considering economies of scale
assumptions (Coelli 1996; Emrouznejad & Thanassoulis 2011; Hollingsworth 1997; Iliyasu et al.
2015).

Input or output orientation determinations for the DEA depend on the context of the study. Input
orientated models seek to understand how efficiency can be maximised by using the least of amount
of inputs for a given level of outputs (input minimisation). Output orientated models seek to
understand how efficiency can be maximised by producing the maximum amount of outputs for a
given level of inputs (output maximisation) (Cooper et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2016; Pascoe et al. 2003).
Within the context of the HORSt the orientation is an output model, as per aim 1 of the study, the
objective is to develop the HORSt benchmark so as to represent desirable or best health outcomes
approximated by health status for LHNs’ populations’ relative to funding inputs across the
continuum of care. An output DEA model for maximised positive health outcomes (minimising poor
health) relative to the service inputs of the continuum of care is logical.

The DEA also needs to consider if efficiency is maximised under an assumption of constant returns to
scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). In Figure 12, examples of efficient frontiers under both
models are plotted. Assuming in the examples an output-oriented model such as the HORSt, the
frontiers define the maximum capacity output for the inputs. Under VRS the production capability
of DMUs is assumed to exhibit variability, including increasing (IRS), CRS and decreasing returns to
scale (DRS). Under CRS the production capability of DMUs is assumed to be constant; that is a
doubling of all inputs will double output.
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Figure 12

Example of DEA efficiency frontier under CRS and VRS – output orientation

Outputs

CRS frontier

VRS frontier
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A

0

Inputs

Figure 12 example adapted from (Cooper et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2016; Pascoe et al. 2003).

In Figure 12, under VRS, the DMUs A, D, F, E make up the VRS frontier (dotted line). These DMUs are
efficient peers amongst the set of 8 DMUs (A through H) representing the maximum outputs per
inputs. The peers are a relative benchmark for the relatively inefficient DMUs (B, G, C, H). Under
CRS only DMU D is efficient being on the CRS frontier which is established proportionally between
outputs and inputs. The assumption of CRS implies that a small DMU should be able to operate as
efficiently as a large one (Santos et al. 2013). In the context of the HORSt, the returns to scale are
not known. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, a priori reasoning is acceptable in the DEA literature
to assume VRS (Cooper et al. 2011; Pascoe et al. 2003). In the context of the HORSt, as per the
literature review and as will be shown in Chapter Five regarding data inputs and outcomes, there are
observable differences in outcome, inputs, population sizes and access to health services amongst
the populations (DMUs). Therefore, based on a priori logic, VRS will be assumed for the DMUs of
HORSt DEA.
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4.3.2 The goal and scope of the HORSt DEA
The goal for the HORSt will be that the data generating process of the DEA measures the relative
allocative efficiency for each NSW SA310 populations’ health status relative to all other NSW SA3
populations, subject to taxpayer inputs across the continuum of care. In doing so, the DEA will
establish a meaningful benchmark that can be then utilised to examine populations’ social
determinants of health that affect the achievement of the benchmark. The DEA derived efficiency
scores will serve as the dependent variable in the second stage of the methodology. This is now
outlined.

4.4

PREDICTIVE METHODOLOGY FOR IDENTIFYING SOCIAL DETERMINANTS / HEALTH

NEEDS – (HORST METHOD STAGE 2)
The DEA in stage one identifies the allocative efficiency of each population’s health status (a proxy of
population health outcomes) relative to the combination of health service inputs and relative to
each other populations’ allocative efficiency and populations who are 100% efficient. The second
stage involves identifying variables within each population that predict or explain the variation in the
efficiency scores. In doing so, the social determinants reflect health needs in the context of each
population’s potential capacity to benefit. The literature commonly refers to the combination of
DEA and predictive modelling, as in the case of the first two stages of the HORSt, as ‘two-stage DEA’
“where efficiency is estimated in the first stage and then the estimated efficiencies or, in a few cases,
ratios of estimated efficiencies, are regressed” (Simar & Wilson 2007, p. 32).

This approach for the HORSt will inform development of the need indices and consequently the third
stage of the HORSt methodology discussed in section 4.5; involving vertical equity funding
adjustments, based on the regression coefficients found to predict the variation in the DEA efficiency
scores (the dependent / outcome variable in the regression).

The HORSt construct design that underpins the second stage uses the allocative efficiency of health
status for each LHN’s geographical populations as a latent variable. As guided by the literature
review, two measures of population health status will be considered for the HORSt. These are age-

10

SA3 are small area populations and a metric of the ABS. These are defined and justified in the data chapter,

chapter 5.
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standardised rates of PPH and age-standardised rate of comorbidity measured by Charlson scores.
Chapter Five outlines and justifies which of these data elements will be ultimately used.

The selection of independent / explanatory variables sought to explain the variation in the allocative
efficiency of health status derived from the DEA need to be considered in terms of whether they give
rise to or form of the dependent variable or whether or not they reflect it.

Jarvis (2014),

Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006) and Bagozzi (2011), explains that the formative or reflective
nature of a construct depends upon the conceptualisation of the latent variable. Health status for
example can be a latent variable within either a formative or reflective construct. Conceptually for
example, in a formative construct, illness or disability could be formative indicators, as they give rise
or form to health status. In a reflective construct, a person or population’s health status can be
reflected in for example, the measurement of physical functioning, wellbeing and general health
perceptions, or in health system costs. However, in the research construct the population health
status being sought is a level of health outcomes for populations. As discussed, it is observed in the
literature that the
“social and economic conditions and their effects on people’s lives determine their risk of illness
(health status) and the actions taken to prevent them becoming ill or treat illness when it occurs”
(Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008a).

From this definition, it is apparent that social determinants give rise to or form the risk of illness
(health status). As such, a formative construct, as illustrated in Figure 13, is appropriate for the
HORSt second stage methodology that considers populations’ social determinants that explain the
variation in the allocative efficiency of health outcomes, approximated by variables that represent
populations’ health status.
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Figure 13

An example of a formative construct supporting the HORSt second stage methodology
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Figure 13 adapted from (Petter et al. 2007, p. 626).

The nature of the formative construct is an important consideration for the selection of variables to
support the predictive modelling to ensure construct validity of the model. Variable selection is
discussed in Chapter Five.

A key challenge for the predictive statistical modelling is that DEA uses a linear programming (nonstatistical / nonparametric) approach. This means that the DEA scores derived from the linear
programming are estimated and makes no allowance for error (noise) in sampling variability. As
such, DEA cannot afford accuracy of the efficiency estimates being representative of the population
and regression modelling used for predictive modelling of the estimates is not possible (Assaf &
Matawie 2010, pp. 3,549). However, there is a substantial body of literature that demonstrates the
wide spread use of two-stage DEA that employs regression modelling after estimating confidence
intervals and statistical parameters for each of the efficiency scores is conducted using a process
called bootstrapping (Aly et al. 1990; Amold et al. 1997; Banker & Johnston 1994; Barlos 2004;
Burgess Jr & Wilson 1998; Byrnes et al. 1988; Carrington et al. 1997; Chilingerian 1995; Chilingerian
& Sherman 2011; Chirikos & Sear 1994; De Borger & Kerstens 1996; Desli & Ray 2004; Dusansky &
Wilson 1994; Fried et al. 1999; Garden & Ralston 1999; Gillen & Lall 1997; Gonzalez & Barber 1996;
Kooreman 1994; Lovell et al. 1994; Luoma et al. 1996; McMillan & Datta 1998; Okeahalam 2004;
Simar & Wilson 1998, 1999).

Coelli et al. (2005, p. 202) contextualising bootstrapping to DEA states that it consists of:
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“using a random selection of thousands of ‘pseudo samples’ (using simple random sampling with
replacement) from the observed set of a sample data. ‘Pseudo’ estimates can then be obtained from
each of these samples. These thousands of pseudo estimates form an empirical distribution of the
estimator improving the accuracy of DEA-efficiency analysis of interest. The distribution is then used
as an approximation of the true underlying sampling distribution”.
The literature finds that bootstrapping affords valid statistical inference to permit second stage DEA
predictive modelling and that it also useful for sensitivity analysis of the DEA efficiency estimates
using the generated confidence intervals (Coelli et al. 2005; Simar & Wilson 1998, 1999, 2007).

Initially the preliminary modelling for this study, guided by the two stage DEA literature, used
bootstrapped DEA mean efficiency scores for the HORSt. However, Coelli et al. (2005, p. 203)
outlines that the use of bootstrapping DEA data is questionable when the whole population data is
used, rather than a sample. i.e.
“For example, when one has data on all hospitals in a particular region or census data, the data is
noise free as it represents all DMUs in the population and the DEA frontier obtained must be the true
frontier. That is, in this case the frontier has been measured and not estimated. Hence there is no
need to consider sampling variability” (emphasis added).
This situation is applicable to the HORSt, whereby the data to be used for the outputs and inputs of
the DEA, outlined in Chapter Five, is for all populations across NSW. Given this, bootstrapping is not
required and will not be used for the DEA efficiency scores. The resulting scores for each DMU are
relative measures of allocative efficiency, relative to all other DMUs.

4.4.1 Regression for the second stage DEA
Regression analysis is a form of predictive modelling that investigates the explanatory relationship
between variables. Specifically, a regression analysis takes the form of a linear model between an
outcome variable (dependent variable) which is predicted or explained by one or more independent
variables (Seber & Lee 2003). The linear model takes the form of that shown in equation 4.

Equation 4 - Linear regression model
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖
whereby: 𝒀 = the outcome variable;
𝑿𝒊 = the predictor variable(s);
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𝒃𝟏 = the regression coefficient associated with the predictor;
𝒃𝟎 = the value of the outcome when the predictor is zero; and
𝝐𝒊 is an error term.
(Field 2013, p. 883)

The interpretation of the regression coefficient is that as the independent / predictor variable
increases by one unit, the value of the outcome / dependent variable increases by the value of the
coefficient. Where the regression has multiple predictors, the effect of each independent variables
on the dependent variable is subject to holding the effects of all other covariates constant (Field
2013, p. 339). The error term in the regression model reflects that independent variables will not
perfectly predict the outcome (Gallo 2015).
A regression model is an appropriate model for the HORSt, investigating factors 𝑿𝒊 that explain the
variation across DMUs’ (populations’) efficiency scores (the dependent variable Y). However, there
are various forms of regression and the “choice often depends on the kind of data you have for the
dependent variable and the type of model that provides the best fit” (Frost 2018b). The best fit
refers to how well the data fits the predicted linear equation (Chatterjee & Simonoff 2013, p. 5),
depicted in the simple example in Figure 14 as the red line, which is the expected value of Y given
the value of X. The dots are data points.

Figure 14

Example of a basic regression between two variables X and Y

Source for Figure 14, adapted from (Gallo 2015, p. 5).
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A statistic known as R-squared (R2) indicates the fit of the data in the model. Ogee et al. (2013)
provides defines R2 as:
“the percentage of the response variable variation that is explained by a linear model.


R-squared = Explained variation / Total variation



R-squared is always between 0 and 100%:



0% indicates that the model explains none of the variability of the response data around its
mean.



100% indicates that the model explains all the variability of the response data around its
mean.

R2 is known as a coefficient of determination and represents the proportion of the variance in the
dependent variable that is predictable from the independent variable(s).”

It follows from this explanation that a regression model with higher R2 can explain more of the
variance in the dependent variable from the predictors. However, caution needs to be applied with
seeking a higher R2 as a goal for the regression. This is because R2 will always be larger if more
predictor variables are added, even if due to random chance alone, so the issue becomes whether or
not the larger R2 represents a significantly better fit of the data, whereby the regression axioms
(discussed in the next subsections) are not violated and where the regression significance has been
established (Field 2013, p. 324; Ogee et al. 2013). The literature indicates that there is no specific
rule on how large an R2 ought to be for the regression to be considered useful, as it will largely
depend on the context of the study and any necessary transformations that have been applied to
the data to fit the context of the study and or meet necessary regression assumptions (Frost 2017a;
Nau 2018).

In the context of the HORSt second stage methodology, the regression should represent a
description of what social determinants effect health outcomes and provide guidance to predictors
that can be applied in the third stage as vertical equity funding adjustors. In this context, the HORSt
will consider statistically significant R2 size alongside how logical the description of the model’s
independent variables is in describing the underlying relationship with the dependent variable with
respect to the underlying literature that guides the choice of the independent variables.

Overall, the key objective of the regression for the HORSt will to develop a parsimonious model; a
model that offers the simplest explanation of predicting the variation in the allocative efficiency
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scores of the DMUs, so that the data fits the linear equation. Typically in a regression, parsimony is
achieved when the minimum number of independent variables affords an adequate explanation of
the variation in the dependent variable (Berenson et al. 2013, p. 536; Vandekerckhove et al. 2015,
p. 3).

4.4.2 Linear regression assumptions and test procedures
Before discussing the underlying data for the regression to be used in Chapter Five, it is important to
outline the key assumptions that must be met in order to be confident that the results can be
generalised. Appendix 7 on page 318 provides a summary of these key assumptions and outlines the
methodological tests that will be applied to the HORSt regression to ensure that the regression
results are robust. The outcomes of these tests for these assumptions will be presented in the
results section in Chapter Six.

4.4.3 HORSt Regression
Within the two-stage DEA literature, the type of second stage regression modelling applied by
researchers varies. According to Simar and Wilson’s (2007, p. 33) seminal paper and review of two
stage DEA methods, they find that most researchers have used Ordinary least Squares (OLS)
regression, or a Tobit regression, a type of censored regression. Briefly, these techniques can be
defined as follows:


OLS – the most common form of linear regression, often just known as linear
regression, provides best estimates of the model when all assumptions for linear
regression (those defined in the appendix 7 page 318) are met (Frost 2018a).



Tobit regression – provides maximum likelihood estimates of linear relationships
between variables when the dependent variable is either left-and / or right censored
(restricted) due to measurement constraints. Examples of censoring include a model
of data measured from a scientific gauge that provides a range of values of some
phenomena being measured, where the true measure of some of the data
observations may lie beyond the range of the gauge yet are recorded at the gauges
maximum or minimum.

In such cases a regression would require censoring to

eliminate observations at the maximum and / or minimum. (UCLA Statistical
Consulting Group 2018).
The divergence in the literature between these approaches is that some researchers claim that the
nature of DEA efficiency estimates, bound between 0 and 1 mean that conventional linear
regression modelling, such as OLS, should not apply and that a Tobit regression is appropriate
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(Ahmad et al. 2017; McDonald 2009; Simar & Wilson 2007). However, as argued by Raheli et al.
(2017), Simar and Wilson (2007), McDonald (2009), Ramalho et al. (2010) a growing body of
literature indicates that such a position is false, whereby all DEA scores being a fractional
relationship of outputs to inputs will logically be bound by 0 and 1 and are not censored. It follows
that the use of Tobit regression in DEA, despite being widespread is questionable. Based on this
literature the HORSt will utilise OLS regression. The OLS regression will be computed using SPSS v24
software (IBM Corp 2017).

4.5

UTILISING SOCIAL DETERMINANTS / HEALTH NEEDS AS VERTICAL EQUITY FUNDING

ADJUSTORS TO INFORM LHNS SHARE OF STATE HEALTH FUNDING – (HORST METHOD
STAGE 3)
The population structures in this study that represent the DMUs are ABS population structures
known as Statistical Area level 3 (SA3s). There are 88 of these used in the study that span within and
across the 15 NSW LHNs. These are discussed and justified for their selection in the next chapter
which outlines the data sources for the study.

After the regression equation for the two-stage DEA is established with independent variables that
represent social determinants that give rise to the allocative efficiency of the health status of the
population, the predicted efficiency scores are calculated for each DMU / SA3 population. From this
calculation, the SA3(s) that are predicted to be the most efficient represent the benchmark.
Equation 5 shows the calculation of the predicted allocative efficiency scores for each population
area using the regression with independent variable 𝑥1 to 𝑥𝑛 . The actual number of independent
variables used in the regression will be ascertained through the regression analysis outlined in the
results in Chapter Six.

Equation 5- Predicted Allocative Efficiency of each DMU / SA3
𝑦̂ = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑥1 + 𝑏2 𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑛 𝑥𝑛
where: 𝐲̂= the predicted efficiency score of each SA3
𝒃𝟎 = the value of the outcome when the predictor is zero, the regression constant;
𝒙𝟏 = predictor / independent variable 1;
𝒃𝟏 = the regression coefficient associated with the predictor / independent variable 1;
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𝒙𝟐 = predictor / independent variable 2;
𝒃𝟐 = the regression coefficient associated with the predictor / independent variable 2;
𝒙𝒏 = predictor / independent variable n; and
𝒃𝒏 = the regression coefficient associated with the predictor / independent variable n.

A health needs allocative efficiency index, the HORSt needs index for each SA3 (equation 6), is then
created by computing a ratio of the best predicted efficiency score to the predicted scores of each
DMU. Doing so enables a vertical equity funding adjustment to be made to SA3s that have social
determinants that limit the ability of the health service inputs across the continuum of care to
achieve allocative efficient desirable health outcomes.

Equation 6- HORSt needs index for SA3s

𝑛𝑖 =

𝑃𝐵
𝑥 100
𝑃𝐴𝐸 𝑖

where:


𝒏𝒊 = The HORSt need index for SA3i;



𝑷𝑩 = the highest predicted allocative efficiency score of all SA3 populations (the
predicted benchmark); and



𝑷𝑨𝑬𝒊 = the predicted allocative efficiency score of SA3i.

The index generated shows the socially determined health needs of each SA3 population as a
proportional difference to the benchmark. The index number of 100 represents the benchmark,
which is the lowest value for the index. Shown below in equation 7 is a hypothetical example for a
fictional 𝑆𝐴3𝑧 having a predicted efficiency score derived from the HORSt regression of 75.2 and
whereby the benchmarked SA3 had the highest predicted efficiency of any SA3 of 98.6. This yields
for 𝑆𝐴3𝑧 a need index of 131, having social determined health needs 31% greater than the
benchmarked SA3 population.

Equation 7- HORSt needs index –hypothetical example

𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑆𝑡 𝑆𝐴3𝑧 = 131 =

𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 98.6
𝑥 100
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝐸 𝑆𝐴3𝑧 75.2

Page 130

Since NSW SA3 populations can sit wholly within or across multiple LHNs, each LHN’s HORSt need
index is built up from the SA3 need indices weighted for the SA3’s population proportions that make
up the LHN. Equation 8 outlines this which is identical to how needs indices at the LGA level were
apportioned within the former NSW RDF and EHUIs to LHNs (Inter-Government & Funding Strategies
2005a; Marshall & Slater 2015). The HORSt need index for each SA3 is apportioned to each of the
LHNs whereby the HORSt need index in each SA3 is multiplied by the portion of the SA3’s population
in the LHN as per the 2016 Australian Census. Each SA3s need adjusted population portion of the
LHN is then summed to calculate the HORSt need index for the LHN.

Equation 8 – HORSt need index of LHNs
𝑛

(𝑁)𝑡 = ∑(𝑛𝑖 𝑥 % 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑡 )
𝑖=1

Where:


(𝑁)𝑡 = the HORSt need index for 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑡 ;



𝑛𝑖 = the HORSt need index for SA3i; and



% 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑡 = the portion of the population of SA3i in 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑡 as per the 2016
Australian Census.

Table 7 is a worked hypothetical example that utilises equation 8 to apportion six theoretical SA3s
(SA3i to SA3n) need indices to an LHN(t) where the SA3s are contained wholly or partially within
LHN(t). In this example the resulting LHN need index is 132.02.
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Table 7

Example of apportioning SA3 need indices to the LHN

LHN(t)

SA3s
within
LHN

A

B

Pop share of SA3 in LHN (t) 2016 Census

i
j
k
l
m
n

0.277%
100.000%
100.000%
99.978%
100.000%
0.146%

C=AxB

D = C / Sum of C

SA3
Proportion of
Population
Total Population
in LHN (t) =
for LHN in each
SA3 Pop 2016 Population
SA3 = SA3
Census
share of
population in LHN
SA3 in LHN
(t)/ Sum of SA3
(t) x SA3
population in LHN
population

72073
77934
92470
133292
101617
49059
Total

199.80
77934.00
92470.00
133262.69
101617.00
71.69
405555.18

H

HNI =the sum of (H x D) for each SA3 in the
LHN (i to n)

HORSt need
HORSt Need index of each SA3 x
index of SA3s
Proportion of Total Population for LHN in
in the LHN (i
the SA3 = need index
to n)

0.0005
0.1922
0.2280
0.3286
0.2506
0.0002
1.0000

125.479
144.997
133.960
122.923
132.265
120.020

0.0618
27.8636
30.5439
40.3917
33.1407
0.0212
132.0230

Once each of the LHNs have a need index built up from the SA3 indices, these indices can inform
socially determined needs-based shares of funding to assist with resource allocation decisions from
the state government to each of the LHNs. These needs-based shares are calculated through the
series of equations 9 through 12, which are the same calculations that have been applied in the NSW
RDF and EHUIs for ascertaining the resource allocation shares from RDF and EHUI need indices
(Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005a; Marshall & Slater 2015).

First, each LHN’s 2016 Australian Census population is multiplied by its need index which derives a
needs adjusted population (equation 9) which is logically greater than the actual population, inflated
by the need index. The sum of all the LHNs needs adjusted populations is then calculated, which is
the total state needs adjusted population (equation 10). Again, being needs adjusted this total
exceeds the actual NSW state population.

Equation 9– LHN needs adjusted population
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖
where:


𝑥𝑖 = needs adjusted population of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖 ;



𝑁𝑖 = HORSt need index of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖 ; and



𝑃𝑖 = 2016 Australian Census population of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖 .
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Equation 10– State needs adjusted population
𝜎 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖
where:


𝜎 = NSW state needs adjusted population



𝑥𝑖 = 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖 needs adjusted population

The individual LHN needs adjusted populations are then normalised back to the actual state
population by calculating their proportional share of the state needs adjusted population, by
dividing each LHNs needs adjusted population by the state needs adjusted population and then
multiplying by the actual NSW state population from the 2016 Australian Census (equation 11).

Equation 11– LHN needs normalised population to 2016 Census population

𝛼𝑖 =

(𝑥𝑖 )
𝜎

x𝑆

where:


𝛼𝑖 =needs normalised population of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖



𝑥𝑖 = 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖 needs adjusted population



𝜎 = NSW State needs adjusted pop



𝑆 = NSW 2016 Australian Census population

Finally, each LHNs socially determined health needs share of resources, their HORSt share, is
calculated by then dividing the LHNs needs normalised adjusted population by the NSW population
from the 2016 Australian Census (equation 12). The HORSt LHN shares of resources will be subject
to comparison to the currently used EHUIs and the LHNs populations currently reported use of
resources.

Equation 12– LHN HORSt share of resources

𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑆𝑡 𝐿𝐻𝑁 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 % (𝜖)𝑖 =

(𝛼𝑖 )
𝑆

where:
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(𝜖) = HORSt share of resources for 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖 ;



𝛼𝑖 =needs normalised population of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖



𝑆 = NSW 2016 Australian Census population

4.5.1 Resource Allocation guidance using the HORSt
Once the HORSt share of funding is known for every LHN, representing the health needs of the LHNs,
resource allocation decisions between the State and LHNs can be guided by summing the total MBS,
PBS and state health public hospital resources together and comparing what each LHN’s share of
these resources are compared to what they would be if the HORSt shares were applied. The
difference between the actual consumption of resources across these three inputs of the continuum
of care and that guided by the HORSt is the quantum of funds required to be adjusted by the state
health system in order to maximise equity. As discussed, the HORSt informs the state health funding
requirement as a residual adjustment after the taxpayer subsidisation from other relevant
Commonwealth government funding has been considered. In other words, the HORSt represents
what the state needs to spend for population equity, given that the state cannot control the
Commonwealth contribution spending in the private sector.

4.6

CHAPTER SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY APPLIED

This chapter has outlined and justified the methodology for the development of the HORSt.
In summary:
The HORSt benchmark methodology makes use of:


Utilising DEA whereby the data generating process of the DEA measures the relative
allocative efficiency for each NSW SA3 populations’ health status relative to all other
NSW SA3 populations, subject to taxpayer inputs across the continuum of care;



The DEA model to support the benchmark is an output orientated model that seeks to
maximise output relative to inputs and assumes based on a priori reasoning variable
returns to scale;



Population health status is the DEA output variable, which can be approximated by
rates of PPHs or Charlson comorbidities (discussed in further detail in Chapter Five);
and
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The main taxpayer funding inputs across the continuum of care from Commonwealth
and NSW government for MBS, PBS and state public health outputs will be used as the
resource inputs in the DEA (discussed in further detail in Chapter Five).

The HORSt predictive modelling methodology makes use of:


An ordinary least squares regression;



The measured DEA allocative efficiency scores for each NSW SA3 populations’ health
status will be the dependent variable;



Testing explanatory variables from the Australian 2016 census and reputable secondary
data sources that are demonstrated in the literature to represent social determinants
of health and can give rise or form in a formative construct to the allocative efficiency
of populations’ health status.

The HORSt informs LHNs shares of funding using vertical equity loadings. These loadings and LHN
shares are constructed using:


The regression coefficients to calculate the predicted allocative efficiency for all
populations’;



The ratio of individual predicted allocative efficiency scores for each SA3 population
compared to the most efficient SA3 population inform need indices for each SA3
population; and



Population weighted need indices for each SA3 population as proportions of the LHNs
that contain them inform LHN needs-based shares of funding.

The HORSt results for LHNs shares of funding will be compared to the current LHNs shares of state
health inpatient resources by area of residence and will also be compared to the current EHUIs
shares of resources.
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CHAPTER FIVE - DATA SOURCES
5.1

DATA SOURCES

This chapter outlines and justifies the data sources and their application used in the study. First the
population level structures are outlined for inclusion, with limitations examined due to the
availability of Commonwealth Government supplied data. DEA data inputs and output data are then
justified in alignment with data availability and the literature presented. Data standardisation and
applicable transformations required to support the methodology are outlined and justified. Finally,
variables to be considered for inclusion in the regression analysis are appraised.

5.2

POPULATION LEVEL STRUCTURES

As the HORSt ultimately will inform resource distribution for LHNs from the state government, it is
logical and necessary to utilise population level data structures that can support the DEA and
regression analysis. As indicated in the previous chapter, the population structure will inform the
DMUs of the DEA. The ABS data that will be utilised in this study is available at different levels of
aggregation for populations and geographies.

Since 2011 the ABS use Australian Statistical

Geography Standard (ASGS) and within this is an ABS structure which provides a hierarchy of
geographical areas developed for the release of ABS statistical information. Figure 15 depicts the
ABS Structures, showing the hierarchy of areas and their component statistical areas and how they
interrelate. The ABS main population and census structures are stable for 5 years (Australian Bureau
of Statistics 2017d).
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Figure 15

The ASGS ABS Structure

Figure 15 source: ABS website Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS) (Australian Bureau
of Statistics 2017d)

Small population clusters are sensible structures to study to inform geographical health needs. For
example, the previous NSW Health Needs Indices (EHUIs) study used Statistical Area Level 2 (SA2)
ABS geographies (Health Policy Analysis 2014b, p. 14). These generally have a population range of
3,000 to 25,000 persons and have an average population of about 10,000 persons. SA2s in remote
and regional areas generally have smaller populations than those in urban areas (Australian Bureau
of Statistics 2016c). In addition, the ABS definition SA2 geographies:
“aim is to represent a community that interacts together socially and economically” (Australian
Bureau of Statistics 2016c).

As identified in the literature and methodology chapter, core resource data for assessing the publicly
provided and subsidised resources across the continuum of care includes MBS and PBS data and
these will be utilised as DEA inputs variables discussed in section 5.3.2. However, the Australian
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Government Department of Human services have stated following requests for this data, that the
smallest geographical level that they supply de-identified aggregated data by age and sex is the
Statistical Area Level 3 (SA3) level (Slater 2017).

Across Australia, SA3 ABS geographies typically have population sizes of between 30,000 and
130,000 people, though there are some exceptions. The ABS states that the SA3s:
“provides a standardised regional breakup of Australia. The aim of SA3s is to create a standard
framework for the analysis of ABS data at the regional level through clustering groups of SA2s that
have similar regional characteristics. SA3s are built from whole SA2s. Whole SA3s aggregate directly
to SA4s in the Main Structure. SA3s do not cross state / territory borders” (Australian Bureau of
Statistics 2016c, 2016d).

Given the restriction that the smallest geographical structure for the provision of MBS and PBS data
is SA3, this study utilises SA3 geographies for this study. There are two versions of SA3 geographies
since the commencement of ASGS, 2011 and 2016 with some minor changes between the two and
mapping available between them (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016b, 2017d). The MBS and PBS
data were supplied with the 2011 version which forms the basis of the SA3 geographies used in the
study. All variables identified for consideration in this study, outlined in this chapter, are available or
able to be derived at the 2011 SA3 level (hereafter referred to as SA3/s). As per the ABS definition
above, SA3s are wholly contained within states borders. In NSW there are 91 SA3 geographical areas
having an average population of about 83,000 people (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016d). A
discussion of the virtues of using SA2 data in the future is included in Chapter Seven.

It is important to note that 34 SA3 geographies do not fit precisely within the boundaries of the 15
NSW Health LHN boundaries. The NSW LHNs are defined by 2011 Statistical Local Areas (SLAs) (SLHD
Planning Unit 2013) which are contained either wholly or partially within Local Government Areas
(LGAs) boundaries (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001). LGAs are not part of the ABS ASGS that
commenced in 2011, but were part of the ABS Australian Standard Geographical Classification
(ASGC) prior (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017d). However the ABS has available “Non-ABS
Structure LGA Boundaries and Correspondences” for 2011 boundaries (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2012), which allows for concordance mapping between structures.

To support the third stage of the HORSt methodology outlined in section 4.5 (page 129) which
informs resource distribution shares for each LHN and to provide an understanding of the resource
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inputs and outcomes for LHNs, the HORSt results for the 15 NSW LHNs are built up from NSW SA3
geographies and apportioned to LHNs on the basis on each SA3’s population needs and the
population proportion of each SA3 within each LHN. The portion of SA3 populations found within
each LHN is based on the 2011 ABS LGA and SA3 structures and 2011 ABS concordance mapping
showing the LGA population apportioning to corresponding SA3 geographies (Australian Bureau of
Statistics 2012). The most recent population projections of SA3s from the 2016 Census (Australian
Bureau of Statistics 2017g) have been used for this apportioning task. An alternative contemporary
population projection that could be used in lieu of the census is to use the NSW Department of
Planning Projections (NSW Department of Planning and Environment 2017). Given the timing of the
release of the 2016 Census results in 2017 concurrent with the timing of this thesis, the 2016 ABS
Census has been used.

Of the 91 NSW SA3s, 88 were used in the study as 3 found to have extremely low population
numbers (two had less than 10 people and one had less than 400). These SA3s were also missing
input data to support the DEA. These were excluded. The excluded SA3s by code and name are as
follows:


12402 Blue Mountains – South (population less than 10 individuals);



10702 Illawarra Catchment Reserve (population less than 10 individuals); and



10803 Lord Howe Island (inconsistent and very low PBS data and population of 382).

According to the 2016 Census, the 88 SA3s used in the study have populations ranging from 12,737
in the Lower Murray Area of Murrumbidgee LHN, to 230,326 in the Sydney Inner City Area which
straddles South Eastern Sydney and Sydney LHNs (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017g). Table 8
(page 140) shows a summary of the 88 NSW SA3s of the study and their proportional population
mapping to build up the 15 NSW LHNs. Equation 13 outlines the mapping employed to apportion
the SA3 populations to LHNs. An almost identical method of apportioning LGAs to SLAs and NSW
LHNs and former NSW AHSs was used with the former NSW RDF and EHUIs (Marshall & Slater 2015).
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Table 8

88 DMUs (NSW SA3 populations) used in DEA with population portions of each LHN

Pop
share of
SA3 in
each LHN
2016
DMUs (SA3 Code and Name)
LHN
Census
10601 Lower Hunter
100.00%
10602 Maitland
100.00%
10603 Port Stephens
100.00%
10604 Upper Hunter
100.00%
10801 Great Lakes
100.00%
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
0.12%
10804 Port Macquarie
0.02%
Hunter New
10805 Taree - Gloucester
100.00%
England
11001 Armidale
100.00%
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield
100.00%
11003 Moree - Narrabri
100.00%
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah
100.00%
11101 Lake Macquarie - East
100.00%
11102 Lake Macquarie - West
100.00%
11103 Newcastle
100.00%
10104 South Coast
0.28%
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla
100.00%
Illawarra
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour
100.00%
Shoalhaven
10704 Wollongong
99.98%
11401 Shoalhaven
100.00%
11402 Southern Highlands
0.15%
10402 Coffs Harbour
99.48%
Mid North
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
99.88%
Coast
10804 Port Macquarie
99.98%
10101 Goulburn – Yass
26.89%
10302 Lachlan Valley
10.61%
10901 Albury
100.00%
10902 Lower Murray
28.76%
Murrumbidgee
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury
100.00%
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West)
100.00%
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
99.99%
11303 Wagga Wagga
100.00%
10301 Bathurst
0.04%
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
45.88%
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
0.34%
11503 Hawkesbury
100.00%
Nepean Blue
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
31.65%
Mountains
12401 Blue Mountains
100.00%
12403 Penrith
95.28%
12404 Richmond - Windsor
100.00%
12405 St Marys
100.00%
12702 Fairfield
0.94%
10401 Clarence Valley
100.00%
10402 Coffs Harbour
0.52%
Northern NSW 100.00%
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland
100.00%
11203 Tweed Valley
100.00%
11501 Baulkham Hills
18.43%
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
49.02%
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove
100.00%
12102 Hornsby
100.00%
12103 Ku-ring-gai
100.00%
12104 North Sydney - Mosman
Northern
100.00%
12201 Manly
Sydney
100.00%
12202 Pittwater
100.00%
12203 Warringah
100.00%
12502 Carlingford
10.45%
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
84.39%
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
97.49%

SA3 Pop
2016
Census
89,621
76,134
73,036
30,877
31,895
49,005
79,929
54,761
38,098
38,858
26,452
82,379
123,536
77,075
169,571
72,073
77,934
92,470
133,292
101,617
49,059
87,943
49,005
79,929
73,003
56,416
62,504
12,737
42,542
49,464
14,686
95,644
47,783
47,572
27,076
25,165
34,081
78,496
143,452
37,469
55,427
193,076
50,961
87,943
80,412
71,294
93,458
148,761
27,076
117,824
83,456
123,474
100,152
44,994
63,504
157,846
68,864
49,288
140,873

DMUs (SA3 Code and Name)
LHN
11701 Botany
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham
11703 Sydney Inner City
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North
South
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South
Eastern
11903 Hurstville
Sydney
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale
12703 Liverpool
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote
10704 Wollongong
11402 Southern Highlands
11901 Bankstown
11902 Canterbury
12301 Camden
South
12302 Campbelltown (NSW)
Western
12303 Wollondilly
Sydney
12403 Penrith
12501 Auburn
12503 Merrylands - Guildford
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley
12702 Fairfield
12703 Liverpool
10101 Goulburn – Yass
10102 Queanbeyan
Southern
10103 Snowy Mountains
NSW
10104 South Coast
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham
11703 Sydney Inner City
11901 Bankstown
11902 Canterbury
Sydney
11903 Hurstville
12001 Canada Bay
12002 Leichhardt
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield
10301 Bathurst
10302 Lachlan Valley
Western
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
NSW
10304 Orange
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
10503 Dubbo
11501 Baulkham Hills
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
11601 Blacktown
11602 Blacktown - North
Western
11603 Mount Druitt
Sydney
12501 Auburn
12502 Carlingford
12503 Merrylands - Guildford
12504 Parramatta
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
10201 Gosford
Central
10202 Wyong
Coast
10502 Broken Hill and Far West
Far West
10902 Lower Murray
Average SA3 pop size of the 88 SA3s
Median SA3 pop size of the 88 SA3s
Minimum SA3 pop size
Maximum SA3 pop size

Pop
share of
SA3 in
each LHN
2016
SA3 Pop
Census
2016 Census
100.00%
49,169
0.04%
57,574
94.36%
230,326
100.00%
136,152
100.00%
149,266
93.89%
132,733
100.00%
145,493
0.57%
122,238
100.00%
114,106
100.00%
111,321
0.02%
133,292
99.85%
49,059
99.09%
178,409
5.84%
141,819
100.00%
64,212
100.00%
162,845
100.00%
42,215
4.72%
143,452
0.91%
94,077
22.72%
157,512
100.00%
106,378
99.06%
193,076
99.43%
122,238
73.11%
73,003
100.00%
59,472
100.00%
19,740
99.72%
72,073
0.01%
14,686
99.96%
57,574
5.64%
230,326
0.91%
178,409
94.16%
141,819
6.11%
132,733
100.00%
89,595
100.00%
59,540
100.00%
159,133
99.96%
47,783
89.39%
56,416
54.12%
47,572
100.00%
58,991
100.00%
25,059
100.00%
71,138
81.57%
148,761
50.64%
27,076
68.35%
34,081
100.00%
139,391
100.00%
95,745
100.00%
115,220
99.09%
94,077
89.55%
68,864
77.28%
157,512
100.00%
146,708
15.61%
49,288
2.51%
140,873
100.00%
173,257
100.00%
162,052
100.00%
20,598
71.24%
12,737
87,942
78,215
12,737
230,326

Sources: (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001, 2012, 2016d, 2017g; SLHD Planning Unit 2013).
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Equation 13 – Apportioning / mapping SA3 populations to NSW LHNs
𝑛

𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 = ∑(𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 ) 𝑥 (% 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 )
𝑖=1

Where: 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 = 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛
% 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 = 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝐻𝑁

5.3

DEA DATA

As a relative concept DEA does not require all of the outputs and inputs of DMUs, requiring only a
sensible choice of variables that express the performance of DMUs (Morita & Avkiran 2009, p. 164;
Sherman & Zhu 2006b). Contextually for the HORSt, the financial inputs identified in the literature
review (MBS expenditure, PBS expenditure, state public hospitals expenditure) that represent the
majority of taxpayer funding inputs across the continuum of care, around 73% in 2015-16 (Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a), are a sensible choice for inclusion in the DEA. All are
available at the SA3 population level.

The governance review in Chapter Three also identified that out-of-pocket patient costs for nonhospital Medicare subsidised services are now available for SA3 populations. Whilst this data could
be used as a financial input in the DEA, a decision was made not to do so on the basis that of the
literature presented surrounding the fact that out-of-pocket costs represent health inequity; where
people forgo or delay access to private treatment due to unaffordability of costs and run the risk of
worsening their health. As such out-of-pocket cost will be more appropriately considered for
inclusion in the HORSt as a predictor variable in the HORSt regression. Furthermore, given the
widespread variations in out-of-pocket costs which are determined by private doctors’ profit-making
motives, it is difficult to understand the resource contribution that out-of-pocket costs make to the
production of health outcomes across the continuum of care. This is especially so when out-ofpocket costs in acting as a barrier to private services:


can lead to people to utilising higher costing taxpayer provided, free of charge services,
in the public sector; or



cause people to delay treatment exacerbating heath conditions leading to poorer
health that may ultimately cost more to treat.
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The outputs identified in the literature review, PPHs and Charlson Co-Morbidities can be used as
proxies of population health outcomes via population health status. As such, the relative efficiency
scores produced from an output orientated VRS DEA will reflect the appropriate mix of health
services inputs to produce effective health outcomes (allocative efficiency). SA3 populations that
are found to be relative allocative efficient (100%) compared to all other SA3s (the efficient peers)
will establish the benchmark for the HORSt.

In keeping with the literature that underpins the use of prolonged high rates of PPHs amongst
populations as hot spots of poor health / cold spots in the case of the HORSt to represent good
health and in using PPHs as a proxy variable of population health status, the objective of the DEA for
the HORSt is concerned with representing the typical relative efficiencies of each of the populations’
health status. The work of Duckett and Griffiths (2016b, pp. 5-6) in defining hot spots using PPHs,
which is not a DEA study, used a minimum persistence threshold of three years’ data to identify a
hotspots within 10 years data. It follows that if a similar methodology could be employed with
HORSt using the available population data to identify prolonged good health status; a question arises
of which years’ measured frontier would represent the norm sufficient enough to inform resource
distribution in any given year?

Given that there are resource limitations to this study pertaining to costs of purchased data required
for the DEA inputs, limited to three successive years, a measure of central tendency of three years’
output and inputs data will be used in the DEA to represent the typical output and resource usage of
each DMU. The median or middle score is recognised in the literature as a useful measure of central
tendency as it is stable and not distorted by any outliers (Manikandan 2011; Ott 1988, p. 39). As
such the median of the data will be used. Doing so with the population data for the three years
represents the measured median allocative efficiency scores for the DMUs and as discussed
according to Coelli et al. (2005, p. 203) pertaining to the use of the whole populations’ data this does
not require bootstrapping. The individual years and the median data for the DEA outputs and inputs
are tabled in the following sections. The data over the three years can be demonstrated to be very
stable.

The goal of developing the HORSt in this study is to demonstrate a workable proof of concept model
that answers the research questions and can inform resource distribution from state to LHNs and
this is by no means compromised by utilising the methodology outlined herein that is constrained by
practical limitations of the resources available. As discussed in section 4.5, the third stage of the
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HORSt methodology requires a measure of the relative efficiencies of each DMU to the efficient
DMUs. This can be entirely satisfied by the methodology above utilising the median population
data.

5.3.1 DEA OUTPUT DATA
The two alternative measures identified in the literature to proxy population health outcomes via
representing markers of population health status; PPHs and Charlson Co-morbidities are now
examined in terms of their data sources for suitable inclusion in the study as the output variable in
the DEA. Methodology for their extraction from NSW Health data sources are examined, along with
quality assurance measures that can be applied. Standardising the variables for age and casemix
complexity is also examined. Given that both variables represent a proxy of poor health status and
the DEA model’s linear programming is designed to consider maximising desirable outcomes, a
methodology for translating the poor (undesirable) health status for use in the DEA computations is
also examined.

5.3.1.1

DEA Outputs Data – Age-standardised and casemix adjusted PPHs

As discussed in the literature review there are 22 PPHs. Upon reviewing the ethics approval for this
study, the SWSLHD Epidemiology accessed NSW hospital data from the NSW Secure Analytics for
Population Health Research and Intelligence (SAPHaRI) data bases (Centre for Epidemiology and
Evidence 2017). Prior to understanding that MBS and PBS expenditure data was only affordable for
three years and the study therefore only utilised three years’ worth of data, the data extracted from
the NSW hospital data bases comprised ten years’ of PPHs to 2016/17 using the identifying and
definitional attributes of the 2016 National Healthcare Agreement: PI 18–Selected PPHs (Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare 2017b), which is tabled in appendix 1. These attributes show how
PPHs are identified within hospital data sets. These are classified by the National Health Care
agreement across three broad categories, of Chronic, Acute and Vaccine Preventable. For the HORSt
all three categories of PPHs are included so as to represent a broad level of population health status
for each DMU.

The data extract from the NSW for PPHs was conducted for each hospital separation. A hospital
separation is defined by the AIHW as the:
“process by which an episode of care for an admitted patient ceases. A separation may be formal or
statistical. Formal separation: The administrative process by which a hospital records the cessation
of treatment and/or care and/or accommodation of a patient.

Statistical separation: The
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administrative process by which a hospital records the cessation of an episode of care for a patient
within the one hospital stay” (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018f).

To represent the health status of each SA3 population, the separations data extracted were from the
patient’s demographic location of residence (their SA3 population), not the hospital in which they
were treated. Data elements included in the extract for each separation included:


diagnosis codes that support identification of the separation being an PPH;



patient demographics;
o

SA3 location, gender, five-year age groups from 0-4, to 80-84 and 85 years and over;
and



resource intensity data;
o

Australian Refined Diagnosis Related Group (AR-DRG), National Weighted Activity
Units (NWAU).

These data elements above support the data extraction to be expressed as an age-standardised rate
adjusted for patient resource complexity, casemix.

According to the AIHW, age standardisation is:
“A method of adjusting the crude rate to eliminate the effect of differences in population age
structures when comparing crude rates for different periods of time, different geographic areas
and/or different population sub-groups (e.g. between one year and the next and/or States and
Territories, Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations). Adjustments are usually undertaken for
each of the comparison populations against a standard population (rather than adjusting one
comparison population to resemble another). Sometimes a comparison population is referred to as a
study population” (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005).

Age standardisation can be taken a step further by including gender, in order to calculate an age
gender standardised rate. Doing so allows for an adjustment to eliminate any effect on the
difference in compared populations attributed to sex. The data extracted and ethics approval
enables this age gender standardisation to occur and the underpinnings for including sex in the
extraction in the planning phase for the study was somewhat guided by the developments of the
former NSW RDF, which considered a segmented approach of specific health programs whereby the
effects of sex were more pronounced on health needs such as obstetrics (Inter-Government &
Funding Strategies 2005b). However, the AIHW (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005)
states that standardisations extended to include an adjustment for sex is usually not undertaken and
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congruent with the health program approach taken by the former NSW RDF done so only when the
study outcome is specifically interested in sex specific affects as for example; considering rates of
caesarean sections. Conversely the HORSt development in this study is to demonstrate a proof of
concept model for resource distribution amongst whole populations and is not health program
specific. As such, sex standardisation was not conducted. Further discussion on feasibility and
limitations for refining the HORSt at the program level is included in Chapter Seven.

According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2005); Naing (2000), there are two
established methods of age standardisation:


a direct method which is generally used for comparisons between study groups; and



an indirect method which is recommended when the age-specific rates for the population
being studied are unknown

The method used for the HORSt employs the direct method, as the comparative rate between the
study groups is sought and the entire populations’ rates being studied are derived from the extract.
The direct method is used also used by NSW Health for PPH separations with the rate expressed per
100,000 people (Epidemiology and Evidence 2017). The AIHW provides guidelines for the direct
method shown below in equation 14:

Equation 14 - Direct Method of Standardisation

𝑆𝑅 =

Σ(𝑟𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖)
Σ(𝑃𝑖)

Where:
SR = the age-standardised rate for the population being studied;
ri =the age-group specific rate for age group i in the population being studied;
Pi =the population of age group i in the standard population* ; and
Σ(𝑟𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖) = is the expected number of events in the population being studied
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005).
* “The ABS and AIHW recommend that the 30 June 2001 standard population should be used for agestandardisation until a new standard population becomes available after the 2026 Census”
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013).

PPHs differ between conditions and the patients presenting with these in hospitals can logically have
different levels of complexity / severity and associated resource intensity even amongst the patients
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having the same PPHs. If PPHs were simply subject to age standardisation, the severity and resource
intensity of the patients would not be represented in the data and comparison of population health
status across populations so as to identify cold or hot spots may be distorted. A remedy for this
situation is to use the casemix data contained within each separation’s record, using the NWAU.

“An NWAU is a measure of health service activity expressed as a common unit. It provides a way of
comparing and valuing each public hospital service (whether it is an admission, emergency
department presentation or outpatient episode), by weighting it for its clinical complexity. The
average hospital service is worth one NWAU – the most intensive and expensive activities are worth
multiple NWAUs, the simplest and least expensive are worth fractions of an NWAU” (Administrator
National Health Funding Pool 2018).

To support the inclusion of patient severity and resource intensity with the PPH data to be used in
the DEA for the HORSt, the data extraction of separations was summarised by total NWAUs for each
age group of each SA3 population. This data was then subjected to direct standardisation so as to
derive an age-standardised casemix adjusted rate of PPHs for each SA3 (each DMU) per 10,000
people. The DEA output expressed as an age-standardised rate, along with DEA inputs, do not cause
a problem for DEA with numerous examples in the literature expressed this way (Cordero et al.
2015; Liu et al. 2010).

The NSW Health Stats website publishes data on the volume and age adjusted rates of PPHs at the
LHN level (Epidemiology and Evidence 2017) and the AIHW publishes PPHs the same data at the SA3
level (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a). These published data rates are not adjusted
for patient severity and resource intensity as per the methodology for this study outlined above
using NWAUs. In addition, the AIHW data shows a greater volume of separations compared to the
NSW Health Stats published data and that extracted from the NSW Health data, with the AIHW data
including PPHs occurring at private hospitals (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a)

Quality assurance checking of the data extract can be conducted by comparison to the officially
published rates per 100,000 people and volumes of PPHs on the NSW Health Stats website. In order
to do so, the data extract was summarised by total separations for each age group for each SA3 and
the direct method of age standardisation (excluding an NWAU adjustment) was applied. The
extracted data was then required to be mapped to the LHN level. To do so the PPH standardised
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rates apportioning used the same methodology of that in equation 13. This is shown as follows in
equation 15.

Equation 15 – Apportioning / mapping SA3 standardised rates of PPHs to NSW LHNs
𝑛

𝑃𝑃𝐻𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 100𝑘 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 = ∑(𝑆𝐴3 𝐴𝐶𝑆𝐶 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 100𝑘𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 ) 𝑥 (% 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 )
𝑖=1

Where:
𝑆𝐴3 𝑃𝑃𝐻 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 100𝑘𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 = 𝑃𝑃𝐻 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 100,000 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛
% 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 = 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝐻𝑁
There are some minor differences between the data extract and the official published figures.
However, these are not manifestly different to warrant questioning the validity of the data extract
for its use with this study, whereby the volume of separations in the extract compared with
published figures are no more than 3% larger in any of the three years.

Importantly the

proportionality of the volume and size of the age-standardised rates amongst the LHNs are the
same. Furthermore, there are several reasons that explain these differences. These are:


the nature of the extract at SA3 level to support the HORSt analysis requires apportioning /
mapping by SA3s to LHNs to allow the quality assurance comparison as per previously
discussed, whereas the NSW Health Stats published data did not have to undergo this
apportioning;



the NSW Health Stats data estimates the NSW patients with PPHs receiving treatment
interstate, whereas the extract counts the patient volume of these patients;



the NSW Health Stats data excludes PPH separations that are categorised as rehabilitation,
whereas the HORSt in wanting to capture a broad view of health status approximated by
these separations does not exclude these separations; and



the NSW Health Stats data for LHNs are point estimates bound by upper and lower
confidence intervals with some very low counts of PPHs in some LHNs excluded, whereas the
extract simply takes the volume of patient separations for PPHs and calculates an agestandardised rate

(Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).
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The following graphs (figures 16 through 21) summarises differences between the extract and the
NSW Health Stats published data, showing the very small differences between the data extract ages
sex standardised rates and volumes of PPHs from 2013/14 through to 2015/16.

With minor

differences explainable, the quality assurance testing finds that the data extract is consistent with
the official published figures. As such the extract PPHs data will be used with HORSt.

Figure 16

Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published age-standardised rates for 2013/14

2013/14 PPHs age standardised rate per 100k population by LHN
- Extract from NSW Health data vs NSW Health Stats Published data
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Figure 16: (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).
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Figure 17

Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published volume of separations for 2013/14

Figure 17: (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).
Figure 18

Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published age-standardised rates for 2014/15

2014/15 PPHs age standardised rate per 100k population by LHN
- Extract from NSW Health data vs NSW Health Stats Published data
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Figure 18 : (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).

Page 149

Figure 19

Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published volume of separations for 2014/15

Figure 19: (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).
Figure 20

Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published age-standardised rates for 2015/16

2015/16 PPHs age standardised rate per 100k population by LHN
- Extract from NSW Health data vs NSW Health Stats Published data
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Figure 20: (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).

Page 150

Figure 21

Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published volume of separations for 2015/16

Figure 21: (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).

5.3.1.2

DEA Outputs Data Alternative – Age-standardised Charlson Co-morbidity

As an alternative to using the age and casemix adjusted rates of PPHs as the output variable in the
HORSt DEA, guided by the literature review, Charlson Co-morbidities could be used as a proxy for
each SA3’s / DMU’s population health status. The Charslon Co-morbities of each separation have a
weighting assigned, a score, that can be used to reflect complexity of the patient and or the
associated NWAU of the separation could also be used.

There is some overlap between Charlson Co-morbidties and the PPHs where some PPHs separations
will also have a Charlson score and the Charlson Co-morbidity can be a predictor of PPHs (Eggli et al.
2014; Saver et al. 2014) Given that, the intent to use the Charlson Co-morbities as an alternative
standalone proxy of health status in place of PPHs, there was no need for the Charlson Comorbidties extract to exclude separations that also were found to be PPHs.

The data extract followed the literature of Sundararajan et al. (2004) which identified the Charlson
Co-morbidities separations and assigned a score using secondary diagnosis codes in each separation.
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A complete list of the codes is available in appendix 2, which uses the International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision, Australian Modification (ICD10-AM), (Australian Consortium for Classification Development 2018).

Similar to the extract of PPHs / PPHs, SWSLHD Epidemiology extracted the data from the NSW
SAPHaRI data sets. However, the extracts were found upon inspection to be somewhat unreliable.
Significant volumes of separations around 7% to 10% across each SA3 that should have had positive
Charlson scores were found to have zero scores, with many of the ICD-10-AM codes found to have
decimal place errors that were affecting the assignment of the scores. Due to these errors, the use
of the Charlson Co-morbidities as an alternative to PPHs were considered to be unreliable for the
purposes of this study and were not pursued further.

5.3.1.3

Transforming the DEA Outputs Data for use with the DEA

The HORSt DEA output in this model is expressed by age-standardised and case mix adjusted rates of
PPHs per 10,000 people. Importantly in the context of the HORSt DEA the goal is to maximise
outputs and, in this case, maximum health outcomes are approximated by health status represented
by low rates of PPHs. This means that the PPHs need to be mathematically transformed as higher
rates are bad and lower rates are desirable and, in the DEA, required to be maximised. In the DEA
literature, outcomes that need this transformation are termed undesirable outcomes and similarly
inputs requiring transformation are called undesirable inputs (Aminuddin et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2010;
Valdmanis et al. 2008).

The literature has multiple methods for transforming undesirable variables for use in DEA. A critique
of the literature by Liu et al. (2010, p. 178) examine the three main established published peer
reviewed methodologies and concluded that the type of transformation applied is very much a
matter of the context of the individual study. With respect to this, the operationalisation of the
HORSt and the study’s resources, the key requirements for the treatment of the undesirable output
for the HORSt is that the method:


does not overly complicate the interpretation of the DEA objectives as a meaningful
benchmark as outlined in the previous chapter (page 122);



does not alter the ranking and identification of efficient and inefficient DMUs; and



from a practical point of resourcing for this study, allows transformed variables to be
calculated using the purchased DEA software for this study, namely PIM-DEA and
Frontier Analyst.
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A critique of the transformation methodologies is outlined in equations 16 through 18. These are
examined along with a non-transformation methodology for the HORSt output data.

The

methodology to be used for the study is then justified and outlined in equation 18, with an example
shown in equation 19. The transformed data for each DMU is then presented in Table 9 and the
distribution of the transformed results is presented in Figure 26.

Equation 16 – Additive inverse for transforming undesirable DEA variables
𝑓 (𝑈 ) = −𝑈
Where 𝑈 = the data to be transformed

Equation 16 demonstrates the approach by Koopmans (1951, p. 35). This simply transforms the
undesirable output by adding a negative sign to the data to be transformed, an additive inverse
approach. The simplicity of this approach is that it maintains the absolute differences between the
DMUs’ data that is transformed. However, the transformed data becomes negative. Liu et al. (2010,
p. 178) and Sarkis (2002, p. 119) argues that whilst negative data can be used it is problematic and
very complicated in the computation of efficiency scores. Moreover a number of DEA software
packages, PIM-DEA and Frontier Analyst for example, cannot handle negative data (Avkiran 2002, p.
11; Emrouznejad & Thanassoulis 2011; Hollingsworth 1997). For these reasons, this methodology
was rejected for use with the HORSt DEA undesirable output.

Equation 17 – Multiplicative transverse for transforming undesirable DEA variables
𝑓 (𝑈 ) = 1/𝑈
Where 𝑈 = the data to be transformed

The approach outlined in equation 17 involves taking the multiplicative inverse of the data
(Francisco et al. 2012; Golany & Roll 1989, p. 241; Knox Lovell et al. 1995, p. 510). This avoids the
conversion of the variable to negative numbers. However, in doing so it converts the data to a
fractional number. Doing so is problematic as it does not preserve the absolute differences between
the values of the DMUs’ variables as it is a nonlinear transformation. This does not preserve the
linearity and convexity of the DEA frontier (its overall shape as depicted by example in Figure 12
(page 121) and the approach has been therefore criticised as to its effects on the resulting efficiency
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scores of the DMUs (Liu et al. 2010, p. 178). For these reasons, this methodology was rejected for
use with the HORSt DEA undesirable output.

Liu et al. (2010) also highlights that the treatment of undesirable DEA variables could remain
untransformed where undesirable outputs could be simply treated as desirable inputs and vice versa
thus reversing the ratio studied.

For the HORSt, experiments were conducted with PIM-DEA

software and Frontier Analyst software for swapping the undesirable output to be treated as a
desirable input and vice versa with the DEA inputs now treated as outputs. Problematically, both
the software products produced results that were difficult to interpret whereby some of the worst
and best performing DMUs in terms of low and high ages standardised PPHs were found to be 100%
efficient peers to each other, regardless of the resources (treated as an output) they consumed.
The spread of efficiency scores made very little intuitive sense with all DMUs scores clustered within
10% of each other. Furthermore, both the software packages using identical data produced vastly
different results for the same DMUs. As such this methodology was not pursued further.

As Cordero et al. (2015, p. 238) points out the problems encountered with swapping inputs and
outputs are not surprising as:
“this method does not truly reflect the real production process and the scale and intervals of original
variables are affected by the data transformation”.
Furthermore, as Liu and Sharp (1999) outline, the nature of the output-input relationship and the
DEA’s model orientation is altered. The explanation of this reversal of outputs and inputs somewhat
overcomplicates the parsimonious approach of the already defined scope for the HORSt DEA being
an output orientated model (page 120). Therefore, this transformation methodology was rejected
for use with the HORSt DEA undesirable output.

Equation 18 –Translational linear decreasing monotone approach for transforming undesirable DEA
variables
𝑓 (𝑈 ) = −𝑈 + 𝑘
Where 𝑈 = the data to be transformed
𝑘 = a positive integer greater than the highest value of the undesirable variable to be
transformed (Cordero et al. 2015, p. 238; Seiford & Zhu 2002, p. 18)
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According to Liu et al. (2010) review, the approach shown in equation 18 has become widely used,
with most literature using this method citing Seiford and Zhu’s (2002) examination of this method.
The work of Seiford and Zhu (2002) built on that of Ali and Seiford (1990), demonstrates through
experimentation of multiple DEA transformations that this process maintains the linearity and
convexity of the frontier, the rankings of efficiencies scores between DMUs and the identification of
efficient and inefficient DMUs. Setting the size of 𝑘 however just above the maximum value of the
output variable does have an effect of the corresponding DMU’s efficiency score, with a very low
DEA score expected.

Similar to the transformation required for the HORSt using age-standardised rates of PPHs, Cordero
et al. (2015) used this approach with age-standardised rates of ACSCs as an output to be minimised
so as to act as a proxy of maximising health outcomes. The paper showed the area with the highest
age-standardised rate of ACSCs was 474.22 per 10,000 people. This study set the size of 𝑘 = 500
and did not explain the rationale for this. The lead author was e-mailed on 11 June 2018, seeking
clarification as to whether 𝑘 had been set as the nearest hundred up from the maximum rate of
ACSCs per 10,000 people, as this seemed logical. An e-mail confirmation (appendix 5 page 295) was
received on 12 June 2018 that this was indeed the case, with the maximum rate not used to avoid
having a DMU with a zero value (Cordero 2018).

This method will be utilised for the HORSt. In summary justification for doing so is based on:


the literature’s finding of stability of this method to preserve the DMU efficiency rankings
and the linearity and convexity of the DEA frontier;



an example in peer reviewed literature of the transformation of the same output statistic
(age-standardised rates of ACSCs / PPHs);



there being no required change in the justified output orientated DEA model to support the
HORSt; and



there being no DEA software problems with the transformed results.

Specifically drawing upon the work of Cordero et al. (2015) in setting the size of 𝑘, with respect to
age-standardised PPHs as the nearest hundred above the maximum rate, an examination of the
median of the three years age-standardised PPH rates found that the highest DMU rate was 550 per
10,000 people. The next hundred up from this is 600. For the HORSt 𝑘 was therefore set at 600.
The output data was transformed accordingly using equation 18 and this value. The transformed
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DEA output represents a desirable output, a proxy of the health status of each DMU whereby higher
rates are desirable, transformed from the lowest rates of age-standardised PPH and vice versa.

Table 9 (page 157) shows a summary of the transformed DEA outputs data to be used in the study.
The table shows that the median rate of PPHs for each SA3 population (DMU) compared to the
individual years are a good measure of the populations’ normal rate of PPHs with very little variation
over the years. The highest median rate of PPHs, expressed as age-standardised NWAUs per 10,000
people was for the SA3 ‘10501 Bourke – Cobar –Coonamble’ with 550.10. Using equation 18 where
(𝑘) = 600, the transformed value of this 49.90, as equation 19.

Equation 19 – PPHs - Transformed example for SA3 ‘10501 Bourke – Cobar –Coonamble’
𝑓 (𝑈 ) = −550.10 + 600 = 49.9

Similarly, the SA3 with the best median rate of PPHs NWAUs per 10,000 people is that of ‘12103 Kuring-gai’ with 149.15, transformed to 450.85.

Both these rates reasonably reflect the extremes of health outcomes via population health status.
The Bourke – Cobar – Coonamble area is remote and there is little access to services. The area has a
higher at need indigenous population. The area is typified by very poor socioeconomic status, social
determinants that give rise to very poor health outcomes. The Ku-ring-gai area is at the opposite
end of the scale to these attributes (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2018; Centre for
Epidemiology and Research 2010; Western NSW Local Health District & Western NSW Medicare
Local 2013).

Figure 22 (page 159) shows comparison histograms of the frequency of the median rates of PPHs
(NWAUs) per 10,000 people and that of the transformed data for use as the DEA output. Figure 23
(page 159) shows each of the three years’ rates of PPHs (NWAUs) per 10,000 people, showing little
difference in the rates over time. Nonetheless, as per the statistical literature (Manikandan 2011;
Ott 1988, p. 39) the use of the median is a sensible choice to be representative of the DMUs three
years data in the analysis and be transformed as a desirable output in the HORSt DEA.
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Table 9

Summary of Transformed age-standardised and casemix adjusted PPHs data to be used as the output data in the

HORSt DEA
age standardised per 10,000 people
2013-14
ALL
PPHs
SA3 Code &Name
NWAUs
10101 Goulburn – Yass
285.35
10102 Queanbeyan
194.02
10103 Snowy Mountains
154.96
10104 South Coast
267.40
10201 Gosford
199.95
10202 Wyong
256.57
10301 Bathurst
179.28
10302 Lachlan Valley
285.37
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
229.43
10304 Orange
243.69
10401 Clarence Valley
312.79
10402 Coffs Harbour
281.66
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
550.10
10502 Broken Hill and Far West
289.41
10503 Dubbo
295.60
10601 Lower Hunter
267.29
10602 Maitland
278.24
10603 Port Stephens
212.75
10604 Upper Hunter
270.12
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla
315.31
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour
266.81
10704 Wollongong
262.01
10801 Great Lakes
217.75
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
349.14
10804 Port Macquarie
231.51
10805 Taree - Gloucester
247.18
10901 Albury
232.45
10902 Lower Murray
278.86
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury
261.43
11001 Armidale
219.17
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield
284.29
11003 Moree - Narrabri
282.33
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah
298.14
11101 Lake Macquarie - East
200.29
11102 Lake Macquarie - West
231.06
11103 Newcastle
248.29
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal
181.07
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland
282.11
11203 Tweed Valley
215.62
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 323.11
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
326.81
11303 Wagga Wagga
317.84
11401 Shoalhaven
259.83
11402 Southern Highlands
187.03
11501 Baulkham Hills
160.90
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
165.76
11503 Hawkesbury
209.54

2014-15
ALL
2015-16 Median
PPHs
ALL PPHs PPHs
NWAUs NWAUS (NWAUs)
285.35 303.86
285.35
192.69 194.02
194.02
182.42 150.86
154.96
296.07 267.40
267.40
199.95 231.05
199.95
256.57 272.66
256.57
179.28 251.57
179.28
287.04 285.37
285.37
229.43 240.59
229.43
243.69 289.68
243.69
322.08 312.79
312.79
281.66 296.15
281.66
550.10 579.00
550.10
272.73 289.41
289.41
295.60 304.21
295.60
273.53 267.29
267.29
289.34 278.24
278.24
212.75 241.63
212.75
270.12 329.54
270.12
315.31 348.52
315.31
266.81 271.40
266.81
264.91 262.01
262.01
258.02 217.75
217.75
349.14 436.35
349.14
231.51 231.65
231.51
244.37 257.92
247.18
255.67 232.45
232.45
281.60 278.86
278.86
266.99 261.43
261.43
219.17 236.55
219.17
284.29 305.84
284.29
282.33 351.82
282.33
298.14 354.25
298.14
200.29 208.03
200.29
231.06 235.52
231.06
248.29 252.30
248.29
181.07 185.00
181.07
282.11 305.51
282.11
215.62 230.99
215.62
323.11 342.68
323.11
326.81 368.41
326.81
317.84 335.67
317.84
259.83 295.35
259.83
191.92 187.03
187.03
160.90 173.34
160.90
220.39 165.76
165.76
284.94 189.42
209.54

Median
Transformed
PPHs
(NWAUs)
314.65
405.98
445.04
332.60
400.05
343.43
420.72
314.63
370.57
356.31
287.21
318.34
49.90
310.59
304.40
332.71
321.76
387.25
329.88
284.69
333.19
337.99
382.25
250.86
368.49
352.82
367.55
321.14
338.57
380.83
315.71
317.67
301.86
399.71
368.94
351.71
418.93
317.89
384.38
276.89
273.19
282.16
340.17
412.97
439.10
434.24
390.46
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Table 9 continues on next page
Table 9 continued
age standardised per 10,000 people
2013-14
ALL
PPHs
SA3 Code & Name
NWAUs
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
200.62
11601 Blacktown
321.79
11602 Blacktown - North
234.71
11603 Mount Druitt
532.18
11701 Marrickville
Botany
242.69
11702
- Sydenham Petersham
253.90
11703 Sydney Inner City
289.00
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North
192.59
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South
216.42
11901 Bankstown
267.86
11902 Canterbury
281.43
11903 Hurstville
208.46
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale
235.36
12001 Canada Bay
170.88
12002 Leichhardt
211.39
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield 205.30
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove
164.07
12102 Hornsby
176.32
12103 Ku-ring-gai
149.15
12104 North Sydney - Mosman
186.13
12201 Manly
175.34
12202 Pittwater
154.74
12203 Warringah
177.42
12301 Camden
196.60
12302 Campbelltown (NSW)
317.51
12303 Wollondilly
198.81
12401 Blue Mountains
217.45
12403 Penrith
259.59
12404 Richmond - Windsor
390.92
12405 St Marys
326.84
12501 Auburn
270.11
12502 Carlingford
210.72
12503 Merrylands - Guildford
303.01
12504 Parramatta
267.73
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
153.91
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
186.45
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley
255.74
12702 Fairfield
257.73
12703 Liverpool
292.75
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah 166.26
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote 189.14
Maximum
550.10
Minimum
149.15
Mean
247.94
Median
245.44
SD
69.03

2014-15
ALL
PPHs
NWAUs
200.62
321.79
253.89
532.96
242.69
252.83
297.28
192.59
216.42
285.26
281.43
219.43
246.00
170.88
211.39
205.30
164.07
176.32
153.30
204.57
205.91
154.74
177.42
219.88
317.51
198.81
217.45
242.53
407.33
359.27
273.55
210.72
303.01
267.73
153.91
186.45
255.74
257.73
292.75
166.26
189.14
550.10
153.30
253.07
253.36
68.51

2015-16
ALL
Median
PPHs
PPHs
NWAUS (NWAUs)
201.22
200.62
364.72
321.79
218.45
234.71
532.18
532.18
278.85
242.69
288.12
253.90
289.00
289.00
208.86
192.59
244.11
216.42
267.86
267.86
308.15
281.43
208.46
208.46
235.36
235.36
182.41
170.88
221.23
211.39
222.85
205.30
192.34
164.07
189.16
176.32
149.15
149.15
186.13
186.13
175.34
175.34
189.23
154.74
190.62
177.42
196.60
196.60
334.24
317.51
221.72
198.81
218.80
217.45
285.57
259.59
390.92
390.92
326.84
326.84
270.11
270.11
253.27
210.72
335.16
303.01
283.96
267.73
154.91
153.91
199.98
186.45
286.49
255.74
272.78
257.73
334.98
292.75
210.16
166.26
220.77
189.14
579.00
550.10
149.15
149.15
264.18
247.94
259.67
245.44
74.38
69.03

Median
Transformed
PPHs
(NWAUs)
399.38
278.21
365.29
67.82
357.31
346.10
311.00
407.41
383.58
332.14
318.57
391.54
364.64
429.12
388.61
394.70
435.93
423.68
450.85
413.87
424.66
445.26
422.58
403.40
282.49
401.19
382.55
340.41
209.08
273.16
329.89
389.28
296.99
332.27
446.09
413.55
344.26
342.27
307.25
433.74
410.86
450.85
49.90
352.06
354.56
69.03
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Figure 22

Histograms of the median rate of PPHs standardised for age and casemix and the Transformed output

variable for use in the HORSt DEA

Figure 22 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017).

Figure 23

Histograms of the 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 rate of PPHs standardised for age and casemix

Figure 23 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017)
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5.3.2 DEA INPUTS DATA
As discussed, the DEA inputs represent the primary sources of taxpayer funded expenditure across
the continuum of care. There are three DEA inputs being,
1. MBS expenditure for all residents of NSW;
2. PBS expenditure for all residents of NSW; and
3. State Health administered taxpayer expenditure for NSW public hospitals.

5.3.2.1

MBS and PBS data

MBS and PBS data were purchased for 3 years (2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16) costing $5,375.56. This
cost was generously funded by SWSLHD for dual purposes of supporting an internal SWSLHD project
that was subject to a secondary ethics approval and this study.

Additional years would be

significantly more expensive and was not pursued.

Given that the HORSt is seeking to represent a broad measure of health status of the population, the
resources that contribute to the health of the population were similarly sort from inputs that
represent a broad contribution to the continuum of care. For the MBS the data purchased was for
all categories based on date of processing by age group for each SA3 geographic area for the
financial years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16:


Category 1 - Professional Attendances



Category 2 - Diagnostic Procedures and Investigations



Category 3 - Therapeutic Procedures



Category 4 - Oral and Maxillofacial Services (by Approved Dental Practitioners)



Category 5 - Diagnostic Imaging Services



Category 6 - Pathology Services



Category 7 - Cleft Lip and Cleft Palate



Category 8 - Miscellaneous Services



Category 9 - Dentist, Dental Specialist and Dental Prosthetists.



Category 10 - Dental Benefits Schedule

It is important to note that in June 2018, the AIHW published MBS expenditure for SA3 populations
for GP and special attendances on the newly established “My Healthy Communities” website. This
information is age-standardised (AIHW 2018a) . However, the data is limited to GP and specialist
attendances, Category 1 of the above list (AIHW 2018b; Australian Government 2017). As a proof of
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concept study, the DEA could have used this data, although it would be somewhat narrower in its
resource coverage of the continuum of care than that purchased.

Total scripts and benefits paid for the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (Normal Arrangements PBS
and Special Arrangements PBS) for all patient categories based on date of processing by age group
for each SA3 geographic area for the financial years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16 were purchased.
The included areas of PBS expenditure purchased are:


General - Ordinary



Concessional - Ordinary



General - Safety Net



Concessional - Free Safety Net

The purchased MBS and PBS data was age-standardised using the same direct method of that of the
PPHs data as per equation 14 (page 145), so that every SA3 / DMU had an age-standardised rate of
MBS and PBS expenditure per 10,000 people. Congruent with the treatment of the DEA output, the
median of the three years age-standardised rate for each DMU for the MBS and PBS was calculated.
The median rates for MBS and PBS per 10,000 people were then used as inputs for the DEA.

Table 10 (page 162) and Table 11 (page 164) show a summary of the age-standardised MBS and PBS
data to be used as inputs in the study. The tables show that the median costs $’000 per 10,000
people for each SA3 population (DMU) compared to the individual years are a good measure of the
populations’ normal rate of consumption of MBS and PBS resources with very little variation over
the years.

The highest age-standardised median MBS costs per 10,000 people was for the SA3 ‘11502 Dural –
Wisemans Ferry’ with $11,097,900. Contrastingly, the lowest age-standardised median MBS costs
per 10,000 people were for the SA3 ‘10103 Snow Mountains’ with $4,281,700.

The highest age-standardised median PBS costs per 10,000 people was for the SA3 ‘11703 Sydney
Inner City’ with $6,243,600. Contrastingly, the lowest age-standardised median PBS costs per 10,000
people were for the SA3 ‘10103 Snow Mountains’ with $1,827,100.
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Table 10 MBS age-standardised costs $’000 per 10,000 people for each NSW SA3 population
$'000 age standardised per 10,000 people

2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Median
MBS
MBS
MBS
MBS
SA3 Code & Name
7703.4
7853.2
7703.4
7348.8
10101 Goulburn – Yass
6885.3
6885.3
6635.6
6099.7
10102 Queanbeyan
4281.7
4281.7
4042.5
3935.6
10103 Snowy Mountains
7796.1
7796.1
7468.6
6834.7
10104 South Coast
9843.4
9843.4
9526.8
9169.0
10201 Gosford
9851.8
9851.8
9593.5
9162.5
10202 Wyong
7704.2
7704.2
7374.3
7044.2
10301 Bathurst
8750.9
8750.9
8413.4
7874.1
10302 Lachlan Valley
7963.8
7963.8
7927.8
7641.9
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
8432.5
8432.5
8252.3
7784.2
10304 Orange
8918.1
8918.1
8665.8
8535.1
10401 Clarence Valley
9155.7
9155.7
9069.9
8278.5
10402 Coffs Harbour
9102.5
9102.5
8298.1
7575.0
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
9686.2
9686.2
8948.3
8185.9
10502 Broken Hill and Far West
8787.9
8787.9
8701.0
8332.1
10503 Dubbo
8966.6
8966.6
8606.1
8152.7
10601 Lower Hunter
8725.2
8725.2
8576.3
7833.6
10602 Maitland
9457.8
9457.8
8827.8
8342.2
10603 Port Stephens
8602.7
8602.7
8262.8
7614.0
10604 Upper Hunter
9637.6 10200.5 10654.5 10654.5
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla
9909.7 10127.8 10127.8
9434.4
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour
9737.5 10035.4 10035.4
9235.0
10704 Wollongong
9297.5
9297.5
9181.5
8911.7
10801 Great Lakes
9362.6
9362.6
9289.7
8594.4
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
9829.8
9829.8
9713.3
9240.1
10804 Port Macquarie
8593.6
8593.6
8596.1
8243.4
10805 Taree - Gloucester
8471.2
8471.2
8469.5
7968.7
10901 Albury
8081.6
8081.6
7809.4
6847.1
10902 Lower Murray
8301.7
8301.7
8235.8
7808.7
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury
7119.6
7119.6
6956.0
6583.3
11001 Armidale
7104.7
7104.7
6681.9
6511.4
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield
7651.8
7651.8
7316.2
6645.9
11003 Moree - Narrabri
6880.1
6880.1
6516.6
6086.5
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah
9797.6
9797.6
9156.6
8788.9
11101 Lake Macquarie - East
9870.1
9870.1
9426.4
8965.6
11102 Lake Macquarie - West
9386.8
9386.8
8867.4
8494.9
11103 Newcastle
6386.7
6386.7
6383.6
6011.8
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal
8463.2
8463.2
8006.6
7816.1
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland
9963.1
9963.1
9463.6
8942.7
11203 Tweed Valley
8394.0
8394.0
8606.1
8288.9
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West)
8689.4
8689.4
8821.6
8240.7
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
8684.2
8684.2
8837.8
8379.0
11303 Wagga Wagga
8848.4
8848.4
8703.6
8472.6
11401 Shoalhaven
8794.7
8794.7
8692.2
8264.8
11402 Southern Highlands
9722.9 10008.1 10413.0 10413.0
11501 Baulkham Hills
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
10527.8 10906.8 11097.9 11097.9
9429.1
9429.1
8938.2
8806.0
11503 Hawkesbury
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Table 10 continued
$'000 age standardised per 10,000 people

SA3 Code & Name
2013-14
MBS
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
10060.4
11601 Blacktown
10435.3
11602 Blacktown - North
9788.2
11603 Mount Druitt
9888.1
11701 Botany
8846.3
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham
9430.2
11703 Sydney Inner City
9829.8
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North
8692.6
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South
8865.4
11901 Bankstown
9953.0
11902 Canterbury
10311.9
11903 Hurstville
9173.2
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale
8135.1
12001 Canada Bay
9248.1
12002 Leichhardt
9396.1
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield
9042.6
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove
8902.5
12102 Hornsby
8908.9
12103 Ku-ring-gai
9654.7
12104 North Sydney - Mosman
10194.4
12201 Manly
8790.9
12202 Pittwater
8910.9
12203 Warringah
8839.0
12301 Camden
9629.1
12302 Campbelltown (NSW)
10538.9
12303 Wollondilly
8286.1
12401 Blue Mountains
8200.1
12403 Penrith
9853.9
12404 Richmond - Windsor
9420.7
12405 St Marys
8428.9
12501 Auburn
8778.5
12502 Carlingford
9096.4
12503 Merrylands - Guildford
9775.8
12504 Parramatta
9924.7
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
9315.3
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
8864.9
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley
9428.7
12702 Fairfield
9815.3
12703 Liverpool
9825.6
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah
10076.0
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote
10244.8
Maximum
10538.92
Minimum
3935.62
Mean
8659.27
Median
8842.62
SD
1177.798

2014-15
MBS
10544.3
10865.6
10125.1
10158.2
8932.3
9745.7
9937.3
8899.7
9123.9
10294.6
10527.9
9523.8
8322.1
9587.4
9735.7
9291.5
9174.9
9163.2
10006.7
10485.4
9272.8
9301.2
9115.3
10184.0
10937.5
8980.9
8467.0
10210.8
9576.5
8735.8
8893.9
9323.2
10054.4
10240.6
9594.3
9191.6
9776.6
10104.0
10310.5
10415.2
10662.6
10937.46
4042.55
9046.83
9159.86
1157.562

2015-16
MBS
10610.2
11086.9
10159.0
10467.2
9015.6
10026.1
9785.7
9002.6
9033.7
10627.8
10704.1
9422.8
8230.3
9686.9
9693.1
9226.5
9155.0
9553.2
10097.5
10463.9
9261.7
9452.8
9210.5
10405.5
10856.0
9184.9
8753.8
10429.8
9972.6
9379.5
8889.8
9619.6
10376.6
10517.8
9642.4
9330.7
9614.3
10323.9
10184.5
10566.7
10985.2
11097.89
4281.71
9244.34
9371.08
1149.498

Median
MBS
10544.3
10865.6
10125.1
10158.2
8932.3
9745.7
9829.8
8899.7
9033.7
10294.6
10527.9
9422.8
8230.3
9587.4
9693.1
9226.5
9155.0
9163.2
10006.7
10463.9
9261.7
9301.2
9115.3
10184.0
10856.0
8980.9
8467.0
10210.8
9576.5
8735.8
8889.8
9323.2
10054.4
10240.6
9594.3
9191.6
9614.3
10104.0
10184.5
10415.2
10662.6
11097.89
4281.71
9172.90
9279.58
1111.625
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Table 11 PBS age-standardised costs $’000 per 10,000 people for each NSW SA3 population
$'000 age standardised per 10,000 people

2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Median
SA3 Code & Name
PBS
PBS
PBS
PBS
10101 Goulburn – Yass
4012.9
4000.5
4863.0
4012.9
10102 Queanbeyan
3439.0
3342.6
3955.5
3439.0
10103 Snowy Mountains
1827.1
1782.9
2075.3
1827.1
10104 South Coast
4298.1
4309.7
5668.7
4309.7
10201 Gosford
4067.6
3982.3
4676.3
4067.6
10202 Wyong
4659.2
4427.9
5067.6
4659.2
10301 Bathurst
3885.4
3732.1
4189.7
3885.4
10302 Lachlan Valley
4198.6
4125.8
4620.5
4198.6
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
3855.3
3917.6
4611.0
3917.6
10304 Orange
4079.0
4010.5
4692.8
4079.0
10401 Clarence Valley
4565.4
4592.4
5356.4
4592.4
10402 Coffs Harbour
3835.9
3804.4
4949.3
3835.9
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
4331.2
4210.2
4407.1
4331.2
10502 Broken Hill and Far West
4803.6
4881.9
5267.0
4881.9
10503 Dubbo
4303.4
4151.5
4560.8
4303.4
10601 Lower Hunter
4273.5
4149.1
4668.6
4273.5
10602 Maitland
3852.1
3680.1
3892.3
3852.1
10603 Port Stephens
4052.8
4029.1
4484.9
4052.8
10604 Upper Hunter
3672.1
3653.6
4083.6
3672.1
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla
4688.5
4600.1
4950.6
4688.5
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour
4303.7
4331.5
4601.7
4331.5
10704 Wollongong
4143.9
3958.2
4395.5
4143.9
10801 Great Lakes
4471.0
4300.3
5424.4
4471.0
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
4861.7
4789.6
5814.5
4861.7
10804 Port Macquarie
4448.8
4225.3
4727.8
4448.8
10805 Taree - Gloucester
4263.7
4481.1
5200.2
4481.1
10901 Albury
4086.6
3935.3
4430.2
4086.6
10902 Lower Murray
3844.9
3588.7
4469.4
3844.9
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury
4175.8
4305.8
4738.0
4305.8
11001 Armidale
3818.1
4084.3
4513.2
4084.3
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield
4016.0
3807.7
4658.8
4016.0
11003 Moree - Narrabri
3726.6
3871.4
4150.3
3871.4
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah
3516.4
3479.6
4076.2
3516.4
11101 Lake Macquarie - East
4274.6
4209.8
4947.7
4274.6
11102 Lake Macquarie - West
4367.1
4232.6
4988.1
4367.1
11103 Newcastle
4355.6
4232.8
4852.9
4355.6
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal
1992.1
1870.3
2271.5
1992.1
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland
4413.6
4006.5
5033.7
4413.6
11203 Tweed Valley
4103.3
3996.3
5017.6
4103.3
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West)
4308.2
4244.4
4418.4
4308.2
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
4242.4
4142.4
4630.0
4242.4
11303 Wagga Wagga
4307.3
4217.6
4329.6
4307.3
11401 Shoalhaven
4556.8
4343.4
4979.2
4556.8
11402 Southern Highlands
4091.6
4218.8
4508.2
4218.8
11501 Baulkham Hills
3221.9
3222.7
3588.8
3222.7
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
3358.6
3393.8
3551.5
3393.8
11503 Hawkesbury
3393.7
3159.9
4104.7
3393.7

Table 11 continues on next page.
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Table 11 continued
$'000 age standardised per 10,000 people

SA3 Code & Name
2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Median
PBS
PBS
PBS
PBS
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
3374.3
3337.0
3517.3
3374.3
11601 Blacktown
4151.1
3774.5
4463.1
4151.1
11602 Blacktown - North
3269.8
3208.8
3640.5
3269.8
11603 Mount Druitt
4270.9
4046.9
4454.8
4270.9
11701 Botany
3850.7
3646.5
4486.4
3850.7
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham
4581.2
4253.9
5660.4
4581.2
11703 Sydney Inner City
6243.6
5910.2
7829.2
6243.6
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North
1983.8
1899.6
2059.8
1983.8
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South
3668.4
3433.0
4291.2
3668.4
11901 Bankstown
4711.1
4636.1
5283.5
4711.1
11902 Canterbury
4496.4
4376.0
5117.9
4496.4
11903 Hurstville
4071.4
4442.6
4522.9
4442.6
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale
2781.8
2882.2
2504.0
2781.8
12001 Canada Bay
3220.2
3125.8
3848.9
3220.2
12002 Leichhardt
3568.8
3276.2
4283.0
3568.8
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield
3471.6
3309.1
4032.6
3471.6
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove
2965.7
2897.3
3365.1
2965.7
12102 Hornsby
3370.0
3322.8
3577.0
3370.0
12103 Ku-ring-gai
3015.6
3041.7
3366.2
3041.7
12104 North Sydney - Mosman
2858.0
2758.3
3361.1
2858.0
12201 Manly
2872.4
2782.2
3365.2
2872.4
12202 Pittwater
2974.7
2811.1
3169.0
2974.7
12203 Warringah
3300.6
3063.3
3677.2
3300.6
12301 Camden
3920.4
3830.5
4415.7
3920.4
12302 Campbelltown (NSW)
4528.9
4297.8
4948.7
4528.9
12303 Wollondilly
3737.3
3569.9
4342.0
3737.3
12401 Blue Mountains
3137.2
3107.2
3405.7
3137.2
12403 Penrith
3828.1
3855.6
4105.5
3855.6
12404 Richmond - Windsor
4267.9
4011.4
4343.6
4267.9
12405 St Marys
2592.8
2566.0
2810.9
2592.8
12501 Auburn
3821.4
3536.5
4092.0
3821.4
12502 Carlingford
3756.6
3478.4
4103.4
3756.6
12503 Merrylands - Guildford
4489.7
4207.2
4782.5
4489.7
12504 Parramatta
4245.2
3960.0
4267.7
4245.2
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
3108.9
3126.5
3357.7
3126.5
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
3287.5
3276.0
3634.0
3287.5
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley
4234.9
3893.9
4372.7
4234.9
12702 Fairfield
4858.2
4524.1
5383.7
4858.2
12703 Liverpool
3938.6
3657.5
4069.2
3938.6
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah
3508.9
3595.1
4013.8
3595.1
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote
3759.7
3866.6
4229.7
3866.6
Maximum
6243.56 5910.22 7829.16 6243.56
Minimum
1827.09 1782.88 2059.81 1827.09
Mean
3880.21 3779.88 4341.11 3900.26
Median
4014.42 3905.78 4417.01 4034.36
SD
685.9373 666.073 848.2218 691.6004

Page 165

Figure 24 and 25 show histograms of the frequency of the age-standardised median MBS and PBS
costs per 10,000 people and that of the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16. It is apparent from
tables 10 and 11 and the graphical presentation of the histograms that there is some small variation
in the later years’ MBS and PBS costs being somewhat higher than the earlier two years and again as
per the statistical literature (Manikandan 2011; Ott 1988, p. 39) the use of the median is a sensible
choice to represent the three years in the analysis.

Figure 24

Histogram of the median rate of age-standardised MBS costs for the 88 DMUs used as an input

variable in the HORSt DEA and the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16

Figure

24

Histograms

derived

using

SPSS

software

V24

(IBM

Corp

2017)

Page 166

Figure 25

Histogram of the median rate of age-standardised PBS costs for the 88 DMUs used as an input variable

in the HORSt DEA and the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16

Figure 25 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017).

5.3.2.2

State health expenditure

Taxpayer funded state health expenditure in NSW is part funded by NSW and Commonwealth
governments (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a). For the purposes of the DEA as a
funding input, it is a source of taxpayer funding administered by the NSW State government.

The NSW State health expenditure was expressed by the calculation of an age-standardised cost
ratio (SCRs) of inpatient public hospital separations. An extract of all inpatient hospital separations
by SA3 of residence of the patient was conducted for the years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16 from the
NSW Health planning tool FlowInfo V17.0 (Clinical Services Planning Analytics 2018). The extract was
conducted by 5-year age group and included the NWAU of each separation reflecting the casemix /
resource intensity of the patient.

It could be contended that this extract of all inpatient hospital

separations which also includes PPH separations reflects double counting, given that PPHs are an
output for the DEA. However, this is not the case. DEA as discussed is a relative concept that only
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requires a sensible choice of variables that express the performance of DMUs (Morita & Avkiran
2009, p. 164; Sherman & Zhu 2006b). The PPHs are representing markers, indicators of health status
/ outcomes, adjusted for resource and patient complexity. These markers as an output are relative
to the inputs, whereas the SCRs are reflecting the public hospital sector resource contribution to the
continuum of care to the performance of health outcomes / health status at the population level.

Likewise, to the MBS and PBS data, the SCR were age-standardised using the direct method detailed
in equation 14 (page 145). Every DMU had an age-standardised rate per 10,000 people calculated
for each of the three years. The median of the three years’ rates was then used as an input for the
DEA.

Table 12 (page 169) shows a summary of the age-standardised median NWAUs data to be used as
input representing state health costs in the study. The table shows that the median NWAUs per
10,000 people for each SA3 population (DMU) compared to the individual years are a good measure
of the populations’ normal rate of consumption of inpatient hospital utilisation with very little
variation over the years.

The highest age-standardised median of NWAUs per 10,000 people was for the SA3 ‘10501 Bourke –
Cobar –Coonamble’ with 4,710.17. This SA3 had the poorest population health status represented
by aged standardised PPH (NWAUs) per 10,000 people, which is logical given that PPHs are a
function of inpatient hospital use SCRs. Contrastingly, the lowest age-standardised median of
NWAUs per 10,000 people were for the SA3 ‘12601 Pennant Hills - Epping’ with 2,068,91.

Figure 26 (page 171) shows histograms of the frequency of the age-standardised median SCR
(NWAUs) per 10,000 people and that of the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16. It is apparent
from the tables and the graphical presentation of the histograms that there is some small variation
in the across the years and again as per the statistical literature (Manikandan 2011; Ott 1988, p. 39)
the use of the median is a sensible choice to represent the three years in the analysis.
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Table 12 State Health costs expressed as Standardised Costs Ratio (SCR) NWAUs per 10,000 people for each NSW SA3
population
age standardised per 10,000 people

2013-14
SCR
SA3 Code & Name
(NWAUs)
10101 Goulburn – Yass
2891.26
10102 Queanbeyan
2132.54
10103 Snowy Mountains
1934.03
10104 South Coast
3292.83
10201 Gosford
2884.16
10202 Wyong
3148.57
10301 Bathurst
2922.49
10302 Lachlan Valley
3564.20
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
2878.62
10304 Orange
3348.17
10401 Clarence Valley
3497.06
10402 Coffs Harbour
3505.45
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 4506.21
10502 Broken Hill and Far West
2445.55
10503 Dubbo
3615.59
10601 Lower Hunter
3308.45
10602 Maitland
3514.38
10603 Port Stephens
2936.28
10604 Upper Hunter
3077.77
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla
3377.10
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour
2924.76
10704 Wollongong
2885.58
10801 Great Lakes
3374.67
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
3835.34
10804 Port Macquarie
3072.79
10805 Taree - Gloucester
3325.94
10901 Albury
2841.99
10902 Lower Murray
2828.66
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury
2997.41
11001 Armidale
2879.75
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield
3468.99
11003 Moree - Narrabri
3316.02
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah
3750.38
11101 Lake Macquarie - East
2918.90
11102 Lake Macquarie - West
3062.96
11103 Newcastle
2957.81
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal
2280.49
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland 3397.10
11203 Tweed Valley
2323.55
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 3545.82
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
3395.18
11303 Wagga Wagga
3407.29
11401 Shoalhaven
3291.60
11402 Southern Highlands
3041.83
11501 Baulkham Hills
2302.52
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
2678.05
11503 Hawkesbury
2770.69

2014-15 2015-16
SCR
SCR
(NWAUs) (NWAUs)
3039.80 2965.15
2329.13 2347.25
2953.96 2259.46
3309.97 3229.65
2903.96 3049.63
3208.55 3339.84
2952.64 3222.89
3559.09 3915.82
3182.27 3104.86
3541.87 3632.20
3570.28 3669.09
3719.81 3748.30
4710.17 4926.36
3502.09 3790.40
3783.41 3899.25
3246.73 3190.74
3344.39 3346.04
3059.56 3222.52
3308.89 3525.90
3292.76 3425.92
3010.07 2947.40
2854.95 2845.40
3318.42 3282.27
4098.64 4039.81
3099.80 3097.72
3304.30 3450.75
2928.26 2983.57
3390.24 3318.34
2956.49 2885.56
3029.69 2966.68
3257.49 3650.91
3469.19 3602.61
3773.26 3723.93
2838.45 2944.62
2970.91 3198.02
2984.85 3059.88
2311.81 2319.63
3257.82 3321.11
2467.30 2388.35
3672.72 3585.09
3433.67 3818.23
3461.55 3545.70
3425.96 3442.09
3059.06 3030.82
2351.46 2298.76
2687.06 2691.53
2796.87 2946.76

Median
SCR
(NWAUs)
2965.15
2329.13
2259.46
3292.83
2903.96
3208.55
2952.64
3564.20
3104.86
3541.87
3570.28
3719.81
4710.17
3502.09
3783.41
3246.73
3346.04
3059.56
3308.89
3377.10
2947.40
2854.95
3318.42
4039.81
3097.72
3325.94
2928.26
3318.34
2956.49
2966.68
3468.99
3469.19
3750.38
2918.90
3062.96
2984.85
2311.81
3321.11
2388.35
3585.09
3433.67
3461.55
3425.96
3041.83
2302.52
2687.06
2796.87
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Table 12 continued
age standardised per 10,000 people

2013-14
SCR
SA3 Code & Name
(NWAUs)
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
2429.77
11601 Blacktown
3680.13
11602 Blacktown - North
2672.12
11603 Mount Druitt
4505.91
11701 Botany
3091.76
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham 3252.22
11703 Sydney Inner City
3096.82
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North
2567.24
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South
3181.24
11901 Bankstown
2935.48
11902 Canterbury
3100.23
11903 Hurstville
2424.31
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale
3153.38
12001 Canada Bay
2405.76
12002 Leichhardt
2636.30
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield
2402.09
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove
2339.62
12102 Hornsby
2445.19
12103 Ku-ring-gai
2242.85
12104 North Sydney - Mosman
2990.68
12201 Manly
2674.25
12202 Pittwater
2651.90
12203 Warringah
2595.32
12301 Camden
2742.87
12302 Campbelltown (NSW)
3751.19
12303 Wollondilly
2857.50
12401 Blue Mountains
2756.11
12403 Penrith
3422.74
12404 Richmond - Windsor
3186.49
12405 St Marys
4585.00
12501 Auburn
3053.76
12502 Carlingford
2524.61
12503 Merrylands - Guildford
3007.22
12504 Parramatta
2930.10
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
2090.73
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
2546.03
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley
3192.15
12702 Fairfield
2710.90
12703 Liverpool
3519.86
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah
2647.47
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote
2677.94
Maximum
4585.00
Minimum
1934.03
Mean
3015.16
Median
2974.25
SD
509.1432

2014-15
SCR
(NWAUs)
2708.98
3700.87
2675.56
4725.46
3218.97
3148.49
3021.09
2325.36
3185.67
2970.96
3126.35
2434.85
3311.58
2375.70
2709.68
2523.00
2449.20
2513.13
2322.87
2860.77
2595.77
2593.19
2605.32
2873.99
3798.85
2935.96
2903.32
3342.68
3335.90
4380.97
3104.24
2617.51
3023.43
3001.50
2068.91
2665.42
3109.49
2783.47
3387.08
2734.24
2657.25
4725.46
2068.91
3085.87
3034.75
499.5848

2015-16
SCR
(NWAUs)
2624.82
3886.93
2784.97
4560.64
3475.23
3202.41
2961.36
2420.70
3162.16
2959.19
3256.37
2420.14
3127.59
2400.87
2710.78
2534.04
2331.55
2552.90
2235.24
2934.54
2764.93
2797.69
2666.35
3060.90
3817.98
2966.01
3015.68
3584.90
3531.55
4420.26
3248.59
2572.65
3091.05
2903.88
2031.83
2562.42
3248.71
2713.31
3323.53
2744.65
2853.89
4926.36
2031.83
3132.50
3094.39
538.5081

Median
SCR
(NWAUs)
2624.82
3700.87
2675.56
4560.64
3218.97
3202.41
3021.09
2420.70
3181.24
2959.19
3126.35
2424.31
3153.38
2400.87
2709.68
2523.00
2339.62
2513.13
2242.85
2934.54
2674.25
2651.90
2605.32
2873.99
3798.85
2935.96
2903.32
3422.74
3335.90
4420.26
3104.24
2572.65
3023.43
2930.10
2068.91
2562.42
3192.15
2713.31
3387.08
2734.24
2677.94
4710.17
2068.91
3073.11
3032.63
506.0761
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Figure 26

Histogram of the median rate of age-standardised SCR (NWAUs) for the 88 DMUs used as an input

variable in the HORSt DEA and the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16

Figure 26 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017).

5.4

REGRESSION -DEPENDENT VARIABLE

As discussed in the previous chapter (page 122) regarding two-stage DEA, the dependent variable for
the regression will be the allocative efficiency scores of population health status measured by the
DEA for the 88 DMUs / SA3 populations.

5.5

REGRESSION - INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables considered for the HORSt regression are informed by the literature of
social determinants that are known in a formative construct to give rise to health inequalities and
therefore logically can give rise or form to the allocative efficiency of health status measured by the
DEA allocative efficiency scores. As correlation methods such as regression models do not indicate
the direction of interaction between variables, it is important for the research to accurately consider
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the nature of the construct’s direction in the selection of explanatory variables (Leedy & Ormrod
2010, p. 185). If the direction of interaction between the variables is misspecified in a correlation
model, variables thought to be associated may not be and correlation coefficients in predictive
models may be in error (Jarvis 2014; Roy et al. 2012). Formative constructs imply that correlating
variables would give form to the construct, whereas reflective constructs imply that correlating
variables are reflected from the construct (Coltman et al. 2008; Diamantopoulos & Siguaw 2006;
Jarvis 2014).

As outlined by Field (2013, p. 321) independent variable selection should be judicious, parsimonious
and be based on sound theoretical knowledge and well conducted research. In particular, to
contextualise the model to Australian data sources, the data sources of predictor variables of former
NSW RDF and development of the latest iteration the NSW Expected Health Utilisation Need Indices
(EHUIs) were considered along with the underlying literature. As outlined in the literature review
the former RDF and EHUIs utilised formative constructs; both sought variables that give rise to
inpatient utilisation as a measure of health need.

Variables that represent seven categories of social determinants that are demonstrated in the
literature to give rise to health inequalities that affect health outcomes for individuals and within
populations are to be tested in the HORSt regression analysis. These are:
1. lower socioeconomic status;
2. living in rural and remote communities;
3. indigenous status;
4. living with a disability
5. living with mental illness;
6. migrants with low levels of English; and
7. affordability / financial barrier of access to private primary care services.
Ultimately the regression model will not feature variables for all of these categorises as there is
overlap amongst these categories. Furthermore, as this section will show there is overlap amongst
some of the variables representing them.

Seeking a parsimonious robust regression that fits the

data, the regression analysis will consider the combined linear predictive effects of independent
variables to explain the variation in the DEA allocative efficiency scores. Doing so, the regression
analysis will eliminate variables that are not significant and ultimately reduce the number of
independent variables in the regression model that best fits the data.
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The first six categories listed above were introduced in Chapter One and are well supported
contextually in the Australian literature as social determinants of health (Allan et al. 2007; Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a; NSW Department of Health 2004; Palmer & Short 2014;
Turrell et al. 2006).

A seventh category will consider out-of-pocket expenses at the population level that represent the
affordability and / or financial barriers to access private predominately primary care services.
Inclusion of this is fourfold. First, as discussed in the literature review, it is well established that
delays in treatment due to financial constraints may give rise to worst health inequalities and poorer
health outcomes (Kraft et al. 2009; Mollborn et al. 2005; Prentice & Pizer 2007). Second, at the time
of this research, Australians are facing more than ever growing out-of-pocket costs for private health
care, around 20% of the total Australian Health Care expenditure, which is higher than the OECD
average of 19% (OECD 2015), which has resulted in an Australian Government Senate inquiry
(Community Affairs References Committee 2014). Third, in response to the second, the Australian
Government has made available for the first time variables reflecting out-of-pocket consumer costs
at the population level including SA3s for non-hospital Medicare subsided treatment (Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare 2018d). Fourth, as proven in the literature it is entirely likely that
populations that cannot afford private sector access will eventually substitute the lack of private
sector access with public sector services such as the ED in public hospitals and at higher costs to the
tax payer (Eckermann 2014a, 2014b; Eckermann et al. 2016). It would seem therefore logical that
vertical equity financial loadings informed by the HORSt regression analysis should consider the
significance of out-of-pocket costs on the benchmarked allocative efficiency of health outcomes.

The former NSW RDF and EHUI considered and used variables comprising the first six social
determinant categories listed above but also included premature standardised mortality ratios
(SMRs) less than 70 years of age (Health Policy Analysis 2014a, 2014b; Inter-Government & Funding
Strategies 2005b; Marshall & Slater 2015). However, using SMRs is problematic for the formative
construct validity of the former RDF, the EHUIs and the HORSt. Premature deaths data as per the
SMR does not give rise to health status or health utilisation, rather SMRs logically reflect these.
Therefore, the use of SMR data in a reflective construct would be correctly specified but incorrectly
specified in a formative construct. For the HORSt it is difficult to see how deaths data could give rise
to the allocative efficiency or inefficiency of health status measured by PPHs. As such SMR data will
not be considered in the HORSt regression.
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Independent variable selection for the HORSt regression analysis for each of the seven categories
identified will utilise data from established secondary data sources for the SA3 populations. It is
likely that there will be correlations between the independent variables as there are obvious
intersections between the social determinant categories, such as people of lower socioeconomic
status living with a disability etc. The regression analysis will ultimately test each of the variables
consistent with the axioms outlined in the previous chapter (page 128) and develop a parsimonious
model of best fit with far fewer predictors than the variables that are now critiqued.

5.5.1 Socioeconomic variables from the 2016 ABS Census
Utilising census data, the ABS develops Socioeconomic Indices for Areas (SEIFA) that ranks
geographical areas by the relative socioeconomic advantage and disadvantage of their collective
populations. The SEIFA indices are for collective populations, not individuals and are established
from census data (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 4,6). There are four key socioeconomic
variables that are produced by the ABS being:


Index of Relative Socio-economic Disadvantage (IRSD);



Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage (IRSAD);



Index of Education and Occupation (IEO); and



Index of Economic Resources (IER).

The current version is for the 2016 census. The indices overtime a broadly comparable with previous
versions, of other censuses of 2001, 2006 and 2011 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 4).

The indices produced are ordinal rankings and at the lowest population level applied (SA1), 1,000
represents the mean of the rankings. Higher scores represent higher socioeconomic ranking and
vice versa. However, the produced index numbers are not proportionally comparable. For example
an area having an index of 1,100 is not twice that as socioeconomically advantaged as an area having
an index of 550 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 18, 30).

All are indices constructed from multiple data collected at the census and utilise principal
component analysis, a method to reduce a large number of correlated data into uncorrelated
principal components (meaningful dimensions) that are useful for supporting each indices
assessments of the population socioeconomic advantage and disadvantage (Australian Bureau of
Statistics 2018d, p. 15).

The dimensions identified and included for use in the indices are

summarised in the Table 13.

As each individual index contains some of the same principal

components and some of the same underlying variables these indices correlate with each other.
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With the HORSt regression bi-variate correlation analysis will demonstrate the extent of the
correlations.

Regression options modelled will not contain multiple SEIFA indices due to the

multicollinearity.

Table 13 Principal components / dimensions used with 2016 ABS SEIFA indices
Dimension

2016 SEIFA Indices
IRSD

IRSAD

IER

Income







Education





Employment





Occupation





Housing







Other







IEO







(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 39).

The ABS definitions of the four SEIFA indices are presented herein. Accompanying tables showing
the included census measures aligned to the six dimensions of each index are provided. Variable
weightings are applied by the ABS to construct a single index number of each SA1 and SA2
population. The individual census variable weightings that make up the index for each population
area not relevant to the HORSt and are not presented. By contrast, the index numbers for each of
the four SEIFA indices for the population levels are relevant and, importantly, the ABS only compile
the four indices at SA1 and SA2 population levels. However, within the ABS Technical paper there is
a formula designed to permit the calculation of these indices at SA3 and higher levels, which is
required to support the HORSt regression analysis. This ABS formula depicted in equation 20 was
utilised so as to compute SEIFA indices for each SA3 population.

Equation 20 – ABS formula for creating higher geographical level SEIFA indices from SA1 to SA3

𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑆𝐴3(𝑖)

∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑆𝐴1(𝑖) × 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐴1(𝑖) )
=
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐴3 (𝑖)

where:
INDEXSA1(i) = index score for each SA1
POP SA1(i) = Population for each SA1
POP SA3(i) = Population for the SA3
n = Total number of SA1s with index scores in SA3(i)
Page 175

(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 18).

It is important to note that at higher calculated levels, such as the SA3, that the indices do not have
the same average around 1,000 as that of the SA1 levels as the higher levels are not standardised in
this way (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 18).

It could be argued that the calculated indices at the higher population levels do not have the same
level of visibility of socioeconomic advantage or disadvantage in small areas as per the SA1 levels.
However, the SA3 indices derived from the ABS formula designed to do so, nonetheless represent
the socioeconomic rankings of the SA3 populations that take into account the SA1 socioeconomic
index rankings weighted for the SA1 populations that make up the SA3.

Given the literature’s findings of socioeconomic status being associated with health outcomes and in
particular PPHs, it is expected that for each of the SEIFA indices, high socioeconomic status will be
associated with high rates of population health status and higher rates of allocative efficiency
associated with the production of desirable health outcomes and vice versa.

The individual SEIFA indices are now outlined in detailed.

IRSD
“The IRSD summarises variables that indicate relative disadvantage. This index ranks areas on a
continuum from most disadvantaged to least disadvantaged. A low score on this index indicates a
high proportion of relatively disadvantaged people in an area ” (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2018d, p. 6).

Table 14 shows a summary of the census variables included in the IRSD index.
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Table 14 IRSD with component census variables
Dimension

Variable Description

Income

% People with stated annual household equivalised income between $1 and $25,999 (approx. 1st
and 2nd deciles).

Education

% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education is Year 11 or lower. Includes
Certificate I and II.
% People aged 15 years and over who have no educational attainment.

Employment

% People (in the labour force) unemployed.

Occupation

% Employed people classified as labourers.
% Employed people classified as Machinery Operators and Drivers.
% Employed people classified as Low Skill Community and Personal Service Workers.

Housing

% Occupied private dwellings paying rent less than $215 per week (excluding $0 per week).
% Occupied private dwellings requiring one or more extra bedrooms (based on Canadian
National Occupancy Standard).

Other

% Families with children under 15 years of age who live with jobless parents.
% One parent families with dependent offspring only.
% Occupied private dwellings with no cars.
% People aged under 70 who have a long–term health condition or disability and need assistance
with core activities.
% People who do not speak English well.
% People aged 15 and over who are separated or divorced.
% Occupied private dwellings with no internet connection.

(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 19-20).

IRSAD
“The IRSAD summarises variables that indicate either relative advantage or disadvantage. This index
ranks areas on a continuum from most disadvantaged to most advantaged. An area with a high
score on this index has a relatively high incidence of advantage and a relatively low incidence of
disadvantage” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 6-7).

Table 15 shows a summary of the census variables included in the IRSAD index.
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Table 15 IRSAD with component census variables
Dimension

Variable Description

Income

% People with stated annual household equivalised income between $1 and $25,999 (approx. 1st
and 2nd deciles).
% People with stated annual household equivalised income greater than $78,000 (approx. 9th and
10th deciles).

Education

% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education is Year 11 or lower. Includes
Certificate I and II.
% People aged 15 years and over who have no educational attainment.
% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of educational attainment is a certificate III or
IV qualification.
% People aged 15 years and over at university or other tertiary institution.
% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education attainment is a diploma
qualification.

Employment

% People (in the labour force) unemployed.

Occupation

% Employed people classified as labourers.
% Employed people classified as Machinery Operators and Drivers.
% Employed people classified as Low Skill Community and Personal Service Workers.
% Employed people classified as Low Skill Sales.
% employed people classified as Managers.
% Employed people classified as Professionals.

Housing

% Occupied private dwellings paying rent less than $215 per week (excluding $0 per week).
% Occupied private dwellings requiring one or more extra bedrooms (based on Canadian National
Occupancy Standard).
% Occupied private dwellings with four or more bedrooms.
% Occupied private dwellings paying rent greater than $470 per week.
% Occupied private dwellings paying mortgage greater than $2,800 per month.

Other

% Families with children under 15 years of age who live with jobless parents.
% One parent families with dependent offspring only.
% Occupied private dwellings with no cars.
% People aged under 70 who have a long–term health condition or disability and need assistance
with core activities.
% People aged 15 and over who are separated or divorced.
% Occupied private dwellings with no internet connection.

(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 20-1).

IER
“The IER summarises variables relating to the financial aspects of relative socio-economic advantage
and disadvantage. These include indicators of high and low income, as well as variables that
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correlate with high or low wealth. Areas with higher scores have relatively greater access to
economic resources than areas with lower scores” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 7).
Table 16 shows a summary of the census variables included in the IER index.
Table 16 IER with component census variables
Dimension

Variable Description

Income

% People with stated annual household equivalised income between $1 and $25,999 (approx. 1st
and 2nd deciles).
% People with stated annual household equivalised income greater than $78,000 (approx 9th and
10th deciles).

Employment

% People aged 15 years and over who are unemployed

Housing

% Occupied private dwellings paying rent less than $215 per week (excluding $0 per week).
% Occupied private dwellings requiring one or more extra bedrooms (based on Canadian National
Occupancy Standard).
% Occupied private dwellings owning dwelling without a mortgage.
% Occupied private dwellings with four or more bedrooms.
% Occupied private dwellings paying mortgage greater than $2,800 per month.

Other

% Dwellings with at least one person who is an owner of an unincorporated enterprise.
% One parent families with dependent offspring only.
% Occupied private dwellings with no cars.
% Occupied private dwellings who are group occupied private dwellings.
% Occupied private dwellings who are lone person occupied private dwellings.

Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 21-2).
IEO
“The IEO summarises variables relating to the educational and occupational aspects of relative socioeconomic advantage and disadvantage. This index focuses on the skills of the people in an area, both
formal qualifications and the skills required to perform different occupations. A low score indicates
that an area has a high proportion of people without qualifications, without jobs and/or with low
skilled jobs. A high score indicates many people with high qualifications and/or highly skilled jobs”
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 7).

Table 17 shows a summary of the census variables included in the IRSD index.
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Table 17 IEO with component census variables
Dimension

Variable Description

Education

% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education is Year 11 or lower. Includes
Certificate I and II.
% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of educational attainment is a certificate III or
IV qualification.
% People aged 15 years and over at university or other tertiary institution.
% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education attainment is a diploma
qualification.

Employment

% People (in the labour force) unemployed.

Occupation

% Employed people who work in a Skill Level 1 occupation.
% Employed people who work in a Skill Level 2 occupation.
% Employed people who work in a Skill Level 4 occupation.
% Employed people who work in a Skill Level 5 occupation.

(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 22).

5.5.2 Accessibility and Remoteness Index of Australia (2011 ARIA)
The literature indicates that people living in rural and remote areas face high rates of health
inequalities related to the access of health services and have poorer health outcomes than people in
more urbanised areas (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2007, 2016a, 2016b). In Australia
access to services and remoteness are measured by the Accessibility and Remoteness Index of
Australia (ARIA) which classifies geographical areas of Australia into five classes of remoteness being:
1. Major cities;
2. Inner regional;
3. Outer regional;
4. Remote; and
5. Very Remote
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018c).

ARIA is produced by the Hugo Centre for Migration and Population Research at the University of
Adelaide who can supply ARIA at cost scores for all ABS geographies (including SA3s) and non-ABS
geographies such as LGAs. The scores ranging from 0 to 15 and calculated to two decimal places
whereby lower scores represent great access to services and vice versa. The scores themselves are
calculated based on road distances of populations’ locations to nearest service centre (major
settlement) within each of the five remoteness categories and divided by the national average in
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each category. The version of ARIA applicable to the 2011 version SA3 geographies used in the
HORSt is called ARIA+ (Hugo Centre for Migration and Population Research 2018a).

The inclusion of this variable in the regression analysis is logically sensible and supported by the
literature including the former NSW RDF and EHUIs that used it (Health Policy Analysis 2014b; InterGovernment & Funding Strategies 2005b). However, there is no guarantee that the variable would
be a significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency scores in a regression model
containing other variables. Given this risk and due to financial limitations of this study, the costs of
purchasing the ARIA data for the NSW SA3s were deemed prohibitive.

A free version demonstration version of the ARIA+ scores at SA3 level is available for download. This
data lacks the precision of the purchased scores to two decimal places and provides the ARIA+ to the
nearest whole number (Hugo Centre for Migration and Population Research 2018b). Given the
literature’s strong position on ARIA being a social determinant of health the downloaded data which
requires a separate download for each SA3 was nonetheless pursued and the ARIA+ scores to the
nearest whole number were included in the regression analysis for assessment.

5.5.3 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (2016 Census)
The health inequalities faced by indigenous Australians in particular are a blunt contrast to
Australian norms. For example, in 2011-12 the average life expectancy for indigenous Australian
males and females was 10.6 and 9.5 years less respectively compared to non-indigenous Australians
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2018, p. 104).

In addition to reduced life

expectancy, indigenous Australians have higher rates of associated morbidity than non-indigenous
Australians and higher rates of social disadvantage. For example:
“Blinding cataract is 12 times more common in indigenous Australians adults than non-Indigenous
adults but the rates of cataract surgery are seven times lower. Cataracts cause 32% of blindness in
indigenous Australians adults and 27% of low vision. 94% of vision loss for indigenous Australians
Islander people is preventable or treatable, but only 65% of those with vision loss caused by cataracts
have received surgery”(Holland 2014, p. 9).

A key initiative of Australian Government’s, Closing the Gap, was established in 2008 to tackle these
serious health inequalities of indigenous Australians. This initiative remains a priority of all levels of
Government in Australia (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2015b; Holland 2014).
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Given the poor health outcomes of the indigenous Australian community, the proportion of people
who identify as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people amongst SA3 populations will be included
in the regression analysis.

It would be expected that populations that have higher rates of

indigenous Australians would have poorer health outcomes and lower rates of allocative efficiency
associated with those outcomes. The latest 2016 Census data of “Estimates of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Australians, June 2016” will be utilised for this purpose (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2018b).

5.5.4 Disability – Assisted Needs Population (2016 Census)
People living with disabilities are known to have poorer health outcomes and have lower
socioeconomic means (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2010, 2016b). The key Census
statistic for assessing people living with disabilities is the ‘Core Activity Need for Assistance (ASSNP)’
variable (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017e). The 2016 Census data for SA3s is available via the
ABS online data base ‘Table builder’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017a).

This data was

downloaded as a portion of the 2016 population for inclusion in the regression.

Given the literature, it is expected that populations that have higher proportions of people requiring
assistance, will have poorer health outcomes and lower rates of allocative efficiency associated with
those outcomes. However, with due consideration to the SEIFA variables discussed, elements of the
population with assisted needs under 70 years are included in the IRSD and IRSAD indices. Given this
and the literature noted above, it is possible that in a regression analysis the Assisted Needs variable
might give rise to multicollinearity problems with the SEIFA indices and or be a non-significant linear
predictor of the DEA Allocative efficiency score in a regression containing a SEIFA index.
Nonetheless, the literature indicates that variable is well worth assessment in the regression
analysis.

5.5.5 Health and wellbeing and risk of Mental illness – Lone Person Households (2016
Census)
According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2015a), there are a number of risk
factors for health and wellbeing and mental health associated with people living on their own.
Specifically, people living alone:


are more than twice as likely to have three or more social determinants that lead to
poorer health than couples or families;



have an increased risk of developing mental health problems; and



15% of people living with mental illness live in single person households.
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Furthermore, according to de Vaus and Qu (2015), lone person households were more likely to
engage in excessive alcohol and tobacco consumption than households containing couples and
families. Given that living alone is a risk factor to health outcomes, this variable will be included in
the regression analysis, where it could be expected that higher numbers of lone person households
yield poorer health outcomes and lower rates of allocative efficiency associated with those
outcomes.

The SEIFA index IER includes lone person dwellings and there maybe issues of significance for this
variable in a regression model containing IER or another SEIFA index that correlates with or
represents social determinants known in the literature to be associated with people living alone.

The number of lone person households is collected on the Census via questions regarding Family
Composition (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017f). The data was extracted via the ABS Stat
database for SA3 populations (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017c).

5.5.6 Migrant populations - No or Poor English (2016 Census)
“Immigrants from English-speaking countries were found to have advantages related to physical
health, mental health and self-assessed health. English proficiency had an effect on the difference in
health between populations, as a language barrier could hinder an individual’s access to health
services. It can also have an impact on employment, which has broader socioeconomic implications”
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a).

Given the literature relating to hindered access of services due to poor English proficiency, it could
be expected that populations that have higher rates of poor English proficiency have poorer health
outcomes and lower rates of allocative efficiency associated with those outcomes.

The SEIFA index IRSD includes people who cannot speak English very well and there maybe
significance problems in a regression for this variable, where the regression also contains IRSD or
another SEIFA index that covers broader socioeconomic issues that the literature documents as
having an association with migrants with poor English. Nonetheless the variable will be assessed in
the regression analysis.

The Census statistic for assessing peoples’ English proficiency is the ‘Proficiency in Spoken English
(ENGP)’ variable (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017h). The 2016 Census data for SA3s is available
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via the ABS online data base ‘Table builder’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017b). Two categories
of English proficiency, ‘no-English’ or ‘poor English’, were downloaded and combined as a portion of
the 2016 population for inclusion in the regression analysis.

5.5.7 Out-of-pocket health expenses (AIHW)
The systematic public reporting of out-of-pocket health expenses by ABS geographical areas is
relatively new in Australia.

In 2018, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare released

information at the SA3 level via report (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018c) and via
downloaded data (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a). The reports and data show
out-of-pocket costs for non-hospital Medicare subsidised services for:


GP services;



Specialists;



Obstetrics;



Diagnostics and Imaging; and



A total of the above.

At the time of this study the AIHW data is only available for the 2016/17 financial year. The data is
reported for populations as the percentage of patients with out-of-pocket costs, the median out-ofpocket costs of patients and the out-of-pocket costs of patients of the 90th percentile for each SA3
are available (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a).

For assessment in the regression analysis, data will include the portion of the populations with outof-pocket costs for: GP services; Specialists; Diagnostics and Imaging; and the total of all these
categories which also includes obstetrics. Obstetrics out-of-pocket costs will not be assessed on its
own as unlike the other categories it covers a very narrow specific area of health, whereas the
HORSt is seeking a broad view of the overall health status of the community. However, due to the
nature of the proportional population data available, Obstetrics costs are already included in the
total proportions and will not be able to be removed so it is not possible to consider a total
proportion for GPs, Specialists and Diagnostic and Imaging together.

As per the literature that finds out-of-pocket costs act as a barrier to private non-admitted primary
care services, it is expected that populations’ that have higher portions of patients with out-ofpocket costs will have better health outcomes and in turn better allocative efficiency associated with
those outcomes as the costs incurred represent an ability to pay for access to private services.
Contrastingly, populations with lower portions of out-of-pocket costs will have a lower ability to pay
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to access private services, which may result through delay in worsening health outcomes,
compromising allocative efficiency.

Importantly, the underlying logic of the use of out-of-pocket costs in the regression is not saying that
individuals within populations with out-of-pocket costs do not face financial burdens to pay.
However, at the population level it is reasonable to assume that populations with higher portions of
out-of-pocket costs have a greater capacity and or willingness to pay to access private services than
those populations with lower portions. Furthermore, this logic is not saying that higher portions of
out-of-pocket costs cause better health outcomes and improve allocative efficiency associated with
those outcomes. The logic underpinned by the literature is positioning out-of-pocket costs as
representative of the financial ability of populations to access private primary care services. If the
financial access to private primary care services that populations require is lower, it is reasonable to
expect that the health outcomes of those populations could be compromised along with the
accompanying allocative efficiency of those outcomes.

5.5.8 Summary of Independent Variables for each SA3 to be assessed for the HORSt
regression
Table 18 shows that for 2016 that:


SA3 12702 Fairfield has the lowest IRSD and IEO of 860.9 and 883.9 respectively;



SA3 11730 Sydney Inner City had the lowest IER 884.6 and highest amount of lone
person households 32,415;



SA3 10802 Kempsey Nambucca had the lowest IRSAD 884.6;



SA3 12103 Ku-ring-gai had the highest IRSD and IRSAD 1121.0 and 1166.6 respectively,



SA3 12104 North Sydney - Mosman had the highest IEO 1192.9;



SA3 11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill had the highest IER 1154.8 and lowest number of
lone person households 976;



the highest ATSI proportion was at SA3 10501 Bourke – Cobar - Coonamble almost 30%
of the population;



SA3 10801 Great lakes had the highest assisted needs proportion almost 9% of the
population; and



SA3 12501 Auburn had the highest population portion with no or little English 18.4%;



11603 Mount Druitt has the lowest population portion with non-admitted Medicare
subsidised Out-of-pocket Costs 18.5%, 12104 North Sydney –Mosman the highest
76.2%.
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Table 18 Summary table of independent / explanatory variables to be tested in the HORSt regression analysis by NSW SA3 area

SA3 Code and Name
10101 Goulburn – Yass
10102 Queanbeyan
10103 Snowy Mountains
10104 South Coast
10201 Gosford
10202 Wyong
10301 Bathurst
10302 Lachlan Valley
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
10304 Orange
10401 Clarence Valley
10402 Coffs Harbour
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
10502 Broken Hill and Far West
10503 Dubbo
10601 Lower Hunter
10602 Maitland
10603 Port Stephens
10604 Upper Hunter
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour
10704 Wollongong
10801 Great Lakes
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
10804 Port Macquarie
10805 Taree - Gloucester
10901 Albury
10902 Lower Murray
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury
11001 Armidale

% of pop
% of pop No or Lone person % Out of pocket % Out of pocket
% Out of pocket
% Out of pocket costs
IRSD IRSAD IER
IEO
ARIA % of pop ATSI Assisted Needs Poor English
households costs ALL
costs GPs
costs Specialists
Diagnostics & Imaging
982.6 970.4 1007.4 968.9
2
3.02%
6.41%
0.40%
7247
58.35%
44.10%
73.20%
29.45%
1053.4 1056.3 1059.4 1045.1
2
3.02%
3.84%
1.28%
5264
68.30%
61.60%
75.40%
39.10%
1004.9 980.9 998.8 985.0
4
2.39%
4.43%
0.43%
2242
60.90%
48.10%
75.40%
20.30%
968.8 943.6 975.7 953.8
4
4.69%
6.92%
0.29%
8695
62.40%
47.90%
76.30%
32.20%
1013.1 1005.0 1014.4 1007.9
1
2.58%
5.79%
0.54%
16968
56.00%
33.80%
78.60%
31.90%
962.1 943.6 985.7 929.9
0
4.28%
7.12%
0.44%
14987
50.00%
25.50%
75.30%
28.70%
984.1 970.8 994.6 973.0
2
4.81%
4.93%
0.32%
4395
50.80%
30.70%
67.80%
36.30%
941.4 928.5 968.0 938.2
5
9.21%
6.29%
0.22%
6269
47.30%
24.70%
72.20%
24.10%
942.3 926.0 971.8 912.4
3
4.98%
5.89%
0.33%
5233
46.50%
25.10%
69.70%
20.80%
988.5 977.1 1001.0 975.4
2
5.40%
5.24%
0.55%
5618
56.20%
38.30%
71.80%
39.60%
926.0 907.4 953.3 917.9
3
6.67%
8.41%
0.21%
5679
61.50%
37.00%
75.00%
44.00%
966.7 953.6 973.6 964.4
4
4.59%
6.16%
0.77%
8776
53.60%
37.50%
76.40%
15.10%
892.1 902.1 916.4 940.9
11
29.45%
5.16%
0.42%
2808
27.70%
11.10%
47.50%
23.10%
897.9 889.0 917.4 903.2
11
12.04%
7.47%
0.36%
2817
25.90%
16.00%
25.60%
9.40%
953.7 942.4 975.6 950.2
5
16.15%
6.00%
0.27%
6768
46.70%
26.70%
58.50%
36.40%
949.1 929.4 987.9 897.9
2
5.04%
6.36%
0.24%
7338
50.70%
33.90%
74.50%
15.00%
989.5 972.2 1009.9 946.7
0
3.82%
5.66%
0.35%
5705
60.80%
48.70%
76.00%
19.90%
978.4 957.3 998.6 938.6
1
4.17%
6.48%
0.30%
6639
51.20%
32.00%
71.70%
18.60%
951.5 936.1 983.2 905.2
4
5.49%
4.81%
0.40%
3009
52.30%
34.50%
71.90%
23.20%
949.2 938.8 977.4 919.7
0
3.20%
7.57%
3.39%
6402
39.20%
11.90%
69.90%
14.60%
996.7 981.0 1016.3 959.2
1
3.05%
6.19%
1.20%
6517
44.30%
17.70%
74.30%
20.50%
1012.3 1020.2 988.8 1042.3
0
2.00%
5.75%
2.45%
12469
52.90%
29.80%
74.90%
21.50%
930.1 910.3 956.0 918.4
2
4.57%
8.75%
0.24%
4109
60.00%
37.00%
79.80%
19.30%
895.4 884.4 935.4 901.6
4
11.05%
8.43%
0.21%
5574
46.40%
23.60%
73.20%
16.90%
975.9 958.0 985.2 964.7
3
3.85%
7.38%
0.20%
8815
50.00%
17.10%
79.60%
32.20%
922.1 907.1 951.3 916.9
3
6.16%
7.89%
0.24%
6037
59.30%
38.60%
78.10%
19.00%
973.7 957.7 969.0 963.3
2
2.62%
5.88%
0.66%
6955
61.90%
49.50%
77.50%
26.00%
951.9 937.9 973.5 940.3
7
9.57%
5.03%
0.55%
1275
48.30%
24.10%
65.60%
32.20%
968.6 946.9 979.5 945.7
4
2.74%
5.88%
0.26%
5031
64.10%
47.80%
80.90%
19.40%
985.9 979.3 969.5 1015.0
4
7.38%
5.09%
0.66%
3814
58.60%
46.40%
70.80%
38.40%

Table continues on next page
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Table 18– continued

SA3 Code and Name
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield
11003 Moree - Narrabri
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah
11101 Lake Macquarie - East
11102 Lake Macquarie - West
11103 Newcastle
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal
11202 Richmond Valley 11203 Tweed Valley
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
11303 Wagga Wagga
11401 Shoalhaven
11402 Southern Highlands
11501 Baulkham Hills
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
11503 Hawkesbury
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
11601 Blacktown
11602 Blacktown - North
11603 Mount Druitt
11701 Botany
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham 11703 Sydney Inner City
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South
11901 Bankstown
11902 Canterbury
11903 Hurstville
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale

IRSD
IRSAD IER
IEO
ARIA
914.0 906.0 947.7 929.0
939.0 932.1 958.9 937.3
955.3 941.3 977.5 936.9
1001.4 986.5 1004.6 977.4
984.2 965.0 1003.9 948.3
993.6 992.7 966.5 1012.6
997.9 988.6 993.2 1013.2
933.6 921.5 953.5 937.4
973.3 956.3 984.9 959.5
954.6 939.1 974.4 922.3
951.1 933.4 977.9 927.0
983.6 966.4 989.1 966.2
963.6 943.1 981.6 949.2
1034.6 1021.8 1046.0 1024.8
1106.2 1133.9 1128.1 1113.9
1091.4 1104.0 1137.4 1073.0
1061.7 1049.5 1108.8 1005.9
1098.4 1116.7 1154.8 1059.2
984.9 986.5 989.1 971.0
1076.8 1096.6 1117.6 1051.5
913.1 916.3 951.5 896.0
1001.2 1028.5 967.9 1028.4
1034.8 1078.0 979.4 1101.6
1028.2 1096.2 884.6 1149.6
1101.6 1151.3 1031.5 1174.5
1051.7 1095.5 983.6 1118.5
941.1 963.9 971.3 966.3
930.8 958.2 943.1 966.6
1007.0 1032.3 992.1 1039.8
1005.6 1027.0 976.9 1032.3

% of pop
% of pop No or Lone person % Out of pocket % Out of pocket
% Out of pocket
% Out of pocket costs
% of pop ATSI Assisted Needs Poor English
households
costs ALL
costs GPs
costs Specialists
Diagnostics & Imaging
5
7.44%
6.73%
0.28%
4509
54.60%
40.60%
72.50%
33.20%
6
19.04%
4.25%
0.33%
2529
52.90%
43.80%
65.60%
15.60%
4
10.52%
5.65%
0.25%
8241
61.60%
51.70%
72.10%
35.60%
0
3.04%
6.24%
0.45%
11256
58.80%
42.90%
72.20%
18.00%
0
4.05%
7.28%
0.37%
6213
51.60%
32.50%
72.20%
17.40%
0
3.15%
5.99%
1.22%
18245
61.60%
49.40%
71.10%
22.50%
1
3.04%
5.45%
0.33%
8400
64.80%
47.30%
76.90%
25.00%
2
6.11%
6.89%
0.41%
7729
61.60%
46.20%
71.50%
39.40%
1
4.02%
7.14%
0.37%
10106
52.10%
30.70%
71.40%
23.20%
6
6.79%
5.42%
2.14%
4341
57.30%
40.10%
71.00%
31.40%
3
4.62%
4.89%
0.37%
1575
44.70%
16.80%
84.60%
35.00%
3
5.00%
5.31%
0.53%
9129
59.30%
41.90%
81.80%
47.10%
2
5.50%
7.68%
0.36%
10895
56.60%
37.00%
70.20%
22.50%
1
2.09%
5.64%
0.31%
4642
61.60%
47.50%
71.70%
32.00%
0
0.34%
3.72%
2.93%
5613
50.50%
27.30%
79.60%
20.20%
1
0.60%
4.25%
1.33%
1111
58.50%
34.10%
83.60%
29.40%
2
2.03%
3.65%
0.30%
1199
51.00%
27.60%
78.80%
18.10%
0
1.01%
2.80%
1.23%
976
43.30%
18.00%
77.40%
15.10%
0
2.32%
5.46%
4.92%
7628
27.70%
5.60%
60.00%
6.70%
0
1.57%
3.28%
2.49%
2767
34.80%
9.60%
72.30%
11.00%
0
5.37%
6.23%
4.42%
5083
18.50%
2.60%
49.20%
3.30%
0
1.85%
4.90%
5.86%
3783
40.80%
19.00%
67.70%
17.30%
0
1.91%
5.05%
7.13%
5511
47.90%
28.90%
68.70%
20.30%
0
1.66%
2.44%
3.68%
32415
53.90%
39.10%
71.80%
27.30%
0
0.39%
2.78%
1.26%
14082
68.90%
54.30%
81.00%
42.00%
0
1.73%
3.81%
3.27%
13098
52.10%
32.10%
71.70%
23.10%
0
0.92%
7.03%
9.36%
10163
32.20%
9.50%
65.40%
7.00%
0
0.55%
6.27%
13.45%
7681
28.80%
6.70%
62.10%
7.00%
0
0.70%
5.24%
8.84%
8582
42.40%
19.40%
70.90%
13.10%
0
0.63%
5.29%
7.52%
10594
40.00%
14.80%
70.70%
15.00%

Table continues on next page
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Table 18– continued

SA3 Code and Name
12001 Canada Bay
12002 Leichhardt
12003 Strathfield - Burwood 12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove
12102 Hornsby
12103 Ku-ring-gai
12104 North Sydney - Mosman
12201 Manly
12202 Pittwater
12203 Warringah
12301 Camden
12302 Campbelltown (NSW)
12303 Wollondilly
12401 Blue Mountains
12403 Penrith
12404 Richmond - Windsor
12405 St Marys
12501 Auburn
12502 Carlingford
12503 Merrylands - Guildford
12504 Parramatta
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley
12702 Fairfield
12703 Liverpool
12801 Cronulla - Miranda 12802 Sutherland - Menai -

IRSD IRSAD IER
IEO
ARIA
1070.8 1108.6 1026.1 1121.0
1089.7 1142.1 1041.6 1169.1
1023.5 1059.9 966.3 1083.8
1092.7 1142.0 1047.7 1162.3
1079.4 1101.1 1065.4 1106.1
1121.0 1166.6 1110.2 1169.7
1110.1 1160.7 1025.9 1192.9
1110.7 1158.7 1077.0 1169.2
1100.5 1120.5 1074.1 1108.4
1084.2 1109.0 1089.9 1094.5
1055.2 1053.2 1100.9 1004.3
951.3 948.5 977.6 932.3
1039.2 1026.4 1088.8 976.5
1045.3 1042.5 1038.6 1069.9
991.4 989.2 1025.0 953.1
993.0 975.9 1012.1 946.1
964.6 948.7 989.5 905.1
936.7 979.1 930.9 986.7
1033.8 1058.5 1023.9 1070.1
914.3 941.3 946.2 944.0
1022.4 1040.9 963.5 1057.8
1096.9 1133.1 1077.2 1144.7
1061.1 1093.1 1018.7 1113.0
1033.8 1058.5 1023.9 1070.1
860.9 899.9 949.1 883.9
957.5 977.3 994.0 968.2
1073.6 1083.6 1067.5 1067.6
1086.4 1091.5 1100.5 1063.3

% of pop
% of pop No or Lone person % Out of pocket % Out of pocket
% Out of pocket
% Out of pocket costs
% of pop ATSI Assisted Needs Poor English
households costs ALL
costs GPs
costs Specialists
Diagnostics & Imaging
0
0.45%
4.26%
4.49%
6944
51.90%
25.60%
76.30%
23.60%
0
1.19%
3.40%
1.87%
6102
63.10%
45.70%
78.00%
34.40%
0
0.68%
4.82%
8.45%
11696
38.20%
15.60%
67.60%
12.30%
0
0.24%
3.28%
4.23%
9277
60.10%
43.80%
81.60%
40.40%
0
0.51%
3.89%
3.66%
5099
54.80%
33.80%
81.90%
41.30%
0
0.16%
3.63%
2.31%
6161
67.10%
51.70%
85.20%
49.40%
0
0.22%
2.41%
1.49%
13539
76.20%
67.70%
84.50%
55.20%
0
0.34%
2.43%
0.92%
3678
73.60%
61.00%
85.40%
44.90%
0
0.51%
3.68%
0.60%
4127
72.70%
60.80%
87.00%
46.80%
0
0.49%
4.01%
1.78%
11328
64.40%
46.90%
83.00%
39.10%
0
2.32%
4.50%
0.61%
2719
44.70%
19.80%
78.30%
12.70%
0
3.80%
5.85%
2.87%
9237
29.00%
5.60%
66.30%
7.00%
0
2.86%
4.70%
0.42%
2036
41.00%
14.60%
75.60%
13.70%
1
2.06%
5.50%
0.42%
7353
54.20%
30.10%
74.80%
9.40%
0
2.83%
5.03%
1.06%
9064
35.20%
10.30%
70.70%
7.30%
0
4.38%
5.69%
0.66%
2928
48.10%
24.10%
76.80%
16.00%
0
3.74%
5.52%
2.38%
3192
25.70%
3.40%
62.80%
5.30%
0
0.72%
4.45%
14.80%
4443
23.30%
4.60%
58.80%
6.80%
0
0.78%
4.73%
7.05%
4018
38.80%
15.90%
72.60%
17.20%
0
0.96%
6.65%
9.63%
8978
25.40%
4.70%
58.20%
7.20%
0
0.98%
4.69%
6.42%
10042
32.30%
9.50%
65.40%
12.30%
0
0.29%
3.48%
4.67%
2435
51.40%
31.40%
80.90%
28.50%
0
0.39%
4.69%
5.64%
10927
48.90%
27.30%
76.80%
24.20%
0
0.00%
5.62%
6.58%
3545
30.10%
6.00%
69.40%
7.50%
0
0.81%
8.37%
18.40%
8078
26.70%
4.70%
62.10%
5.20%
0
1.55%
6.36%
7.33%
6201
30.40%
6.60%
68.40%
6.90%
0
0.95%
4.36%
1.23%
9804
57.60%
31.70%
82.60%
24.60%
0
0.91%
4.21%
1.01%
6212
58.30%
33.50%
83.10%
23.70%

(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017g, 2018a, 2018b).
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5.6

CHAPTER SUMMARY OF DATA SOURCES APPLIED TO THE STUDY METHODOLOGY

This chapter has outlined and justified the data to be used to support the methodology outlined in
Chapter Four for the development of the HORSt.

The HORSt benchmark methodology makes use of:


88 NSW SA3 populations defined by the ABS.



The decision to use the SA3 populations is determined by the availability of MBS and
PBS data at this level.



Population health status is the DEA output variable and is measured by the transformed
median rate of age-standardised and casemix adjusted (NWAUs) per 10,000 people for
PPHs for the years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16;



The median age-standardised rates of MBS and PBS costs per 10,000 people for the
years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16, are DEA inputs representing Commonwealth
government taxpayer funded inputs; and



The median age-standardised and casemix (NWAUs) adjusted rate per 10,000 people
(SCRs) is a DEA input representing state health administered taxpayer funded inputs.

The HORSt regression modelling methodology makes use of:


The measured DEA allocative efficiency scores for the population health status of each
NSW SA3 populations will be the dependent variable;



Testing explanatory variables from the Australian 2016 census and reputable secondary
data include:
o

The 4 ABS SEIFA variables IRSD, IRSAD, IER, IEO (in separate regression models)
along with variables that: represent location (ARIA); the indigenous population;
disability (portion of people requiring assistance); people with poor levels of
English proficiency; the number of people living alone; and ability to pay out-ofpocket costs.
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CHAPTER SIX – RESULTS
6.0

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the results for the HORSt. Aligned with the previous methodology chapter the
results are organised into three sections. These are:
1. The DEA allocative efficiency scores of the SA3 populations;
2. The regression analysis that identifies variables that predict the allocative efficiency
scores of the SA3 populations’; and
3. The vertical equity adjusted needs-based shares for SA3 populations and ultimately the
LHNs that can be used to guide resource allocation decisions between the NSW state
government and regions.

6.1

DEA RESULTS

The DEA allocative efficiency scores for each DMU / SA3 are summarised in Table 19. Heat maps for
these scores are shown for NSW and the metropolitan and surrounding areas of Sydney in figures 27
and 28 respectively. A descriptive analysis is also provided for these results, where the DEA
efficiency scores are the dependent variable in the regression analysis. As outlined in Chapter Four
there is no requirement for the data of the dependent variable to be normally distributed to support
the regression, the requirement is for the standardized regression residuals for the dependent
variable to be normal. The distribution shown for the data in Figure 29 shows extremely low scores
of two DMUs below 20 are clearly visible. These are for the SA3 areas Bourke – Cobar – Coonamble
and Mount Druitt having scores of 11.13 and 15.08 respectively. Figure 30 shows a stem and leaf
plot. Both areas are known to have very poor health outcomes and challenging social determinants
that give rise to these outcomes (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2018; Centre for
Epidemiology and Research 2010; McNab & Gillespie 2015; Western NSW Local Health District &
Western NSW Medicare Local 2013).

Assessment of the DEA scores is conducted by considering the top and bottom 5 ranked DMUs / SA3
populations in terms of their allocative efficiency scores and with respect to their ranked health
status that was used as the DEA output and their ranked use of input resources. Table 20 shows a
summary of the efficiency scores compared to ranked health status, Table 21 shows a summary
compared to ranked resource intensity.
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Table 19 Summary of DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores for the 88 DMUs / SA3 NSW populations
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Figure 27

Heat map of NSW DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores for the 88 DMUs / SA3 NSW populations

Note –the legend above shows efficiency scores bound between 0 through to 100% clustered into deciles. Areas shaded in white are the ACT, and the SA3’s excluded for very low populations
(discussed on page 139).
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Figure 28

Heat map of NSW DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores for the metropolitan DMUs / SA3 NSW populations around Sydney

Note –the legend above shows efficiency scores bound between 0 through to 100% clustered into deciles.
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Figure 29

Histogram showing the distribution of DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores for the 88 DMUs / SA3 NSW

populations

Figure 30

DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores Stem-and-Leaf Plot
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Table 20 Highest and Lowest ranked DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores and health status (DEA output)

DEA Results - Highest and Lowest Efficiency

Extreme
Values

Highest

Lowest

Case
Rank Number
Eq 1
3
Eq 1
66
Eq 1
82
4
69
5
45
1
13
2
51
3
76
4
24
5
41

DEA Output and Health Status ranking for each DMU
/ SA3 highest (1) to lowest (88)

DEA
Allocative DEA
Efficiency Transformed
DMU/SA3 Code and Name
Score
Output
10103 Snowy Mountains
100
445
12103 Ku-ring-gai
100
451
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
100
446
12202 Pittwater
98.83
445
11501 Baulkham Hills
97.34
439
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
11.13
50
11603 Mount Druitt
15.08
68
12404 Richmond - Windsor
46.39
209
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
55.74
251
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
60.71
273

ACSCs age
standardised
NWAUs per
10k people
155
149
154
155
161
550
532
391
349
327

Health status ranking:
(from best to worst health
status as measured by the
ACSCs rate and DEA
Transformed output)
4
1
2
3
5
88
87
86
85
83

Table 21 Highest and Lowest ranked DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores and DEA resource inputs

DEA Results - Highest and Lowest Efficiency

Extreme
Case
Values Rank Number
Eq 1
3
Eq 1
66
Highest Eq 1
82
4
69
5
45
1
13
2
51
Lowest
3
76
4
24
5
41

DEA Input Resources ranked for each DMU / SA3 from highest (1) to
lowest (88)

DEA
Allocative
Efficiency MBS $ age MBS $ PBS $ age PBS $
DMU/SA3 Code and Name
Score
std per 10K Ranking std per 10K Ranking
10103 Snowy Mountains
100
4,282
88
1,827
88
12103 Ku-ring-gai
100
10,007
22
3,042
79
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
100
9,594
34
3,126
78
12202 Pittwater
98.83
9,301
43
2,975
80
11501 Baulkham Hills
97.34
10,413
10
3,223
75
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
11.13
9,103
52
4,331
22
11603 Mount Druitt
15.08
10,158
16
4,271
30
12404 Richmond - Windsor
46.39
9,577
36
4,268
31
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
55.74
9,363
41
4,862
3
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
60.71
8,689
66
4,242
33

SCR
(NWAUs)
age std per SCR
10K
Ranking
2,259
86
2,243
87
2,069
88
2,652
71
2,303
85
4,710
1
4,561
2
3,336
24
4,040
4
3,434
18

As outlined in Chapter Four, the DEA allocative efficiency scores are relative to the output and input
variables. Within an output orientated DEA model like the HORSt, it is reasonable to expect that the
areas that have the best and worst outputs would be somewhat ranked towards the top and bottom
extremes of the DEA scores, subject of course to their input resource usage compared to the other
areas. Tables 20 and 21 indicate that the DEA results make intuitive sense when the five highest and
lowest ranked allocative efficiency scores of DMUs are considered alongside the health status of
these populations (their DEA output) and their corresponding taxpayer provided resource usage
(their DEA inputs). Moreover, the DEA results are reasonably consistent with the underlying health
status and social determinants of these populations that are routinely monitored by health
authorities. The lowest 5 have some of the worst outcomes and challenging social determinants.
The reverse is true for the top 5 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017e, 2017f, 2017h, 2018a, 2018b;
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Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2018; Centre for Epidemiology and Research 2010; McNab &
Gillespie 2015; Western NSW Local Health District & Western NSW Medicare Local 2013).

In terms of the DEA output, Table 20 shows that the DMUs / SA3s that have the five highest ranking
DEA allocative efficiency scores also were the five best ranked areas for health status as measured
by the five lowest rates of age-standardised and casemix adjusted PPHs (NWAUs) per 10,000 people
and highest transformed DEA output variable. By contrast, the five lowest ranked DEA allocative
efficiency scores belong to areas that occupy the bottom four and sixth worst ranked areas for
health status.

Table 21 shows the underlying rankings of DEA input resource contributions to the DEA efficiency
results and reinforce the logic of the DEA results. The top 3 DMUs; Snowy Mountains; Ku-ring-gai;
Pennant Hills Epping; all being efficient (allocative efficiency = 100%). A contributing factor for these
top three efficiency scores were not only did that they had the best outputs (health status) as per
Table 19, they also used the least public inpatient hospital resources to do so. Furthermore, Snowy
Mountains had also the lowest MBS and PBS resource usage. Ku-ring-gai and Pennant Hills Epping
was somewhat different however, having higher ranked rates of MBS resource usage 22 nd and 34th
highest respectively, although their PBS resource usage ranked 79th and 78th respectively is the 9th
and 10th lowest for the state.

Table 21 also shows that the two lowest areas for allocative efficiency; Bourke – Cobar – Coonamble
and Mount Druitt had the two highest rates of age-standardised inpatient public hospital resource
usage of the state (ranking 1 and 2) and at the same time had relative lower rates of MBS and PBS
resource usage. These results also reinforce the logic of the DEA results. The technical efficiency
contribution of these relatively high public hospital inputs to the allocative efficiency of these
populations’ health status appears to be somewhat ineffectual. However, the state provided
hospital resource input contribution cannot be considered on its own. The appropriate mix of
resources across the continuum of care for these populations may well be sub optimal and being
compromised by access to private primary care, compromising the observed allocative efficiency.
For example, the MBS usage for Bourke – Cobar – Coonamble is the 52nd lowest for the state.

With the DEA results making intuitive sense relative to the DEA output and inputs, the second stage
of the DEA, the predictive regression modelling as outlined in Chapter Three can proceed. This is
now discussed.
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6.2

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

A matrix of Pearson’s bi-variate correlations was initially produced to assess whether or not the
independent variables identified in chapter five had a linear relationship with the dependent
variable; the DEA allocative efficiency scores. Doing so follows a reductionist methodology to
eliminate variables that will not be useful for the regression.

The matrix shown in Table 22 is also useful at providing preliminary indications of possible
multicollinearity between independent variables where the correlation between independent
variables are high. Correlations range between 0 and 1, 1 representing a perfect correlation.

The results indicate variables that do not have a significantly linear relationship with the dependent
variable and these will be eliminated from the analysis. Shown in the shaded section of Table 22,
these are:


The proportion of the population that has No English and or poor English proficiency;
and



Lone person households.

A summary of the variables found to have a significant linear relationship with the dependent
variable, listed in order of absolute value of strength of the correlation is as follows:
1. Index of Relative Socioeconomic Disadvantage (IRSD) 0.691;
2. Index of Relative Socioeconomic Advantage / Disadvantage (IRSAD) 0.638;
3. The portion of the population that are indigenous Australians (ATSI) -0.607 (a negative
relationship);
4. Index of Education and Occupation (IEO) 0.602;
5. Index of Economic Resources (IER) 0.601;
6. Out-of-pocket costs Specialists 0.586;
7. Out-of-pocket costs ALL (includes GPs, Specialists, Diagnostics and Imaging and
Obstetrics) 0.519;
8. Out-of-pocket costs GPs 0.425;
9. The portion of the population that are living with a disability and require assistance
(Assisted Needs) -0.412 (a negative relationship);
10. Geographical location measured by the accessibility and remoteness index (ARIA) 0.406 (a negative relationship); and
11. Out-of-pocket costs Diagnostics and Imaging 0.320.
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Table 22 Correlations Matrix – HORSt dependent variable and independent variables

Correlations Matrix

DEA
Allocative
IRSD
Efficiency
Score

1
DEA Allocative Efficiency Pearson Correlation
Score
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation .691**
IRSD
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Pearson Correlation .638**
IRSAD
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Pearson Correlation .601**
IER
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Pearson Correlation .602**
IEO
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Pearson Correlation .519**
Out of pocket costs ALL
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Pearson Correlation .425**
Out of pocket costs GPs
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Out of pocket costs
Pearson Correlation .586**
Specialist
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Out of pocket costs
Pearson Correlation .320**
Diagnostics Imaging
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.002
Pearson Correlation -.412**
Assist Need prop
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Pearson Correlation -0.037
No / Poor English prop
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.73
Pearson Correlation 0.054
Lone person households
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.618
Pearson Correlation -.607**
ATSI prop
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
Pearson Correlation -.406**
ARIA
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

IRSAD IER

IEO

.691** .638** .601** .602**
0
1

Out of
Out of
pocket
pocket
costs
costs ALL
GPs
.519**

0
0
0
0
.965** .825** .898** .442**
0
0
0
0
.965**
1
.726** .963** .329**
0
0
0
0.002
.825** .726**
1
.555** .321**
0
0
0
0.002
.898** .963** .555**
1
.369**
0
0
0
0
.442** .329** .321** .369**
1
0
0.002 0.002
0
.357** .269* .213* .330** .958**
0.001 0.011 0.046 0.002
0
.613** .512** .586** .457** .720**
0
0
0
0
0
.372** .317** .239* .384** .789**
0
0.003 0.025
0
0
-.802** -.829** -.579** -.784** -.247*
0
0
0
0
0.02
-0.105
0.1
-0.198 0.128 -.582**
0.328 0.352 0.065 0.235
0
0.066 0.145 -.297** .253*
0.149
0.54
0.179 0.005 0.017
0.166
-.568** -.587** -.450** -.513** -0.108
0
0
0
0
0.314
-.521** -.561** -.416** -.475**
0.02
0
0
0
0
0.857
N = 88 for all pairs

Out of
Out of
pocket
Assist
pocket
costs
Need
costs
Diagnostic prop
Specialist
s Imaging

No /
Lone
Poor
ATSI
person
English
prop
households
prop

.425**

.586**

.320**

-.412** -0.037

0
.357**
0.001
.269*
0.011
.213*
0.046
.330**
0.002
.958**
0
1

0
.613**
0
.512**
0
.586**
0
.457**
0
.720**
0
.554**
0
1

0.002
.372**
0
.317**
0.003
.239*
0.025
.384**
0
.789**
0
.764**
0
.527**
0
1

0
-.802**
0
-.829**
0
-.579**
0
-.784**
0
-.247*
0.02
-.259*
0.015
-.351**
0.001
-.315**
0.003
1

.554**
0
.764**
0
-.259*
0.015
-.539**
0
0.154
0.153
-0.015
0.893
0.11
0.306

.527**
0
-.351**
0.001
-.312**
0.003
0.073
0.502
-.475**
0
-.412**
0

-.315**
0.003
-.449**
0
0.1
0.355
0.044
0.682
0.144
0.182

0.73
-0.105
0.328
0.1
0.352
-0.198
0.065
0.128
0.235
-.582**
0
-.539**
0
-.312**
0.003
-.449**
0
0.005
0.96
0.005
1
0.96
-0.022 0.111
0.841 0.305
.296** -.369**
0.005
0
.273* -.393**
0.01
0

0.054
0.618
0.066
0.54
0.145
0.179
-.297**
0.005
.253*
0.017
0.149
0.166
0.154
0.153
0.073
0.502
0.1
0.355
-0.022
0.841
0.111
0.305
1
-.213*
0.046
-.298**
0.005

ARIA

-.607** -.406**
0
-.568**
0
-.587**
0
-.450**
0
-.513**
0
-0.11
0.314
-0.02
0.893
-.475**
0
0.044
0.682
.296**
0.005
-.369**
0
-.213*
0.046
1

0
-.521**
0
-.561**
0
-.416**
0
-.475**
0
0.02
0.857
0.11
0.306
-.412**
0
0.144
0.182
.273*
0.01
-.393**
0
-.298**
0.005
.828**
0
.828**
1
0

Table 22 Correlations matrix calculated using SPSS v24 software.
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Figures 29 through 39 are scatter plots of the 11 independent variables that have a significant linear
relationship with the dependent variable. For each correlation depicted the direction of association,
positive or negative is shown, as well as simple regression R-squared coefficient of determination.
As outlined in the methodology, the R-squared shows how much of the variation of the dependent
variable is explained by independent variable. For these simple single variable regressions derived
from each bi-variate correlation, the R-squared indicated is derived by squaring the independent
variables’ Pearson correlation coefficients.

Figure 31, 32, 33 and 34 illustrates that there is a positive linear relationship between the DEA
allocative efficiency scores and the SEIFA variables IRSD, IRSAD, IER and IEO. When the value of
these indices increases, which represents more advantageous socioeconomic status, the predicted
value of the DEA allocative efficiency scores also increase and vice versa. This is consistent with the
literature examined, whereby advantageous socioeconomic status is associated with better health
outcomes and vice versa. Each of these SEIFA indices explains 47.8%, 40.7%, 36.1% and 36.3%
respectively of the variation in DEA allocative efficiency scores.

Figure 31

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the IRSD
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Figure 32

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the IRSAD

Figure 33

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the IER
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Figure 34

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the IEO

Figures 35 through 38 shows that the DEA allocative efficiency scores have a positive linear
relationship with the percentage of patients with non-hospital / non-admitted Out-of-pocket costs.
This is consistent with the underlying theory expressed in the methodology chapter that the
expressed demand measured by the portion of patients with these out-of-pocket costs at the
population level represents an affordability of access to private services, predominately primary
care. Populations with a high percentage of patients that have paid out-of-pocket costs have by the
nature of this expressed demand, a high percentage of patients accessing private primary care and
the positive relationship of the correlation coefficients indicates that this high access is associated
with higher DEA allocative efficiency scores. Contrastingly, populations with lower percentages of
out-of-pocket costs exhibit lower DEA allocative efficiency scores.

Specifically, out-of-pocket costs for all non-admitted / non hospital categories explain 26.9% of the
variation in the DEA efficiency scores. Non-admitted / non hospital out-of-pocket costs associated
with GPs, Specialists and Diagnostic and Imaging services each explain 18%, 34.3% and 10.2%
respectively of the variation in the DEA efficiency scores.
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Figure 35

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and all categories of Out-of-pocket

Costs for non-admitted Medicare reimbursed services

Figure 36

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and GP Out-of-pocket Costs for non-

admitted Medicare reimbursed services
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Figure 37

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and Specialist Out-of-pocket Costs for

non-admitted Medicare reimbursed services

Figure 38

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and Diagnostic and Imaging Out-of-

pocket Costs for non-admitted Medicare reimbursed services
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Figure 39 shows that the DEA allocative efficiency scores have a negative linear relationship with the
percentage of the population living with a disability requiring assistance. This is congruent with the
literature and underlying theory for this variable presented in the methodology chapter whereby
higher portions of disability expressed through higher portions of the community requiring assisted
needs correlate with lower rates of health status / health outcomes at the population level which in
turn is associated with lower rates for allocative efficiency for those health outcomes. Specifically,
the percentage of the population requiring assistance explains 17% of the variation in the DEA
efficiency scores.

Figure 40 illustrates that the DEA allocative efficiency scores have a negative linear relationship with
the percentage of the population that are indigenous Australians. This is aligned to the literature
demonstrating the appalling health outcomes of indigenous Australians. At the population level
higher percentages of indigenous Australians correlate with lower rates of health status / health
outcomes which are associated with commensurate lower rates of allocative efficiency. Specifically,
the percentage of the population that are indigenous Australians explains 36.8% of the variation in
the DEA efficiency scores.

Figure 39

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the portion of the population that

lives with a disability and requires assistance
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Figure 40

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the portion of the population that

are indigenous Australians

Figure 41 illustrates that the DEA allocative efficiency scores have a negative linear relationship with
the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA).

This too is aligned to the literature

demonstrating that access issues in rural and remote areas to health services can compromise
health outcomes. When the ARIA+ score is higher, indicating more remoteness and less access, the
correlated DEA efficiency scores are lower and vice versa. Specifically, the ARIA score of populations
explains 16.5% of the variation in the DEA efficiency scores.
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Figure 41

Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the Accessibility/Remoteness

Index of Australia (ARIA+)

As outlined in the methodology chapter, the Pearson bi-variate correlations matrix (Table 22, page
198) provides guidance to the combinations of independent variables that should be considered in
the regression analysis. For example, as discussed, to be somewhat expected is that all SEIFA indices
show strong correlations amongst each other and therefore separate regression models containing a
single SEIFA index will be assessed. Doing so will avoid an obvious problem of multicollinearity that
would exist if multiple SEIFA indices were combined in a regression.

The correlation results also indicate potential multicollinearity problems with combining multiple
independent variables of out-of-pocket expenses. Logically all out-of-pocket costs variable shows
high correlations with that of out-of-pocket costs GPs, Specialists, Diagnostics and Imaging, having a
correlation of 0.958, 0.720 and 0.789 respectively. For parsimony in the regression analysis the
broadest category Out-of-pockets ALL (referred to as simply out-of-pocket costs for the remained of
this thesis) will be utilised representing a broad potential financial barrier to private primary care.

Furthermore, there are potential multicollinearity problems with the strong correlation between the
Assisted Needs variable and the IRSD, IRSAD and IER variables, having correlations of 0.802, 0.829
and 0.784 respectively. As outlined in the methodology section the IRSD and IRSAD SEIFA indices
include Assisted Needs via the percentage of people aged less than 70 years of age that have a long–
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term health condition or disability and need assistance with core activities.

Nonetheless the

regression analysis will thoroughly test the value of including the Assisted Needs variable.

Multicollinearity is also likely to be an issue between ARIA+ and ATSI having a correlation with each
other of 0.828. It’s likely that a regression model should consider only one of these variables and
not both. The bi-variate relationships and R-squared results of the correlations produced in Figures
38 and 39 outlines that the ATSI variable has 50% more explanatory value of the dependent variable
than the ARIA+. Given this and the study’s resource limitation of not being able to purchase the
ARIA+ variable at a much higher degree of precision to two decimal places as opposed to the freely
available downloadable whole number measure used in the study, ATSI will be used in developing
the regression model.

Based on the assessment of the Pearson Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients, parsimony of variables
and data availability, variables that are potentially useful as explanatory variables in the regression
are each of the four SEIFA variables, ATSI, Assisted Needs and out-of-pocket costs. These are
summarised in Table 23. The table shows the R-squared value for each variable, determined by
squaring the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. This shows how much variation in DEA allocative
efficiency can be attributed to each variable on its own. For example, if IRSD was used as the sole
independent variable in a regression with the DEA Allocative efficiency scores, IRSD would explain
47.7% of the variation in the DEA allocative efficiency scores.
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Table 23 Summary of potential independent explanatory variables to be used in the regression

Summary of Pearson Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients with the Dependent
Variable (DEA Allocative Efficiency)

Independent Variable

IRSD
IRSAD
IER
IEO
ATSI
Assisted Needs
Out of Pocket Costs

Correlation Co-efficient

R-squared =
Correlation Coefficient squared

0.691
0.638
0.601
0.602
-0.607
-0.412
0.519

0.477
0.407
0.361
0.362
0.368
0.170
0.269

Multiple regression analysis with these variables identified as potentially useful for explaining the
variation in the DEA allocative efficiency scores was then conducted.

As there is known

multicollinearity between the SEIFA variables multiple regression analysis will contain no more than
four variables being:
1. A single SEIFA / socioeconomic variable;
2. The portion of the population that are indigenous Australians, Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander (ATSI) peoples;
3. A variable representing the percentage of the population that has out-of-pocket costs
representing at the population level financial barriers to private primary care access;
and
4. The portion of the population that are living with a disability and require assistance
(Assisted Needs) where the inclusion of this variable will depend to some degree upon
the multicollinearity interaction of the SEIFA variable.

6.2.1 Regression Analysis Modelling Results Summary
Stepwise regression is a common automated approach to selecting independent variables for
regression analysis. This functionality is built into statistical software packages and is well known
amongst consultants, researchers and academics. It is a technique popular with data miners.
However, it is important to state that this approach was not used for this study based on a plethora
of literature that highlights significant problems with it and makes recommendations not to use it
(Altman & Andersen 1989; Derksen & Keselman 1992; Smith 2018; Thompson 1989, 1995;
Whittingham et al. 2006).
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A good description of Stepwise regression and a summary of its pitfalls can be found in Field’s (2013)
916-page comprehensive text on “Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics” where he donates
less than 2 pages to it, deliberately does not detail the SPSS software functionality of it and
dedicates this space to strongly encouraging researchers to not undertake it. Fields states that
Stepwise regression selects variables based on mathematical criteria.

Variable inclusion is

influenced strongly on the order of variables already in the model. Key problems noted with this
approach in the literature are variables excluded as bad predictors only because of variables already
included in the model (under fitting the model), and potentially having too many variables in the
model that are included due to their success of explaining small remaining variances (over fitting the
model). This leads to unreliable R-squares that are biased and too high. The methodology also has
been shown to increase the risk of making a Type II error, excluding an important predictor(s) that
actually does predict the outcome. Most importantly this method detracts from the researcher
being involved in critical assessment and decision making regarding variable selection (pp. 322-4).

For the HORSt, multiple regression analysis was undertaken using SPSS V24 software (IBM Corp
2016) to explore the development of regression models that best fit the data and explain the
variations in DEA Allocative efficiency. In direct contrast to the automated Stepwise regression
approach, twelve modelled options were developed and evaluated, three each for each of the four
SEIFA indices with different combinations of the other independent variables (ATSI, Assisted Needs,
out-of-pocket costs).

A summary of the modelling is presented first, outlining the combinations of variables assessed
under each option. The results of the modelling are then summarised, outlining the preferred model
to be used with the HORSt. Detailed individual regression analysis of the preferred model is then
presented, demonstrating how the model meets all the requirements for regression. Detailed
analysis of the other eleven models that were evaluated is provided in appendix 6, commencing
page 297.

Table 24 outlines a summary of the included variables modelled under each option. In all models 1
through 4 each of the SEIFA indices were combined initially with the three other independent
variables. In all cases these regression models with four independent variables were invalid as the
Assisted Needs variable was found to be non-significant at the 5% threshold (Sig)> 0.05 when
applied in conjunction with any of the SEIFA variables and ATSI and out-of-pocket costs. Assisted
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needs was also found to be non-significant at the 5% threshold in models 2a, 3a and 4a, when
combined with IRSAD and ATSI, IER and ATSI, or IEO and ATSI. Full details of this modelling and
results are found in appendix 6 (page 297).

Table 24 HORSt multiple regression models evaluated
Options
Modellled

Model 1 SEFIA =IRSD
Model 1 Model 1a Model 1b
IRSD
IRSD
IRSD
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI

Model 2 SEFIA =IRSAD
Model 3 SEFIA =IER
Model 2
Model 2a Model 2b Model 3 Model 3a Model 3b
IRSAD
IRSAD
IRSAD
IER
IER
IER
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
Independent
Out of
Out of
Assisted
Assisted Out of Pocket Assisted
Assisted
Assisted Assisted
Variables in
Pocket
Pocket
Needs
Needs
Costs
Needs
Needs
Needs
Needs
Multiple
Costs
Costs
Regression
Out of
Out of Pocket
Out of Pocket
Pocket
Costs
Costs
Costs

Model 4 SEFIA =IEO
Model 4 Model 4a Model 4b
IEO
IEO
IEO
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
Out of
Assisted Assisted
Pocket
Needs
Needs
Costs
Out of
Pocket
Costs

A summary of the regression models that were found to be valid using three independent variables
and conforming to all the necessary axioms of robust regression that were outlined in Chapter Four
(page 128) is provided in Table 25. Table 25 demonstrate that models 1b and 3b are almost identical
in predicting the variation in the DEA Allocative efficiency scores, explaining 63.2% and 63.3%
respectively. Models 2b, 4b and 1a explain 62%, 61% and 57.2% respectively. All these multiple
regression models explain the variation in DEA scores better than the individual variables as shown
in Table 23 on page 208.

Table 25 HORSt multiple regression model results

R-square
Adjusted R-square
Independent
Variables

Model 1a
0.572
0.557
IRSD
ATSI
Assisted
Needs

Model 1b
Model 2b
Model 3b
Model 4b
0.632
0.620
0.633
0.610
0.619
0.606
0.620
0.596
IRSD
IRSAD
IER
IEO
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
Out of Pocket Out of Pocket Out of Pocket Out of Pocket
Costs
Costs
Costs
Costs

Table 25 shows a summary of the regression models found to be robust and parsimonious predictors
of the DEA Allocative Efficiency scores. What is apparent from the five models is that they all have
around the same level of prediction of the dependent variable, around 60%, irrespective of the SEIFA
variable chosen and with one exception, Assisted Needs in model 1a, the SEIFA variable is the only
variable of difference. Given that all the models meet all of the assumptions required for regression
(as per demonstrated in appendix 6 and the following section), there is no reason not to select the
model that has the highest coefficient of determination (R-square) for use in the HORSt being Model
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3b. The next section presents the preferred model. This will be utilised for calculating the HORSt
share of resources amongst NSW populations and the NSW LHNs.

6.2.2 HORSt Regression Model –analysis of Model 3b (preferred model)
Table 26 Regression Model 3b (IER + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Table 26 shows that IER, ATSI and Out-of-pocket Costs, in a regression model together are all
significant linear predictors of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score.

This model meets all the

requirements of robust regression outlined in appendix 7, commencing on page 318. The regression
model is significant as per the F statistic in the ANOVA section.

There is no indication of

multicollinearity as per the VIFs. This model explains 63.3% of the variation in the DEA Allocative
Efficiency scores, 62% adjusted for the number of independent variables included. Proof of this
model (3b) meeting all the other regression assumptions for robust regression is now presented.

The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 1.927 in Table 26 is demonstrating the model exhibits no auto-serial
correlations. As per the appendix 7 section A7.5 (page 323) as d 1.927>1.6990 (the critical value
from the Durbin Watson table), the 𝐻0 is not rejected and the residuals are independent. In
addition, Figure 42 shows a line graph of regression unstandardized residuals. Between case
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numbers there is no discernible pattern of association so independence for the errors can be
confirmed and therefore there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation observed.

Figure 42

Line Graph of Regression Residuals -Model 3b (IER + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Figure 43 is a scatter plot that tests for heteroscedasticity. There is no discernible pattern to indicate
any association with standardised predicted values on the x axis with the regression residuals on the
y axis so we can conclude that the model meets the assumption of homoscedasticity as discussed in
appendix 7, section 7.4 (page 322).
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Figure 43

Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 3b (IER + ATSI + Out-of-

pocket Costs)

Figure 44 shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and
Figure 45 is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line). It
can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally
distributed as discussed in appendix 7, section 7.2 (page 319).

Figure 44

Histogram of regression residuals– Model 3b (IER + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)
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Figure 45

Normal P-P plot of regression standardised residuals– Model 3b (IER + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

It can therefore be concluded that regression Model 3b containing IER, ATSI and Out-of-pocket Costs
is a robust and parsimonious option for the HORSt regression.
Model 3b is summarised in equation 21.

Equation 21
𝑦̂ = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑥1 + 𝑏2 𝑥2 + 𝑏3 𝑥3
𝑦̂ = −17.088 + (0.078 × 𝑥1 ) + (−153.117 × 𝑥2 ) + (45.3577 × 𝑥3 )
where:


𝐲̂= the predicted efficiency score of each DMU (SA3)



𝒃𝟎 = the value of the outcome when the predictors are zero, the regression constant 17.088;



𝒙𝟏 = predictor / independent variable IER;



𝒃𝟏 = the regression coefficient for IER 0.078;



𝒙𝟐 = predictor / independent variable the percentage of the population that is ATSI;



𝒃𝟐 = the regression coefficient for the percentage of the population that is ATSI 153.117;
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𝒙𝟑 = predictor / independent variable the percentage of the population with Out-ofpocket Costs value for each DMU; and



𝒃𝟑 = the regression coefficient for the percentage of the population with Out-of-pocket
Costs 45.3577

The interpretation of the regression coefficients is as follows:


For every additional unit of increase in a DMU’s IER, (with no change in the percentage
of the population that is ATSI or the percentage of the population that has nonadmitted out-of-pocket costs), the predicted DEA Allocative Efficiency Score is expected
to increase by 0.078%;



For every additional unit of increase in a DMU’s percentage of the population that is
ATSI, (with no change in the IER and no change in the percentage of the population that
has non-admitted out-of-pocket costs) the predicted DEA Allocative Efficiency Score is
expected to decrease by 1.53%; and



For every additional unit of increase in a DMU’s percentage of the population that paid
Out-of-pocket Costs (with no change in the IER and no change and no change in the
percentage of the population that is ATSI), the predicted DEA Allocative Efficiency Score
is expected to decrease by 0.46%.

The predicted allocative efficiency scores of each DMU (SA3) calculated using equation 21 are
presented in Table 27. Table 27 also provides the corresponding measured DEA Allocative Efficiency
scores for comparison. A summary of the top and bottom five predicted scores and the DEA scores
is provided in Table 28.

The predicted allocative efficiency scores and rankings of these scores for the DMUs are to be
expected to be different from the DEA Allocative Efficiency scores. This is because both are
calculated differently: the predicted scores are generated from a regression of expressed needs, the
social determinants found to give rise to the allocative efficiency of desirable health status as
measured by the DEA allocative efficiency scores; and the DEA allocative efficiency scores are the
measured weighted ratio of desirable populations’ health status output relative to populations’
resourcing inputs. Furthermore, the regression modelling does not predict all the variation in the
DEA scores, with the preferred model predicting 63.3%. However, because the social determinants
that influence the DEA scores in the regression are demonstrated in the literature to also give rise to
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the health status and health outcomes at the population level used in the DEA, it is reasonable to
expect that results of the regression predicted scores are somewhat indicative of the DEA measured
scores and vice versa. The results in tables 27 and 28 illustrate that this is indeed the case. This
result validates the HORSt methodology.
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Table 27 Predicted Allocative Efficiency Scores derived from the regression equation

DMU/SA3 Code and Name

10101 Goulburn – Yass
10102 Queanbeyan
10103 Snowy Mountains
10104 South Coast
10201 Gosford
10202 Wyong
10301 Bathurst
10302 Lachlan Valley
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
10304 Orange
10401 Clarence Valley
10402 Coffs Harbour
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
10502 Broken Hill and Far West
10503 Dubbo
10601 Lower Hunter
10602 Maitland
10603 Port Stephens
10604 Upper Hunter
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour
10704 Wollongong
10801 Great Lakes
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
10804 Port Macquarie
10805 Taree - Gloucester
10901 Albury
10902 Lower Murray
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury
11001 Armidale
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield
11003 Moree - Narrabri
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah
11101 Lake Macquarie - East
11102 Lake Macquarie - West
11103 Newcastle
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland
11203 Tweed Valley
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West)
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
11303 Wagga Wagga
11401 Shoalhaven
11402 Southern Highlands

IER

1007
1059
999
976
1014
986
995
968
972
1001
953
974
916
917
976
988
1010
999
983
977
1016
989
956
935
985
951
969
974
980
970
948
959
977
1005
1004
966
993
954
985
974
978
989
982
1046

Predicted
% of
% pop with nonAllocative
population admitted Out
Efficiency
that is ATSI of pocket costs
Scores
3.02%
3.02%
2.39%
4.69%
2.58%
4.28%
4.81%
9.21%
4.98%
5.40%
6.67%
4.59%
29.45%
12.04%
16.15%
5.04%
3.82%
4.17%
5.49%
3.20%
3.05%
2.00%
4.57%
11.05%
3.85%
6.16%
2.62%
9.57%
2.74%
7.38%
7.44%
19.04%
10.52%
3.04%
4.05%
3.15%
3.04%
6.11%
4.02%
6.79%
4.62%
5.00%
5.50%
2.09%

58.4%
68.3%
60.9%
62.4%
56.0%
50.0%
50.8%
47.3%
46.5%
56.2%
61.5%
53.6%
27.7%
25.9%
46.7%
50.7%
60.8%
51.2%
52.3%
39.2%
44.3%
52.9%
60.0%
46.4%
50.0%
59.3%
61.9%
48.3%
64.1%
58.6%
54.6%
52.9%
61.6%
58.8%
51.6%
61.6%
64.8%
61.6%
52.1%
57.3%
44.7%
59.3%
56.6%
61.6%

83.52
92.09
84.95
80.32
83.66
76.10
76.34
65.94
72.35
78.39
75.12
76.31
22.03
47.94
55.64
75.42
83.59
77.82
75.10
72.20
77.79
81.14
77.88
60.17
76.71
74.75
82.73
66.28
84.37
73.99
70.38
52.71
71.16
83.47
78.60
81.59
85.29
76.04
77.38
74.68
72.55
79.48
76.90
89.43

DEA
Allocative
Efficiency
Scores
70.21
90.70
100.00
74.26
88.79
76.12
93.90
70.09
82.64
79.25
63.83
70.66
11.13
69.12
67.60
74.07
71.63
86.04
73.46
63.19
73.85
74.99
84.86
55.74
81.65
78.52
81.88
71.53
75.46
85.06
70.59
70.94
67.49
88.86
81.92
78.25
93.99
70.83
85.25
61.64
60.71
62.71
75.61
91.84

Table continues over.
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Table 27 continued.

DMU/SA3 Code and Name

11501 Baulkham Hills
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
11503 Hawkesbury
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
11601 Blacktown
11602 Blacktown - North
11603 Mount Druitt
11701 Botany
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham
11703 Sydney Inner City
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South
11901 Bankstown
11902 Canterbury
11903 Hurstville
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale
12001 Canada Bay
12002 Leichhardt
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove
12102 Hornsby
12103 Ku-ring-gai
12104 North Sydney - Mosman
12201 Manly
12202 Pittwater
12203 Warringah
12301 Camden
12302 Campbelltown (NSW)
12303 Wollondilly
12401 Blue Mountains
12403 Penrith
12404 Richmond - Windsor
12405 St Marys
12501 Auburn
12502 Carlingford
12503 Merrylands - Guildford
12504 Parramatta
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley
12702 Fairfield
12703 Liverpool
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote

IER

1128
1137
1109
1155
989
1118
952
968
979
885
1031
984
971
943
992
977
1026
1042
966
1048
1065
1110
1026
1077
1074
1090
1101
978
1089
1039
1025
1012
989
931
1024
946
964
1077
1019
1024
949
994
1067
1101

Predicted
% of
% pop with nonAllocative
population admitted Out
Efficiency
that is ATSI of pocket costs
Scores
0.34%
0.60%
2.03%
1.01%
2.32%
1.57%
5.37%
1.85%
1.91%
1.66%
0.39%
1.73%
0.92%
0.55%
0.70%
0.63%
0.45%
1.19%
0.68%
0.24%
0.51%
0.09%
0.22%
0.34%
0.15%
0.49%
2.32%
3.80%
2.86%
2.06%
2.83%
4.38%
3.74%
0.72%
0.78%
0.96%
0.98%
0.29%
0.39%
0.00%
0.81%
1.55%
0.95%
0.91%

50.5%
58.5%
51.0%
43.3%
27.7%
34.8%
18.5%
40.8%
47.9%
53.9%
68.9%
52.1%
32.2%
28.8%
42.4%
40.0%
51.9%
63.1%
38.2%
60.1%
54.8%
67.1%
76.2%
73.6%
72.7%
64.4%
44.7%
29.0%
41.0%
54.2%
35.2%
48.1%
25.7%
23.3%
38.8%
25.4%
32.3%
51.4%
48.9%
30.1%
26.7%
30.4%
57.6%
58.3%

93.49
97.45
89.62
91.29
69.25
83.66
57.47
74.25
78.28
73.97
94.20
80.80
72.04
68.85
78.62
76.46
85.98
91.14
74.74
91.70
90.28
100.00
100.00
99.97
99.63
96.57
85.70
66.67
82.26
85.54
74.68
77.14
66.20
65.16
79.37
66.93
71.38
89.99
84.13
76.61
67.97
72.03
91.04
94.00

DEA
Allocative
Efficiency
Scores
97.34
96.23
86.68
88.47
61.64
80.93
15.08
79.35
76.76
68.99
91.30
85.33
73.61
70.73
87.03
81.25
95.21
86.31
87.74
96.86
94.19
100.00
91.98
94.41
98.83
93.98
89.36
62.53
89.12
85.22
75.39
46.39
60.83
73.35
86.38
65.85
73.61
100.00
91.96
76.34
75.83
68.07
96.23
91.13
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Table 28 Top and Bottom 5 Predicted Allocative Efficiency Scores and a comparison to their DEA Allocative Efficiency
scores

The results indicate that the DMUs (SA3s) of 12103 Ku-ring-gai and 12104 North Sydney – Mosman
have efficient predicted scores of 100.00. These two DMUs had DEA Allocative Efficiency scores
ranked 4th and 15th.

These two populations represent the benchmarked level of predicted

maximised allocative efficiency subject to social determinants of the population.

The 3rd, 4th and 5th ranked predicted allocative efficiency scores were 12201 Manly (99.97), 12202
Pittwater (99.63) and 11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry (97.45) which had DEA Allocative Efficiency
scores of 94.41 (10th), 96.23 (rank 7th) and 93.98 (rank 4th) respectively. In summary, the top five
ranked predicted allocative efficiency scoring DMUs featured in the top 15 for DEA Allocative
Efficiency Scores.

The bottom 5 predicted allocative efficiency scores feature the two DMUs with the lowest
corresponding DEA Allocative Efficiency scores: 10501 Bourke – Cobar –Coonamble and 11603
Mount Druitt. Of the bottom five Mount Druitt is the only metropolitan area, the others being rural
and remote.
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6.3

VERTICAL EQUITY LOADINGS AND HEALTH NEED INDICES

Using the methodology and equations outlined in section 4.5 (page 129), need indices were
calculated for each SA3s using the ratio of the predicted benchmark allocative efficiency score (100)
to each predicted allocative efficiency scores for each SA3. The results are shown in Table 29.
Table 29 HORSt need indices for each SA3 population in NSW
SA3 HORSt
SA3 HORSt
DMUs / SA3s Code and Name
Need index
DMUs / SA3s Code and Name
Need index
10101 Goulburn – Yass
119.74 11501 Baulkham Hills
106.97
10102 Queanbeyan
108.59 11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
102.61
10103 Snowy Mountains
117.71 11503 Hawkesbury
111.59
10104 South Coast
124.50 11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill
109.54
10201 Gosford
119.53 11601 Blacktown
144.41
10202 Wyong
131.40 11602 Blacktown - North
119.53
10301 Bathurst
130.99 11603 Mount Druitt
174.02
10302 Lachlan Valley
151.64 11701 Botany
134.68
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
138.22 11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham
127.74
10304 Orange
127.57 11703 Sydney Inner City
135.19
10401 Clarence Valley
133.13 11801 Eastern Suburbs - North
106.16
10402 Coffs Harbour
131.04 11802 Eastern Suburbs - South
123.77
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble
454.02 11901 Bankstown
138.81
10502 Broken Hill and Far West
208.58 11902 Canterbury
145.23
10503 Dubbo
179.72 11903 Hurstville
127.19
10601 Lower Hunter
132.59 11904 Kogarah - Rockdale
130.79
10602 Maitland
119.63 12001 Canada Bay
116.30
10603 Port Stephens
128.51 12002 Leichhardt
109.72
10604 Upper Hunter
133.16 12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield
133.79
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla
138.50 12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove
109.05
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour
128.55 12102 Hornsby
110.77
10704 Wollongong
123.24 12103 Ku-ring-gai
100.00
10801 Great Lakes
128.41 12104 North Sydney - Mosman
100.00
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca
166.18 12201 Manly
100.03
10804 Port Macquarie
130.35 12202 Pittwater
100.37
10805 Taree - Gloucester
133.79 12203 Warringah
103.55
10901 Albury
120.88 12301 Camden
116.68
10902 Lower Murray
150.88 12302 Campbelltown (NSW)
149.98
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury
118.52 12303 Wollondilly
121.57
11001 Armidale
135.15 12401 Blue Mountains
116.91
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield
142.09 12403 Penrith
133.90
11003 Moree - Narrabri
189.72 12404 Richmond - Windsor
129.63
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah
140.52 12405 St Marys
151.05
11101 Lake Macquarie - East
119.81 12501 Auburn
153.48
11102 Lake Macquarie - West
127.23 12502 Carlingford
125.99
11103 Newcastle
122.57 12503 Merrylands - Guildford
149.41
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal
117.25 12504 Parramatta
140.09
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland
131.50 12601 Pennant Hills - Epping
111.12
11203 Tweed Valley
129.22 12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill
118.87
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West)
133.91 12701 Bringelly - Green Valley
130.53
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba
137.83 12702 Fairfield
147.12
11303 Wagga Wagga
125.82 12703 Liverpool
138.83
11401 Shoalhaven
130.04 12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah
109.85
11402 Southern Highlands
111.82 12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote
106.38
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The need indices represent vertical equity loadings, representing each SA3 populations’ capacity to
benefit given their social determinants that give rise to their ability to efficiently achieve desirable
health outcomes (approximated by health status) with respect to the MBS, PBS and state health
provided tax payer resource inputs across the continuum of care.

The SA3 HORSt Needs Indices were then apportioned to each LHN so as to inform each LHNs need
index. A summary of the LHN HORSt need indices is provided in Table 30 below. A breakdown of
the construction of these LHN need indices with the supporting calculations that were outlined in
the methodology section 4.5 is provided in Table 31.

Table 30 Summary of the HORSt LHN Need Indices for all NSW LHNs

LHD
LHD HORSt Need Index
Central Coast
125.27
Far West
190.93
Hunter New England
129.97
Illawarra Shoalhaven
129.09
Mid North Coast
138.74
Murrumbidgee
126.11
Nepean Blue Mountains
130.50
Northern NSW
127.20
Northern Sydney
106.55
South Eastern Sydney
122.39
South Western Sydney
138.26
Southern NSW
117.97
Sydney
130.25
Western NSW
176.08
Western Sydney
138.51
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Table 31 HORSt need indices for each NSW LHN

Calculation

LHN

Central Coast

Far West

Hunter New
England

B

C =AxB

D = C / Total of C for LHN
(Total of SA3s populations
in the LHN)

H

LHN HNI = the sum
of (H x D) for each
SA3 in the LHN

SA3 population proportion in
Population
HORSt Need Index
the LHN = Each SA3
SA3
share of SA3
of each SA3 x SA3
population in the LHN / Total
SA3
in LHN (ABS Population
(2016 ABS population in of SA3s populations in the HORSt need index of pop proportion that
2016
each SA3 in the LHN makes up the LHN
LHN
LHN
Census)
Census)
SA3 code and name with LHN
173,257
173,257
61.76
119.53
51.67%
100.00%
10201 Gosford
162,052
162,052
63.50
131.40
48.33%
100.00%
10202 Wyong
Central Coast HORSt
125.27
100.00%
335,309
Need Index
20,598
20,598
144.79
208.58
69.42%
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 100.00%
9,074
12,737
46.14
150.88
30.58%
71.24%
10902 Lower Murray
Far West HORSt
190.93
100.00%
29,672
Need Index
89,621
89,621
13.02
132.59
9.82%
100.00%
10601 Lower Hunter
10602 Maitland

100.00%

76,134

76,134

8.34%

119.63

9.98

10603 Port Stephens

100.00%

73,036

73,036

8.01%

128.51

10.29

10604 Upper Hunter

100.00%

30,877

30,877

3.38%

133.16

4.51

10801 Great Lakes

100.00%

31,895

31,895

3.50%

128.41

4.49

10802 Kempsey - Nambucca

0.12%

49,005

57

0.01%

166.18

0.01

10804 Port Macquarie

0.02%

79,929

14

0.00%

130.35

0.00

10805 Taree - Gloucester

100.00%

54,761

54,761

6.00%

8.03

11001 Armidale

100.00%

38,098

38,098

4.18%

133.79
135.15

11002 Inverell - Tenterfield

100.00%

38,858

38,858

4.26%

142.09

6.05

11003 Moree - Narrabri

100.00%

26,452

26,452

2.90%

189.72

5.50

11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah

100.00%

82,379

82,379

9.03%

140.52

12.69

11101 Lake Macquarie - East

100.00%

123,536

123,536

13.54%

119.81

16.22

11102 Lake Macquarie - West

100.00%

77,075

77,075

8.45%

127.23

10.75

11103 Newcastle

100.00%

169,571

169,571

18.59%

912,364

100.00%

122.57
Hunter New England
HORSt Need Index

5.64

22.78
129.97

0.28%

72,073

200

0.05%

124.50

0.06

10701 Dapto - Port Kembla

100.00%

77,934

77,934

19.22%

138.50

26.61

10703 Kiama - Shellharbour

100.00%

92,470

92,470

22.80%

128.55

29.31

10704 Wollongong

99.98%

133,292

133,263

32.86%

123.24

40.50

11401 Shoalhaven

100.00%

101,617

101,617

25.06%

130.04

32.58

0.15%

49,059

72

0.02%

405,555

100.00%

111.82
Illawarra Shoalhaven
HORSt Need Index

10104 South Coast

Illawarra
Shoalhaven

A

11402 Southern Highlands

0.02
129.09

10402 Coffs Harbour

99.48%

87,943

87,482

40.44%

131.04

52.99

10802 Kempsey - Nambucca

99.88%

49,005

48,948

22.62%

166.18

37.60

99.98%

79,929

79,915

36.94%

216,345

100.00%

130.35
Mid North Coast
HORSt Need Index

Mid North Coast 10804 Port Macquarie

48.15
138.74

10101 Goulburn – Yass

26.89%

73,003

19,627

6.67%

119.74

10302 Lachlan Valley

10.61%

56,416

5,985

2.03%

151.64

3.09

10901 Albury

100.00%

62,504

62,504

21.25%

120.88

25.69

10902 Lower Murray
10903 Upper Murray exc.
Murrumbidgee Albury
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee
(West)

28.76%

12,737

3,663

1.25%

150.88

1.88

42,542

42,542

14.46%

118.52

17.14

49,464

49,464

22.52

Nepean Blue
Mountains

100.00%

7.99

16.82%

133.91

11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba

99.99%

14,686

14,685

4.99%

137.83

6.88

11303 Wagga Wagga

100.00%

95,644

95,644

32.52%

40.91

294,114

100.00%

125.82
Murrumbidgee
HORSt Need Index

100.00%

126.11

10301 Bathurst

0.04%

47,783

17

0.00%

45.88%

47,572

21,826

5.93%

130.99
138.22

0.01

10303 Lithgow - Mudgee
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry

0.34%

27,076

92

0.02%

102.61

0.03

11503 Hawkesbury
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths
Hill

100.00%

25,165

25,165

6.84%

111.59

7.64

34,081

10,786

2.93%

109.54

3.21

12401 Blue Mountains

100.00%

78,496

78,496

21.34%

116.91

24.95

12403 Penrith

95.28%

143,452

136,683

37.17%

133.90

49.77

12404 Richmond - Windsor

100.00%

37,469

37,469

10.19%

129.63

13.21

12405 St Marys

100.00%

55,427

55,427

15.07%

151.05

22.77

12702 Fairfield

0.94%

193,076

1,807

0.49%

0.72

367,767

100.00%

147.12
Nepean Blue
Mountains HORSt
Need Index

31.65%

8.20

130.50

Table continues over.
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Table 31 continued.
Calculation

LHN

SA3 code and name with LHN
10401 Clarence Valley

10402 Coffs Harbour
11201 Richmond Valley Coastal
Northern NSW 11202 Richmond Valley Hinterland
11203 Tweed Valley

Northern
Sydney

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

B

C =AxB

80,412

80,412

71,294

71,294

93,458

93,458
296,586

100.00%

27.11%

117.25

31.79

24.04%

131.50

31.61

31.51%

129.22
Northern NSW HORSt
Need Index

40.72
127.20

11501 Baulkham Hills

18.43%

148,761

27,413

2.99%

106.97

11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry

49.02%

27,076

13,273

1.45%

102.61

1.48

12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove

100.00%

117,824

117,824

12.83%

109.05

14.00

12102 Hornsby

100.00%

83,456

83,456

9.09%

110.77

10.07

12103 Ku-ring-gai

100.00%

123,474

123,474

13.45%

100.00

13.45

12104 North Sydney - Mosman

100.00%

100,152

100,152

10.91%

100.00

10.91

12201 Manly

100.00%

44,994

44,994

4.90%

100.03

4.90

12202 Pittwater

100.00%

63,504

63,504

6.92%

100.37

6.94

12203 Warringah

100.00%

157,846

157,846

17.19%

103.55

17.80

12502 Carlingford

10.45%

68,864

7,196

0.78%

125.99

0.99

12601 Pennant Hills - Epping

84.39%

49,288

41,594

4.53%

111.12

5.03

12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill

97.49%

140,873

137,330

14.96%

17.78

918,056

100.00%

11701 Botany
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham
- Petersham

100.00%

49,169

49,169

4.69%

118.87
Northern Sydney
HORSt Need Index
134.68

0.04%

57,574

22

0.00%

127.74

0.00

11703 Sydney Inner City

94.36%

230,326

217,330

20.73%

135.19

28.03

11801 Eastern Suburbs - North

100.00%

136,152

136,152

12.99%

106.16

13.79

11802 Eastern Suburbs - South

100.00%

149,266

149,266

14.24%

123.77

17.63

93.89%

132,733

124,619

11.89%

127.19

15.12

100.00%

145,493

145,493

13.88%

130.79

18.15

0.57%

122,238

694

0.07%

138.83

0.09

100.00%

114,106

114,106

10.89%

109.85

11.96

100.00%

111,321

111,321

10.62%

122.39

South Eastern 11903 Hurstville
Sydney
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale
12703 Liverpool
12801 Cronulla - Miranda Caringbah
12802 Sutherland - Menai Heathcote

3.19

106.55
6.32

10704 Wollongong

0.02%

133,292

29

0.00%

106.38
South Eastern Sydney
HORSt Need Index
123.24

11402 Southern Highlands

99.85%

49,059

48,987

5.07%

111.82

5.67

11901 Bankstown

99.09%

178,409

176,784

18.30%

138.81

25.40
1.25

1,048,173

100.00%

11.30

0.00

5.84%

141,819

8,289

0.86%

145.23

12301 Camden

100.00%

64,212

64,212

6.65%

116.68

7.76

12302 Campbelltown (NSW)

100.00%

162,845

162,845

16.86%

149.98

25.28

12303 Wollondilly

11902 Canterbury

South
Western
Sydney

D = C / Total of C for LHN
LHN HNI = the sum
(Total of SA3s populations
H
of (H x D) for each
in the LHN)
SA3 in the LHN
Population
SA3 population proportion in
SA3
share of SA3
the LHN = Each SA3
HORSt Need Index
SA3
Population
in LHN (ABS
of each SA3 x SA3
population in population in the LHN / Total
(2016 ABS
2016
of SA3s populations in the HORSt need index of pop proportion that
LHN
Census)
Census)
LHN
each SA3 in the LHN makes up the LHN
50,961
50,961
100.00%
17.18%
133.13
22.87
87,943
461
0.52%
0.16%
131.04
0.20
A

100.00%

42,215

42,215

4.37%

121.57

5.31

12403 Penrith

4.72%

143,452

6,769

0.70%

133.90

0.94

12501 Auburn

0.91%

94,077

853

0.09%

153.48

0.14

12503 Merrylands - Guildford

22.72%

157,512

35,793

3.71%

149.41

5.54

12701 Bringelly - Green Valley

100.00%

106,378

106,378

11.01%

130.53

14.37

12702 Fairfield

99.06%

193,076

191,269

19.80%

147.12

29.13

12703 Liverpool

99.43%

122,238

121,544

12.58%

17.47

965,968

100.00%

138.83
South Western
Sydney HORSt Need
Index

138.26

Table continues over
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Table 31 continued.

Calculation

LHN

SA3 code and name with LHN
10101 Goulburn – Yass
10102 Queanbeyan

10103 Snowy Mountains
Southern NSW 10104 South Coast
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba

Sydney

B

C =AxB

D = C / Total of C for LHN
(Total of SA3s populations
in the LHN)

H

LHN HNI = the sum
of (H x D) for each
SA3 in the LHN

Population
SA3 population proportion in
SA3
SA3
share of SA3 Population
the LHN = Each SA3
HORSt Need Index
in LHN (ABS (2016 ABS population in population in the LHN / Total
of each SA3 x SA3
LHN
2016
of SA3s populations in the HORSt need index of pop proportion that
Census)
Census)
LHN
each SA3 in the LHN makes up the LHN
73.11%
73,003
53,376
26.11%
119.74
31.26
100.00%
59,472
59,472
29.09%
108.59
31.59
100.00%
19,740
19,740
9.65%
117.71
11.36
99.72%

72,073

71,873

35.15%

124.50

0.01%

14,686

1

0.00%

204,462

100.00%

137.83
Southern NSW HORSt
Need Index

43.76
0.00
117.97

11702 Marrickville - Sydenham
- Petersham

99.96%

57,574

57,552

11.02%

127.74

14.08

11703 Sydney Inner City

5.64%

230,326

12,996

2.49%

135.19

3.37

11901 Bankstown

0.91%

178,409

1,625

0.31%

138.81

0.43

11902 Canterbury

94.16%

141,819

133,530

25.58%

145.23

37.15

6.11%

132,733

8,114

1.55%

127.19

1.98

12001 Canada Bay

100.00%

89,595

89,595

17.16%

116.30

19.96

12002
12003 Leichhardt
Strathfield - Burwood Ashfield

100.00%

59,540

59,540

11.40%

109.72

12.51

100.00%

159,133

159,133

30.48%

40.78

522,084

100.00%

133.79
Sydney HORSt Need
Index

10301 Bathurst

99.96%

47,783

47,766

17.11%

130.99

22.42

10302 Lachlan Valley

89.39%

56,416

50,431

18.07%

151.64

27.40

10303 Lithgow - Mudgee

54.12%

47,572

25,746

9.22%

138.22

12.75

100.00%

58,991

58,991

21.13%

127.57

26.96

100.00%

25,059

25,059

8.98%

454.02

40.76

100.00%

71,138

71,138

25.49%

279,131

100.00%

179.72
Western NSW HORSt
Need Index

11903 Hurstville

10304 Orange
Western NSW 10501 Bourke - Cobar Coonamble
10503 Dubbo

Western
Sydney

A

130.25

45.80
176.08

11501 Baulkham Hills

81.57%

148,761

121,348

12.86%

106.97

13.76

11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths
Hill

50.64%

27,076

13,711

1.45%

102.61

1.49

68.35%

34,081

23,295

2.47%

109.54

2.71

11601 Blacktown

100.00%

139,391

139,391

14.78%

144.41

21.34

11602 Blacktown - North

100.00%

95,745

95,745

10.15%

119.53

12.13

11603 Mount Druitt

100.00%

115,220

115,220

12.21%

174.02

21.26

12501 Auburn

99.09%

94,077

93,224

9.88%

153.48

15.17

12502 Carlingford

89.55%

68,864

61,668

6.54%

125.99

8.24

12503 Merrylands - Guildford

77.28%

157,512

121,719

12.90%

149.41

19.28

12504 Parramatta

100.00%

146,708

146,708

15.55%

140.09

21.79

12601 Pennant Hills - Epping

15.61%

49,288

7,694

0.82%

111.12

0.91

12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill

2.51%

140,873

3,543

0.38%

943,267

100.00%

118.87
Western Sydney
HORSt Need Index

0.45
138.51

Table 31 demonstrates that there can be quite a lot of intra-LHN variation in the health needs
expressed by the individual SA3 populations’ HORSt need indices. For example, as discussed on
pages 190 and 196, the SA3 11603 - Mount Druitt, experiences very high public hospital usage, very
low MBS and PBS usage, has some of NSW’s poorest health outcomes. Mount Druitt’s population
faces significant socioeconomic barriers to the achievement of good health outcomes. It has a
HORSt need index of 174.02 (74% higher than the benchmark SA3 populations within Northern
Sydney) and represents 12.2% of the Western Sydney LHN population. The SA3 11501 - Baulkham
Hills is a similar sized population portion of this LHN (12.9%). It has far better outcomes and its
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population has more advantageous socioeconomic status. It has a HORSt need index just 6% higher
than the benchmark.

The variations at the intra–LHN level demonstrates the importance of

calculating needs for smaller geographical structures below the LHN level and building these up to
LHN based needs indices. States wishing to adopt the HORSt as an outcomes-based commissioning
tool should endeavour to consider the variation in needs at smaller population levels. This may
assist with more strategically targeted commissioning amongst LHNs and also within LHNs to address
specific levels of needs. The intra-LHN variation also helps explain final needs based shares of
funding at the LHN level across the state.
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6.4

LOCAL HEALTH DISTRICTS SHARE OF FUNDING UNDER THE HORSt

To inform state health resource distribution to NSW LHNs, the HORSt LHN shares are applied to the
LHN’s population as a needs adjusted population and then this inflated needs adjusted population is
normalised proportionally back to the NSW State population. The methodology for doing so was
outlined in section 4.5, and a worked example was provided in table7 page 132). The results are
provided in Table 32 below which show the HORSt needs adjusted share of resources.

Table 32 HORSt LHN needs adjusted share of resources

Normalised
Need's adjusted
HORSt Resource
pop to 2016
Allocations pop
census
shares
= (HORSt need
= Normalised
adjusted
need adjusted
population /
pop for each
HORSt need adjusted
total NSW HORSt
LHN / total NSW
population
need adjusted
pop
population) x
LHN population = HORSt LHN need x pop / total 2016 NSW
LHN
HORSt Need index 2016 census
100
pop
Central Coast
125.27
335,309
420,025
324,075
4.19%
Far West
190.93
29,672
56,654
43,712
0.56%
Hunter New England
129.97
912,364
1,185,774
914,897
11.82%
Illawarra Shoalhaven
129.09
405,555
523,518
403,926
5.22%
Mid North Coast
138.74
216,345
300,151
231,585
2.99%
Murrumbidgee
126.11
294,114
370,895
286,168
3.70%
Nepean Blue Mountains
130.50
367,767
479,929
370,295
4.78%
Northern NSW
127.20
296,586
377,257
291,077
3.76%
Northern Sydney
106.55
918,056
978,220
754,756
9.75%
South Eastern Sydney
122.39
1,048,585
1,283,361
990,192
12.79%
South Western Sydney
138.26
965,968
1,335,562
1,030,468
13.31%
Southern NSW
117.97
204,462
241,212
186,109
2.40%
Sydney
130.25
522,084
680,033
524,687
6.78%
Western NSW
176.08
279,131
491,507
379,228
4.90%
Western Sydney
138.51
943,267
1,306,559
1,008,090
13.03%
Total
7,739,265
10,030,655
7,739,265
100.00%

Table 33 applies the same methodology used with the HORSt in Table 32 to the last published
version of the NSW EHUIs Acute need index (Health Policy Analysis 2014a, 2014b; Marshall & Slater
2015) to show that if the EHUIs were used with the 2016 Census what each LHNs EHUIs based share
of resources would be compared to that of the HORSt. The results are somewhat similar shares of
resources and given that both the EHUIs and HORSt are primarily made up from social determinants
that give rise to health needs (albeit that the health needs are assessed very differently) one would
expect that the differences in shares of resources would not be too vast.
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Table 33 Acute EHUIs needs-based share of resources
Normalised
Need's adjusted
pop to 2016
census
LHN population
EHUI Acute Index
2016 census

LHN
Central Coast
Far West
Hunter New England
Illawarra Shoalhaven
Mid North Coast
Murrumbidgee
Nepean Blue Mountains
Northern NSW
Northern Sydney
South Eastern Sydney
South Western Sydney
Southern NSW
Sydney
Western NSW
Western Sydney
Total

107.69
129.81
108.29
102.94
111.09
113.77
103.31
106.76
85.19
89.90
102.29
101.51
92.64
122.51
95.56

335,309
30,084
912,364
405,555
216,345
294,114
367,767
296,586
918,056
1,048,173
965,977
204,462
522,084
279,131
943,267
7,739,274

EHUI need adjusted
population
= EHUI LHN need x pop /
100

361,104
39,052
987,959
417,468
240,333
334,626
379,943
316,647
782,101
942,257
988,051
207,550
483,634
341,967
901,385
7,724,077

EHUI State
Resource
Allocations pop
shares

2016 HORSt
= (EHUI need
needs based
adjusted
= Normalised
share of
population /
need adjusted
resources
total NSW EHUI
pop for each
need adjusted
LHN / total NSW
population) x
pop
total 2016 NSW
pop
361,814
39,128
989,903
418,290
240,806
335,284
380,691
317,270
783,639
944,111
989,995
207,959
484,586
342,640
903,158
7,739,274

4.68%
0.51%
12.79%
5.40%
3.11%
4.33%
4.92%
4.10%
10.13%
12.20%
12.79%
2.69%
6.26%
4.43%
11.67%
100.00%

4.19%
0.56%
11.82%
5.22%
2.99%
3.70%
4.78%
3.76%
9.75%
12.79%
13.31%
2.40%
6.78%
4.90%
13.03%
100.00%

EHUI Source: (Health Policy Analysis 2014a, 2014b; Marshall & Slater 2015).

6.4.1 Resource allocation funding adjustments to maximise equity of health funding
across the continuum of care
The HORSt represents health needs in the context of social determinants that underpin populations’
capacity to benefit. Health funding equity can be maximised when financial adjustments are made
in alignment with each LHNs proportional health needs so as to provide a financial opportunity of
populations to benefit. As outlined in the methodology and the core aims for this study, the HORSt
identifies the quantum of funding adjustments from the current pool of resources across the
continuum of care that is required to maximise equity of health funding. Given that the state cannot
control the Commonwealth contribution of spending in the private sector, represented in the study
by MBS and PBS expenditure, the adjustments are a residual adjustment applied to state health
funding, after the total pool of resources for populations including the MBS and PBS Commonwealth
subsidisation is considered. Table 34 (page 229), as per the methodology outlined in section 4.5.1
(page 134) shows these results.

Table 34 demonstrates the results of the HORSt for 2015-16. This provides each LHN populations’
2015-16 quantum of expenditure of MBS, PBS and NSW State Public Hospitals by LHN of residence.
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This is the total pool of included taxpayer resources in the study and the focus of the HORSt for
maximising needs-based equity for populations’ share of these resources.

The public hospital costs in the pool are the dollar value of the total NWAUs for the clinical streams
of Acute, Emergency Department, Sub Acute and Non-Acute Services, Acute Mental Health and Nonadmitted services by LHN of residence for that year multiplied by the state price. In 2015-16
according to the NSW Health Activity Based Management (ABM) portal there was 2,467,947 NWAUs
across these streams (NSW ABF Taskforce 2019). The 2015-16 NSW state price per NWAU was
$4,569 (ABF Taskforce 2016, p. 22).

The total pool of resources included in this study for 2015-16 MBS, PBS and State Public Hospital
costs is $22.2 billion. Each LHN populations share of this resource pool is calculated and then
compared to the HORSt’s health needs share of these resources. The difference between the shares
represents the quantum of vertical equity adjustments, a residual adjustment that the state can
make to align the HORSt so health funding equity can be maximised with respect to the total pool of
resources and the underlying population health needs. Note that that column C in Table 34, the
state health system resourcing, reconciles with Table 3 on page 28.
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Table 34 Quantum of funding adjustments and shares of funding required for maximising health funding equity
2015-16 Resource Pool
A

C

D=A +B+C

H

2015-16
MBS

2015-16 NSW
State Health
System
2015-16 Total
2015-16 Share of
payments Total
Resources
Total Resources
Cost all
(MBS + PBS + (MBS + PBS + State
inpatient &
State Health
Health Public
2015-16
outpatient
Public Hospitals)
Hospitals)
PBS
activity
"Resource Pool" "Resource Pool"

HORSt
share of
resources
based on
health
needs

$Mil
$360
$29
$856
$425
$239
$264
$349
$311
$878
$960
$936
$160
$479
$248
$894
$7,389

$Mil
$187
$17
$470
$210
$138
$144
$150
$175
$332
$458
$437
$108
$217
$136
$346
$3,524

%
4.19%
0.56%
11.82%
5.22%
2.99%
3.70%
4.78%
3.76%
9.75%
12.79%
13.31%
2.40%
6.78%
4.90%
13.03%
100.00%

LHN

Central Coast
Far West
Hunter New England
Illawarra Shoalhaven
Mid North Coast
Murrumbidgee
Nepean Blue Mountains
Northern NSW
Northern Sydney
South Eastern Sydney
South Western Sydney
Southern NSW
Sydney
Western NSW
Western Sydney
Total

B

HORSt share and Quantum of adjustments
𝐿𝐻𝑁 𝑠 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐷
𝐸=
Σ𝐷

$Mil
$737
$79
$1,713
$836
$519
$415
$600
$570
$1,076
$1,252
$1,540
$331
$894
$564
$1,376
$12,503

$Mil
$1,284
$125
$3,040
$1,471
$897
$824
$1,099
$1,056
$2,286
$2,670
$2,913
$599
$1,590
$947
$2,616
$23,417

%
5.48%
0.53%
12.98%
6.28%
3.83%
3.52%
4.69%
4.51%
9.76%
11.40%
12.44%
2.56%
6.79%
4.05%
11.17%
100.00%

𝐻𝑆 = 𝐻 𝑥 Σ 𝐷

𝑅 = 𝐻𝑆 − 𝐷

HORSt Vertical
HORSt
Equity Adjustment
share of
$
2015-16
(+ or -)
"Resource from resource pool
Pool"
shares
$Mil
$981
$132
$2,768
$1,222
$701
$866
$1,120
$881
$2,284
$2,996
$3,118
$563
$1,588
$1,147
$3,050
$23,417

$Mil
-$303
$8
-$271
-$249
-$196
$42
$21
-$175
-$3
$326
$205
-$36
-$3
$200
$434
$0

Sources: MBS and PBS purchased data (Department of Human Services 2017); NWAUS – NSW ABM Portal Quick Report by LHN of Residence (NSW ABF
Taskforce 2019).
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6.5

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has presented and discussed the results for the HORSt. A summary of the results are as
follows.

The HORSt DEA produces meaningful results for each region’s measured allocative efficiency of
health outcomes relative to the use of MBS, PBS and state health resources. The findings from the
regression stage successfully predict the measured allocative efficiency of the DEA, indicating that
the most advantageous and disadvantageous social determinants give rise to the best and worst
levels of allocative efficiency of health outcomes

The results demonstrate that populations’ ability to achieve allocative efficiency in the production of
desirable health status is affected by:


Socioeconomic status, measured by the SEIFA index IER (index of economic resources);



The proportion of the population that is indigenous;



The proportion of the population that has an ability to pay out-of-pocket costs.

These three attributes were found to explain in the regression 63.3% of the variation in the DEA
allocative efficiency scores. These results are in complete congruence with the findings of the
literature, that social determinants are the single largest barrier to achieving health outcomes.

Weighting the DEA predicted scores for each LHN population to inform the HORSt shares of
resourcing finds that the proportional shares for each LHN are somewhat similar to that of the EHUI,
a need index derived from acute hospital utilisation as proxy of need. The application however of
the HORSt to the pool of resources spanning Commonwealth and State funding does indicate
adjustments that could be made, prior to adjusting for patient flows, to improve funding equity. The
next chapter concludes the thesis and discusses these findings.
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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSIONS
7.0

INTRODUCTION

This concluding chapter begins by demonstrating that the study’s findings achieve all the aims and
research questions. Throughout the chapter, the study findings are contextualised to the literature
review and conceptual framework.

Reflections of the study’s aims, methods and results are then discussed.

The strengths and

limitations of the research are examined. The unique and significant contributions of the research
are revisited. Operationalising the HORSt for resource distribution is outlined.

Commentary of the applicability of the HORSt beyond establishing needs-based shares of state
health resources is then provided. Finally, recommendations for the implementation of future
policies in similar settings are outlined.

7.1

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS - ADDRESSING THE STUDY’S AIMS AND RESEARCH

QUESTIONS
The study’s findings achieve the aims of the study and the research questions. These are now
presented in three subsections for each of the aims.

7.1.1 - Satisfying aim 1 of the study
Aim 1 - Develop the HORSt as a parsimonious, measurable and consistent benchmark of desirable
health outcomes for states’ LHNs’ populations, relative to funding inputs across the continuum of
care, so as to promote allocative efficiency and equity across populations.

The HORSt results outlined in the previous chapter demonstrate that the underlying methodology
for the HORSt achieves the first aim of the study completely. The HORSt benchmark is parsimonious,
representing a metric of the best outcomes for the resource mix of health service inputs at a macro
level for populations. The HORSt DEA results for each population in comparison to the benchmark
validate the aims for the development of the instrument. Populations experiencing poorer health
are found to have low levels of allocative efficiency relative to the benchmark. These results are
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predicted by social determinants that inhibit better health outcomes. The reverse is also evident in
the results for populations that have the best population health status, having far fewer social
barriers to the achievement of health outcomes and therefore being able to achieve greater
allocative efficiency from the mix of health services resource they consume.

Research question 1:
What measures / data of health status can best represent an acceptable level of desirable health
outcomes for populations that can inform a benchmark?

The population health status data used to approximate health outcomes in the benchmark, the agestandardised rates of PPHs is a good proxy for the heath per se for the populations. The use of PPHs
was justified in the literature review, whereby PPHs reflect poorer health, are statistics that are
collected routinely by all state health authorities in Australia, reflect three of four of the Bradshaw
axioms of social need. Furthermore, addressing these metrics of poor health outcomes are national
health priorities.

The decision to include PPHs as the outcome variable in the DEA benchmark is validated in the
results.

The DEA produces meaningful and understandable results, prior to any explanatory

regression analysis of the social determinants that predict the variations in allocative efficiency
amongst populations. The DEA results themselves indicate that communities that face significant
social barriers to the achievement of good health outcomes, having poor levels of health status in
their population, had the poorest allocative efficiencies and vice versa.

Age-standardised rates of PPHs are representative of sicker patients and ill health in the population.
As such, rates of PPHs as a metric of population health status to support the benchmark represent
better health status when minimised. Contrastingly the benchmark within an output orientated DEA
model that seeks to maximise output relative to inputs is established around the most advantageous
health status. This situation requires transformation of the PPH metric so that low rates represent
the output to be maximised. The transformation supported by established methodology in the DEA
literature was not practically difficult to achieve and the transformation itself is not conceptually
difficult to understand within the construction of the benchmark.

Research question 2:
What health service funding inputs should be included to represent the continuum of care?
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As supported by the DEA literature presented, it is not necessary to include all of the input variables
that make up the production function of the outputs (outcomes in the case of the HORSt). The DEA
is a relative measure of efficiency for each DMU, relative to all other DMUs and subject to the
included input and output variables. However, in order for the HORSt to guide what shares of
funding ought to be provided by the state subject to the resources applied across the continuum of
care, a comprehensive set of measurable inputs was sought and included in the HORSt.

The health service funding inputs used within the DEA, being the MBS, PBS and state health
expenditure (SCRs), representing 62% of total health expenditure in Australia and 92% of total
governments tax payer funded health expenditure at the time of the study (Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare 2017a, pp. 22-30) are the most suitable for inclusion in the DEA calculation of
the relative allocative efficiency of the desirable low levels of PPHs. These variables constitute the
bulk of the mix of resources across the continuum of care. The literature review in Chapter Two and
the review of funding and governance arrangements in Chapter Three have identified these funding
inputs as routinely collectable and accurate. These inputs across the continuum of care contribute
to the sensible results obtained by the DEA.

The advantages of the HORSt in considering the majority of resources across the continuum of care
is that it affords resource allocation decision makers the ability to position the HORSt LHN shares in
the context of funding for the overall mixed private / public system. Applying the HORSt to the pool
of MBS, PBS and state health resources, informs what the state needs to spend to achieve funding
equity. The governance and funding of the MBS and PBS, where private medical practitioners act as
gatekeepers and there is no resource distribution mechanism to promote equity, warrants these
funding inputs to also be included in the pool of resources. This makes the HORSt unique compared
to previous public sector resource allocation models. Doing so helps determine what the state
health system share of resource ought to be so as to enable funding equity for improved health
outcomes with respect to the interactions of health service resources across the continuum of care.

Out-of-pocket costs, identified in Chapter Three as a relatively newly collected metric at the
population level of the 88 DMUs of the study, have been demonstrated via the literature to be more
aligned to supernormal rent-seeking profits than a factor of production. As demonstrated in the
regression results, this metric is best represented as an explanatory variable in the second stage of
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the DEA, representing an economic barrier to access, which can affect the allocative efficiency of
achieving the desirable levels of population health status.

The productive role of PHI was determined in Chapter Three to be difficult to ascertain. Data
regarding PHI coverage for the 88 DMUs (ABS SA3 level) is not currently available. The PHI rebate
has been demonstrated in the literature examined in Chapter Three to be regressive, exacerbating
inequities and inefficient. Furthermore, as an insurance contingency rather than an expended
resource it remains not suitable for inclusion in the HORSt as an input for the benchmark.

Research question 3:
What methodology should be applied to derive the benchmark?

Corresponding with the study’s first aim, populations that are allocative efficient in the production of
desirable health outcomes can serve as benchmark. Resource distribution can be informed by
redistributing funding to populations that have poor allocative efficiency compared to the
benchmark, due to poor social determinants of health that affect allocative efficiency. Doing so
represents a funding enabler on the basis of capacity to benefit and is congruent to social justice
theories by Rawls and Daniels, both of which are as demonstrated in the literature review in Chapter
Two as palatable approaches to resource distribution by the Australian public. Both theories are
also compatible with the goals of Medicare.

The use of DEA to establish the benchmark represents a unique and significant contribution to the
literature surrounding population needs-based funding models and instruments. The results for the
entire NSW population represent a relative measure of the allocative efficiency for each of the 88
NSW DMUs.

In the context of establishing a benchmark, the methodological literature outlined in Chapter Five
demonstrates the value of the DEA’s ability to do so as the tool of choice. The two-stage DEA
employed allows an empirical measure of the allocative efficiency of desirable health outcomes from
the mix of key health service inputs to be calculated, whereby the weighting of inputs can be
determined through optimisation of the relative outputs using linear programming techniques. The
latter stage reveals for each population area the social determinants that predict the ability of
populations to achieve the benchmark and inform the vertical equity adjustments for each LHN to
enable resource allocation aligned to each population’s capacity to benefit.
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7.1.2

Satisfying aim 2 of the study

Aim 2 - Identify and incorporate measures of local geographical population health needs that can be
used in resource allocation decisions.

Research question 4:
What are appropriate measures of population need that could be applied to support the HORSt?

The literature review highlighted that the mainstay methodology for assessing population needs in
population needs-based instruments was via using utilisation as a proxy for need. The utilisation
approach does not require the development of a benchmark. Placing utilisation on a par with need
requires a rationale and an explanation as to what predictors of utilisation can inform the potential
use of the health system. Such an approach, which largely in the literature has been used as a risk
capitation model, ignores the interactions of the mix of services across the continuum of care to
produce favourable health outcomes.

In direct response to the gaps in the literature the HORSt sought a different approach to population
health needs assessment, via explicitly considering each population’s capacity to benefit from
resources across the continuum to produce desirable health outcomes.

The distance each

population is from achieving the benchmark represents their need via their relative capacity to
benefit. In the mixed private-public Australian health care sector (described in Chapter One) the
ever-increasing goal of state health systems are to keep people healthy and out of hospital. The
interaction of resources across the continuum of care in this regard cannot be ignored.

For the HORSt, twelve regression models explored a combination of variables that could best explain
population health needs to be used in resource allocation decisions. Seven models were eliminated
due to not meeting the axioms of robust regression. The results of the DEA regression (Table 25,
reproduced as Table 35 below) show the 5 models that were found to meet all statistical axioms for
robust regression. Population health needs in 4 out of the 5 models (models 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b) were
best represented by three variables. These are:
1. A composite measure of populations’ socioeconomic status;
2. The proportion of the population that is indigenous; and
3. The proportion of the population that can pay out-of-pocket costs.
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Model 1a is the exception because the proportion of the population with disabilities requiring
assistance “Assisted Needs” constitutes the third variable instead of out-of-pocket costs.

Table 35 HORSt multiple regression model results (from Table 25)

R-square
Adjusted R-square
Independent
Variables

Model 1a
0.572
0.557
IRSD
ATSI
Assisted
Needs

Model 1b
Model 2b
Model 3b
Model 4b
0.632
0.620
0.633
0.610
0.619
0.606
0.620
0.596
IRSD
IRSAD
IER
IEO
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
ATSI
Out of Pocket Out of Pocket Out of Pocket Out of Pocket
Costs
Costs
Costs
Costs

The only difference between the four models spanning the same three key areas listed above was
the type of composite socioeconomic indicator. The Index of Economic Resources (IER) is the
composite indicator in the preferred model 3b. Given that these four models via their r-squared
results all predict around 60% of the variation in needs these three measures can be relied upon to
inform the construction of LHN shares and resource allocation.

Whilst there are key differences in how needs are expressed in population needs-based models
using utilisation as needs and the HORSt, both are guided by the literature to explain needs via
enumerating how social determinants predict need. Table 36 shows a comparison of the HORSt and
EHUI models approaches to informing need indices.
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Table 36 Comparative approach to health needs - HORSt methodology and preferred regression model compared to the
NSW acute EHUI

Need

Regression
Dependent
Variable for Need

HORSt
DEA:
Output: Transformed age-standardised and
adjusted rate of PPHs
Inputs: MBS; PBS, SCR (all age-standardised)

EHUI acute
casemix

DEA Allocative efficiency score

Independent
Variables
that
predict
need
(socioeconomic
determinants)

IER
ATSI
Out-of-pocket costs

Regression
calculates

Predicted DEA efficiency score for each DMU

Ratio of:
Need indices

Acute
inpatient
utilisation (SCR)

𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐸𝐴 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐸𝐴 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝐷𝑀𝑈 (𝑆𝐴3 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)

IEO (quintiles 1 and 2)
IEO (quintiles 3 and 4)
ATSI
ARIA
SMR75
%LONE65
%COB_HIGH_UTIL

Expected Utilisation rate
– used as need index

= each SA3 population’s capacity to benefit

Source EHUI: (Health Policy Analysis 2014a, p. 26)

For the EHUI the composite socioeconomic index used as an independent predictor of utilisation was
the IEO. However, to fit the model the EHUI developed dummy variables of this index, using quintile
scores to demarcate the index into 4 groups and then used the upper and lower halves as two
independent variables.

The other variables used were the ARIA scores; the ATSI population

proportion; the SMR for persons under 75 years of age (SMR75); the percentage of the population
over 65 years that is living alone (%LONE65); and the percentage of the population born in a country
group with higher utilisation rates (%COB_HIGH_UTIL).

As discussed in the literature review in Chapter Two and again in the methodological section
regarding construct validity, the use of a mortality measure (as per the EHUI) in conjunction with
other independent variables that predict utilisation in a formative construct is problematic. The
other issue with the EHUI regression is that having seven variables to predict need and the division
of the socioeconomic composite indicator into four dummy variables to then be combined
effectively back into two, could be consider as overtly complicated, whereby as documented in the
literature in Chapter Four, parsimony is a key goal for any regression formula.
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Of comparative interest between the two regression models approaches to health needs is the
HORSt regression considered lone person households for inclusion and excluded this as a nonsignificant correlation with the DEA Allocative efficiency score (page 198). This is a nuanced
difference to that included in the EHUI which was lone person households over 65 years.

7.1.3 Satisfying aim 3 of the study
Identify the share and quantum of taxpayer resources provided by the state to geographical
populations to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care so as to act as an
enabler to improve equity of health outcomes.

Research question 5:
What share of funding is required for each geographical population to adjust for population health
needs so as to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care?

The share of funding required to adjust for population health needs to maximise equity of health
funding across the continuum of care is guided by the regression coefficients for each of the 88 SA3
level populations in NSW. As outlined in Chapter Four, literature pertaining to other population
needs-based resourced distributions formulas guides this methodology. Once the variables that
explain the variation in need have been identified through the regression, the coefficients applied to
the corresponding regression variables for each of the populations derives the predicted allocative
efficiency scores for each population.

The ratio of the benchmarked allocative efficiency to each population’s predicted score informs the
population’s need index; their capacity to benefit relative to the benchmark. Weighting the results
for each of the SA3’s population proportions in each LHN informs the LHNs need index. Applying
each LHNs need index to their populations, calculates a needs adjusted population and normalising
the sum total of all LHNs needs adjusted populations to the state population derives each LHNs
share of funds under the HORSt.

The NSW LHNs HORSt shares of funding as portions of funding are summarised in Table 37. For
comparison purposes, shares that would be derived under the NSW acute EHUI need indices, if the
acute EHUI was used for resource distribution are also provided, utilising calculations from Table 33
(page 227). Importantly, the application of the EHUIs is not the same as the HORSt. To reiterate,
from Chapter One (page 26), the EHUIs is a small component of a range of adjustments applied to
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historically determined utilisation and population growth and punitive performance adjustments to
determine the quantity of activity to be funded / purchased in each LHN. The EHUI does not
establish resource distribution shares.

EHUI shares shown in Table 37 are therefore only computed as a resource distribution share in this
research to demonstrate a comparison to the HORSt. If applied to a traditional resource distribution
formula these shares would apply only to resources from the state budget. In contrast, the HORSt
informs resource distribution amongst LHNs from the state, after considering the Commonwealth
government’s subsidisation of each LHN’s population’s use of MBS and PBS services. Nonetheless
the comparative shares are weighted to the population as percentages and are comparable in the
context of both being weighted population needs-based shares.

To allow fair comparison both sets of shares are based upon the respective need indices for the
LHNs resident populations and are not resourcing shares adjusted for flows where patients are
treated in other LHNs.

Table 37 HORSt shares of taxpayer resources for health funding equity and the EHUIs needs-based shares

LHN
Central Coast
Far West
Hunter New England
Illawarra Shoalhaven
Mid North Coast
Murrumbidgee
Nepean Blue Mountains
Northern NSW
Northern Sydney
South Eastern Sydney
South Western Sydney
Southern NSW
Sydney
Western NSW
Western Sydney
Total

2016 HORSt
needs-based
share of
resources
4.19%
0.56%
11.82%
5.22%
2.99%
3.70%
4.78%
3.76%
9.75%
12.79%
13.31%
2.40%
6.78%
4.90%
13.03%
100.00%

2016 EHUIs
needs-based
share of
resources
4.68%
0.51%
12.79%
5.40%
3.11%
4.33%
4.92%
4.10%
10.13%
12.20%
12.79%
2.69%
6.26%
4.43%
11.67%
100.00%

NB. Table 37 is a summary from Table 33 in Chapter Six (page 227).
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As flagged in the literature review, one would expect somewhat similar shares of resources on the
basis that both methods, as different as they are (illustrated in Table 36), find commonality in that
the needs-based shares are heavily influenced in both methodologies by how well variables
representing the social determinants of health predict each models respective proxies of health
need. In this regard there can be a degree of comfort in the similarity of the LHN shares produced
by the HORSt. A comparison of shares is perhaps the only method of verification open to this
research. As an entirely new method for establishing population needs-based resource allocation,
the HORSt would suffer credibility problems if the proportional differences in shares were
significantly larger.

Research question 6:
What quantum of funding is required to be adjusted by the state from the existing pool of resources
used by each geographical population?

Determining the quantum of funding to be adjusted by the state for each of the LHNs requires first
calculating what is the current resource share of resources are across the pool of funds from the
MBS, PBS and SCRs by area of residence. The difference between this share of the total pool of
funds and what the share would be if the whole pool was allocated accordingly to the LHNs HORSt
share is the adjustment the state would need to make, to enable funding equity. This is illustrated in
Table 34 on page 229.

At the time of the study design (2016), the quantum of funding required to be adjusted by the state
from the existing pool of resources used by each geographical population was as follows. Seven of
the 15 NSW LHNs receive a positive adjustment of resources being:


Western Sydney $434 million;



South Eastern Sydney $326 million;



South Western Sydney $205 million;



Western NSW $200 million;



Murrumbidgee $42 million;



Nepean Blue Mountains $21 million; and



Far West NSW $8 million.

Eight of the 15 NSW LHNs receive a negative adjustment of resources being:


Northern Sydney -$3 million;
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Sydney -$3 million;



Southern NSW -$36 million;



Northern NSW -$175 million;



Mid North Coast $196 million;



Illawarra Shoalhaven -$249 million;



Hunter New England -$271 million; and



Central Coast -$303 million.

Importantly, these shares of funding are for the needs of the populations within each LHN of
residence. The operationalisation of the HORSt (outside the scope of this research) will require
adjustments for patient flows, between LHNs. These adjustments do not include these flows. This is
discussed in section 7.2.

The vertical equity adjustments in terms of quantum of dollars are directly attributed to the HORSt
assessment of individual population health needs within each LHN, and comparing this to funds
already used by their populations via MBS, PBS, and state health funding allocations. Caution needs
to be taken in interpreting these adjustments, positive or negative, as indicators of higher or lower
needs. For example, Western Sydney and Central Coast have adjustments of a $434 million increase,
and a $303 million decrease respectively. Their respective HORSt need indices are 138.51 and
125.27 (see table 31, page 222), indicative of being 38.51% and 25.27% more needy than the
benchmark SA3 populations that are within the Northern Sydney LHN. However, Central Coast’s
current share of resources is 5.48%, whilst its HORSt share of resources, which is determined by its
HORSt need index weighted for population, is 4.19% (see table 34 page 229). This means Central
Coast is actually over funded relative to its needs determined by the HORSt. Contrastingly, Western
Sydney is currently under funded, having a share of resources of 11.17% and HORSt needs based
share of 13.03%.

The example above demonstrates that the positive and negative adjustments in dollars shown are
indicative of the corrective action of the HORSt proportional shares to the current use and
distribution of MBS, PBS, and state health funds respectively. The quantum of adjustments should
not be taken on their own as a measure of relative needs between LHNs. The proportionality of
shares shown as a percentage in column H of table 34, page 229 is indicative of more and less needy
LHNs. Moreover, the HORSt need indices for LHNs and the smaller geographies of SA3s (summarised
in table 31, page 222) that construct the proportional shares transparently outline areas of higher
and lower relative needs.
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7.2

DISCUSSION - REFLECTIONS OF THE AIMS, METHODS AND RESULTS OF THE

RESEARCH
This section is a discussion that reflects upon the findings and results of the research contextualised
to the conceptual framework that generated the aims and research questions that underpinned the
methodology developed. Discussion comprises:


outlining the unique and significant contributions of the research achieved;



comparing the use and value of the HORSt methodology as an alternative population
needs-based resource distribution tool to traditional models;



recognising the study’s limitations and strengths;



operationalising the research to inform state health resource distribution to regional
areas; and



applications of the research methodology beyond the state health system.

7.2.1 The unique and significant contributions of the research achieved
The unique contributions and innovations achieved through this research are significant for a
number of reasons. These are now summarised and discussed.

First, as outlined in the first three chapters, taxpayer provided and subsidised health funding in
Australia is siloed across layers of government and amongst public and private sectors (Eagar et al.
2001, p. 26; Gadiel 2015; Lairson et al. 1995, p. 475). In Australia, funding is firmly aligned to the
production of health outputs rather than health outcomes. Evidence for this is the widespread use
of ABF for public hospitals and the nature of fee-for-service private funding. Contrastingly, the
HORSt represents a significant change in focus via considering funding in the context of the
appropriate mix and volume of taxpayer funded and subsidised outputs to produce an acceptable
benchmarked level of health outcomes for geographical populations that seek to maximise equity
across the continuum of care.

Second, in moving away from a siloed approach to funding, the HORSt advises on what the ideal
level of state taxpayer funding should be as each LHNs share of state funding, relative to the total
tax payer funding across the continuum of care for each LHN population, adjusted for social
determinants that give rise to health outcomes. State health funding in this context is an essential
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residual adjustment component, after the taxpayer subsidisation from other relevant
Commonwealth government funding has been considered. In other words, the HORSt represents
what the state needs to spend for population funding equity, given that the state cannot control the
Commonwealth contribution spending in the private sector. This aligns Medicare to its original
purpose, as a “mechanism to fund two key provider groups: hospitals and doctors” (Duckett 2000, p.
34). The HORSt represents regional level Medicare.

Third, the HORSt does not require regulatory reform. As outlined in the third chapter, health reform
in Australia that has contemplated regulatory change has faced pronounced challenges. Boxall and
Gillespie (2013); Maiden (2010); Milne (2010), all document that many attempts of health funding
reform have involved rancour between different levels of government and also medical
professionals. The HORSt can disrupt the status quo of health funding of inputs and outputs by
making the focus on health outcomes (albeit via a proxy variable of health status of the population)
but it does so within the current regulatory rules of the game. It does not require constitutional
change for any layer of government to abrogate or exceed their funding or governance
arrangements for health.

Fourth, the HORSt, whilst considering a population needs-based approach to resource distribution, is
significantly different to the former Australian state health population needs-based funding models.
The former NSW and Queensland models primarily considered health service utilisation as a proxy
for population health needs, with the goal being equalisation of financial access (Ho 2001; InterGovernment & Funding Strategies 2005b; Kirigia 2009), an instrument of horizontal equity.
Contrastingly, the HORSt primarily considers need in terms of capacity to benefit via vertical equity.
In doing so, the HORSt recognises inequity in the health system by explicitly considering the social
determinants in geographical populations that give rise to the production of poor health outcomes
and not through utilisation. The HORSt successfully measures the contributions of resourcing across
the continuum of care whereas former models only considered resource distribution in the context
of state health budget funding.

It is important to acknowledge that other population needs-based resource allocation models such
as that used in the NHS in the UK (documented in Table 6 in the literature review, page 62) have
used at times a health outcomes based approach, via considering factors that give rise to premature
mortality so as to address inequities (Barr et al. 2014). Whilst part of the HORSt is somewhat similar
to this, save for other variables that may be used to approximate geographical population health
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status which do not involve mortality data, the HORSt is significantly different via the inclusion of a
productivity assessment of proxied health outcomes as per the two-stage DEA approach.

Fifth, unlike any previous population needs-based funding model that assumes implicit
improvements in allocative efficiency, the HORSt measures the allocative efficiency of desirable
health outcomes for populations, represented by age-standardised rates of PPHs and established a
benchmark. The three social determinants that were found to affect populations’ ability to achieve
the benchmark were then used to inform resource distribution weighted population shares of
funding.

Finally, the HORSt is designed to be compatible with ABF. The previous population needs-based
models in NSW and QLD did operate alongside episode funding models (ABF models) (Hindle 2002;
NSW Health 2005, p. 4; Schneider 2005, p. 5). As such, the equity goal of the HORSt is not in a tradeoff with efficiency. The HORSt is complementary to the ongoing advancement of technical efficiency
that occurs with output-based purchasing models like the ABF. The HORSt is significant in this role
as it makes explicit and transparent for state governments and their local geographical populations
what the fair distribution of resources ought to be to advance health outcomes and maximise equity
before decisions regarding how best to purchase public health outputs are made at the local level
using ABF.

7.2.2 Comparing the use and value of the HORSt methodology as an alternative
population needs-based resource distribution tool to traditional models
As the differences between the HORSt and EHUI shares of funding to LHNs (outlined in Table 37) are
not that large, it might be argued that perhaps utilisation (the need proxy of EHUIs) could be used as
the proxy of health status to inform the needs-based benchmark used in the HORSt, or perhaps that
traditional models that simply use utilisation as the proxy for need should be used. This section
discusses the value in applying the HORSt or alternatives to support resource distribution decision
making.

As per the logic of population needs-based models discussed in the literature, higher and lower rates
of utilisation for example could reflect higher and lower rates of need. Doing so however, would
make the construction of the benchmark utilising the HORSt DEA approach conceptually difficult.
This is because utilisation remains an important input for the DEA, measured by MBS, PBS and state
health resources using the SCRs. Furthermore, it would be illogical to have a benchmark where the
outcome is health system use, especially when the benchmark is seeking a measure of allocative
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efficiency of producing outcomes given the mix of resources and use thereof across the continuum
of care.

Within a DEA approach, if utilisation was to be the output, the DEA would be a function of the
technical efficiency of the production of the utilisation. Moreover, if utilisation was pursued as an
outcomes measure for a benchmark, this would pose a conceptual question of what would the
inputs be? In addressing that question in the Australian context of this research, state health
resource distribution, the inputs to hospital and community service outputs logically could not
include the MBS and PBS resources which would be outside the production of these outputs.

As outlined in the literature review and illustrated in Table 6 (page 62), several population needsbased funding formulae that have used utilisation as need, have customised their formulae to inform
localised resource allocation for specific health program budget areas. Specific health needs for
program budget areas have been developed, using utilisation from specific health program areas
and explanatory variables that predict the utilisation delivered under specific health program. In the
case of the former NSW RDF, total needs-based shares are then the sum of the individual health
program shares.

If individual need indices and needs-based shares for health program areas are desired by the state
health authority in the same light, using a HORSt approach would require more program specific
health status or outcome measures pertaining to the outputs of the program areas. Doing so may
require multiple benchmarks and separate two-stage DEAs for the outcomes of individual program
areas, so as to generate program specific need indices. This would require not only considering
variables to best represent the health outcomes of individual programs but would require
assessment of corresponding input variables. This would pose difficulties as this approach would
somewhat ignore the interactions of the other services across the continuum of care.

A further complicating factor to this limitation of not being able to calculate the HORSt at the state
health program level also involves a mismatch between typical health programs used by states and
the inputs supplied by the Commonwealth (MBS and PBS). Table 38 illustrates this.
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Table 38 Disconnection between the MBS and PBS categorisation of data and state health program areas

MBS / PBS categories

Typical state health program areas (NSW
used for example)

MBS
Category 1 - Professional Attendances
Category 2 - Diagnostic Procedures and
Investigations
Category 3 - Therapeutic Procedures
Category 4 - Oral and Maxillofacial Services
(by Approved Dental Practitioners)
Category 5 - Diagnostic Imaging Services
Category 6 - Pathology Services
Category 7 - Cleft Lip and Cleft Palate
Category 8 - Miscellaneous Services
Category 9 - Dentist, Dental Specialist and
Dental Prosthetists.
Category 10 - Dental Benefits Schedule
PBS
General - Ordinary
Concessional - Ordinary
General - Safety Net
Concessional - Free Safety Net

Aboriginal Health
Acute Inpatients
Emergency Departments
Mental Health
Obstetrics
Oral Health - Adult (Caries)
Oral Health - Adult (Dentures)
Oral Health - Child
Outpatients
Patient Flows
Population Health
Primary & Community Based Care
Rehabilitation and Extended Care
Sub-Acute
Non-admitted patients
Teaching & Research
(ABF Taskforce 2016).

(AIHW 2018b; Department of Human Services
2015, 2017).
It is clear from this research that the construction of the HORSt whereby needs are assessed by
populations ability to achieve a benchmark of allocative efficiency of the production of desirable
health outcomes is a very different approach to traditional utilisation-based needs formulas. As
alluded to in the literature review, context and practicality will be the ultimate arbiter as to the
appropriateness and value of use of either method.

Where health systems require resource

distribution instruments to consider population health needs as a form of risk adjustment for
informing regionalised budgets, or program budget areas, the utilisation needs-based models will
continue to have merit. The implicit nature of improving funding equity and promoting allocative
efficiency through a better distribution of resources via a utilisation approach still holds. However,
where more specific equity objectives are required that consider the funding across the whole
continuum of care, the HORSt methodology developed can be applied.
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7.2.3

Study limitations and strengths

7.2.3.1 Study limitations
State health program needs indices and resource-based shares
Drawing upon the previous section, a key study limitation is that the HORSt utilising an approach
that seeks to include the allocative efficiency of health system inputs across the continuum of care
to produce desirable levels of health outcomes will inevitable find difficulty in calculating health
need indices to inform resource allocation of specific health programs within the LHNs funding
envelopes. This limitation confines the HORSt as a top-level macro barometer of health needs. The
HORSt is not designed to, nor can, answer questions as to what the mix of health service delivery
ought to be. These are questions that are answered through policy and clinical improvements
pertaining to models of care.

Population structures determined by Medicare Australia
The study’s use of SA3 level population and socioeconomic data was completely determined by
Medicare Australia’s data policy, whereby the SA3 population level is the lowest level of population
aggregated data that can be released for the key inputs MBS and PBS. As discussed, typically
population needs-based models are built up from small measurable populations that can inform an
accurate and comprehensive representation of the populations of interest in the study. The NSW
EHUIs and former RDF used data built up from SA2 and LGA populations respectively.

There is no way of telling what affect smaller units of population and socioeconomic data would
have on the results of the HORSt. However, smaller data units should they become available will not
change the methodology established for determining the HORSt need indices for these smaller
populations, or the apportioning methodology of the smaller units to the LHNs need indices.

Health outcomes proxy measure
The study’s use of age-standardised and casemix adjusted rates of PPHs as performance measure of
health outcomes and proxy of population health status has been well justified in this research via the
literature and the results generated. However, one of the limitations deliberately applied to the DEA
methodology, was the use of this metric as a single output measure in the DEA. This is completely
satisfactory for a proof of concept development model that was seeking a parsimonious approach.
As discussed in Chapter Four, the DEA can accommodate multiple outputs as well as the multiple
inputs used.

Future research may find approximating health needs in the context of health
Page 247

outcomes at the population level could comprise multiple metrics, whereby the linear programming
of the DEA can appropriately weight the output contributions towards the calculation of allocative
efficiency.

7.2.3.2 Study’s strengths
Congruent with the achievement of the study’s unique and significant contributions already
discussed, the study’s key strengths are summarised below.

As demonstrated in the development of and results achieved, the HORSt represents at a top level a
robust and reliable barometer of population health needs. It successfully draws upon gaps in the
research to develop health needs for local populations with LHNs that enable resource allocation to
be aligned with populations capacity to benefit. It successfully measures the ability of populations
to achieve desirable levels of health outcomes subject to the allocative efficiency of the bulk of
publicly funded and subsidised health care in Australia. In doing so it informs state governments of
what they need to redistribute to enable funding equity.

The core strength of the HORSt is synonymous with the Gonski models approach to education. The
HORSt is the first model of this kind to explicitly make a link between health outcomes and
expenditure and does so in an environment that has been consistently dominated by the funding
and organisation of the production of health outputs.

7.2.4 Operationalising the HORSt for state health resource distributions
The HORSt was developed as a proof of concept using a case study for NSW, circa 2016. However,
the methodology is designed to be applied to any recurrent year of funding. The long stability of the
secondary data sources collected in the census cycle means that there is no requirement of the
HORSt to be recalibrated annually. The HORSt needs-based shares can be used to guide resource
allocation recurrently for each year between census data updates. Like the previous RDF and EHUIs
the HORSt should be updated after each ABS census is complete.

The application of LHNs shares should as per the previous RAWP in the UK and former RDF in NSW,
be applied to growth funding and not the recurrent budget per se. Doing so would avoid creating
too much disruption of established service delivery patterns, over the short term, however this
would lead to longer term improvements in funding equity. On this point, state health systems
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wanting to enable greater funding equity and allocative efficiency should be prepared to consider
the HORSt as a long-term perpetuating initiative. The dismantling of the NSW RDF and the resulting
erosion in funding equity that can occur once the commitment to a needs-based funding tool is
abandoned was demonstrated in Chapter Two, Figure 7, page 57.

The goals of the HORSt were deliberately kept as a proof of concept model and the complications of
patient flows in the planning of this research was excluded to focus on the core methodology being
developed. Nonetheless, the HORSt shares calculated could be initially distributed to LHNs who hold
a portion of the funds for redistribution of patient flows to other LHNs that treat the patients. The
payment of net flows between LHNs could be conducted entirely with a transfer of NWAUs via ABF,
guided by weightings aligned to population needs informed by the HORSt. A similar mechanism
could apply to the flow transfers from LHNs to speciality networks that have state-wide service
functions, such as speciality tertiary services, for example, paediatric child and maternal services. A
flows adjusted share of funding could be calculated via weighting each of the LHNs populations
HORSt shares for where each population is treated. However, there are endless possibilities as to
how patient flows could be treated. Ultimately patient flows are a policy matter for state health
authorities.

This study has used NSW as a case study. In the first chapter it was suggested that, based on the
literature pertaining to the strong links between social determinants of health and outcomes, the
HORSt is logically going to be more applicable in states that face more dispersed and
socioeconomically different populations, where inequalities and inequities are more apparent and
where the supply of services are scarcer. The outcomes of the regression for NSW are specific for
that state’s data and are not directly translated to other states.

Nonetheless the HORSt

methodology can be applied to other states, where different predictors to the three identified for
NSW may be revealed.

7.2.5 Applying the HORSt methodology beyond state health resource distribution to
regional areas
Whilst this thesis’ scope has been focused on the state health system’s distribution of funding to
local populations, the application of the HORSt methodology can be applied to other population
needs-based determinations, such as informing fairer and more allocatively efficient shares of
funding for specific purpose payments from Commonwealth to states via the Commonwealth Grants
Commission. Further, the national health funding model used to administer Commonwealth and
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State funding pools could be similarly influenced by a HORSt methodology so as to promote equity
and allocative efficiency across the continuum of care and with respect to the influence that social
determinants have upon health outcomes.

The HORSt has been ultimately developed to guide the recurrent resource distribution between
states and LHNs. Capital planning is outside the scope of this research. Nonetheless capital decision
making could be informed by the HORSt need indices so as to plan for resources that are established
in areas of greater need.

7.3

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This research set out to demonstrate a different way of distributing resources compared to the
business as usual approach that all states and territories have adopted since the commencement of
nation-wide ABF. This process disappointingly has not seen an advancement in enabling funding for
better health outcomes or alleviating inequity and has perpetuated the status quo. Whilst ABF has
been successful in driving technical efficiency (a very good thing) the public health system in
Australia has been left somewhat wanting for improvements in allocative and dynamic efficiency.
IHPA’s quote on page 2 of this thesis in this regard is timely and telling for the need for the HORSt
namely:
“Whilst Activity Based Funding models have been effective in driving technical efficiency in the
delivery of public hospital services, the current pricing models designed by IHPA do not necessarily
provide incentives to maximise allocative and dynamic efficiency” (IHPA 2019, p. 30).

The HORSt developed and demonstrated in this research not only responds to gaps in the literature
regarding the technical approaches used to approximate health needs but has also responded to the
growing view that public resources should be demonstrated to being applied to the betterment of
outcomes.

The HORSt makes transparent in the context of health outcomes the differences

between good and poor health status and then makes explicit the taxpayer inputs and the social
determinants that contribute to the achievement of those outcomes. It does so without requiring
legislative reform. Importantly in this later regard, it does not seek to disrupt ABF’s role as a
purchasing currency or driver of technical efficiency. The HORSt positioned as the first step in the
funding model needs ABF just as much as ABF needs the HORSt.
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Policy and Practice Recommendations
The contextualised use of the HORSt will fundamentally determine whether or not it should be
pursued in place of population needs-based models based on utilisation. For example, the HORSt
could simply be used as per the proof of concept model as per this thesis, to inform an overall first
step in the funding model, informing population needs-based resource allocation to LHNs at a very
broad level, defining the overall resource distribution envelope for LHNs funding. To promote equity
and allocative efficiency this is recommended. It is a substantial improvement on business as usual
which essentially is commissioning for history plus growth. The mix of services to be purchased by
the LHN amongst their facilities could be left purely as a cost and casemix decision with respect to
existing infrastructure, informed by cost and ABF factors and clinical innovation of models of care.
Doing so would not require any further sophistication of refining the HORSt for specific health
program resource allocation.

This research has contextualised the use of traditional population needs-based models that use
utilisation as a proxy for need. Whilst these models by design will focus on outputs rather than
health outcomes, if policy requires oversight for resource distribution congruent with risk capitation
arising from need at a health program level, then these traditional approaches as extensively
outlined in the literature are sound. As demonstrated in the literature such approaches remain
compatible with ABF / episode funding, which will always be a logical second payment stage in the
funding model.

The recommendations for the use of the HORSt are:
1. utilise the HORSt methodology to establish the top level commissioning / funding
envelope for state health funding determinations to LHNs;
a. adjusting the HORSt LHNs populations needs-based shares of funding for
fixed cost factors associated with facilities and patient flows;
2. use ABF as the payment currency for purchasing of health system outputs within
each LHN.

Recommendations for further research
Operationalising the HORSt could involve a mix of methods. For the reasons outlined in this thesis
and benefits associated with dealing with the gaps in the literature, as recommended the HORSt
should be used for top level resource allocation guidance to local areas. However, factors that
determine utilisation of health programs could be calculated separately. The nexus of how such a
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mix would operate is beyond the scope of this research, however this would be an opportunity for
further research.

Further research could seek to address the limitation outlined with using the HORSt methodology for
specific health programs, whereby the HORSt DEA represents a relative measure of the productivity
of inputs across the continuum care. The use of a single output in the HORSt DEA (PPHs) and the
inputs selected could be refined in further research agenda. As outlined, DEA does support multiple
outputs alongside multiple inputs.

There is potential for the HORSt methodology to act as top-level sounding for capital works
expansion and health technology innovations. HORSt determined health needs indices could be
considered for infrastructure developments so as to not make structural funding inequities.
However, as patient flows are indicative of the fact that it is not practical for each LHN to supply all
facilities to address population need (such as tertiary and quaternary facilities for example), further
research would be required to consider how the HORSt methodology could be practically applied.

Ultimately, the use of the HORSt, particularly as identifying the residual funding component from
within the continuum of care, may lead to political discourse between Commonwealth, states and
private practitioners. However, the transparency afforded under the HORSt, may contribute to
greater understanding by taxpayers as to the structural funding inequities that perpetuate in the
constitutionally protected private layers of the Australian health care system. Specifically, IHPA, in
seeking to address its quest for improving allocative efficiency, could consider developing the HORSt
at a national level to guide the distribution of quantum of NWAUs from Commonwealth to states.
Doing so may require further research so as to consider what appropriate NWAU targets for each
state ought to be.

The recommendations for future research surrounding the HORSt are as follows:
1. Consider using the HORSt to establish the top level outcomes-based commissioning /
funding envelope for state health funding determinations to LHNs (as above) and consider
state health program needs-based approaches within this envelope for localised
commissioning of health programs. Patient flows / cost factor adjustments and the use of
ABF as the currency in the second stage of the model still applies.
2. Consider alternative outputs and inputs to consider refinements to the HORSt and
developing the methodology for specific health program areas.
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3. Consider how the HORSt methodology could be practically applied to capital expansions and
health technology innovations.
4. IHPA could consider developing the HORSt at a national level to guide the distribution of the
quantum of NWAUs from Commonwealth to states.
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APPENDIX 1

SUMMARY OF POTENTIALLY PREVENTABLE HOSPITALISATIONS

(PPHs) AND IDENTIFYING ATTRIBUTES
Source: (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017b)
ICD-10-AM, 7th edition codes used for identifying potentially preventable hospitalisations
ICD-10-AM
Category
ICD-10-AM description
Additional requirements
codes

Vaccine preventable
PPHs
J10
Pneumonia and influenza
(vaccine-preventable)

J11
J13
J14
A08.0
A35
A36
A37
A80
B01
B05
B06

Other vaccine-preventable
conditions

B16.1
B16.9
B18.0

Influenza due to other identified
influenza virus

In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Influenza, virus not identified
Exclude people under 2 months.
Pneumonia due to Streptococcus
In any diagnosis.
pneumoniae
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Pneumonia due to Haemophilus influenza
Exclude people under 2 months.
Rotaviral enteritis
In any diagnosis.
Other tetanus
In any diagnosis.
Diphtheria
In any diagnosis.
Whooping cough
In any diagnosis.
Acute poliomyelitis
In any diagnosis.
Varicella [chicken pox]
In any diagnosis.
Measles
In any diagnosis.
Rubella [German measles]
In any diagnosis.
Acute hepatitis B with delta-agent
In any diagnosis.
(coinfection) without hepatic coma
Acute hepatitis B without delta-agent and
In any diagnosis.
without hepatic coma
Chronic viral hepatitis B with delta-agent In any diagnosis.

B26
G00.0

Chronic viral hepatitis B without deltaagent
Mumps
Haemophilus meningitis

J45

Asthma

J46

Status asthmaticus

I50

Heart failure

I11.0

hypertensive heart diseased with
(congestive) heart failure

J81

Pulmonary oedema

B18.1

In any diagnosis.
In any diagnosis.
In any diagnosis.

Chronic PPHs
Asthma

Congestive cardiac failure

As principal diagnosis.
Exclude children aged less than 4 years.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude children aged less than 4 years.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with the following cardiac procedure codes:
Blocks 600-606, 608-650, 653-657, 660-664, 666, 669-682, 684-691,
693, 705-707, 717 and codes 33172-00[715], 33827-01[733], 3480000[726], 35412-00[11], 38721-01[733], 90217-02[734], 9021502[732].
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with the following cardiac procedure codes:
Blocks 600-606, 608-650, 653-657, 660-664, 666, 669-682, 684-691,
693, 705-707, 717 and codes 33172-00[715], 33827-01[733], 3480000[726], 35412-00[11], 38721-01[733], 90217-02[734], 9021502[732].
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with the following cardiac procedure codes:
Blocks 600-606, 608-650, 653-657, 660-664, 666, 669-682, 684-691,
693, 705-707, 717 and codes 33172-00[715], 33827-01[733], 3480000[726], 35412-00[11], 38721-01[733], 90217-02[734], 9021502[732].

E10.0–E10.9 Type 1 diabetes mellitus

As principal diagnosis.

E11.0–E11.9 Type 2 diabetes mellitus

As principal diagnosis.

E13.0–E13.9 Other specified diabetes mellitus

As principal diagnosis.

E14.0–E14.9 Unspecified diabetes mellitus

As principal diagnosis.

Diabetes complications
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APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF POTENTIALLY PREVENTABLE HOSPITALISATIONS (PPHs) AND
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J20

J47

Simple and mucopurulent chronic
bronchitis
Unspecified chronic bronchitis
Emphysema
Other chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease
Bronchiectasis

J20

Acute bronchitis

I20

Angina pectoris

I24.0

Coronary thrombosis not resulting in
myocardial infarction

I24.8

Other forms of acute ischaemic heart
disease

I24.9

Acute ischaemic heart disease,
unspecified

D50.1
D50.8
D50.9

Sideropenic dysphagia
Other iron deficiency anaemias
Iron deficiency anaemia, unspecified

I10

Essential (primary) hypertension

I11.9

Hypertensive heart disease without
(congestive) heart failure

J41
COPD

J42
J43
J44

Bronchiectasis

Acute bronchitis

Angina

Iron deficiency anaemia

Hypertension

E40
E41
E42
Nutritional deficiencies

E43
E55.0
E64.3
I00

Rheumatic heart diseases

I01
I02
I05
I06
I07
I08
I09

Kwashiorkor
Nutritional marasmus
Marasmic kwashiorkor
Unspecified severe protein-energy
malnutrition
Rickets, active
Sequelae of rickets
Rheumatic fever without mention of heart
involvement
Rheumatic fever with heart involvement
Rheumatic chorea
Rheumatic mitral valve diseases
Rheumatic aortic valve diseases
Rheumatic tricuspid valve diseases
Multiple valve diseases
Other rheumatic heart diseases

As principal diagnosis.
Only with additional diagnoses of J41, J42, J43, J44.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
Only with additional diagnosis of J47.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases according to the list of procedures excluded from the
Congestive cardiac failure category above.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases according to the list of procedures excluded from the
Congestive cardiac failure category above.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases according to the list of procedures excluded from the
Congestive cardiac failure category above.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases according to the list of procedures excluded from the
Congestive cardiac failure category above.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with procedure codes according to the list of
procedures excluded from the Congestive cardiac failure category
above.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with procedure codes according to the list of
procedures excluded from the Congestive cardiac failure category
above.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As
As
As
As
As
As
As

principal
principal
principal
principal
principal
principal
principal

diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.

Appendix Table 1 continues on next page

Page 288

APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF POTENTIALLY PREVENTABLE HOSPITALISATIONS (PPHs) AND
IDENTIFYING ATTRIBUTES continued…

Acute PPHs

Pneumonia (not vaccinepreventable)

J15.3

Pneumonia due to streptococcus, group B

J15.4

Pneumonia due to other streptococci

J15.7

Pneumonia due to Mycophasma
pneumoniae

J16.0

Chlamydial pneumonia

N10
N11

Acute tublo-interstitial nephnitis
Chronic tublo-interstitial nephritis
Tubolo-interstitial nephritis, not
specified as acute or chronic
Pyonephrosis
Renal and perinephric abscess
Renal tubule-interstitial disease,
unspecified
Disorders of kidney and ureter,
unspecified
Urinary tract infection, site not specified
Disorder or urinary system, unspecified
Gastric ulcer, acute with haemorrhage
Gastric ulcer, acute with perforation
Gastric ulcer, acute with both
haemorrhage and perforation
Gastric ulcer, chronic or unspecified with
haemorrhage
Gastric ulcer, chronic or unspecified with
perforation
Gastric ulcer, chronic or unspecified with
both haemorrhage and perforation
Duodenal ulcer, acute with haemorrhage
Duodenal ulcer, acute with perforation
Duodenal ulcer, acute with both
haemorrhage and perforation
Duodenal ulcer, chronic or unspecified
with haemorrhage
Duodenal ulcer, chronic or unspecified
with perforation
Duodenal ulcer, chronic or unspecified
with both haemorrhage and perforation
Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, acute with
haemorrhage
Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, acute with
perforation
Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, acute with
both haemorrhage and perforation
Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, chronic or
unspecified with both haemorrhage and
perforation
Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, chronic or
unspecified with both haemorrhage and
perforation
Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, chronic or
unspecified with both haemorrhage and
perforation
Gastrojejunal ulcer, acute with
haemorrhage
Gastrojejunal ulcer, acute with
perforation
Gastrojejunal ulcer, acute with both
haemorrhage and perforation
Gastrojejunal ulcer, chronic or
unspecified with haemorrhage
Gastrojejunal ulcer, chronic or
unspecified with perforation
Gastrojejunal ulcer, chronic or
unspecified with both haemorrhage and
perforation

N12
Urinary tract infections,
including pyelonephritis

N13.6
N15.1
N15.9
N28.9
N39.0
N39.9
K25.0
K25.1
K25.2
K25.4
K25.5
K25.6
K26.0
K26.1
K26.2
K26.4
K26.5
K26.6
K27.0
K27.1

Perforated/bleeding ulcer
K27.2
K27.4

K27.5

K27.6
K28.0
K28.1
K28.2
K28.4
K28.5
K28.6

In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal
As principal
As principal
As principal

diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.

As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.

As principal diagnosis.

As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
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Cellulitis

L02

Cutaneous abscess, furuncle and
carbuncle

L03

Cellulitis

L04

Acute Lymphadenitis

L08

Other local infections of skin and
subcutaneous tissue

L88

Pyoderma gangrenosum

L98.0

Pyogenic granuloma

L98.3

Eosinphilic cellulitis [Wells]

N70

Salpingitis and oophoritis
Other female pelvic inflammatory
diseases
Other female pelvic inflammatory
disorders in diseases classified
elsewhere

N73
Pelvic inflammatory disease
N74
H66
J02
Ear, nose and throat infections J03
J06
J31.2
K02
K03
K04
K05
K06
Dental conditions

K08
K09.8

Convulsions and epilepsy
Eclampsia

Gangrene

K09.9
K12
K13
K14.0
G40
G41
R56
O15
R02
I70.24
E09.52

As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00,
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the
only listed procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00,
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the
only listed procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00,
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the
only listed procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00,
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the
only listed procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00,
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the
only listed procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00,
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the
only listed procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00,
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the
only listed procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.

Suppurative and unspecified otitis media As principal diagnosis.
Acute pharyngitis
Acute tonsillitis
Acute upper respiratory infections of
multiple and unspecified sites
Chronic pharyngitis
Dental caries
Other diseases of hard tissues of teeth
Diseases of pulp and periapical tissues
Gingivitis and periodontal diseases
Other disorders of gingiva and
edentulous alveolar ridge
Other disorders of teeth and supporting
structures
Other cysts of oral region, not elsewhere
classified
Cyst of oral region, unspecified
Stomatitis and related lesions
Other diseases of lip and oral mucosa
Glossitis
Epilepsy
Status epilepticus
Convulsions, not elsewhere classified
Eclampsia
Gangrene, not elsewhere classified
Atherosclerosis of arteries of extremities
with gangrene
Impaired glucose regulation with
peripheral angiopathy, with gangrene

As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal
As principal
As principal
As principal
As principal

diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.
diagnosis.

As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
In any diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
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APPENDIX 2

Condition

CHARLSON CO-MORBIDITIES USING ICD-10 CODES
Charlson

ICD-10AM codes used to identify Charlson Co-morbidities in separations data

weights

where any secondary diagnosis fields indicate any of the following codes

(score)
Acute

1

I21, I22, I252

1

I50

1

I71, I790, I739, R02, Z958, Z959

Cerebral
vascular
accident

1

I60, I61, I62, I63, I65, I66,G450, G451, G452, G458, G459, G46, I64, G454, I670,
I671, I672, I674, I675, I676, I677 I678, I679, I681, I682, I688, I69

Dementia

1

F00, F01, F02, F051

Pulmonary
disease

1

J40, J41, J42, J44, J43, J45, J46, J47, J67, J44, J60, J61, J62, J63, J66, J64, J65

Connective
tissue disorder

1

M32, M34, M332, M053, M058, M059, M060, M063, M069, M050, M052,
M051, M353

Peptic ulcer

1

K25, K26, K27, K28

Liver disease

1

K702, K703, K73, K717, K740, K742, K746, K743, K744, K745

Diabetes

1

E109, E119, E139, E149, E101, E111, E131, E141, E105, E115, E135, E145

Diabetes
complications

2

E102, E112, E132, E142 E103, E113, E133, E143 E104, E114, E134, E144

Paraplegia

2

G81 G041, G820, G821, G822

Renal disease

2

N03, N052, N053, N054, N055, N056, N072, N073, N074, N01, N18, N19, N25

2

C0, C1, C2, C3, C40, C41, C43, C45, C46, C47, C48, C49, C5, C6, C70, C71, C72,
C73, C74, C75, C76, C80, C81, C82, C83, C84, C85, C883, C887, C889, C900,
C901, C91, C92, C93, C940, C941, C942, C943, C9451, C947, C95, C96

3

C77, C78, C79, C80

myocardial
infarction
Congestive
heart failure
Peripheral
vascular disease

Cancer

Metastatic
cancer
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Severe

liver

3

K729, K766, K767, K721

6

B20, B21, B22, B23, B24

disease
HIV

Adapted from (Sundararajan et al. 2004, pp. 1,290).
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APPENDIX 3

ETHICS APPROVAL

From: Rob Gordon [mailto:robg@uow.edu.au]
Sent: Thursday, 16 March 2017 2:17 PM
To: Kathy Eagar
Cc: John Slater; Silvia Mendolia
Subject: RE: Amended Protocol to support HREC exemption

John, Kathy, Sylvia,

My apologies for the delay in replying. John, I have read your Research Protocol and agree that the
research you are undertaking can be classified as negligible risk. On this basis, I approve your
application for it to be exempted from ethical review by the Human Research Ethics committee.

Kind regards
Rob

Associate Professor Rob Gordon
Deputy Director
Australian Health Services Research Institute
University of Wollongong
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APPENDIX 4

MBS / PBS DATA REQUEST APPROVAL

Page 294

APPENDIX 5

CONFIRMATION E-MAIL EXCHANGE REGARDING TRANSLATIONAL

TRANSFORMATION OF DEA OUTPUTS DATA
From: Jose

Manuel

Sent: Tuesday,

12

Cordero

Ferrera

June

2018

<jmcordero@unex.es>
7:55

To: John

PM
Slater

Subject: Re: Efficiency assessment of primary care providers: A conditional nonparametric approach

Dear John,

Thanks for your interest in our research. Regarding your question, you are right. We decided
to use the whole hundred up from the maximum value (474,22). There is no further
computation beyond that. We also thought about the possibility of using the maximum value,
but in this case we would have one 0 value, which could complicate the estimation of
efficiency measures.

Best regards,

Jose Cordero

De: "John

Slater"

<jmrs561@uowmail.edu.au>

Para: jmcordero@unex.es
Enviados: Lunes,

11

de

Junio

2018

13:24:34

Asunto: Efficiency assessment of primary care providers: A conditional nonparametric
approach

Dear Professor Jose

I'm a PhD (DBA) student in Australia and Health Economist. I'm researching ACSCs as an
undesirable variable in DEA. I very much enjoyed your paper on the efficiency assessment
of primary care providers.

I am very interested in how you transformed the undesirable ACSCs output. I note in your
paper with interest that you followed the Seiford and Zhu (2002) method and you set the
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value of your transformation parameter at k=500. I was wondering if this was done as the
maximum rate of ACSCs per 10,000 in your paper was 474.22? I was thinking that you have
assigned the parameter at the next whole hundred up from this Figure. This seemed logical
to me, but I was wondering if there were any further computations to setting k at 500?

Kind regards

John Slater
University of Wollongong.
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APPENDIX 6

HORSt DEA REGRESSION MODELLING, ALTERNATE MODELS TO THE

PREFERRED MODEL
A6.1 Regression Model 1 (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs + Assisted Needs)
Regression analysis commenced with including the IRSD variable, the ATSI variable, out-of-pocket
costs and the Assisted Needs variable. Several combinations were tested. The results are presented
herein.
Table A6.1.1 – Preliminary Independent Variable Assessment Regression Model 1 using IRSD as the
SEIFA index

The coefficients panel of Table A6.1.1 shows the significance of each variable at the 5% significance
level depicted by (Sig.). At the 5% significance level the Assisted Needs proportion (Sig 0.209>0.05)
is not a significant linear predictor of the DEA allocative efficiency score in a model that also includes
IRSD, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs.
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Whilst Assisted Needs was not a significant linear predictor of the DEA allocative efficiency score in a
model that contained out-of-pocket costs, further analysis was conducted where Assisted Needs
were included and the out-of-pocket costs was removed.

Table A6.1.2 shows the resulting

regression (labelled Model 1a) finds that Assisted Needs in a regression with IRSD and ATSI and
without out-of-pocket costs is a significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score.
IRSD and ATSI are also significant linear predictors in this model.

Table A6.1.2 –Regression Model 1a – IRSD + ATSI + Assisted Needs

The overall regression of Model 1a is significant as shown by the F value and Sig values in the ANOVA
(analysis of variance) section of the table. The coefficient of determination (R-square 0.572) for the
model with these variables explains 57.2% of the variation in the DEA Allocative efficiency score, or
55.7% when adjusted for the number of independent variables. As discussed in the preceding
section regarding the bi-variate correlations, the VIF statistic shows potential multicollinearity
between IRSD and Assisted Needs, although the VIF statistics are below 5, which as discussed in the
methodological literature can be perfectly acceptable.
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Notwithstanding a potential issue of multicollinearity, the model depicted in Table A6.1.2 meets all
the required regression axioms outlined in the methodology chapter. Results of testing these
required assumptions are now outlined.

The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 1.719 in Table A6.1.2 is demonstrating the model exhibits no autoserial correlations. Hypothesis testing the Durbin Watson statistic (d) tests for autocorrelation and
serial correlation was conducted. i.e.
𝐻0 : 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐻𝐴 : 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
Using critical values of 1.60709 and 1.69990 from the Durbin Watson tables (Savin & White 1977)
with 88 observations (DMUs / SA3s) and 3 independent variables, the decision rule for hypothesis
testing is:


Reject 𝐻0 : if d<1.60709 or (4-d)< 1.60709;



Do not reject 𝐻0 : if d>1.69990 or (4-d)> 1.69990; and



Test inconclusive if: 1. 60709<d<1. 69990 and 1.60709<(4-d)<1.69990.

As d (1.719>1.69990), we do not reject 𝐻0 and find the residuals are independent.

In addition to the Durbin Watson statistic Figure A6.1A shows a line graph of regression
unstandardized residuals. The fact that between case numbers there is no discernible pattern of
association it can be concluded that the errors are independent and no autocorrelation or serial
correlation is observed.

Figure A6.1.2 is a scatter plot that test for heteroscedasticity. If the standardised errors on the y axis
can be seen to be associated with standardised predicted values on the x, we can conclude that part
of the error term is influencing the deterministic part of the model. This is not the case. Therefore,
the model meets the assumption of homoscedasticity.
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Figure A6.1A – Line Graph of Regression Residuals – Model 1a (IRSD + ATSI + Assisted Needs)

Figure A6.1B – Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 1a (IRSD
+ ATSI + Assisted Needs)

Figure A6.1.C shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and
Figure A6.1.D is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).
It can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally
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distributed.
Figure A6.1.C– Histogram of regression residuals– Model 1a (IRSD + ATSI + Assisted Needs)

Figure A6.1.D – Normal P-P plot of regression standardised residuals– Model 1a (IRSD + ATSI +
Assisted Needs)
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As an alternative to Model 1a, Model 1b, adds in the out-of-pocket costs variable and removes the
Assisted Needs. Table A6.1.3 shows that in regression Model 1b containing IRSD, ATSI, out-of-pocket
costs, that all these variables are significant linear predictors of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score.
Furthermore, the regression model is significant as denoted by the F value and Sig values in the
ANOVA (analysis of variance) part of the table. The Model Summary section of the table indicates
via the coefficient of determination (the R-square 0.632) that the model with these variables
explains 63.2% of the variation in the DEA Allocative efficiency scores or 61.9% when adjusted for
the three independent variables.

Table A6.1.3 –Regression Model 1b (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

In contrast to Model 1a, where there is a suggestion of multicollinearity via the VIF statistics, the
values in model 1b are clear enough to avoid any inference. Model 1b also meets all the required
regression assumptions. Proof is now presented.

The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 1.949 in Table A6.1.3 is demonstrating the model exhibits no autoserial correlations. As per the previous section as d (1.949)>1.6990 (the critical value from the
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Durbin Watson table), the 𝐻0 is not rejected and the residuals are independent. In addition, Figure
A6.1.E shows a line graph of regression unstandardized residuals. Between case numbers there is no
discernible pattern of association so independence for the errors can be confirmed and therefore
there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation observed.

Figure A6.1E – Line Graph of Regression Residuals - Model 1b (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Figure A6.1F is a scatter plot that test for heteroscedasticity. If the standardised errors on the y axis
can be seen to be associated with standardised predicted values on the x, we can conclude that part
of the error term is influencing the deterministic part of the model. This is not the case. Therefore,
the model meets the assumption of homoscedasticity.
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Figure A6.1G– Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 1b (IRSD
+ ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Figure A6.1H shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and
Figure A6.1J is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).
It can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally
distributed.
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Figure A6.1H – Histogram of regression residuals– Model 1b (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Figure A6.1J – Normal P-P plot of regression standardised residuals– Model 1b (IRSD + ATSI + Outof-pocket Costs)

It can therefore be concluded that both models 1a and 1b are robust and parsimonious options to
represent the HORSt regression. Similar analysis is now presented for other regression models that
consider the other three SEIFA indices.
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A6.2 Regression Model 2 IRSAD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs + Assisted Needs
Preliminary regression modelling with the inclusion of the IRSAD SEIFA index included ATSI, out-ofpocket costs ALL and Assisted Needs. Doing so is a logical extension to the results of the analysis
conducted to first model. Results are shown in Table A6.2.1.
Table A6.2.1 – Preliminary Independent Variable Assessment Regression Model 2 using IRSAD as
the SEIFA index

Table A6.2.1 shows that there is again a potential problem of multicollinearity between the SEIFA
index IRSD and Assisted Needs, VIFs being 5.826 and 3.934 respectively. Moreover, Assisted Needs
(sig .379>0.05) is not a significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score in a
regression also including IRSAD, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs.

Model 2a explores the removal of out-of-pocket costs to see whether or doing so would contribute
to Assisted Needs being a significant predictor. Table A6.2.2 is a summary of this model and shows
that this is not the case with Assisted Needs (sig .211>0.05) also being a non-significant linear
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predictor in regression containing IRSAD and ATSI. Also, in this model there is very little change in
the VIFs for the IRSAD and Assisted Needs. Given these issues surrounding the Assisted Needs
variable an alternative model is now pursued replacing Assisted Needs with out-of-pocket costs.

Table A6.2.2 –Regression Model 2a (IRSAD + ATSI + Assisted Needs)

Table A6.2.2 is a summary of Model 2b, which consists of the IRSAD, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs
variables. All of these variables when combined in a regression are significant linear predictors of
the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score. This model meets all the requirements of robust regression.
The regression model itself is significant as per the F statistic in the ANOVA section. There is no
indication of multicollinearity as per the VIFs. This model explains 62% of the variation in the DEA
Allocative Efficiency scores, 60.6% adjusted for the number of independent variables included. Proof
of model 2b meeting all the other regression assumptions for robust regression is now presented.

The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 1.984 in Table A6.2.3 is demonstrating the model exhibits no autoserial correlations. As per the previous section as d 1.984>1.6990 (the critical value from the Durbin
Watson table), the 𝐻0 is not rejected and the residuals are independent. In addition, Figure A6.2A
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shows a line graph of regression unstandardized residuals. Between case numbers there is no
discernible pattern of association so independence for the errors can be confirmed and therefore
there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation observed.
Table A6.2.3 – Regression Model 2b (IRSAD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Figure A6.2B is a scatter plot that test for heteroscedasticity. There is no discernible pattern to
indicate any association with standardised predicted values on the x axis with the regression
residuals on the y axis so we can conclude that the model meets the assumption of
homoscedasticity.

Figure A6.2C shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and
Figure A6.2D is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).
It can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally
distributed.

It can therefore be concluded that regression Model 2b containing IRSAD, ATSI and out-of-pocket
costs is a robust and parsimonious option for the HORSt regression.
Page 308

Figure A6.2A– Line Graph of Regression Residuals -Model 2b (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Figure A6.2B – Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 2b (IRSD
+ ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)
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Figure A6.2C – Histogram of regression residuals– Model 2b (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Figure A6.2D – Normal P-P plot of regression standardised residuals– Model 2b (IRSD + ATSI + Outof-pocket Costs)
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A6.3 Regression Model 3 IER + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs + Assisted Needs
Preliminary regression modelling with the inclusion of the IER SEIFA index included ATSI, out-ofpocket costs ALL and Assisted Needs. Results are shown in Table A6.3.1. Assisted Needs (sig .645>
0.05) in a regression model containing IER, ATSI, out-of-pocket costs is a non-significant linear
predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores. Whilst this is similar to the previous modelling
conducted with IRSD and IRSAD, there appears however to be no preliminary indications of
multicollinearity given the VIFs. Aligned to the previous modelling logic, two further iterations of
modelling were conducted with IER:
1. Model 3a containing IER, ATSI and Assisted Needs summarised in Table A6.3.2; and
2. Model 3b containing IER, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs, presented and analysed in
chapter 6 page 211. This is the preferred model for the HORSt).
Table A6.3.1 – Preliminary Independent Variable Assessment Regression Model 3 using IER as the
SEIFA index

Table A6.3.2 shows that Assisted Needs (sig .438 > 0.05) in a model with IER and ATSI is a nonsignificant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency score.
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Table A6.3.2 –Regression Model 3a (IER + ATSI + Assisted Needs)

A6.4 Regression Model 4 IEO + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs + Assisted Needs
Consistent with analysis of the previous modelling, preliminary regression modelling with the
inclusion of the IEO SEIFA index included ATSI, out-of-pocket costs ALL and Assisted Needs. Results
are shown in Table A6.4.1. Assisted Needs (sig .931> 0.05) in a regression model containing IEO,
ATSI, out-of-pocket costs is a non-significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores.
IEO (sig .096>0.05) in a regression model containing ATSI, out-of-pocket costs and Assisted Needs
was also found to be a non-significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores.

There appears be no preliminary indications of multicollinearity given the VIFs.

Whilst the

preliminary four variable model indicated non significance of IEO with the three other variables, IEO
was pursued in further modelling aligned to the previous modelling logic. As such two further
iterations of modelling were conducted with IEO:
1. Model 4a containing IEO, ATSI and Assisted Needs summarised in Table A6.4.1; and
2. Model 4b containing IEO, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs summarised in Table A6.4.2.
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Table A6.4.1– Preliminary Independent Variable Assessment Regression Model 4 using IEO as the
SEIFA index

Model 4a presented in Table A6.4.2 shows that in this model IEO is a significant linear predictor of
the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score, although Assisted Needs is not.

Table A6.4.3 shows that in Model 4b, IEO, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs are significant linear
predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score. This model meets all the requirements of robust
regression. The regression model itself is significant as per the F statistic in the ANOVA section.
There is no indication of multicollinearity as per the VIFs. This model explains 61% of the variation in
the DEA Allocative Efficiency scores, 59.6% adjusted for the number of independent variables
included.

Proof of this model (4b) meeting all the other regression assumptions for robust

regression is now presented.
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Table A6.4.2 –Regression Model 4a (IEO + ATSI + Assisted Needs)

The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 2.026 in Table A6.4.3 is demonstrating the model exhibits no autoserial correlations. As per the previous section as d 2.026>1.6990 (the critical value from the Durbin
Watson table), the 𝐻0 is not rejected and the residuals are independent. In addition, Figure A6.4A
shows a line graph of regression unstandardized residuals. Between case numbers there is no
discernible pattern of association so independence for the errors can be confirmed and therefore
there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation observed.
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Table A6.4.3 –Regression Model 4b (IEO + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)

Figure A6.4A– Line Graph of Regression Residuals - Model 4b (IEO + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs)
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Figure A6.4B is a scatter plot that test for heteroscedasticity. There is no discernible pattern to
indicate any association with standardised predicted values on the x axis with the regression
residuals on the y axis so we can conclude that the model meets the assumption of
homoscedasticity.

Figure A6.4C shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and
Figure A6.4D is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).
It can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally
distributed.

It can therefore be concluded that regression Model 4b containing IEO, ATSI and Out-of-pocket Costs
ALL is a robust and parsimonious option for the HORSt regression.

Figure A6.4B – Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 4b (IEO
+ ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs ALL)
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Figure A6.4C – Histogram of regression residuals– Model 4b (IEO + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs ALL)

Figure A6.4C– Normal P-P plot of regression standardised residuals– Model 4b (IEO + ATSI + Outof-pocket Costs ALL)
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APPENDIX 7

SUMMARY OF KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL TESTS

APPLIED TO THE HORST REGRESSION ANALYSIS
A7.1

Linear and additivity relationship

The outcome / dependent variable should have a significant linear relationship to the independent /
predictor variables. Further, where there are multiple predictors their combined effects best
describe the linear relationship when added together. Independent variables that are found to not
have a linear statistical correlation with the dependent variable are unreliable predictors and require
elimination from the regression analysis (Field 2013, p. 309).

The literature indicates that scatter plots can be used to assess this assumption for the individual
predictors and the dependent variable (Field 2013, pp. 309-11). In addition, the Pearson’s coefficient of correlation, known as Pearson’s r, provides an indication of any bivariate linear
relationship with the dependent variable and amongst variables themselves (Lind et al. 2013, p.
394). Pearson’s r is outlined in equation A7.1. This test shows the direction of the association as
positive or negative and the statistical strength of the correlation as an absolute value between 0
and 1: 1 being perfect linear correlation; 0 indicating no linear relationship whatsoever (Babbie et al.
2018, pp. 245-6).

Equation A7.1 - Pearson’s r – coefficient of correlation

𝑟=

𝑁Σxy − (Σx)(Σy)
√([𝑁Σ𝑥 2 − (Σx)2 ][𝑁Σ𝑦 2 − (Σy)2 ])

where N = number of pairs
𝛴𝑥 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑥 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝛴𝑦 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝛴𝑥 2 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑥 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝛴𝑦 2 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝛴𝑥𝑦 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠
(Lind et al. 2013, p. 397).
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SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017) will be used with the HORSt data in Chapter Four to generate
scatter plots and a matrix of bivariate correlations between potential independent variables and the
dependent variable using the Pearson’s R coefficient of correlation.

A7.2

Multivariate normality

In regression analysis the vertical distances between the data points and the regression model are
known as residuals or errors. This is illustrated by example in Figure 14 by the distances of the blue
data points vertically above and below the red regression model line. It is an important assumption
for the regression that these residuals are random and are normally distributed with a mean of zero
(where zero implies zero distance to the regression line).

Non-normally distributed residuals can

invalidate confidence intervals and tests of significance for the predictor variables (Field 2013, p.
311). Importantly it is the distribution of regression residuals that need to meet this assumption and
not the distribution of the predictor variables themselves. As such SPSS software will be used to
generate a histogram and normal probability plot of the regression standardised residuals. These
area the standard procedures required to test this assumption (Perera 2017, p. 137).

The following examples show a histogram (Figure A7.2a) and probability plot (Figure A7.2b) when
indicating multivariate normality. Figure A7.2a is indicative of a normal distribution bell curve and
Figure A7.2b is indicative of the data points close to the ideal diagonal line, whereas discussed above
the residuals are random and are normally distributed with a mean around zero. Both graphs will be
produced for the HORSt data in Chapter Six to assess multivariate normality.
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Figure A7.2a

Example histogram of multivariate normality of regression standardized residuals
Histogram example
Dependent Variable X

Frequency

Regression Standardized Residual

Figure A7.2 adapted from (Perera 2017, p. 141).
Figure A7.2b

Example probability plot illustrating multivariate normality of regression

standardized residuals
Example of Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable X

Expected
Cumulative
Probability

Observed Cumulative Probability

Figure A7.2b adapted from (Perera 2017, p. 142).
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A7.3

No or little multicollinearity

Multicollinearity occurs when some of the predictor variables in the model are highly correlated with
each other. This creates a problem in that it can become difficult to isolate the individual effect of
these explanatory variables on the dependent variable. In such cases the regression coefficients for
the correlated variables may fluctuate, depending on which variables are included in the regression.
More seriously multicollinearity can diminish the accuracy of the coefficients, which weakens the
statistical power of the regression model (Frost 2017b; Ott 1988, p. 492).

The Pearson’s R statistic previously discussed, showing correlation coefficient values between 0 and
1 can logically be used to assess the correlations between pairs of independent variables, with
coefficient values closer to 1 (perfect correlation) being indicative of strong correlations, with a
general rule that correlations between -0.70 and 0.70 are not likely to be problematic (Lind et al.
2013, p. 466). However, a precise test, known as the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) shown in
equation A7.3 is useful in diagnosing multicollinearity.

Equation A7.3 - Variance Inflation Factor
𝑉𝐼𝐹 =

1
1 − 𝑅𝑗2

where 𝑅𝑗2 is the coefficient of determination from a regression equation where the selected
independent variable to test for multicollinearity is used as a dependent variable and the remaining
independent variables are included as independent variables (Lind et al. 2013, p. 466).

According to Field (2013, p. 325) there is no precise threshold for when VIF determines a problem
with multicollinearity. For example a VIF greater than 10 according to some literature is considered
to be unsatisfactory (Lind et al. 2013, p. 466; Marquardt 1980; Myers 1990, p. 370), whilst other
literature suggest that a VIF greater than 5 is problematic (Snee 1973), whilst less than 5 is perfectly
satisfactory (Frost 2017b). Moreover, Bowerman and O'Connell (1990); Field (2013, p. 886) argue if
the average VIF of the independent variables are greater than 1 in a regression multicollinearity may
be biasing the model.

Hamburg and Young (1994, p. 528) assert that if a suspected collinear variable is deleted from a
regression and the R2 increases the deletion is justified. This approach will be adopted for the HORSt
assessment of multicollinearity using SPSS software V24, considering the VIF values for independent
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variables below a value of 5 and whether or not the effect on the coefficient of determination (R2) by
considering their deletion increases.

A7.4

Homoscedasticity

This assumption requires that the spread of errors (residuals) in a regression model is constant
across the range of values the regression model predicts.

Homoscedasticity is required for the

regression as the predictive relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable
should not be constrained amongst a limited range of the independent values. If the model has an
inconsistent spread of residuals that increase with the predicted values of the dependent variable,
the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated and heteroscedasticity exists. The presence of
heteroscedasticity makes the predictive purpose of the regression untrustworthy (Hair et al. 2010, p.
74; Lind et al. 2013, p. 465).

The HORSt regression will utilise SPSS V24 software to produce scatterplots of the regression
standardised residuals and the standardized predicted values so as to map patterns in the data that
can reveal whether or not the spread of the residuals increase with increases in the predicted value.
Doing so is a valid test for the homoscedasticity assumption being met (Perera 2017, pp. 9/13-9/5).
Figure A7.4 is an example of two scatter plots showing homoscedasticity on the left-hand side and
heteroscedasticity on the right-hand side. Note that for heteroscedasticity as the regression fitted
values increase the residuals increase too.

Figure A7.4

Example scatter plots of regression standardised residuals and standardized

predicted values (fitted values)

Example of scatter plot indicating
heteroscedasticity

Standardized Residuals

Standardized Residuals

Example of scatter plot indicating
homoscedasticity

Standardized predicted values

Standardized predicted values

Figure A7.4 adapted from: (Analytics Vidhya Content Team 2016).
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A7.5

No serial or auto-correlation

A key assumption for the regression is that successive residuals should be independent of each other
(Lind et al. 2013, p. 468). If this is violated residuals may be influencing one another, causing the
predictive power of the regression to be questionable (Hamburg & Young 1994, p. 529). In the case
of time series data, which is not going to be used for the HORSt, auto correlation can be a significant
issue, where data in one-time period may not be too dissimilar to data in the next and so forth
(Berenson et al. 2013). Moreover, serial correlation can arise in non-time series data, whereby
adjacent residuals are correlated (Field 2013).

There are two standard approaches to assessing whether or not serial or auto correlations are
present in a regression. The first involves the use of the Durbin-Watson statistic shown in equation
A7.5 and subject to hypothesis testing. The second involves analysing the pattern of unstandardized
residuals to see whether or not adjacent residuals defy the assumption of independence. Both will
be used to check the HORSt regression in Chapter Four using SPSS Software V24. These approaches
are now outlined.

Equation A7.5 – Durbin-Watson (d) statistic

𝑑=

𝑛
Σ𝑖=2
(𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖−1 )2
𝑛
Σ𝑖=2
𝑢𝑖2

where: 𝑑 = 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑛 − 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑖
𝑢𝑖−1 = 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑖
(Hamburg & Young 1994, p. 529)

To understand the operation of the Durbin-Watson statistic, Berenson et al. (2013, p. 434) outline
from equation 7 that:


𝑛
“the numerator, 𝛴𝑖=2
(𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖−1 )2 is the squared difference between two successive

residuals summed from the second to nth values;


𝑛
the denominator, 𝛴𝑖=2
𝑢𝑖2 is the sum of the squared residuals;



where successive residuals are positively auto/ serial correlated the value of d will approach
0;
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where successive residuals are negatively auto/ serial correlated the value of d will approach
will be greater than 2 or approach its maximum value of 4; and



where the residuals are not correlated the value of d will be close to 2.”

In order to interpret whether or not values either side of 2 are significant to conclude positive or
negative auto/ serial correlation, or no correlation, critical values are found from the Durbin-Watson
tables (Savin & White 1977) showing a level of statistical significance (α), the sample size (n) and
upper (𝑑𝑈 ) and lower (𝑑𝐿 ) critical values (Berenson et al. 2013, p. 435; Perera 2017, pp. 131-2).

Once calculated and the tabular critical upper and lower values are obtained the Durbin-Watson
statistic is used in hypothesis testing whereby:
𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝐻0 : 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝐻𝐴 : 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
The determining criteria for the hypothesis testing are:


If 𝑑 < 𝑑𝐿 𝑂𝑅 (4 − 𝑑) < 𝑑𝐿

reject the null hypothesis, conclude that there is positive

autocorrelation;


If 𝑑 > 𝑑𝑈 𝑂𝑅 (4 − 𝑑) > 𝑑𝑈 do not reject the null hypothesis, conclude the residuals are
independent; and



If 𝑑𝐿 < 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑈 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝐿 > (4 − 𝑑) > 𝑑𝑈 , the test is inconclusive.

Note: the value of 4 above in the three criteria denotes the maximum value of the Durbin-Watson
statistic.
(Berenson et al. 2013, pp. 434-5; Hamburg & Young 1994, p. 530; Perera 2017, pp. 131-2)

A secondary method for the HORSt to check for auto-serial correlation will be a simple line plot of
the residuals (Perera 2017, p. 131). Figure A7.5 below which show an example where there is no
discernible pattern of association between the adjacent residuals and no auto-serial correlation.
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Figure A7.5

Examples of Line graph of residuals to detect auto-serial correlation

Figure A7.5, is Figure 9-14 from (Perera 2017, p. 131).
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